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Introduction.  
Global Studies in Different Dimensions 
 
 
A Google search of the word ‘globalization’ produces 11 million hits. This means that the 
processes of globalization have become universal. But at the same time, despite the ever-
increasing flow of publications on globalization, our understanding and knowledge of it 
still leaves much to be desired. Especially it concerns the global processes in general, of 
which globalization is a part. The development of an adequate system of scientific views 
on global processes and their possible consequences remains a very important task.  
In short, against the background of increasing globalization we confront an acute lack of 
knowledge in this area. 
We also need to systematize our ideas about globalization and Global Studies to some-
how fit the realities. In particular, this concerns the education process because the current 
state of the education will determine the way people will perceive reality in the forthcom-
ing decades. It is well known that many of the stereotypes laid in youth work throughout 
the lifetime. 
This yearbook is the third in the series with a common title Globalistics and Global-
ization Studies. However, why Globalistics, not Global Studies? As we explained earlier, 
the notion of Globalistics first appeared in Russia, this is a translation of the Russian term 
globalistika; however, we believe it might be useful within the English Global Studies the-
saurus. We are sure that the introduction of this term is justifiable, because it expresses  
the vision of systemic and epistemological unity of global processes, the presence of some 
relatively autonomous field with its own research subject. Morphologically this term is iden-
tical with such well-established designations of academic disciplines as Economics, Linguis-
tics, Physics, and so on (for more details see Grinin, Ilyin, and Korotayev 2012, 2013). 
This yearbook has the following subtitle: Aspects & Dimensions of Global Views. This 
means that we continue to consider globalization and Global Studies in different dimen-
sions and aspects: philosophical, methodological, and pedagogical, in terms of various 
processes, problems and perspectives. In this respect the third issue of our yearbook con-
tinues the tradition outlined by its first and second issues (Grinin, Ilyin, and Korotayev 
2012, 2013). 
To some extent, of course, this means that this yearbook presents rather diverse mate-
rials. But globalization itself is diverse either. And its comprehension may proceed in the 
framework of different theoretical approaches and points of view.  
Some articles presented in this anthology have already been published in various 
academic periodicals and almanacs (though some of them are published here for the first 
time). 
The volume is subdivided into four parts. 
Part 1 (Philosophy of Globalization and Methodology of Global Studies) comprises 
articles analyzing such extremely important dimensions as philosophical and methodo-
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logical ones. The articles in this section also address the problems of global research on 
the theory of the state and international relations and some other topical issues.  
Part 2 (Global and Regional Relations and Processes) comprises articles that con-
sider various interrelations between global and regional processes. Note that at present the 
study of interaction of global, regional and local processes is one of the most important ar-
eas of Global Studies.  
Part 3 (Global Trends and Perspectives) contains articles that address some of the 
most important processes and problems of the present-day world, such as inequality, 
global aging, energy resources, geopolitics, and provide forecasts for the next decade, par-
ticularly in relation to the economies of developing countries, especially such as China and 
India. 
Part 4 (Teaching Global Studies) is devoted to pedagogical issues. As we promised in 
the previous issue, we continue publishing some materials devoted to the teaching of 
Global Studies. As we wrote earlier, we regard the realm of teaching as a special dimen-
sion of Global Studies. The publication of various Global Studies curricula and courses for 
university students who learn to see the world in its entirety and variety is immensely im-
portant as the contents of such courses may determine how the world will be compre-
hended by those people who may decide its fate in a decade or two. The publication of 
various materials that reflect global pedagogical experience of teaching of Global Studies 
is also very important against the background of scarcity of such publications.  
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Part I. PHILOSOPHY OF GLOBALIZATION  
AND METHODOLOGY OF GLOBAL STUDIES 
 
Global Knowledge Revolution 
 
Ilya V. Ilyin and Arkadi D. Ursul 
 
 
Today all spheres of human activity undergo global revolutionary transforma-
tions. We can speak not only about the era of globalization but also about some-
thing like a global intellectual revolution. Two interconnected processes take 
place, one of which is globalization of knowledge, while the other represents 
global knowledge establishment. The authors want to determine the place of the 
exploration of global processes in modern science, to build a common vision and 
to estimate the prospects for Global Studies. One can speak about possible for-
mation of global knowledge that may become a basis for the whole globalized 
science and education of the twenty-first century and may be used in global 
practical activities aimed at survival of civilization and preservation of bio-
sphere and geosphere. 
Keywords: globalization, Globalistics, Global Studies, global knowledge, global 
education, global intellectual revolution, global processes, global evolutionism, 
interdisciplinary science. 
There is a growing understanding in academic literature nowadays that we live in the era 
of globalization and global intellectual revolution. The term ‘global’ even appears in eve-
ryday life, expressing a new view on the surrounding world which is already perceived as 
global. So it is important to study the way science reflects the global situation that has 
emerged and become the focus of our life. What are the typical processes of scientific 
cognition that should be involved in the current and upcoming global changes? In fact, 
since the last century, science has got interested in global phenomena of various kinds, but 
new academic disciplines and research areas focused on global matters emerged mainly in 
the second half of the twentieth century.  
Emergence and development of Globalistics and other fields of Global Studies turned 
out to be a natural academic response to global challenges of the twentieth and the early 
twenty-first century. Realizing the important role of globalization and other universal, 
planetary phenomena and understanding prospects for further progress of global activities 
became an important sphere of academic inquiry and a new stage of modern science de-
velopment. The Global Studies discipline already becomes the leading academic and edu-
cational process and serves as one of the bases for modern scientific worldview. A clearly 
marked and intensive process of globalization of science is taking place; all spheres of 
human activities undergo a certain global revolutionary transformation.  
Therefore, a very important objective of Global Studies is to define its own position 
and role not only within modern but, most important, within future science. For this pur-
pose it is necessary to reveal the evolutionary megatrends gaining global dimension and 
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prospects. Another goal, at least of the same importance (if not more), consists in defining 
the role of global processes in society and nature, and in the processes of their evolution 
and co-evolution. A number of publications make an impression that, for example, global-
ization suddenly emerged and came to existence as if it had not been just a part, though an 
important one, of social and socionatural interactions and development processes. This 
brings about the ideas of one global process generating another global phenomenon, while 
their social and natural environment appears to be passive as regards this global genesis 
that seems ‘autonomous’.  
The perception and research of global phenomena is also important for further crea-
tion of high humanitarian and social technologies for education, international activities, 
global politics and global economy to form a global technological pattern of information 
society striving for sustainable growth. Since at present, no forms and models of global 
education are elaborated and effective enough to be taken as an example to follow it is 
particularly important to use the results of Global Studies in education. Therefore, the ne-
cessity arises to identify more clearly the place of global processes in science, to form 
a common view on the world educational process, to estimate Global Studies prospects 
and work out a common conception of global education. 
So the further development of increasing global focus of science has not only scien-
tific and research aspects, but educational and methodological ones as well. The scientific 
and research aspects consist in a more profound perception, elaboration and prospective 
forecast of the most effective ways of development of Global Studies, and, in particular, of 
Globalistics as a new fundamental area of interdisciplinary studies that influences the proc-
ess of globalization of science in general. Educational aspects are related to scientific and 
research ones and are focused on the implementation in teaching process of new knowledge 
obtained through the scientific research. This is expressed both in the creation of special 
training courses and in the formation of global capacity in traditional courses connecting 
subject matters and methods of their research with the emergent global knowledge. 
1. Genesis of Global Worldview 
It is often suggested that global vision of the world and idea of humankind (Granin 2008: 7) 
emerged in their early and primitive forms in the Axial Age. One can hardly agree with 
this statement, since the concept of the global as covering the whole world was practically 
proved in our life and universe almost two thousand years later. Still one should take into 
consideration that ‘the scientific truth of the idea on the spherical form of the Earth’ was 
a well established fact ‘in the early sixteenth century and almost 400 years later it finally 
captured and entered the humankind's conscience’ (Vernadsky 1981: 107).  
At the same time both the recognition and the achievement of this truth needed centu-
ries-long work. Many centuries before CE, the idea of spherical form of the Earth emerged 
for the first time among the Pythagoreans. In those first concepts the idea was not con-
nected with any geographic or astronomic data. It emerged and was proved by pure geo-
metrical reasoning, by the ideas of harmony and mathematic aesthetics that were so typical 
of all doctrines of the Pythagoreans who foreran all major fundamentals of our scientific 
worldview: a sphere is the most perfect geometric figure and the Earth that holds such 
an important place in human worldview should have such form.  
By the time of Plato, that is by the early fourth century BCE, the idea of the Earth's 
spherical form had finally eliminated the previous Greek concepts of a disk-like, flat, cyl-
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inder, and endless conic form of the globe; it was underpinned by the data provided by the 
travelers and was the result of the cultural development. In the late fourth century BC, after 
a thorough examination of all contradicting statements this idea was supported by Aristotle 
and together with his ideas, spreading in the ancient world in the first century BCE, his doc-
trine about the spherical form of the Earth became an ordinary and common knowledge 
among educated people and penetrated classical literature. Many of the reasons that were 
expressed and emphasized at that time later were repeated in scientific debates in the Early 
Modern Period. These views became an impetus for the geographical discoveries and under-
pinned the ideas of searching for new unknown countries in the following centuries (Ver-
nadsky 1981: 107–108). By the way, as Vladimir Vernadsky also noted, Magellan ‘under-
took his round-the-world voyage relying on the idea of spherical form of the Earth, of which 
the Catholic Church was aware and yet blessed this voyage’ (Ibid.: 106). 
In Russia the global thinking and worldview date back to Mikhail V. Lomonosov (see 
Abylgaziev et al. 2011). One should emphasize that Lomonosov's scientific efforts were 
also the focus of Vernadsky's research after 1900 (his several works were devoted to Lo-
monosov) and as a professor of Moscow University, Vernadsky published ‘On Signifi-
cance of Lomonosov's Work in Mineralogy and Geology’ (Vernadsky 1900). Vernadsky 
noted that Lomonosov was ahead of his time with his correct estimation of the whole range 
of phenomena incomprehensible by his generation; he was in advance of his century and 
seems to be our contemporary in terms of objectives and goals of his scientific research. 
Vernadsky highly estimated Lomonosov's work ‘On Terrestrial Strata’ (Lomonosov 1949) 
and considered it a brilliant essay in geological science which provided the earliest foun-
dations of geology that did not exist as a science at that time. Lomonosov also was the first 
scholar to view the Earth as an integral whole formed under the impact of interconnected 
internal and external factors. 
Vernadsky positively estimated Lomonosov's suppositions on the mechanisms of 
earthquakes, on the ore lodes formation, their shift towards the Earth's crust breaks, on the 
origins of soils and fossil fuels, formation of amber and a number of other minerals and 
ores (Yanshina 1998) and even planned to write a work on Lomonosov's physical and 
chemical research; unfortunately, we can find only two pages with introduction under the 
title ‘On M. V. Lomonosov's Biography’ (Vernadsky 1988: 332–333). In 1927, Vernadsky 
established a special Lomonosov Commission affiliated with the Presidium of the Academy 
of Sciences. Later, in 1950–1967, thanks to the activities of the Commission, the Academy of 
Sciences published Lomonosov's complete works in ten volumes that included also all mate-
rials collected by Vernadsky's commission (Yanshina 1998: 444–451). 
Undoubtedly, some Lomonosov's ideas about the interconnection of processes and 
phenomena taking place on the Earth influenced Vernadsky's works, in particular, the for-
mation of his concepts on biosphere as a global system where the living matter plays the 
major role. One should also point that soon after his first works on Lomonosov, Vernadsky 
delivered a course of lectures in Moscow University in which he particularly addressed the 
matters of geographical discoveries and evidence of the spherical form of the Earth and 
a number of other matters that many scholars consider to relate to the origin of globaliza-
tion process. Later these lectures were published in a book on the history of science men-
tioned above (Vernadsky 1981). 
Vernadsky considered Lomonosov to be a great scientist, which were a few in the 
thousand years of human history. In the article ‘In Memory of M. V. Lomonosov’, Ver-
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nadsky wrote: ‘A number of Lomonosov's ideas are clearer, more relevant and compre-
hensible in the beginning of the twentieth century than they used to be in the middle of the 
last century’ (Vernadsky 1911: 262; 1989: 52). The same can be said about the signifi-
cance of Vernadsky's academic heritage: his ideas are clearer, more relevant and compre-
hensible in the beginning of the twenty-first century than in the last century. The scholar's 
ideas about global phenomena that were almost unnoticed earlier, are only starting to open 
out and will be realized to a full in the course of further globalization of science and ex-
pansion of global processes. It is no coincidence that Vernadsky is referred to as ‘a Lo-
monosov of the twentieth century’, but it becomes obvious that his creative contributions 
are even more relevant for the present century. Today Vernadsky is considered a great 
thinker of the global era that also can probably turn into the noosphere era. 
Many thinkers were at the origins of global worldview and created its fundamentals 
(some of them are mentioned in Alexander Chumakov's monograph [Chumakov 2013]). 
However, it was only Vernadsky who initiated the formation of a global consciousness and 
thinking as a new way and direction of environmental exploration with its own peculiari-
ties. The scholar himself in the fragment ‘On the Scientific Worldview’ stressed that ‘the 
discovery of America, the circumnavigation of Africa and discovery of Australia were of 
great significance for the scientific worldview’ (Vernadsky 1991: 195) and like other 
round-the-world voyages of the great navigators of the eighteenth century strongly influ-
enced our scientific worldview (Ibid.: 196). However, the scholar's global (planetary) per-
ception of the world was formed not only due to the globalization processes he explored, 
but also in the course of his other researches. 
In his works Vernadsky paid great attention to the formation of scientific worldview 
that, according to Mikulinsky, the editor of the book Selected Works on the History of Sci-
ence, he understood as ‘an aggregate of fundamental laws and facts discovered by science’ 
(in Vernadsky 1981: 304); like, for example, in his ‘Essays on the History of Modern Sci-
entific Knowledge’ (Ibid.: 32–185). His essays and notes on the issues of formation of sci-
entific worldview give the impression that he considered it not only from the evolutionary 
perspective, but also showed that most important scientific discoveries significantly trans-
formed the worldview, as it was with geographic discoveries. At the same time such 
worldview transformations concern the global trend of scientific understanding of the 
world as well. 
The question is: when did the global trend in science emerge? The formation of one of 
the main areas of Global Studies, Globalistics in Russia, is usually dated back to the late 
1960s – early 1970s (see Ilyin and Ursul 2013 for more details).  
However, it might be reasonable to shift the origin of Globalistics to the first half of 
the last century. In our opinion, it is reasonable to shift the emergence of the global trend 
in science, notwithstanding its specific name, to several decades earlier and set it at the 
first half of the last century. In that very time, in particular in the 1930s, Vernadsky, at that 
time the Head of Mineralogy Department and professor of Moscow University, started to 
study a number of global processes (e.g., the one we now consider globalization, though at 
that time this process was not yet denoted by the term ‘globalization’). We argue that it 
was Vernadsky who pioneered the global worldview and thinking and also founded Global 
Studies and that many of his ideas focused on the planetary area. 
The scholar started studying many processes of global character as early as in 1902–
1903, which one can deduce, in particular, from his ‘Essays on the history of the modern 
scientific world view’ (1903; see in Vernadsky 1981) and a course of lectures delivered on 
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the topic in Moscow University. However, the scholar had no time to publish these lec-
tures as a separate book, but later he included the first three of twelve lectures in the men-
tioned book (and he planned to write in total over 20 lectures) (Vernadsky 1981: 301–
303). Thus, we can suppose that the scholar started working on the global issues in the 
early twentieth century, although, his research in this area at that time was little known.  
Vernadsky believed that ‘In the twentieth century for the first time in the history of the 
Earth, the human being learned and covered the whole biosphere, completed the geographic 
map of the Earth and colonized its whole surface. The mankind became a single totality in 
the life of the Earth’ (Vernadsky 1991: 240). In his book Academic Thought as a Planetary 
Phenomenon (written in 1938) the scholar provides numerous facts and arguments similar 
to the ones of the contemporary scholars, indicating the humankind's endeavor to unity and 
integrity. In fact, in the book Vernadsky studied the globalization process and to some ex-
tent foresaw its outcomes.  
Vernadsky introduced his ‘global’ ideas, in particularly, in his Selected Works on the 
History of Science (a number of its articles and fragments were written in the beginning of 
the last century) as well as in Academic Thought as Planetary Phenomenon. According to 
A. L. Yanshin and F. T. Yanshina, the authors of the preface to the later edition of the 
book, Academic Thought is the culmination of Vernadsky's creative work ‘on the destiny 
of scientific cognition, on relations between science and philosophy and on the future of 
the humankind’ (in Vernadsky 1991: 9).  
A decade later, after World War II, the German philosopher Karl Jaspers (Jaspers 
1991: 141, 158, 205) independently from Vernadsky came to almost the same conclusions 
on the global unity of the humankind. 
We believe that it was Vernadsky who laid the ground for Global Studies both in Rus-
sia and in the world science in general and, thus, he can be rightfully considered the foun-
der of the global trend in science, notwithstanding the point that he did not use the terms 
that were introduced later (Globalistics, Global Studies, etc.). We should emphasize that 
we speak about the global trend in science that includes the whole range of already exist-
ing disciplinary, interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary studies of global processes and 
systems. But it would be precipitate to argue that the scholar laid the foundation only for 
Globalistics or another area of global science. It is rather reasonable to speak about the 
priority of his academic interests in a broader ‘global format’.  
And still in the world academic literature there is a strong adherence to terms, particu-
larly, to the term ‘globalization’. From this ‘terminological position’ the authorship of the 
term is attributed to Roland Robertson who coined it in 1983.1 In the title of one of his 
articles he uses the term ‘globality’. Later he also elaborated and explained the notion of 
‘globalization’ which he formulated as an integral conception and developed in a special 
research in 1992 (Robertson 1983, 1992). 
In this sense we can hardly believe that the global trend in science is connected mainly 
with the Club of Rome activity (Chumakov 2012: 55). Meanwhile, many Russian scholars 
suppose that terms ‘Globalistics’ and ‘Global Studies’ came into common use due to the 
global dangers, especially after the first reports of the Club of Rome. The latter undoubt-
edly played an important role in the formation of Global Studies, they turned the con-
sciousness of a significant number of scholars and society to the global issues, but even in 
Europe this was not the first ‘global’ research. In the 1950s, this role of a certain ‘transna-
                                                          
1 Here one should point that one of the authors of this work used the term ‘globalization’ in a different context earlier 
than Robertson (see, e.g., Ursul 1981: 204).  
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tional actor’ after Vernadsky and Jaspers was played by already mentioned globalists 
whose activity, including the academic one, is still little known (Ursul 1998).  
Globalism is an ideology and movement which aims at a shift from the present variety 
of peoples' activity to the unified, globally governed, integral world. Globalism as an ide-
ology (unlike its Euro-Atlantic version) represents a sum of ideas meant for peaceful set-
tlement of global issues, for establishment of institutions and adoption of norms common 
for all people on the planet. . 
At present Global Studies are turning into a high-priority trend in Social Studies that 
seeks broader interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary connections and extensions. The global 
trend in science facilitates the creation of new general scientific and universal planetary 
principals and forms of academic and global activity and makes a great contribution to 
formation of the modern scientific picture of the world and thus promoting the global gov-
ernance formation.  
2. The Subject Field of Globalistics: Expansion or Contraction? 
In the Russian academic literature Globalistics has been most often interpreted (and this 
notion was included in the first international encyclopedia on Globalistics) as an interdis-
ciplinary integrative area of academic inquiry aimed at identifying the essence of global-
ization and global issues, reasons for their emergence, laws and tendencies of their devel-
opment and reinforcement of positive and elimination of negative consequences with the 
purpose to ensure human survival and biosphere preservation (Mazour and Chumakov 
2003: 199; Chumakov 2008; see Ilyin and Ursul 2013 for more details).  
Below we will suggest an alternative and, to our mind, a more substantiate and broad 
point of view which involves the interaction between society and nature. 
One should point that process of spontaneous globalization did not start several centu-
ries ago from the geographical discoveries as is considered within Eurocentric approach. 
As Vernadsky shows, even the geographical discoveries started not with Columbus' and 
Magellan's voyages but with the Norsemen's voyages (Vernadsky 1981: 121–129). How-
ever, ‘the spherical form of the Earth could be proved only when a man got the opportunity 
to travel around the Earth and put the whole picture of the globe on a map. This was done 
slowly and gradually through centuries-long work… The solution of the issue of the form of 
the Earth was connected with the first circumnavigation’ (Ibid.: 115).  
If we look deeper in the ancient history of the humankind, the processes similar to the 
global issues may be discovered back in the Paleolithic Age and early Neolithic Age. We 
can argue that global issues in a somewhat different form also emerged earlier, when there 
was no globalization in the contemporary sense (see Ilyin and Ursul 2013 for more details). 
For example, Neolithic Revolution that started in various separated regions of the 
planet about twelve thousand years ago constituted a global evolutionary and historical 
process that facilitated survival of the mankind in that period (see Ilyin and Ursul 2013 for 
more details). 
Such examples of social and socionatural processes prove that processes of this kind 
became global from the perspective of quality and content criterion but not in terms of 
territory and geography. However, it is reasonable to define the stages of globalization and 
other global processes formation by criteria of globality: the geographical factor within 
this approach does not initiate a global process (e.g., globalization), but completes it. 
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Therefore, from the perspective of the content criterion of globality, one should shift the 
origin of globalization back to the ancient times. 
Globalistics and Global Studies may be viewed not only as academic research sphere, 
but also as global practical activity rapidly developing at present (in particular, following 
Vernadsky's ideas as a geological activity) and aimed at the above-mentioned reinforce-
ment of positive and mitigation of negative consequences of these processes for the hu-
mans and biosphere (see Ilyin and Ursul 2013 for more details).  
In general, under the influence of Globalistics many scientific areas have already 
gained their global perspective entering the academic field of Global Studies and broaden-
ing it. The typical example is Geopolitics that is not included in Globalistics (though is 
tightly connected to it), but still has already become global (Abylgaziev, Ilyin, and Kefely 
2010) (and there even may be its space continuation). Many branches of scientific knowl-
edge will follow this route getting under the influence of the ‘global attractor’ of knowl-
edge accumulation. Very soon we will face traditional branches of science getting the 
‘global’ adjective added to their names.  
The question arises: why does some academic disciplines entering interdisciplinary in-
teraction with global factors and challenges to science start to ‘merge’ with Globalistics, 
while the others just put the global prefix before already existing disciplines? We do not 
see any serious reason under this nomination phenomenon and believe that it primarily 
depends on a researcher to give this or that name. Besides, this process most often goes by 
inertia increasing the number of supporters who agree with the initial name. In any case, 
the authors of the present paper have already given such names to new branches of Global-
istics as Evolutionary Globalistics, Paleoglobalistics, Futuroglobalistics, Nooglobalistics, 
Space Globalistics and others; thus, other scholars have not argued against this. Still other 
names may be given as well, if academic community for some strong reason will not like 
the already given names. Together with further development of Globalistics the process of 
globalization of scientific knowledge has started which becomes open to an increasing num-
ber of branches of knowledge (this process will be dwelled upon in the end of this article).  
It seems that a number of such branches will not give its fields of Global Studies to the sub-
ject area of Globalistics like it has already happened to Global Economy (the name of ‘Eco-
nomic Globalistics’ is not used for this very reason). It is rather probable that even ‘Legal 
Globalistics’ that has already received its name will still change it into ‘Global Legal Stud-
ies’ or will carry on Global Studies in this direction (Ursul 2012: 8). Together with Politi-
cal Globalistics the term ‘global policy’ is also used, especially in foreign literature (An-
heier and Juergensmeyr 2012). 
Thus, two tightly connected but still different processes proceed: globalization of 
knowledge (within the framework of broadly understood Global Studies) and the estab-
lishment of global knowledge basically due to development of Globalistics proper (Ursul 
2011). During the last two decades, Globalistics has switched to the research of globaliza-
tion process giving significantly less attention to the study of global issues. If earlier the 
subject area of Globalistics included study of global issues (Dunnov 1991–1992), now the 
majority of scholars focus their efforts on study of globalization. As for other global phe-
nomena within Globalistics subject area, they remain without due attention; anyway, it 
seems that global issues and globalization constitute the main subject of research in the 
sphere of Globalistics.  
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At the same time when Globalistics was associated with global issues study, globaliza-
tion also existed and developed although in a different form, ‘unnoticed’ by many people. 
To some extent the global process that we perceive as globalization today, was reflected in 
academic literature as well (including Vernadsky's works), although this process was not 
denoted as ‘globalization’. This refers not only to Vernadsky: other scholars, for example, 
Fernand Braudel and Immanuel Wallerstein, have studied the same process from ‘their 
own perspective’. 
If Globalistics is reduced to the study of globalization alone, there will probably emerge 
some more global processes that will attract attention of the majority of scholars and then we 
will have to define the notion of Globalistics again. Or, as mentioned above, we will have to 
include all other processes of global character in the subject area of Global Studies.  
Now, in course of a discussion on globalization, a significant part of scholars concen-
trate on the social aspect, believing that globalization constitutes a megatrend to the unifi-
cation of the mankind and to the global integrity of civilization (Granin 2008: 7). How-
ever, the upcoming threat of anthropo-ecogical catastrophe reveals a necessity to solve 
a whole range of social and socionatural issues and form co-evolutionary relations be-
tween society and nature. So the future integrity of the mankind by all means should be 
combined with environmental security on the planetary scale. Globalization, from this 
point of view, is considered as a global process of forming the humankind integrity and 
simultaneous establishment of co-evolutionary relations with nature, which may be ful-
filled via global shift to sustainable development of the noosphereic trend. 
3. On the Place and Status of Global Studies in Science 
It seems we can define global processes as the processes taking place on our planet and 
showing a certain ‘global integrity’ or tending to it. In this sense, global processes are not 
just processes taking place on the Earth, but universal planetary-scale ones, which cover 
the whole planet. However, it is important to pay attention to the existing etymological 
‘dichotomy’ and linguistic ambiguity of the term ‘global’. The term ‘global’ etymologi-
cally derives from two languages but not one: Latin (globus – sphere) and French 
(global – universal, taken in general). And in modern science the term ‘global’ is used in 
these two ‘extensional’ senses: 1) global as planetary, related to the globe; and 2) global as 
comprehensive, universal, general, and in this sense it outstretches to the sum of things or 
to the whole Universe. The global processes may be interpreted within these two, ap-
proached respectively: 1) global processes as those taking place on the globe in general;  
2) global processes as those embracing the whole sum of things, at least the part of it, that 
is included in the observable universe.  
It is also worth noting that one of the early ‘model concept’ of the Universe as a cer-
tain ‘celestial globe’ in the form of celestial spheres depiction with stars and other cosmic 
objects mapped on them derives from the same Latin meaning. By the way, the already 
discovered three main forms of matter existence (dark energy, dark matter and baryonic 
matter) may also be represented in the form of interpenetrating and interconnected fields 
(spheres). 
The discovery of the spherical form of Earth was essential for the expansion of anthro-
pogenic activity and for Global Studies. As Vernadsky noted: ‘The first large main basis for 
the modern scientific worldview is the discovery of the Earth's form and size’ (Vernadsky 
1981: 104). Thus, ‘[d]ecision on the form of the Earth was connected with the first round-
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the-world journey. Incidentally, America was discovered and in addition, this extraordi-
narily expanded the horizons available to an educated person’ (Vernadsky 1981: 115).  
However, let us move from etymology to the meaning of the terms that have already 
become conventional in modern science. In the contemporary global knowledge the term 
‘global’ is used in the sense of ‘embracing’ a certain space and having a systemic integrity 
‘determined’ by this or that space (the globe, the Universe). This meaning, which we de-
note as ‘spatial globality’, is often implied when we analyze globalization processes and 
a number of other global processes. 
However, there is another meaning of the term ‘global’ which states that a given proc-
ess (object) has some universal content-related characteristic, property or parameter that 
defines absolutely all existing processes and objects. For example, all objects of baryonic 
matter have gravity or a three-dimensional space. Or all people inhabiting the planet, even 
if they are not united in a certain global and integral system, in their development have 
some general social regularities. One can say that regularities typical of all people without 
exception and their communities (societies) are also global characteristics in the sense that 
they are inherent in the whole social movement and development. 
Comparing these two meanings of the term ‘global’ (spatial and universal content-
related) we can suppose that the latter meaning of the term turns out to be more profound 
and all-embracing. If any social processes have not gained their global integrity yet, they 
by their nature still possess certain universal integral content-related properties, which in 
this case turn out to be attributive universal human characteristics. It is clear that the at-
tributive content-related qualitative criterion of globality proves to be ‘stronger’ and more 
significant than the ‘spatial and quantitative’ geographical one. Ontologically, ‘qualitative 
attributive globality’ is related to the nature and essential features of an object or process, 
to its inherent nature and qualitative content. In this sense globality, as an attribute of 
a certain tangible process or item, is its internal existential globality, while a ‘quantitative’ 
criterion appears as spatial extension of this content-related qualitative criterion. Globality 
of a certain process in the spatial sense is not persistent and this is well proved by the re-
search of globalization phenomenon. 
Thus, the important role of the term ‘global’ (‘globality’) also adds certain peculiar 
features to the global trend in science and groups almost all its cognitive means and forms. 
This specific notion influences the perception of the place and status of global processes 
research.  
Globalistics and, moreover, Global Studies turn out to be interdisciplinary fields, em-
bracing a significant number of academic disciplines and scientific research areas. And 
at the same time, there is an obvious tendency for the establishment of many notions of 
Globalistics and Global Studies as not simply interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary no-
tions, but as general scientific categories. It is also important to find out (and this is 
widely discussed) what ‘knowledge about the global’ constitutes within the modern sci-
ence: a science (in the meaning of a discipline) or something different, for example,  
a scientific trend, a scientific issue or a field of academic inquiry.  
It is worth emphasizing that Vernadsky encountered the same issues when analyzing 
the synthesis of academic disciplines exemplified by Physical Chemistry (and Chemical 
Physics) and especially Biogeochemistry (which he actually founded) (Vernadsky 1981: 
118–124). 
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On the one hand, following the ‘logic of specialization’ and differentiation in science, 
we can suppose that new disciplines (a science, a branch of science) emerged in the form 
of Globalistics and Global Studies. Scientists are already used to the fact that when new 
fields of knowledge emerge, it is reasonable to speak about a new science as a branch 
(component, unit) of science regarding the latter as an integral formation. In this case sci-
ence is understood as a separate discipline or a branch of scientific cognition. This tradi-
tion complies with the already established disciplinary organization of science, where 
a discipline acts as the most significant structural unit of science forming an invariant, rel-
atively sustainable structure of knowledge and a reference system, that allows putting in 
order the whole variety of science analysis units (Mirsky 1980; Ogurtsov 1988). Any aca-
demic discipline has its own subject areas, principals and methods of research, common 
organization institutions, educational forms and structures and also unified ways of formal 
and informal communication among scientists and between them and society. Within 
a broader and more integral system of ‘science’ a discipline usually acts as an established 
and necessary form of existence and systematization of knowledge, its development, dis-
tribution and application. 
Meanwhile, discipline and science, as Kasavin notes, are not identical notions; though 
in modern Science Studies they are rarely distinguished (Kasavin 2010). This very para-
digm of scientific thinking mostly deals with emerging fields of scientific knowledge. 
With this style of reasoning the new global trend of science in our country was named 
Globalistics while in foreign literature it is Global Studies (though in the USSR they used 
to speak about ‘Western Globalistics’).  
The question whether to call this field of study Globalistics, Global Studies or some 
other way also depends on how it is positioned in the system of scientific knowledge. It is 
possible that it is a science meaning a discipline but only in a certain general part that real-
ly integrates and generalizes most fundamental knowledge about global phenomena and is 
not clearly defined yet. For example, Globalistics also includes such sub-disciplines as 
Political Globalistics, Information Globalistics, Space Globalistics, etc., that go beyond the 
limits of a purely disciplinary vision of Globalistics, constituting a result of integrative 
interactions in scientific knowledge. Thus, Globalistics turns out to be a certain ‘centaur-
like’ disciplinary and interdisciplinary cognitive phenomenon. 
In this sense Global Studies are very much like Complexity Studies (usually denoted 
in Russia with the term ‘Synergetics’ proposed by Hermann Haken) that originated in 
Physics and at first developed within that disciplinary perspective. At the same time, ac-
cording to Elena Knyazeva, Complexity Studies achieve certain limits of their disciplinary 
expansion (Knyazeva 2011: 256). Hermann Haken insist that Synergetics [Complexity 
Studies] is a discipline and, according to him, this name is given not only because it stud-
ies joint action of many elements of systems, but also because to find general principals 
governing self-organizing cooperation of many disciplines is necessary (Klimontovich 
n.d.). And these numerous disciplines add peculiar integrity to the synergetic approach 
exactly due to the effect of synergy and consistency. 
Meanwhile, according to Stepin [n.d.], ‘interdisciplinarity and transdisciplinarity do 
not contradict the status of Synergetics [Complexity Studies] as a special discipline’. 
Stepin stresses that ‘[synergetics] should outline its subject area, identify a system of 
methodological principles of research and include them in the established system of scien-
tific knowledge’ (Stepin n.d.). 
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Similar questions or issues on the place and status of newly emerging academic phe-
nomena in science were already discussed when some other new fields of knowledge ap-
peared and their rather marked integrative potential was manifested. For example, in the 
debates on the scientific status of Cybernetics: can it be considered as a separate science 
(discipline) or a scientific trend? (Ursul 1981: 204–216) There was a view that a scientific 
trend constitutes a system of academic disciplines and issues having a rather general re-
search program that in case of Cybernetics consisted in cognition of general regularities of 
informational connection and management in biological and social spheres (Ibid.: 207). 
And most frequently one could hardly deny that Cybernetics is at the same time both 
a separate science (discipline) and interdisciplinary scientific trend. 
Globalistics and Global Studies pass through the same stages of defining their position 
in science. Globalistics, if it is considered a newly emerging academic discipline, also goes 
beyond the established disciplinary boundaries. This is usually emphasized, but many 
scholars, in accordance with disciplinary thinking, continue considering it a branch of 
knowledge – a discipline (science), which looks logically contradictory. Thus, it would be 
strange to call this academic research phenomenon an ‘interdisciplinary discipline’. But, 
probably, it should be called (taking into account that science and discipline are still not 
identical notions) an ‘interdisciplinary science’? This term is often used in Wikipedia, 
where Biochemistry and Biophysics, for example, are described as such sciences.  
The question whether the phrase ‘interdisciplinary science’ is adequate still remains 
disputable, and at the ‘competitive selection’ of the most suitable name for disciplines both 
for Globalistics and Global Studies some time should pass till this name becomes conven-
tional. But for this purpose it is necessary to prove or at least suggest as an epistemological 
hypothesis that such a centaur-like ‘disciplinary and interdisciplinary’ academic phenom-
ena may conceptually exist.   
It is worth noting that Vernadsky expressed exactly the same idea when pointing to 
Biogeochemistry as ‘most tightly connected with a certain Earth shell, biosphere and its 
biological processes in their chemical atomic manifestation’ (Vernadsky 1991: 119). He 
observed synthesis of various academic disciplines in Biogeochemistry (and mostly those 
integrated in its name that does not accurately identifies its position in the system of 
knowledge), notwithstanding that ‘as it is clearly stated in its name, chemical representa-
tions and chemical phenomena play the leading role in comparison to geological and bio-
logical matter and phenomena’ (Ibid.). However, the scholar believes that Biogeochemis-
try is a separate (complex and young) academic discipline and he repeats this many times 
in his ingenious speculations on Biogeochemistry (Ibid.: 119–122). 
While the term ‘interdisciplinary discipline’ looks logically and stylistically controver-
sial and, thus, unsuccessful and hardly applicable, the term ‘interdisciplinary science’ may, 
to some extent, get ‘a right to citizenship’. But for this end we should introduce a new con-
ceptual niche for the term ‘science’ itself that is mainly used in two meanings. The first 
meaning is science as a holistic systemic formation (regardless its gnoseological, activity-
related or other interpretation), for example, as a component of culture and different from 
other constituents. Another meaning is a separate branch or academic knowledge about the 
above mentioned holistic phenomenon (or, as Vernadsky wrote, ‘a separate science’; Ibid.: 
118). These two meanings were formed already within the framework of a disciplinary 
view on science, when integrative interdisciplinary processes did not yet have strong in-
fluences on the understanding of the term ‘science’. Within the context of the present arti-
Globalistics and Globalization Studies 18 
cle, the third interpretation may also emerge: the ‘centaur-like’ meaning of the term ‘sci-
ence’ used in the sense of ‘interdisciplinary science’. Although, in our opinion the term 
‘interdisciplinary studies’ (rather than ‘interdisciplinary sciences’) appears more appropri-
ate and common. 
Chumakov has expressed another point of view on the academic status of Globalistics. 
He believes that ‘to avoid wrong analogies and methodological confusion, it is important 
to emphasize that Globalistics should not be interpreted as a separate or special academic 
discipline as many other that emerge resulting, as a rule, from scientific knowledge differ-
entiation or at the interface of related disciplines. It results from the opposite integration 
processes typical of modern science and constitutes a area of research and cognition where 
various academic disciplines and philosophy (in close interaction and from the positions of 
each science subject and method) analyze all possible aspects of globalization and suggest 
certain solutions of global issues, viewing them as an integral system’ Chumakov 
2012: 4). This point of view (i.e., the interdisciplinary approach) differs from Cheshkov's 
opinion of that Globalistics is an aggregate of different disciplines that just have a com-
mon ‘label’, or in other words, as a multitude of different sciences (multidisciplinary ap-
proach) (Cheshkov 2008). By the way, something similar is observed in the development 
of global education as well, where the debates take place on the status of Global Studies 
and the set of related educational disciplines. 
When we speak about Globalistics and Global Studies, the multidisciplinarity and 
polydisciplinarity of these fields of scientific cognition are rather obvious, for they include 
knowledge from various disciplines (and here the analogy is obvious with Biogeochemis-
try considered by Vernadsky). Polydisciplinarity implies the participation of a number of 
sciences in work on a certain issue, in this case global issues and processes, but at the 
same time sciences (disciplines) included in its subject area may only adjoin each other 
without serious interaction or synthesis. However, in fact many researchers of global phe-
nomena argue not only about polydisciplinarity, but also about multidisciplinarity of this 
research area, because they include intersection and interaction of a number of sciences 
(disciplines or branches of scientific knowledge). The interdisciplinary studies are usually 
understood as a way to arrange academic activity that suggests cooperation between repre-
sentatives of different disciplines in the study of the same objects, and even a certain form 
of their integration. Globalistics and Global Studies undoubtedly constitute such a form or 
way of scientific research.  
In our opinion, a typical peculiarity of such new researches is that in a certain sense, 
mainly in theoretical and methodological one, such researches have a certain disciplinary 
status, as they emerged not only within science integration, but differentiation as well. 
Even having emerged as a result of synthesis, such an academic form of knowledge still 
turns out to be in a certain sense separated from everything else, including the knowledge 
it derived from. Vernadsky noted this, arguing that ‘the matter that outstretched beyond 
the boundaries of one science inevitably creates new areas of knowledge, new sciences 
growing in number and speed of their emergence typical of the academic thought of the 
twentieth century’ (Vernadsky 1991: 118). 
The differentiation of Globalistics and Global Studies is, from a certain perspective,  
a process of science specialization and differentiation; the distinct field of academic re-
search differentiated from already existing knowledge, from academic disciplines that ex-
isted before its emergence. But the emerging special global knowledge also possesses 
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a certain interdisciplinary and integrative potential. Interdisciplinarity and transdisciplinar-
ity of Globalistics does not contradict its disciplinary status, but, in order that it could have 
the status of a discipline, some necessary conditions should exist (and they do exist). 
Before interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary potential and status appear in any newly 
emerged science (discipline) it is important that all basic notions and conceptual ideas of 
a new distinct academic discipline should turn broad enough and, due to this, start their 
expansion within academic knowledge. Meanwhile, the broader ideas and notions of a new 
area of academic inquiry are, the higher probability it has to gain interdisciplinary and 
transdisciplinary status. And if a new separated research area in its conceptual field re-
mains within the framework of the original discipline, it will continue developing along 
the path of specialization within already existing sphere of researches. Therefore, only 
those new special studies are destined to have an interdisciplinary status that contain in 
their theoretical stock broader and more fundamental ideas and notions than the ones used 
before. 
However, in this case the interdisciplinarity often transforms into transdisciplinarity 
(the term was introduced by Piaget in 1970), which is a very important form (way) for sci-
ence to get its integrity that Karl Marx dreamed of. The transdisciplinarity suggests that 
a certain area of science goes beyond disciplinary boundaries. It proposes to use universal 
forms and methods of academic research beyond the framework of a particular discipline 
in the course of interdisciplinary interactions. At first the transdicsiplinary notions, meth-
ods and theories emerged as a summary of certain disciplinary concepts and cognitive 
schemes, mainly in Physics, Chemistry, Biology and Mathematics. By the way, Mathemat-
ics represents a classical example of a discipline manifesting its transdisciplinary opportu-
nities when entering the system of academic disciplines. Another example of transdiscipli-
narity is philosophy of science that penetrated many disciplines due to its methodological 
tools. The cognitive transdisciplinary forms and research tools at first develop within 
a discipline, then separate from its source and develop their own theoretical basis tested in 
other fields of knowledge. 
There is a ‘historical difference’ of Globalistics from Global Studies and many other 
academic disciplines that has been mentioned above and in Chumakov's work: it ‘consists 
in the fact that understanding of the global tendencies and principal solution of the issues 
generated by them requires not only theoretical research, but also corresponding effective 
practical activity. Thus, Globalistics objectively plays a worldview-related and integrative 
role in the sphere of science and practice, making many scholars, politicians and commu-
nity leaders develop a new perception of the modern world and realize their involvement 
in the common destiny of the humankind. Globalization and issues it generates leave the 
humankind no other choice but to unitу in order to overcome separation and controversies, 
possibly preserving uniqueness of cultures, centuries-old traditions and fundamental val-
ues of separate nations and peoples. But such a unity and coherence may be provided only 
by adequate understanding of processes and events taking place in the modern world, 
whose knowledge is worked out and articulated in Globalistics, where closest aims and 
long-term prospects are viewed in tight interaction’ (Chumakov 2012: 8). However, this 
peculiarity of Globalistics (unlike Global Studies), as it has been mentioned, is also typical 
of a number of other interdisciplinary integrative trends, for example, space exploration, 
information science, etc. which also constitute a combination of academic research and 
certain practical experience.  
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4. Globalization of Science 
Speaking about globalization of science (this term has been recently used rather often), 
there are abundant publications on academic mobility, brain drain from some countries to 
other, distribution of scientific knowledge around the world, publications and citation, use 
of new information technologies, international academic cooperation and formation of 
international academic organizations (often for solution of global issues) that facilitate 
globalization of science (Allakhverdyan, Semenov, and Yurkevich 2009). Vernadsky con-
sidered these issues when he dreamed of a powerful global academic organization (and 
even an ‘academic think-tank’ of the whole mankind) and grounded the necessity of vari-
ous forms of international cooperation and scholars' organization as an important element 
of the noosphere establishment process (Vernadsky 1995: 124; 1977: 68). Further we are 
going to reveal the major trends of globalization of science due to Global Studies devel-
opment. 
Globalization of science manifests itself in various fields and areas. Particularly, it is 
expressed in the study of global characteristics and properties of research objects that were 
absent in ‘pre-globalization period’ or have not been realized yet. The process of filling 
science with global content, which we denote as a globalization of scientific knowledge, is 
mainly reflected in the emergence and development of Globalistics and Global Studies in 
the broadest sense creating the global world of knowledge. The further establishment of 
these studies was accompanied with the process of globalization of scientific knowledge, 
that covers a widening range of areas and branches of scientific knowledge adding the 
‘global’ adjective to the names of certain academic disciplines and matters.   
Development of Globalistics and Global Studies constitutes a significant part of the 
general process of globalization of science. The latter is to some extent similar to the in-
fluence of Mathematics, but it is not that significant yet. ‘Global seedling’ in this or that 
branch of science or problem may appear spontaneously, often even regardless of the re-
sults of global researches, and sometimes they may fail to trigger global trends and areas 
of research. Thus, science may gradually get ‘saturated’ with some, probably yet insignifi-
cant, scientific knowledge resulting in significant global transformations like establish-
ment of a new global discipline or area of academic inquiry. 
One can speak about the global world of knowledge in connection with pervasive pro-
cesses of globalization and establishment of information society as well as of ‘knowledge 
society’ as an extension of the mentioned globalization process. It is quite clear that under 
globalization distribution of knowledge (including academic one) around the planet takes 
place as well as the formation of a peculiar type of knowledge that is defined as global 
knowledge. Rather often these processes are not distinguished (this also applies to proc-
esses of globalization of education and establishment of global education). However, it is 
reasonable to distinguish them, because, though they are interconnected, they are still dif-
ferently focused processes of social activity and mainly academic activity. 
In the course of establishment of information society and knowledge society there oc-
cur globalization of cognitive activity and this gives rise to different forms of transforming 
and integrating knowledge; thus, a certain global system of knowledge is formed that may 
be called the global world of knowledge. Naturally, this means that a general access to 
knowledge should form the basis of the shift to knowledge society (Towards Knowl-
edge… 2005). As the German scholars Stehr and Ufer demonstrate, this process under 
market economy is very complicated; therefore, the establishment of the global knowledge 
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society turns out to be rather difficult (Conception… 2010: 178–185). In this process only 
a small part of knowledge has chances to obtain the global status, but a very large part of 
knowledge still faces difficulties that impede the movement to the global level. These 
forms (kinds) of knowledge never lose their local character, though there are situations 
when this character starts changing, while gaining universal global features (Ibid.: 191).  
Further evolution of Global Studies will proceed both through ‘globalization’ of cur-
rently existing academic disciplines, trends and issues and through the development of 
Globalistics together with other areas of academic inquiry globalizing to some extent. Due 
to development of Global Studies and other global phenomena, science will gain its sys-
temic and planetary integrity, and scientific knowledge will become available to scientists 
all around the planet. 
It can also be stated that such rather obvious and important process of globalization of 
scientific knowledge is in progress. The prefix ‘global’ is somehow added to already exist-
ing sciences (disciplines): either to a form of a trend in Globalistics or before the name of 
a branch of science. A typical and already mentioned example is Economics that more 
often turns (and named) not just world but Global Economics (it is sometimes called Geo-
economics; see Kochetov 1999), and this notion summarizes new phenomena that have 
taken place in the world economy for the last decades and yet will take place under domi-
nating influence of globalization and other global processes.  
Another and even earlier example is Global Ecology as an independent complex sci-
entific discipline studying biosphere in general, as it is important to forecast possible bio-
spheric changes in future under the influence of human activity (Budyko 1977). 
Global History (Karpov 2009; Shestova 2011a, 2011b; O'Brien 2008) and even His-
torical Globalistics (Ionov 2001) are still in embryonic state. Historical approach in Glob-
alistics and global approach in History is the description of facts and events as consecu-
tively changing in time, that is social dynamics in temporal dimension. Global History 
represents a trend of historical research of the global human development. The subject of 
Global History is the establishment of the social integrity of the world viewed in the con-
text of global socionatural processes.2 
The same refers to Global Geography (Lavrov and Gladkikh 1998), Global Cultural 
Studies, Global Sociology and a number of other academic disciplines with the prefix 
‘global’ (Anheier and Juergensmeyr 2012). The thing is that ‘Legal Globalistics’ may still 
change its name into ‘Global Legal Studies’ or will continue global researches in this area 
(Ursul 2012a, 2012c, 2013). However, it is reasonable to suppose that the vast number of 
branches of science will not yield their areas of global researches to the subject area of Glob-
alistics, as we see in the case of Global Economics (the name ‘Economic Globalistics’ is 
not used for this very reason).  
They already speak about ‘Global Political Science’ and not only Political Globalistics 
that is included in the subject of Globalistics. Here everything depends on the dominating 
impact of either Globalistics or Political Science. Another example is Geopolitics, which 
has not been included in Globalistics (though tightly connected with it), but has already 
become global (Abylgaziev, Ilyin, and Kefely 2010). Many branches of scientific knowl-
edge will follow this route falling under the influence of the ‘global attractor’ of increasing 
knowledge.  
                                                          
2 URL: http://www.almavest.ru/ru/favorite/2012/02/08/282/. 
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Thanks to Globalistics, more and more academic trends gain global focus getting in-
volved in the course of global researches, enriching and expanding them. Some of them 
may still enter Globalistics and promote its further expanding, others will remain beyond 
its subject area, although expanded, joining other global investigations. They are not posi-
tioned as parts of Globalistics, but as related sciences (disciplines) though already with 
a global dimension. The boundaries between these globalizing sciences and Globalistics 
remain vague, but all of them stay in the research area of Global Studies in the broad un-
derstanding. Further evolution of Global Studies will take place both due to currently ex-
isting academic disciplines and trends and development of Globalistics together with other 
areas of academic inquiry globalizing to some extent. 
In the global dimension of science, as we have already mentioned, two interconnected 
but conceptually different processes take place, one of which is globalization of knowl-
edge, while the other represents global knowledge establishment. Quite possibly, under 
globalization conditions distribution of knowledge (including scientific knowledge) 
around the planet goes on as well as formation of a specific type of knowledge, global 
knowledge. By this type of knowledge we understand knowledge received as a result of 
global processes and global evolution research that in prospect may become a basis for the 
whole globalized science and education of the twenty-first century and may be used in 
global practical activity aimed at survival of civilization and preservation of biosphere and 
geosphere (Ursul 2012b). 
These globalization and global processes are hardly distinguished (the same is with 
the processes of globalization of education and global education establishment [Ursul 
2011]). However, it is reasonable to differentiate them, because they are, though intercon-
nected, still differently oriented processes of social activity and mainly academic activity. 
Global knowledge is generated in global trend of science (mainly in Globalistics and 
Global Studies), while globalization of science is accompanied with the current integrative 
globalization processes. 
To some extent this process is manifested in digital networks and libraries (Ibid.). Natu-
rally, it is meant mainly that general access to knowledge should present the basis for the 
shift to a knowledge society (Ibid.) that obviously will have global scale. 
At present, Globalistics and Global Studies are still little involved in the broader sys-
tems of scientific knowledge. An attempt to change this situation is made in our mono-
graphs (Ilyin and Ursul 2009; Ilyin, Ursul, and Ursul 2012) where Globalistics is consid-
ered as the most important element of integrative general scientific knowledge forming the 
modern picture of the world based on the principles of universal or global evolutionism. 
This system of knowledge is formed in the course of interdisciplinary synthesis and inte-
gration processes in science representing forms and methods with the broadest subject area 
of academic research and use. The very use of global evolutionism as a methodology of 
academic inquiry (more frequently the analogy of bioevolution is used) led to differentia-
tion of evolutionary approach within Global Studies. 
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On the Philosophy of the Contemporary  
Globalization* 
 
Endre Kiss 
 
 
In this global reality the key to a constructive solution of political and social 
problems is not in the hands of politicians; whereas the crisis creates an im-
pression (‘an illusion’) that new social and political problems could be solved 
in the framework of the old, pre-global structures. Therefore, at the societies' 
meso-level the global crisis also becomes a political one. At the national-etatic 
meso-level of globalization this phenomenon is also outdated and supports the 
action of yesterday concepts, even more, that also the political plausibility can 
come up, that such outdated and yesterday concepts of the national-etatic level 
could be successfully put forward now against the negative effects of globaliza-
tion. The negative development is thus also doubled. 
Keywords: globalization, history of globalization, periodization of globalization. 
Globalization is defined as an unprecedented new world state, a special phase of the world 
history that is already perceptible but that started ultimately in its mature form in 1989 
with the retreat of communism. Since then, some attempts have also been made to divide 
the history of globalization into some periods (Kiss 2012). 
What is the Philosophical Question in the Periodization  
of Globalization? 
The periodization, which is actually the history, of globalization, at the first glance, seems 
to be only a trivial but also an empty question. If we understand globalization as a world or 
a world system, it is obvious that this world will pass through diverse periods and thus will 
also have a history. If we, however, define globalization primarily as a world state, which 
is crucially related to the model of functional systems, then the question of historical phas-
es is theoretically put quite attractively, for the functionalism exists separately from the 
society and its actors (Kiss 2010). Here, we think generally of the differently procured 
temporality of functional systems that are distinguished through the fact that their ‘inner’ 
temporality should work independently from the ‘external, historical’ temporality. Niklas 
Luhmann (1973) thematizes somewhat this problem through the fact that it has to be dis-
tinguished with regard to the system-environment relationship, and that time with regard to 
the self-relationship of systems. The specific and qualifying basis of globalization is in its 
functional character. The functional character of existence is indeed also historical, how-
ever, this historicity differs much from the historical way of existence of the non-functional 
                                                          
* This article was first published in Journal of Globalization Studies, Vol. 4, Num. 2, 2013, pp. 129–141. 
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dimension. Only the understanding that globalization is in its entirety a further not defined 
complex of functional and non-functional dimensions, helps us cope with this dilemma.  
So it is likely that this interpenetrated coexistence of functional and non-functional dimen-
sion as a whole, nevertheless, can have a history in a methodologically proper sense. 
The emergence of globalization also brought an end to the division of an imperial 
world in two parts. Therefore, it is quite clear that the exact explanation of the imperial 
problematic seems to be absolutely sinking in the millennial harmony of new universal 
freedoms and global self-regulation. The independent factor of a relative devaluation of 
the political subsystem in the dynamic flow of the unfolding globalization (on these issues 
see also Kiss 2012) also contributes to this general state that one can characterize as spon-
taneous. The first far-reaching articulation of the imperial issues after 1989 belongs to 
Samuel S. Huntington (1996) who formulated the imperial issues also only within the new 
framework of ‘civilizations’; however, it is quite difficult to follow him in the identifica-
tion of the new aspect of civilization and the traditional one of politics. Taking this into 
account, we can conclude on the strength and vitality of the prevailing of both anti- and 
also post-imperial spirits at that time. Even the ‘imperial’ issues could be accentuated 
within civilizational framework of thinking. Huntington most clearly reformulated the im-
perial realities under the semi-political mask of new civilizational relations (Kiss 1997: 
117–125). 
The international politics has also continued, apparently unchanged, with its tradi-
tional imperial way to put questions in the era of globalization. It means that in a widely 
recognized era of globalization, the interpretation of the political system is not subjected to 
any fundamentally new approaches. The peculiar difference between the experiences of 
a new global world and an objective insight revealing that the political system is not glob-
alizing on the basis of a quite abstract insight, might constitute a difficulty, certainly not 
easy to dispel in this learning process. It means that politics, as a system and as a subsys-
tem, is persisting without any changes in the functional world of globalization. Politics just 
as a subsystem has not been globalizing for the simple reason that it is not and also could 
not be determined and governed functionally.  
The increasing importance of the imperial discourse becomes an integral part of the 
history of globalization. Can this question, however, also be redirected? Can we reinter-
pret the former history of globalization through the imperial discourse? In our opinion, the 
history of globalization can be positively shaped by the imperial discourse. 
The imperial issues hardly appear explicitly in the first period of globalization. Before 
this period the world was divided in two parts and this has drastically contributed to the 
validity of imperial reflections. Thus, it is not surprising that Francis Fukuyama in his the-
ory of the end of the history (Fukuyama 1992) forecasts the coming of a universal post-
imperial democracy. Exclusively in this context the basic approach of Samuel S. Hunting-
ton wanted to cool down the optimistic expectations towards a post-imperial new world 
order. Even Huntington himself does not want to call this new imperial start by its proper 
name. He formulates this new message not explicitly in terms of the subsystem of the poli-
tics, but in the half-political terms of the medium of ‘civilization’. In terms of ‘civiliza-
tion’, the international politics will then recall the realism of Kissinger rehabilitating Met-
ternich. The fundamentalism is considered the only adequate enemy in this era of confi-
dence. 
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The second phase of globalization, reproduced in terms of the imperial discourse, has 
again shaped the international politics. In this period of the post-communist democracy 
and of the neo-liberal politics, a possible international conflict can be legitimized only 
from moral viewpoint. The practice of imperial motives and causes was legitimate only if 
the society considers it as an answer to a qualified violation of human rights (Kiss 2000). 
The typical event of this second period was the Kuwait war against Sadam Hussein. This 
prude discourse guided wars and also made serious international conflicts again possible. 
The third period of history of globalization, articulated in the context of imperial dis-
course, started on September 11, 2001. From that time, the contours of a new bipolarity 
become visible. In then still a unipolar global world, the so concrete and so vague phe-
nomenon of terrorism took the position of a structural enemy violating the human rights. 
The Irak war of 2004 took place right in this new period. In 2011, Osama bin Laden's 
death brought a natural end of this period of globalization manifested in the imperial dis-
course. Osama's death manifests the threshold between two great historical periods of the 
new globalization. Here a combination of a new virtual and of a real bipolar world oc-
curred. 
The Huge Distance between the Big and the Small 
The monetarism of the real global economy is an actual manifestation of a completely the-
oretical model. Here a perceptible proximity emerges between model and reality. This 
proximity raises a lot of new problems, in particular, those of an increasing smoothing of 
the effective difference between model and reality. In the case of a crisis, it will be more 
difficult to define whether this crisis is a more or less authentic realization of the model or 
it is a traditional cyclic destabilization of real economy.  
The most determinant quality of the global economy is, however, only indirectly re-
lated to economics! It is the indebtedness of the state, by which globalization had rela-
tively (or also absolutely?) devalued the need for states. However, an indebted state also 
has its own logic of functioning and this logic determines the economic life and social ex-
istence in general; while these two sides of a coin define the global economy also retroac-
tively and reflexively. 
The immediate past of the self-destructive society was determined by a generally 
good intention and by a confidence in the future, farther also from elements of a consen-
sus in an optimistic humanism, which was partly composed of the communicative es-
sence derived from the welfare society, and partly of common optimism towards the 
overall solutions of the human rights-oriented neoliberalism. 
It becomes a very difficult interpretational task to separate the dynamic-structural 
moments of globalization from the cyclic and conjunctural changes in the explanations of 
a crisis.  
The true definition of a modern or post-modern self-destructive society consists of 
a critical measure of the state debt. This measure does not allow the economy to pay the 
state debts even in the most optimal ‘normal’ conjunctural situation. Achill does not 
catch up the turtle. This basic criterion constitutes the self-destructive society taken in 
the proper meaning of the term.1  
                                                          
1 One should remember that there is a state debt without globalization, as well as there might also be globalization 
without any national debt. However, globalization has led to the fact that the action field of economy (above all,  
the one of the multinational groups) has hugely increased and put on its feet the specifically monetary concretization 
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An economic crisis, which breaks out at the world level, aggravates the global prob-
lem of the state, that is the permanent reproduction of national indebtedness. So, we can 
say that the worldwide economic crisis of 2007–2008 has only increased the internal 
tension of the global world with indebted states. As it often happens in real processes, 
the crisis originates from the same economic and financial processes, which shaped the 
global world in real history. The crisis is, therefore, not an independent phenomenon; it 
is rather a temporal end of a relatively unambiguous and linear development. The cur-
rent economic crisis shows, how the economy, after a long galactical trip in the virtual 
existence, returned again on the earth. 
After its worldwide victory of historical importance, the neoliberalism became  
a regulator and a driving force of the global development only at the ideological-
political level. As a form of hegemony, it embodies the dialectical mutation of the ear-
lier liberalism and earlier modernity. Obviously, as a hegemony, it cannot, however, also 
ignore the necessity and responsibility of emphasizing the new forms of emancipation.  
In the age of globalization, the border between ‘normality’ and ‘crisis’ is much more 
transparent than in any earlier period. In pure theoretical terms, the global and world-
wide interrelated economy is never in a state of crisis: what manifests here as a crisis 
actually appears a normal redistribution of resources. Of course, we should make a dis-
tinction between the theoretical model and social reality. We should, however, bear in 
mind that even the language of the crisis became different within globalization. For the 
world-political and world-economic reality, it is certainly of some interest that today the 
US banks are still aided by the government. However, one can also consider this as 
a theoretical criterion of the worldwide economic crisis, since in this context ‘crisis’ and 
‘normality’ also stand in a different relation than it was in the pre-global world. 
Certainly, we could still reverse this logic of crisis. Instead of a ‘crisis’, we could 
designate the current situation just as a ‘normality’, while we emphasize that it is proba-
bly the ‘normality of peculiar global relations’ and that the self-regulating power of 
markets can no longer suffice.  
Hollywood and Greek Myths 
The present-day common thinking may have the feeling that a global Hollywood produc-
tion is running around it, when one wants to drag ‘interactively’. On the one hand, this 
current global everyday consciousness observes the dynamics, the tremendous success 
stories of globalization, what this conscience experiences also in its daily life. On the other 
hand, the same global everyday consciousness finds itself confronting a disintegrating, 
fragmenting political and social reality, which it can finally fail to escape. Thus, it can also 
be easy to experience this new reality as a new condition of life. The more substantial ef-
forts the everyday consciousness makes to survive, the more it comes to realize that such 
efforts for the sake of simple survival no longer constitute only the others' worries, but also 
its own ones. 
The Homo globalicus feels himself one day as a Superman of the civilization and  
a target group of numerous networks which compete with each other and which are all in 
dread for grace and recognition. Another day, the same Homo globalicus turns to be as 
a Pariah, whose numerous formal and individual liberties cannot change a single iota in his 
social downfall, if not social death. Between both these oscillates a society that confronts 
the problems of perception and possible interpretation of globalization. 
                                                                                                                                                         
of the deep structures of global economy, in which the money itself could also function as the most important wares. 
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Globalization in Mind 
The phenomena of globalization can be investigated within several referential systems. 
How exactly we define them is of utmost importance because the exceptional exuber-
ance of phenomena, as well as the exceptional complexity of global relations could eas-
ily make even the most thorough investigation arbitrary. 
The everyday consciousness and the mentality show an astonishing continuity of char-
acteristics within globalization. We argue that these strict attitudes of the everyday con-
sciousness have hardly been modified during the two decades of globalization. 
As far as the fundamental principles of the modern everyday consciousness are con-
cerned with respect to understanding of reality, the basic orientations of the individualism, 
anti-totalitarianism, consumerism and post-modernism have hardly changed. It is all the 
more striking, because the unquestionable hegemony of consumerism can no longer be 
confirmed and legitimized by the reality in the period when neither the magnitude nor the 
qualitative differentiation, as well as the social dissemination of the consumption can hard-
ly approach the real consumption society. 
It is then no ironic gesture, if we describe the everyday consciousness operating within 
globalization as a consciousness representing a consumer's consciousness without real 
consuming. This is by no way a solitary example that the consciousness does not refer to 
the basic being, in particular, the consciousness of an object does not correspond to this 
real object. Similarly, the same non-correspondent relation can be also marked in the 
‘post-material’ world of values applying to the reality. These post-material values kept on 
living also unchanged in the first two decades of globalization. 
The same refers to the post-modern thinking. 
Besides the phenomena of value relativism and virtual reality, the post-modern differ-
ence thinking dominates also over the present globalization, as well as the post-modern 
vision of the other and the otherness. The present system of post-modern values in the 
global everyday consciousness is of a comprehensive importance both from methodologi-
cal and substantive point of view. With respect to methodological reasons it is important 
because the post-modern thinking is applied in quite new structures of thinking (differ-
ence-logic, deconstructivism), in structures, where already every single fact requires fur-
ther fundamental explanations why these structures could gain a foot-hold in the domains 
of control of the everyday consciousness with their new logic and new reality processing. 
The everyday thinking must enable a man to eliminate the everyday problems. It is clear, 
that the essence of the new post-modern thinking and the necessity to enable the everyday 
consciousness to eliminate daily problems are not precisely related to each other. 
Here a new fundamental question arises derived from the basic problematics, namely, 
how it was possible that these post-modern structures of thinking could endure in their 
difference logic and in their inability to admit and articulate the common issues of social 
reproduction, precisely at the time of globalization, since the post-modern value orienta-
tion can definitely disorient the everyday consciousness in recognizing the global world of 
life in its abstractions and deep fragmentation. 
In addition to the long-term hegemony and validity of basic applications of the every-
day consciousness, of the post-material values and/or of the new post-modern structures of 
thinking, the comprehensive ‘soft’ interpretation of the most important relations, the en-
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thusiasm of happiness, the leisure propaganda or the new ‘californism’ with its eternal 
sunshine, sex and body-building are considered as surprisingly strong and uninterrupted. 
The ‘soft’ – ‘hard’ relation applies now as already the fourth dimension of the current 
global everyday consciousness (in addition to the principles of the everyday conscious-
ness, of the post-material values and the specifically post-modern structures of thinking of 
different logic). 
The predominance of the ‘soft’ or ‘tender’ interpretations of reality constitutes the re-
ality and it is a constitution of the world of relative independence.2 
If we try now to understand these orientations and types of thinking from a sociologi-
cal point with respect to their own temporal circumstances (not within the circumstances 
of globalization), it seems clear that they can be interpreted, primarily, if not exclusively, 
as products of a slow and constantly repressed dismantling of the industrial society. Within 
this context, it is noticeable that the concerned soft modes of thinking only rarely thema-
tize explicitly the real processes of this withdrawal. Anyway, it is clear in this respect why 
the fundamentally ‘soft’, that is ‘tender’ characteristics, dominate in them. The advent of 
the ‘soft’ trains of character as sociological genesis corresponds to the context that has just 
been marked as a real event by the withdrawal of the ‘hard’ social relations.  
This basic, although not decisive, explanation is, however, essentially modified by the 
problem circle of the neo-Marxism. The neo-Marxism keeps the conviction of the rele-
vance and survival of the industrial society (it means, that this thinking represented the 
unchanged ‘hard’ elements of the former industrial society). On the other hand, the neo-
Marxism manifests itself, in comparison to the former Marxisms (mainly, of course, to the 
Stalinist and post-Stalinist Marxism), almost in every respect as definitely ‘soft’ approach. 
Amongst the actual relationships within globalization, there are numerous representa-
tions of both hard and soft components. The almost exclusive dominance of the ‘soft’ di-
mension in the range of the new forms of thinking applies, therefore, as a disproportion. 
The gathering of the soft varieties of interpretation and understanding of reality ap-
peared only after the comprehensive hard processes of the year 1945, the Reconstruction 
(Wiederaufbau) and of the Cold War. This corresponded also to the necessity to legitimize 
both the political consolidation and the economic miracle (Wirtschaftswunder), as well as 
that of the consumption society and democratic system. All these elements of the new 
world order were effectively ‘softer’ than their predecessors. 
Yet, accompanied with crises and conflicts, this trend was followed by a whole range 
of new phenomena and attitudes, such as the ever wider and deeper level of consumption, 
the design defining the external image of the society, the new subculture of the fashion, 
the always softer and more intimate (and more naked) world of social communication, the 
growing recognition of individuals and personal happiness, the modified relation towards 
the minorities of any kind, the democratic and consensually accentuated treatment of so-
cial conflicts, the conscious struggle of social mechanisms of exclusion, the growing rec-
ognition of women and the increasing number of social opportunities, and also the increas-
ing superficiality of interpersonal relations in schools, the democratization of military 
forces and generally the comprehensive wave against authorities and authoritarianism. 
                                                          
2 These forms of thinking do not appear directly in the immediate articulation of judgments; they are, however, not 
direct contents, but principles, methods and procedures, which help an effective elaboration of the reality. A ‘soft’ 
treatment of reality means then not exclusively ‘soft’ judgments, but the ‘soft’ methods of construction. 
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The softness and the growing ‘soft’ interpretation of the events gradually formed  
a composite field, a new medium of historical and social existence that slowly radiated 
from the sixties as a determining trend and also as a normative force. In this respect,  
the US war in Vietnam in the sixties and seventies is also a significant example that such  
a ‘hard’ reality might no longer be admitted and could not be treated in such a ‘tender’ 
social and political universe. 
Certainly, in a stricter sense the circumstances and relations have not been ‘hard’ or 
‘soft’, but this is a functional convention through which we perceive social relations and 
phenomena as ‘hard’ or ‘soft’. 
Through the lens of sociology of knowledge (Wissenssoziologie), the decisive aspects 
of social perception appear in a clear light. This shows that the type of perception is also 
the one of evaluation, and as such also the one of categorization and qualification. This 
means, that a society estimated in terms of ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ is not necessarily utilizing its 
sociological perspective, but is also disposing of previous preferences, in any case, how-
ever, of previous value estimations. Then it is also equivalent with a new form of sociol-
ogy of knowledge, if, as it seems, the actual existential fixation (Seinsgebundenheit) re-
mains still determining in some generality in the prevailing constitution of thinking. This 
however means also, that the previously analyzed ways of thinking (principles of everyday 
consciousness, post-material values, post-modern structures, and the ‘soft’ dimension) on 
their part are also disposing of new, partly untouched ideological potentials. 
The Peculiar Approach of the Post-Modern Way of Thinking 
Until the present, the forms of consciousness prevailing within globalization are not yet 
developed ideological forms. In their ‘new’ form they are, however, already dissociating 
from the classical definition of the ‘existential fixation’ (Seinsgebundenheit) of thinking. 
As structures of thinking, they do not correspond to ‘reality’ and so they shape a logical 
relation of a new difference. The terms (notions) do not refer to reality. In the logic the 
identity relation is ideology. This generally new approach, with necessary simplifications, 
can be also formulated within the dual dichotomy of the ‘hard’ and the ‘soft’. 
While the philosophical post-modern thinking in difference (by Foucault: the logic of 
identity is a form of the discourse of the ‘Institution’ [Foucault 1999]) dissociated the 
thinking from the reality (from the reference to a provable objectivity), the post-modern 
everyday thinking is not following exactly the same path. While the philosophical post-
modern thinking in the new order of difference logic is also able to exercise the ‘hard’ 
mode of intellectual processing, the post-modern everyday thinking defends itself through 
its ‘soft’ character at least against the absurd consequences of the philosophical post-
modern thinking. ‘Soft’ difference thinking can never become so absurd as a ‘hard’ one. 
In terms of philosophical difference thinking, the soft processing of the current (glob-
al) reality leads to the manipulation (‘hard’ relations are ‘softly’ treated). The outlines of 
the symmetrical opposite worlds take shape and sometimes they also design the reverse 
contours of each other.3 
The new type of the hard version of the difference logic in post-modernism presents 
the reality through its own way of perception, radically ‘more evil’ than it is, while the 
‘soft’ difference thinking of the everyday consciousness allows showing the same reality 
much ‘more harmonious’ and ‘more balanced’. 
                                                          
3 Such a reversal is simultaneously real (politically and sociologically) and logical. 
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Crisis within Globalization 
As demonstrated above, globalization has its (inner) history, with all the methodological 
problems derived from this fact. The inner variations within different periods of globaliza-
tion have not changed anyhow the fact that globalization exemplifies the rule of huge 
functional systems expanding onto the whole earth, that the value of individual freedom, 
or, in other words, of the agency element, has become decisively larger; that a constant 
struggle is led for the sources at the meso-level of globalization by different actors orga-
nizing the state and the society. That attempt has also hardly changed the situation when 
the international right is extended for the purpose of interventions of the neoliberal-human 
rights, as well as also that the philosophical distance between the abstract order of global-
ization and the elimination of concrete tasks of the social being is not diminished. Half 
a century ago, the critics of real socialism claimed that the real socialism was the world of 
‘the collective irresponsibility’ and argued over who may have been responsible if the 
huge apparatus of collective decisions is no longer accountable. Numerous new variants  
of the same collective irresponsibility are, however, also reproduced in the distribution of 
responsibilities and competences among global institutions of different levels. 
In the basic definitions of globalization the range of phenomena, which we commonly 
call a crisis in the ordinary languages, is also developed organically. We have often point-
ed out that it is one of the most striking and most unprecedented characteristics of global-
ization that ‘crisis’ and ‘normality’ coexist in a new way.  
This new leading characteristic can resemble certain historical antecedents because the 
setting of a local crisis at a higher, global level can be exactly comprehended at this new, 
global level as a part of a normal process. Such a local crisis expanded to the global level 
can also be interpreted as an expansion, if not an advantage of globalization, because pre-
cisely due to its crisis nature it can implicitly favor the regrouping of resources in a more 
optimal way. The phenomenon of ‘globalization’ could succeed not only as a new but also 
as a new and ‘positive’ phenomenon, because it represents a field, where even serious ‘cri-
ses’ can lead to positive and universal consequences. 
The new relations between ‘normality’ and ‘crisis’ were in fact already noticed before 
2007–2008 in the basic relations of globalization. However, within such a constitutive 
context, the crisis of 2007–2008 starts a new era. 
This crisis also produced new and decisive changes in the global actors' behavior. Be-
fore 2007–2008, the rules of interpretation and action proceeded from the fact that global-
ization as a ‘system’ works perfectly. To criticize this system and to act against its spirit 
might only appear an exceptional phenomenon.4 
After the crisis, this attitude has fundamentally changed.  
However, the crisis is by no means the only determinant that can play a crucial role in 
the configuration of the global future. The other phenomenon of equal importance in its 
global dimensions, is a transformation of the imperial structure of globalization. At the end 
of the first decade of globalization, a great transformation becomes quite evident. The first 
half of this decade was the period of the so-called ‘unipolar’ world followed by the forma-
tion of a new structure that embodies then several simultaneous structural formations with 
already several poles perceived in the global architecture. 
                                                          
4 This assertion contains obviously an exaggeration, which, however, demonstrates this particularly important trend of 
the global world of opinions and global everyday life. 
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The contemporary phase of globalization serves a starting point of any forecast.5 
This phase is currently determined by three comprehensive elements: 1) the crisis of 
2007–2008; 2) new definitions of a new ‘multipolar’ world; and finally, 3) changes and 
new interactions of the aforementioned two aspects (crisis and new multipolarity). 
The system of the basic features of globalization is always based on an everyday 
struggle within the mesosphere of globalization. This struggle is disputed between the ba-
sic functional-monetarist attributes of globalization and of the global meso-level, that is of 
the political sphere.6 This struggle of the relative and structural indebtedness of the state 
(every state!) occurs in the form of a peculiar negative spiral, in the etatic, political, social 
and every other representative sphere of life in the society and thus perfectly reverses  
the social existence!  
The society's fears and hopes are also articulated and realized in the meso-dimension. 
The specific basic attributes of the meso-level considered previously as relevant are also 
very clearly manifested in current globalization. We mention the functional change of 
politics, the one-person group, the natural residuals, the element of the self-destruction in 
the tissue of society, the paradoxical phenomenon of the revolt of the rich people, the pre-
sent-future continuity and the (already mentioned new) provisions of the alternation be-
tween ‘crisis’ and ‘normality’. 
The crisis has fundamentally changed the direction of actions and motivations.  
Before this crisis, the leading orientations of action were arranged to interpret the proc-
esses of globalization as an organic development, as a free game of free forces, when the 
individuals' diverse concrete objectives could be realized. After the crisis, the doubt, criti-
cism, often even suspicion towards the foundations and legitimation of the same processes 
already appear as the leading orientation of action. While before the crisis these processes 
were considered ‘natural’, now as quite the reverse, almost nothing is considered as ‘natu-
ral’ or ‘obvious’. Whilst yesterday the ‘action’ was predominant, today it is the ‘reaction’ 
that prevails. 
Within this new approach, the original paradoxes and ambivalences of globalization 
are obviously much more manifested. A sociological dimension is thus manifested. How 
was it possible that the prevailing tendencies and methods of thinking of the seventies and 
eighties remained, practically unchanged, prevalent also in two decades of globalization?  
The present situation could also be exacerbated by the fact that now all those para-
doxes and contradictions of globalization penetrate the everyday consciousness, which 
have not yet been understood by this everyday consciousness in these characteristics. 
While up to the beginning of the first decade we have precisely exaggerated the vision of 
‘global’ relations as ‘normal’, actually the same everyday consciousness considers global-
ization, with the same element of exaggeration, as arbitrary, not measured, and sometimes 
even as hostile. 
In this framework, it soon becomes clear that the greatest extremes of the phenome-
nology of globalization consist in that distance and in that contradiction that exist between 
                                                          
5 It goes without saying that a huge speed of global processes makes it difficult to define exactly the ‘current’ state  
of globalization, because it often happens that at the moment of its publication an exactly performed analysis of  
a current situation no longer corresponds fully to the actual environment. Nevertheless, this difficulty cannot prevent 
us from a thorough investigation of different phases of current globalization. 
6 Ld. Jövőkutatás és globalizáció. Új szempontok a két terület áthatásainak kutatásában. In: Jövő. MTA IX. Osztály 
Jövőkutatási Bizottságának hivatalos lapja. 2006. 3. szám. www.jovo.jovokutatas, hu/3/kiss-jovokutglob. rtf.glob and 
Kiss 2007. 
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the richness and the universality of globalization and the increasing social problems of 
many individuals, groups and societies. Before the crisis of 2007–2008, a part of the opin-
ion-forming industry did almost everything to prevent the interpretation of the real proc-
esses as organic and spontaneous events. This intention and its successful admission are 
now shaken. The emergence of the decisive and reactive thinking has become a fait ac-
compli. 
Already before the crisis, that is to say in the previous historical period, it was clear 
that globalization produces a double effect on society. One of its most important impacts 
on the world is that globalization differentiates and also divides the individual as an indi-
vidual person and the individual as a member of a social formation. Like any fundamental 
opposition of this kind, it is both rather abstract and rather concrete. A person as an indi-
vidual can perceive globalization positively and at the same time as a member of some 
social formation can become the victim of globalization. The reverse situation is also pos-
sible. 
The revolutionary transformation, if not jump of the agency (the agent's freedom) de-
livers that frame, within which the power of an individual can increase also in a historical 
proportion. The same frame, however, can also relatively depreciate the individuals affili-
ated in the social formations (church, trade union, political parties, family, etc.), because 
the larger formations, as actors, cannot provide the same level of self-realization to the 
same extent, as an individual as an actor can. Thus, these formations in comparison with 
the individuals' opportunities can become structural losers of globalization, as it has hap-
pened with the state. 
According to the script of a Hollywood superproduction, the world society now ex-
panding would be effectively a quite ironical story. While globalization was creating its 
huge possibilities and freedoms, a great part of the world society would generally perceive 
it as a restriction when just the pure survival even more clearly becomes the main chal-
lenge. The irony of this virtual film script manifests also in the fact that the unique con-
structive and constitutive side of globalization is profited and enjoyed by individual men 
or women, well organized in their social networks, while the destructive side of the same 
globalization process becomes the fate of the individuals organized in diverse social for-
mations, and the destruction can lead to a total elimination of jobs or residential possibili-
ties. 
The redoubled anthropological consequence of globalization consists, therefore, in the 
fact that it favors and supports the individuals capable of competition better than the indi-
viduals organized in formations.  
The temporal shift between global realities and their delayed notice leads to a new 
asymmetry. The societal standings or the ranking of a whole society are likely not to con-
sider and treat in a balanced way the constructive and destructive sides of globalization. 
And it is all the more so, because the representatives of the constructive opinion on global-
ization are lucky ‘individuals’, while the ‘real masses’, arising from the decay of the pre-
vious great social formations, feel themselves marginalized. But they still revisit the world 
of the former great organizations.  
This evolution leads to a development of political and social issues that remind  
of the problems of the pre-global period. A new simulacrum (Schein), both theoretically 
and practically determined, occurs. This appearance means that the social and political 
issues correspond to those of the pre-global period and represent a ‘continuation’  
of the old realities. The ‘appearance’ (Schein) updates the phenomena of crisis and re-
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minds of the crises of the former periods. In many people's lives this ‘appearance’ is,  
in fact, a ‘reality’, however, not convincing in its essence, because the problems seeming 
identical represent the phenomena not of an international industrial society but already of 
the post-industrial global world society. 
This creates some philosophical problems. The status of reality itself is redoubling. 
The crisis that occurred at the meso-level reminds of the cyclical economic crises of the 
pre-global industrial society, while the same crisis is in fact already a consequence of 
globalization. 
System Changes within the Structure of Globalization 
To a certain extent it depends also on the actors, on their ability to adapt to the overall sit-
uation through their behavior. If populist or extremist concepts appear on the scene as 
a ‘solution’ of these new political and social problems, it also implies that these new actors 
do not want to perceive the whole situation as a ‘global’, but as a ‘traditional-national 
state-centered’ reality. Through a simple categorization of the situation they make politics 
and through their politics they define the situation. The fact that they revive the language 
and the concept of populism and extremism of the thirties with an astonishing fidelity only 
proves the idea stated at the beginning of this article that the currently prevailing flows of 
thought can become extremely distant from the present real historical situation. This actu-
ally arises the question whether the terms ‘left’ and ‘right’ could be still legitimately ap-
plied to the present global relations. 
The political and social issues lead again to the systemic-theoretical dimensions of 
globalization. The fundamental functional characteristics systematically depreciated the 
basic dimensions of politics as a non-functional sphere. For historical reasons, the basic 
social issues have been admitted and articulated within the system of modern society 
through the politically based problematic. Through the depreciation of the political system, 
the depreciation of the social system also occurs. If there appear political thoughts that can 
invoke through their categorization a pre-global political situation, the importance of the 
political and social systems is again reinforced, which, however, cannot bring to the con-
clusion that globalization already disappears in this way and the pre-global reality be-
comes true. 
In this also already structurally reduplicated global reality, the key to the constructive 
solution of political and social problems is not in the hands of the politicians, although the 
crisis creates the impression (‘the appearance’) that the new social and political problems 
could be solved within the framework of the old, pre-global structures. Therefore, the 
global crisis at the meso-level of societies becomes also political. At the national state-
centered meso-level of globalization this phenomenon is also outdated. It contributes to 
the action of yesterday concepts; moreover, even the political plausibility can successfully 
put forward those outdated and yesterday concepts of the national state-centered level 
against the negative effects of globalization.  
The search for new responses to the crisis gets out of control in societies and in mass 
communication. The whole activity of this search is, however, severely limited by two 
points. First is the intellectual limitation. Here, the comprehensive lack of utopia and uto-
pia's hostility become rapidly visible, furthermore the already analyzed deep fixation of 
the everyday consciousness on the forms of thinking of the seventies and eighties, the be-
lief in the former truth of the thesis of the ‘end of the history’ (today, we are already mis-
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taken that no new theories are possible), this also includes the consequence of the year 
1989, when the neo-liberalism marginalized, if not compromised, all other major struc-
tures of thought, while these different great directions could not properly react up actually 
to this degradation (the so-called ‘Third Way’ exemplifies this point by social democracy, 
with which we can thoroughly study, how the neo-liberalism moved the social democracy 
away from its own trend). 
This search for new responses is also complicated by the fact that different levels of 
action are, however, not all in the hands of those who want to react. This also means that 
a strong intellectual background is already necessary.  
At the current phase of globalization, only those economic and social solutions are 
important that now can be organically qualified in the fundamental system of relations 
within globalization. This means, above all, that they are not separated in systemic-
theoretical terms from the determining structural and functional relations of globalization.  
In our days, the structural loser,7 that is the political subsystem, is again revaluated in 
a indirect way of social issues. Social and political problems should be solved, but this 
cannot occur in the directness (Unmittelbarkeit) of a pre-global view of political and social 
systems. We cannot also exclude that a sudden revaluation of political system leads, in the 
public consciousness, to the diminution, if not to repression of the importance of global-
ization. The sudden revaluation of the political system can bring back to life the political 
ghosts that we believed to be dead. 
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contradictions of the contemporary world. 
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General Remarks 
The global financial crisis is not over. This crisis once again has clearly demonstrated that 
financial markets can become a source of serious socioeconomic tensions. The crisis has 
also shown that without an adequate system of control and coordination of activities of  
the bodies regulating the world economy, the financial markets transform from a creative 
force into a destructive one. 
The documents of international organizations as well as many economists' investigations 
maintain that financial crises are inevitable for the market economy evolving in a cyclic 
manner.  
It is important, first, not to commit subjective errors which can exacerbate or provoke 
crises. Second, we need to take well-timed and proper measures in order to mitigate  
the consequences of crises.  
As for specific decisions made by certain countries or regions such as, for example, 
the European Union, they should be left to politicians and specialists in economics, man-
agement and so on. However, taken out of the world context and without taking into ac-
count globalization processes, such decisions would never be efficient. 
An adequate understanding of the world situation in general and of globalization in 
particular becomes the task of utmost importance. Mere technological solutions are insuf-
ficient to solve it. We need a philosophical analysis of the contemporary situation and ear-
lier trends of the world development. The concept of globalization acquires the primary 
importance here. 
                                                          
* This article was first published in Journal of Globalization Studies, Vol. 4, Num. 1, 2013, pp. 147–159. 
Chumakov • What Must We Do Confronted with Globalization? 39 
Globalization as Reality  
Today almost everyone seems to be interested in globalization, including scholars and politi-
cians, artists, businessmen, journalists and some individuals. However, this does not mean 
that in this field one can find any general, though vague, concepts, consolidated opinions or, 
at least, a substantial understanding that alongside with new problems, dangers and negative 
consequences globalization also brings new opportunities and prospects. On the contrary, 
we doubt even the fact that global society itself is now emerging on the planet, although 
many things seem evident, such as a full closeness in geographic space, universal interde-
pendence, common environmental and nuclear threats, planetary information system, and 
world transport communications, etc. 
To assess the global world properly, one should understand that from the very begin-
ning its processes, including globalization itself, are first and foremost objective.  
Of course, the global processes are somewhat influenced by subjective factors, but, never-
theless, in their progressive development they occur basically irrespective of the will and 
subjective aspirations of individuals, social groups, corporations, or even separate states. 
Globalization processes and global problems of modernity have emerged not spontane-
ously or by mistake, not due to somebody's good or wicked plan. They resulted from an 
objective and logical development of society and its new relations with the environment. 
The contemporary world seems to have dramatically changed virtually within the last 
decades; but it is not so. True globalization started in the age of the great geographical dis-
coveries. By the beginning of the twentieth century, globalization became fundamental 
after it had strengthened and expanded to new spheres of social life. Today globalization is 
total and multi-faceted as economic, political, cultural and information flows, links and 
relations have irreversibly transcended the boundaries of countries and nations, being no 
longer their domain and prerogative.  
I can hardly agree with a widely-held view that globalization was born by the twenti-
eth century. It would also be a mistake to equate globalization with modernization or 
mostly with economic integration. Unfortunately, this simplistic vision of a complex issue 
is common even among scholars, engendering numerous debates about ‘waves’, ‘intensifi-
cation’, or ‘stagnation’ of globalization. 
It is important to emphasize that up to the early twentieth century humankind had been 
developing mostly fragmentary and separately. Originally there were local, later regional, 
cultural-cum-civilizational systems, which had relatively insignificant influence on each 
other or did not even interact. Now the world cultural-cum-civilizational system is being 
formed. Its shape became clear by the beginning of the twentieth century. With the emer-
gence and exacerbation of the global problems in the 1970s and the 1980s, the global sig-
nificance of changes became evident also in the broad public consciousness. Humankind 
became a planetary phenomenon. It entered the age of universal interdependence of differ-
ent countries and nations. In spite of the emergence of the foundations of universal culture 
they still preserve their national cultures, but at the same time some signs of civilizational 
unity are increasingly manifest. 
It is impossible to dwell more on these ideas, so I would like to emphasize the main 
point. Now one can speak about the global society or the single world civilization being 
really formed. With increasing persistence, more and more countries and nations are re-
quired to follow universal norms, rules, bans and prescriptions. Having entered the era of 
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transformation from ‘local’ and ‘regional’ cultural-cum-civilizational systems to universal 
cultural-cum-civilizational system, we should act in an appropriate manner. 
Perceptions of Globalization 
In real life even an obvious necessity of changing human behavior quite often produces no 
desired results. In other words, people either completely ignore the changes around them, 
or react inadequately. This is absolutely true in the case of globalization as well. 
Today globalization is as real as a sunrise. The contemporary world, beyond question, 
has radically changed under the influence of globalization and faces dangers, which have 
never existed before. Even mass consciousness, not to mention the academic community, 
understands it as an axiom. 
It can be both good and bad. It is good because there is no need to prove that global-
ization is a topical issue. Thus, we have more opportunities to find constructive solutions 
and reasonable practical responses. It is bad because even sound experts in Global Studies 
start to see the contemporary situation through the lens of habit. Thus, they are able to see 
only one aspect of the situation, from the position of their long-held views. As a result, 
attention is focused, as a rule, on what is conventional and evident. All other secondary or 
nascent problems (dangers, obstacles to social development) remain without due consid-
eration. For example, there is a common statement that the world community has never 
been so endangered in its history as today, in the twenty-first century. It is usually associ-
ated with the threat of nuclear war and environmental disaster, which is true, but the prob-
lem cannot be reduced to these issues. The point is not that we just have nuclear weapons, 
poorly controlled and threatening humankind with a real possibility of self-destruction. 
The increasing human pressure on the environment definitely worsens the tough ecologi-
cal situation, but it is not the greatest danger. 
What is more important now is that humans and their behavior in the global world is 
not an integral part of this world. In other words, in the last decades the whole complex of 
global problems has been enlarged by a new danger, still hardly comprehended – a cardi-
nal and rapid change of the architectonics of world interconnections and interrelations. At 
the same time, the world community demonstrates the inability to react adequately to such 
changes. 
We need a new approach to world problems and we should rethink the priorities of 
their solution. One should emphasize that by the end of the twentieth century globalization 
made the world community fully global and that relations, communications and informa-
tion flows became crossborder. Humankind has become a holistic system with respect to 
all the main parameters of social life. Nation-states (now their number reaches 200) have 
ceased to be the only international actors. Numerous multinational corporations, interna-
tional organizations (including criminal ones, connected with drug trafficking and interna-
tional terrorism) have also become actors. And as before, this world with many interde-
pendent and confronting actors is simply spontaneously self-regulated and does not have 
the governance that it needs.  
The situation is exacerbated by the fact that humans are naturally biosocial beings. 
They still combine good and bad, kind and evil, love and hatred, peacefulness and aggres-
sion. Of course, culture, upbringing and education make people humane and tolerant. But 
we cannot change human nature and biological essence: aggressiveness, lust for domina-
tion, struggle for survival, violent solutions, etc. 
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As before, these things can be traced in the behavior of separate communities and in 
the nation-states' policy. Now the whole world community as a holistic system behaves 
selfishly towards the natural environment. The one who does not notice or pays no atten-
tion to it will lose firm soil under her/his feet, becomes deluded by abstractions and has no 
prospects for changes for the better. 
It is also important that the number of earth inhabitants has exceeded seven billion 
people and continues to grow. At the same time, the planetary resources needed to support 
human lives are limited. They are also unevenly distributed (as well as the population) and 
some are scarce or extinguished. There is overt and covert struggle for the access to natu-
ral resources. Most likely, this conflict of interests is going to increase in the future and 
confrontation is going to become more severe. 
The Main Issue of the Contemporary World 
As a result, the global world, facing essentially new challenges and having no adequate 
system of governance, gets more and more into the situation of increasing contradictions 
and uncertainty. This is the main problem, the main contradiction of our epoch! We can 
also say that under the influence of globalization processes the world community, in fact, 
becomes more and more a single holistic system with respect to all parameters of social 
life. At the same time, there are no governance mechanisms adequate to this holism. 
The most striking in this situation is not that this governance does not exist as such, 
but that it is not purposefully constructed. Moreover, even theoretical discussions about it 
are rather infrequent today, not being the focus of public attention as they deserve to be 
(although concerns about the situation in question grow).1 Besides, governance in general 
and global governance in particular, unlike regulation, cannot emerge spontaneously. This 
issue is to be discussed below; here I would like to make some points about the reasons 
why this happens. 
First, we deal with a principally new, unprecedented situation related to governing an 
extremely complicated and huge socio-natural system, which human beings have never 
encountered in their history. This situation is exacerbated by the fact that the humankind's 
experience and the proven practices to resolving complex problems are not valid any 
more. At the same time, no new approaches have been worked out yet. 
Second, the world community, in spite of the increasing interdependence of different 
countries and peoples, still remains fragmented, divided into autonomous and self-
organized structures, which function in accordance to their own laws targeting, first of all, 
their private profits and interests. These are nation-states, multinational corporations, and 
confessional systems, such as Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, etc. 
And third, globalization itself and its numerous consequences remain a subject of seri-
ous discussions. Such discussions often conceal the main thing: globalization is, first of all, 
an objective historical process and not a project specially designed by someone, or some-
one's insidious plan and intention. We should emphasize this point because if in rethinking 
globalization processes and their circumstances we proceed from a subjective factor and pay 
attention mainly to those who benefit from it, and then we would start to search for perpetra-
tors and discuss globalization scenarios. In this case we face our inability to distinguish be-
                                                          
1 An article by Alexander B. Weber ‘Systemic World and the Problem of Global Governance’ published in Vek Glob-
alisatsii journal (Weber 2009) is one of the first publications attempting to formulate this problem and to seek ap-
proaches to its solution. 
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tween an objective, natural course of events of social development and subjective human 
activity. The former, of course, is the basis of social development but it is not sufficient to 
provide governing complex systems without adequate structures and mechanisms. Thinking 
globally, one cannot help recognizing the state of affairs: there are no structures and mecha-
nisms of government adequate to the holistic global world. That is why, in my opinion, it 
is useless to look for perpetrators or those responsible for globalizations. Moreover, such 
approach engenders illusions and is dangerous because it complicates the matter and dis-
tracts from the search for real solutions for the urgent issues. 
When considering globalization first of all as an objective historical process (which is 
my position), one should look for means of solving globalization-engendered problems 
(including governing social systems) in the sphere of structural changes of the world soci-
ety. This approach is based on a proposition that complex systems, or, at least, biosystems 
(of which human beings are a part) in their development are regulated naturally, based on 
natural laws. Here one can talk about the self-regulation of complex systems.  
Apart from that, social systems are also governed, because an active element plays an 
important role in their development. This active element is human beings who, due to their 
abilities, consciously influence various parameters of development. It is evident that the 
planetary-scale social system, which is being formed now, should not be just self-
regulated but also governed. It is important to distinguish between regulation and gov-
ernment, because they are not the same.  
Regulation (from Latin ‘regulo’ – to set up, to fix, to order) should be understood as 
a spontaneous process or intentional activity aimed at providing functioning of this or that 
system within a framework of parameters, set up naturally or intentionally. 
Via regulation (as well as self-regulation) one can solve the task of the most optimal 
functioning of a system, creating the most favorable conditions for interaction of different 
components of this system. Regulation is aimed at consolidated actions of various parts of 
a whole and can be done consciously (when human beings play a regulative role), or spon-
taneously (when we talk about self-regulating systems). Population numbers constantly 
changing within some limits is an example of natural (spontaneous) regulation of a system. 
It depends on the presence of food supplies, or on obtaining its external parameters based 
on its genetic code and specific environmental conditions. 
The biosphere as a whole is also a self-regulating system, whose balanced develop-
ment is supported by the law of the struggle for survival. Regulation becomes purposeful 
when it is done with participation of a subjective factor, introducing some order to this or 
that system. This is how a traffic-controller acts at a crossroads or a specialist regulating, 
for example, the functioning of an engine, the level of water in a basin or tuning an an-
tenna. Regulation can be conducted automatically, for example, on roads via traffic lights. 
Governance, unlike regulation, never occurs naturally and spontaneously. It always as-
sumes the presence of subjective factors and is characterized by more complex structure of 
relations between the subject and the object. Governance is associated with such notions as 
‘justice’ and ‘law’; it is a conscious process or activity aiming at achieving a specific result. 
This activity is based on predetermined order of conduct combined with creative acts of 
an agent making decisions not only on the basis of already set norms and rules, but de-
pending on situational changes. 
So, unlike regulation, governance is always connected with conscious human activity 
based on setting goals, feedback and creativity. In other words, government is always per-
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formed consciously and purposefully. It presupposes both getting this or that result and 
finding the most optimal means to achieve the goal. Thus, general governance and global 
governance in particular cannot emerge spontaneously or naturally. It only can appear in 
a society and can only be developed consciously, purposefully and following certain logic, 
which provides specific parameters of such governance. Here, unlike regulation, one al-
ways can find an active source – subjects of governance, setting some goals and providing 
their achievement. 
Governance is, thus, a higher level of regulation, as well as development is a higher 
form of movement. That is why there can be no development without movement while we 
can commonly see movement without development. Similarly, governance presupposes 
regulation, while regulation can take place (occur) without governance. 
In this context we can talk about historical dynamics of development of social rela-
tions when their natural regulation was eventually complimented by governance. For ex-
ample, in the period of savagery and, to a large extent, in the period of barbarity, primitive 
people's relations were regulated by force and the survival of the strongest. As for govern-
ing social relations in the full sense, it emerges later, together with settled way of life, la-
bor division, formation of a state and, finally, formation of the first civilizations. Such 
governance is already based on the realization of certain interests and purposefulness. It 
does not substitute natural regulation, but rather supplements it, making social develop-
ment more predictable and less controversial. This is how all social systems evolve, of 
which nation-states have become the largest and the best organized. 
From the mid- twentieth century the situation has principally changed because due to 
globalization processes the whole humankind becomes a holistic system. It more and more 
resembles a single holistic organism based on the central parameters of social life (eco-
nomic, political, and informational, etc.), on its interaction with natural environment, on 
exploring world oceans, outer space, etc. At the same time, in spite of the fact that interna-
tional anarchy of the past gradually became more ordered, this order is not satisfactory 
when one takes into consideration contemporary challenges to humankind.  
From this viewpoint, it is evident that humankind has reached a threshold, beyond 
which spontaneous regulation of social relations cannot continue any longer. It should be 
supplemented with conscious and purposeful building of systemic governance, because the 
world of global relations without effective global governance would encounter serious 
testing. 
Nowadays our world is like a tall ship, which has so far no steering wheel, but is already 
being brought by wind from a relatively safe haven to the open sea. Its crew, stuck in con-
flicts and making no efforts to governing the ship, inevitably becomes hostage of circum-
stances and natural elements. The world community, having entered the era of global inter-
dependence, should acknowledge the danger of uncontrolledness of the modern world and to 
start acting in concord and with purpose. If not, this state of affairs promises nothing good 
for the world community. Without effective governance, the world community will only 
slide more and more into the abyss of increasing conflicts and contradictions. 
There can be another analogy to the contemporary global world – a period of human his-
tory, which Th. Hobbes metaphorically called ‘war of everyone against everyone’. We all 
know that in that time the problem was resolved through the emergence of state as  
an artificial body able to provide peace and order both locally and globally. Hobbes com-
pared it to Leviathan – a biblical monster possessing immeasurable power (see Hobbes 
1991).  
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Has the situation changed much? The world community seems to have reached the 
same situation of ‘war of everyone against everyone’. The difference is that this now glob-
al and, in fact, non-regulated confrontation is not between separate people but between 
sovereign nation-states together with various international bodies and organizations. 
How is Global Governance Possible? 
This state of affairs in the absence of global ethics, global law and universally recognized 
human values, drags the world community into the situation of struggle for survival.  
As a result, most international contradictions and discussions are resolved by power 
policy. Power is not necessarily represented in a brutal and rough form. Quite often, espe-
cially in the economic sphere, coercion is exercised through soft power. Anyhow, the one 
who is stronger and more sophisticated, the one with advantages and pursuing uncontrol-
lably selfish interests, wins. 
In this situation, the UN is practically powerless, although seems to be the only insti-
tution for us to rely on. This organization was created in a different epoch and for resolv-
ing issues other than governing the global world, such as, first of all, prevention of the new 
world war and performing regulatory functions worldwide. It would be naïve to think that 
the reform of the UN as such can change anything cardinally.2 At the same time, new at-
tempts are made to respond serious challenges. New global and regional supranational 
organizations emerge, such as G8, G20, the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, 
the European Union, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, etc. But one should not be 
mesmerized by these structures. They are built to provide cooperative efforts at regional 
and global levels and they somehow manage to do it. At the same time, these organiza-
tions do not solve and are by and large unable to solve the main contradictions of our time 
formulated above. 
First, all of them represent only a certain part of humankind, a region or a separated 
sphere of social activity. Without representing the world as a whole and in its different 
aspects, any governance is doomed to be, at least, limited.  
Second, such organizations at the worldwide scale are only able, at their best, to per-
form some regulative functions, being not appropriate for governing world system as 
a whole. 
It is not surprising that nearly all global projects of the last days, of which ‘Peaceful 
coexistence’, ‘Sustainable development’, ‘Multiculturalism’ and some other are the most 
well-known ones, provide no desirable results or even prove to be invalid. It happens be-
cause, as it has been mentioned above, we have no adequate mechanisms to realize them 
successfully.  
As a result, the conflict of interest in the global world increases, reinforced by grow-
ing openness and accessibility of information, which becomes the most important resource 
and an effective tool for governing social processes, including distant governance. This is 
why dispersed oppositions in various countries act with such coordination and can over-
throw governments in the course of so-called ‘colored’, or ‘Twitter’ revolutions.  
Thus, modern humankind simply has no alternative but global governance, which 
should be created at all costs and as soon as possible. It does not matter, whether it will be 
something like a world state or some supra-national structures to govern the world com-
munity. Evidently, the world government, so much spoken about, would be insufficient.  
It is important to understand that executive power (government) without other branches, 
                                                          
2 This topical issue is still widely and vigorously debated. 
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structures and institutions of power would not be able to act. I will return to this issue; now 
I should stress that to solve this task, one should answer several principal questions: 
– How is global governance generally possible and what is the logic of this govern-
ance?  
– What are the main tasks of global governance? 
– What preconditions for the creation of the global governance already exist in con-
temporary world?  
– What kind of present international organizations and bodies fit (or will be able to fit 
after some degree of reform) the essence and principles of global governance? 
– What obstacles can be found on the way towards creating global governance? 
– What principal decisions and at what level should be made as the first and the fol-
lowing steps in achieving the goals set? 
– Who can and should take responsibility for developing global governance? 
– Finally, what are the costs and who should pay them? 
So, to answer the above-listed questions, one should first answer the most important 
one: Is global governance generally possible, and if ‘yes’, then, ‘how’? 
History allows us to face the future with some optimism. Since the modern age and 
the emergence of the first ideas to make social life peaceful universally and up to now, 
when this task became paramount, humankind, beyond doubt, has collected some theoreti-
cal and practical results in this sphere. Serious contributions to the theory and philosophy 
of human unity and world (planetary) government were made by John Lock, Immanuel 
Kant, Vladimir Solovyov, Nikolai Berdyaev, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Vladimir Ver-
nadsky, Karl Jaspers, Ferdinand Tönnies, Thorstein Veblen, Bertrand Russell, Albert Ein-
stein, Norbert Elias, Saul Mendlowitz, Helmut Schmidt, Aurelio Peccei, Andrei Sakharov, 
Amitai Etzioni, Richard Falk, Friedrich Kratochvil, Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, Ervin 
Laszlo, Glen Martin and others. 
Summing up the heritage in this sphere of knowledge, one can say that all specula-
tions, theories and ideas on common destiny of humankind, global governance, world 
government and so on, have, as a rule, one goal: to find ways and means to achieve peace-
ful coexistence of peoples while preserving their cultural identity. Kant, for example, as 
early as in 1795 when thinking about possibility and principles of reason-based social 
governance wrote in his famous treatise ‘Zum Ewigen Frieden’ that eternal peace is not an 
empty speculation but a task which is being gradually solved and is approaching its reali-
zation (Kant 1966: 309).  
To confirm that the famous philosopher was right, one can point to a constantly grow-
ing interest to this problem and to numerous public organizations that emerged in the last 
decades. Their names speak for themselves: the World Constitution and Parliament Asso-
ciation, World Federalist Association, World Federalist Movement, World Union, World 
Citizens Movement, etc. (Mazour and Chumakov 2006: 131). 
If one looks at practical issues, it cannot go unnoticed that the world community has 
accumulated, during its long history, a significant experience of governing large social 
systems – states, empires, kingdoms, confederations, unions, blocs, etc. The state has 
proven in practice to be the most widespread and enduring form of organizing social life. 
Morality and law are the central instruments of social governance, through which one 
can provide the strongest influence on social consciousness and human behavior.  
We should also emphasize ideology, politics, economy, finance, culture, etc., through 
which social systems are also directly or indirectly governed. But morality and law, no 
doubt, dominate these factors, because they literally penetrate and link together all other 
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spheres of social life, being, in this or that way, subdued to moral and legal norms  
and laws.  
Today, when multi-aspect globalization makes the whole world community a holistic 
planetary system, governing this mega-system becomes a demand of the time and it should 
be built taking into consideration the whole experience accumulated by humankind in this 
sphere. It seems evident that global governance should be based on the historically tested 
principle of separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers. 
In this regard one can and should talk not just (as usual) about World Government (ex-
ecutive power) but also about a World Parliament (legislative power) and Global Law Sys-
tem (judicial power), based on global law. To see them realized, as well as to form an ef-
fective planetary system of governance, we should create adequate conditions, of which 
the most important are the following: 
Universally recognized moral foundations, meaning that we should form universal 
values and universal morality for the planet. They should not replace, but enforce and am-
plify morality and values of different peoples. It seems that the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, equating all people in their right to life, freedom and property, should be 
the starting point for the formation of such a morality. 
A single legal system is another necessary condition for global governance, together 
with a planetary system of adaptation and implementation of legal norms universal for all 
countries and peoples. We should emphasize that here we speak not about international 
law, which is already well-developed at the level of interstate and regional relations, but 
about global law, which would be really universal. Such a law does not presuppose abol-
ishment of legal systems of separate states or regional structures, of international legal acts 
and institutions. It is important, but the national/regional law should be brought with cor-
respondence with the global law and should not contradict it. 
Global governance also means providing cooperative security and uniting efforts in 
maintaining it through various forms of cooperation. First of all, we talk about economic 
cooperation, which already successfully evolves in the modern world in the form of multi-
national corporations, consortiums, joint ventures, etc. World trade has already made all 
peoples of the planet involved into the single market of labor, goods and services. 
Planetary political cooperation is the next necessary condition for global governance. 
It should provide resolution of conflicts and peaceful coexistence through compromising 
and resolving disputes taking into consideration the maximum of interests of different 
parts. Global political cooperation, unlike economic cooperation, still is to be developed 
because in this sphere relations are built so far on the absolute priority of national and cor-
porative interests. 
Military cooperation, existing nowadays at the regional level and meeting the defense 
tasks of separate countries and peoples (i.e. protecting them from external threats), should 
be replaced by police forces providing law and order, protection from criminal activities.  
The recent world financial crisis has shown once again that coordinated planetary 
financial policy is a necessary condition for global governance. It is evident that it is 
hard and even impossible to implement coordinated financial policy without a single 
currency. 
Religious tolerance and separation of church (religious institutions) from institutions 
(structures) of global governance is necessary as the most important condition for peaceful 
coexistence and constructive interaction of different people, independent of their religious 
beliefs or non-beliefs.  
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Scientific and technological cooperation as well as cooperation in the sphere of health 
and education presupposes creating conditions for a balanced cultural and social develop-
ment of various continents and regions of the planet.  
A common (world) language for international communication is needed to support 
conversation in various spheres of social life and to develop intercultural interaction.  
A well-known Korean philosopher Yersu Kim mentions (2009: 191) that language may be 
compared with culture: as well as culture itself is a system of symbolic meanings serving 
common needs of its members.  
Of course, we have not listed all conditions needed for creating a system of global 
governance. But these are the most important ones, without which all the rest will make no 
sense. 
Who is Responsible? 
Now a few words regarding what principal decisions and at what level should be made 
initially and afterwards to achieve the goals set. 
Decisions concerning building the global system of governance should be made, of 
course, at the planetary level. A World Conference, roughly analogical to the World envi-
ronmental conference in Rio de Janeiro (1992), could become the first step. It could also 
be a world summit of heads of all states, which would work out principal approaches to 
global governance. In the future operative-tactical and strategic decisions would become 
more often the prerogative of the newly emerging structures. 
Finally, who can and should take responsibility for building global governance and 
what are the costs and who should pay them? 
First of all, this responsibility lies on the world academic, political and business elites, 
that is on people having adequate worldview, possessing necessary knowledge, have the 
strongest authorities and material resources. On the other hand, the most affluent countries 
and alliances (the USA, the EU, China, Russia, India, Brazil and others) should take initial 
basic responsibility for building the system of global governance. They also should carry 
the main burden of financial support of a reform of modern international relations. This 
does not mean, however, that there should be countries or nations at our planet, which 
would be free from their own reasonable contribution into common expenses. 
Some may say that this is all a utopia, and that global governance is impossible, and 
the supporting arguments listed above are insufficient. This viewpoint has its right to exist, 
because we cannot so far provide a final proof of the truth of our statements. Some can 
question the appropriateness and sequence of the steps proposed and they may also be 
right, because we discuss a topic unprecedented in human history. That is why it is so im-
portant to consider the issue of global governance in all its aspects, including philosophy, 
which, unlike science, is oriented not so much towards finding concrete, final solutions but 
towards broadening the scope of various approaches to solve a problem. Such philosophi-
cal analysis is especially valuable where exact scientific methods have not been worked 
out yet, but the situation does need immediate resolution. The problem of governing the 
contemporary global world is such a case. 
Dialogue as a Way to Overcome Problems 
So, if we take into considerations the above said, today in the global world political deci-
sions between rationality and demands of wisdom and the dialogue of cultures and civili-
zations are the only possible way to resolve contradictions in a constructive way and to 
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provide a balanced social development both at the national and global levels. But they 
have their limits defined by the following points. 
First, approaches based on a separate ‘dialogue of cultures’ or ‘dialogue of civilizations’ 
are not successful, because they do not reflect the genuine (cultural-cum-civilizational) nature 
of social life, which is a combination of cultural achievements and civilizational relations of 
society. 
Second, every culture is initially self-sufficient and is eager to preserve its identity. 
Therefore, a constructive dialogue based on culture alone is impossible; one should not 
expect much from intercultural dialogue and count on bringing different cultural positions 
close to each other. At the same time, one should not be too pessimistic.  
And the higher is the level of civilizational development of the interacting parties, the 
more productive this dialogue can be. However, the level of civilizational development of 
various nations and humanity as a whole still remains very low. Even the academic com-
munity does not fully understand that the level of development of civilization of this or 
that people (a country, a collective, an individual) is the other side of their cultural devel-
opment. That is why the policy of multiculturalism, not considering the civilizational gap 
in the development of various cultures, has been, in fact, seriously defeated not only in 
Europe but in other countries and regions as well. 
One cannot agree with Samuel Huntington talking about ‘clash of civilizations’. In 
fact, we deal with confrontation of different ‘cultural-cum-civilizational’ systems (the 
West and the East, capitalism and socialism, Islam and Christianity, etc.), where they 
confront one another on the basis of cultures but interact on the basis of civilization. This 
creates multiplicity of cultural-cum-civilizational systems. 
Thus, the cultural-cum-civilizational dialogue implies admitting the multipolarity of 
the contemporary global world. And to make it effective we need common civilizational 
principles of social organization, of which the most important are the following:  
 recognizing and protecting basic human rights; 
 a conventional system of ethical norms and values (universal morality); 
 a single legal system (global law);  
 religious tolerance and freedom of consciousness.  
Responsibility for building such principles and providing conditions for a productive 
dialogue in the global world lies, first of all, on the world political, academic and business 
elites, as well as on nation-states as the largest organized social systems.  
And, if the measure of responsibility of politicians depends on their position, the level 
of states' responsibility depends directly on their role in the global system of economic, 
military, political and cultural relations.  
Lessons from the World Crisis and Conclusions 
The decisions on the creation of the global system of governance should be made, of 
course, at the planetary level.  
And we must say that apart from states and intergovernmental organizations two ma-
jor factors have emerged in world policy by now: global business and global civil society. 
They seem to become the main components of the nascent global governance mechanism. 
One should expect the partnership of these structures to become dominant at all lev-
els – global, regional and local – in the near future. 
Solving the task of global governance humankind needs to overcome an important 
psychological barrier. For centuries the state remained at the core of international rela-
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tions; these relations seem to be impossible without states. Now, globalization more and 
more eliminates the differences between internal and external economic and social proc-
esses. Intrastate regulators are losing their autonomy and have to act in cooperation with 
other states, large multinational and world civil society. Governing alliances are formed, 
where the state interacts with civil society and private business. 
With increasing globalization, the transnational relations expand and world civil soci-
ety becomes more and more visible. This process is supported, first, by the growing num-
ber of problems encountered by most (or even all) countries. Second, rapid development 
of the means of international communication, such as Internet, makes the consolidated 
activity of national civil societies much easier. 
Thus, the global civil society as a system of non-governmental and non-commercial 
organizations, concerned with the destiny of the world community, will increasingly play 
its role of one of the world society' regulators, alongside with business and, surely, the 
state. 
At the same time, in this emerging global governance system the separate states are 
expected to be not sovereign and all-powerful masters of their territories, but one of the 
elements of a supra-state mechanism for regulating global processes. This mechanism will 
not be habitually hierarchical, but rather network-like. National power structures, being 
remnants of the previous era, may become hubs of the nascent global governance network. 
In conclusion, I would like to note that it is impossible by simple means to overcome 
the differing interests of the countries that are at different stages of economic develop-
ment. Possible compromises are also very limited, as the range of differences is too great. 
But the path of small compromise is, apparently, the only one which in the future could 
reduce global risks associated with inequality. The development of new and the reform of 
existing principles of global governance should be among the priority tasks of all national 
governments and international organizations. No need to tackle the great challenges im-
mediately – it will be very difficult or even impossible to resolve it given divergence of 
interests. But, taking slow steps to each other, in the future you can get close so that the 
contradictions will cease to be insurmountable.  
If at some point it becomes clear that the bar is set too high and is insurmountable, we 
should lower it and continue our efforts. The convergence of countries, especially in the 
sphere of trade, is a necessary prerequisite for reduction of the risks in many spheres, in-
cluding economy. 
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Can international relations (IR) be a distinctive discipline? In the present paper 
I argue that such a discipline would be a social science that could be formulated 
within the perspective of comparative paradigms. The objections to scientific 
methods are thus overcome by the logic of international oppositions, in other 
words a model takes several paradigms into account and considers three kinds 
of foreign relation (enemy, friend, and rival) in the light of three main questions: 
what is IR about (ontology); what does relate therein (epistemology); and how to 
assess such a relation (logic). 
Keywords: international relations (IR), state, nation, country, foreign policy. 
Introduction: What is IR? 
Roughly speaking, the ‘international relations’ is the study of relations among nations. 
Therefore, it deals with foreign policy. But what does a ‘nation’ mean as distinct from its 
twin concept of a state? In the present paper I would like to deal with this issue by investi-
gating the foundations of the so-called theory of international relations (hereafter, IR), to-
gether with the possibility of its formalization from a logical point of view. In what fol-
lows, I investigate three main domains helping to face this challenge having assumed 
a formal philosophy of global processes for the method of my study. 
Ontology (who?) 
The first domain is the ontology of IR: What sort of being is there, that is what are the 
political categories that matter in such a discipline? Ontology is the domain of philosophy 
concerned with the identity of agents; in short, it purports to answer the following ques-
tion: What are the relata a,b in any international relations of the form R(a,b)? The plausible 
candidates for these are states, regional alliances, transnational firms, non-governmental 
organizations, mere individuals, and the like.  
Epistemology (what?) 
The second domain is the epistemology of IR which concerns the relation R in itself, 
namely: What is the nature of the relation between any two specified relata?  
Because of the troublesome distinction between facts and interpretations, the problem 
here is how to characterize a relation: by means of a natural or a human science whose 
methodological rules crucially differ. As the German philosopher of culture Wilhelm 
Dilthey (1833–1911) stated, ‘We explain nature; we understand psychic life’. For this rea-
son, a genuine theory of IR should be clarified either through the explanation (causal dis-
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course) or through the understanding (intentional discourse) it is supposed to provide in 
order to make sense of any given ‘fact’.  
On the one hand, the sort of discourse attached to a given political event may differ 
following the Aristotelian fourfold set of causes, whether these are material (the material 
conditions under which an event happen), efficient (the agents who caused the event), 
formal (the definition of the event), or final (the reason why some event was provoked by 
some agents).  
On the other hand, the kind of cause the IR theorist tends to choose actually depends 
upon the sort of questions she/he naturally asks before making her/his point; indeed, ques-
tions make sense of events and relevantly betray the questioner's assumptions. We will 
return to this crucial role of questions with the case of paradigms, as implicit theoretical 
representations in the construction of IR. This role is all the more crucial for whoever 
doubts the positivist view that facts are transparent data.  
To put it blantly: what is a fact? Against the positivist dream of a Sirius point from 
which any situation could be easily depicted, it hardly makes sense to assume a theorist 
asking neutral questions. A radically opposed view has been endorsed by the Frankfurt 
School and famously stated by the post-positivist Robert Cox in the following words: 
‘Theory is always for someone and for some purpose’, thus discarding the common belief 
in bare facts. Correspondingly, the choice of specific questions to make sense of political 
events may lead to such paradigms as realism, liberalism, or some more fine-grained vari-
ants. Their level of abstraction may vary, according to the theoretical concerns that make 
them arise: any investigation about the geopolitical strategy of a state leads to technical 
questions about material resources, for example, while a larger reflection about the moti-
vations of mankind resort to the more general domain of political philosophy and leads to 
what may be called ‘meta-questions’ (abstract questions about more concrete questions). 
To account for the complexification of world politics throughout the notion of global-
ization, the paper aims at describing the transition from state-centred relations to Global 
Studies by means of an inquiry into the construction of a world space and through the set 
of social interrelation networks. Such a large-scale ambition may lead to a disciplinary 
holism, in the sense that such a large topic as IR calls for a number of related disciplines 
from politics to other social sciences like sociology (religion and culture), anthropology 
(human nature), psychology (folk behavior, statesmen's rationale), or economics (geopo-
litical motivations).  
A natural objection to this project concerns its philosophical flavor. After all, the story 
of the world patently showed how the history of ideas departs from the history of nations. 
From Plato's expedition in Syracuse to utopian speculations, recall these words by Freder-
ick II of Prussia (1712–1786) that summarize some reluctance in the air at floating abstrac-
tions, ‘If I wished to punish a province, I would have it governed by philosophers’.  
The king argued by these words against the liberal-minded view of Enlightenment phi-
losophers, among which Rousseau's concept of general will or Kant's project of perpetual 
peace. At the same time, it should be noted that not every philosopher is a liberal thinker. 
Think about Hobbes' republican absolutism, or Heidegger's fascination for the Third 
Reich. Notwithstanding a common opinion of the effect that philosophy distorts reality,  
I would reply that the present paper aims at a philosophy for IR rather than a theory of IR 
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for philosophers. In short, the point is not to give a prescriptive view of what IR should be 
but, rather, to think speculatively about what IR might be, without any definite answer and 
by means of proper interrogative methods.  
Accordingly, philosophy is not to be taken as a field of ideologists or idealists opposed 
to the so-called ‘internationalists’, that is the theorists of IR whose favored domain would 
be the field of action and pragmatics. There are two main objectives of the next sections: 
to break with this shared view and to show how both domains are interrelated. 
Logic (how?) 
Finally, the third domain is the logic of IR: How to account for the sort of relation R 
between the relata a, b in R(a, b)?  
Against a positivist stance that claims to penetrate reality and its facts with one-sided 
answers, the primary role I impute to questions in the very process of a theory leads to  
a ‘logic of IR’ in a larger sense of the word, that is a guess-who game, where a variety of 
questions makes sense of political events without giving a final answer to the question 
how the world politics is ruled. While this method has already been applied in other con-
texts by means of a so-called Question-Answer Semantics (see, e.g., Schang 2012), I sug-
gest to organize the content of IR in the form of a qualitative model with coefficients (see 
Section 3).  
By doing so, a difference must be made between what is meant by a paradigm and an 
ideology (compare with the debate between Kuhn and Feyerabend about the legitimacy of 
natural science) and be able to overcome the oversimplifying dichotomy between philoso-
phy (orating about morality) and politics (aiming at efficiency). In particular, such an en-
terprise amounts to a formalization of IR towards a continuist dynamics: enduring ques-
tions may lead to changing answers, in order to account for (giving a sense to) the theory 
of IR and its numerous ‘-isms’ (realism, liberalism, neo-structuralism, culturalism, marx-
ism, constructivism, and so on). In case of successful results, formal epistemology of IR 
has to clarify their technical parlance and numerous concepts related to the previous areas 
of ontology and epistemology. A sample of it is given by what the French internationalist 
Jean-Louis Martres said about his German fellow Alexander Wendt (who depicts himself 
as a ‘constructivist’ or second-rank theorist, strives to establish the identity of neo-liberal 
and neo-realist views, both relying upon an ‘ontological atomism and an epistemological 
positivism’); in short, Martres blames both neo-liberal and neo-realist theories for reifying 
instances, whether the agent, the state, or the world system (Martres 2008: 34). 
Let us review in detail the way in which IR can be characterized in its foundations and 
prospects. 
1. The Object: State vs Country 
Let us consider again the primary question: what is the object of IR?  
The traditional answer is state-centrism, according to which the IR deals with nothing 
but states since the Treaty of Westphalia (1648). In the same vein, the French politologist 
Raymond Aron (1905–1983) depicted IR as the set of relations between states that are en-
dowed with the monopoly of legitimate physical violence (for external war and inner re-
pression). This means that political relations are uniquely about states, insofar as these rule 
armies and are entitled to declare war against foreign powers. The American international-
ist Kenneth Waltz (1924–2013) summed up this classical view by a reductio argument, 
‘For what can act on the international scene, if not states?’ 
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In contradistinction to such a mainstream approach, I want to formulate a plea for po-
litical pluralism which is an alternative view stating that IR is not so much about states or 
even nations than countries, so to a wide extent it is the agents that matter. Thus, the Eng-
lish Susan Strange was depicted as blaming the abuse of state-centrism in political science: 
Being exclusively interested in the state (state-centrism) is oversimplifying and leads to 
develop a conception of political science that does not help understand human condition 
and does not take into account the various entities having an economic and political power 
(Tooze 2001: 103). 
Borrowing from an analogy of the American philosopher Willard van Orman Quine, 
countries are not homogenous entities but, rather, force fields composed of contradictory 
forces. They include military forces (states), but also economic forces (multinational firms, 
transnational holdings, lobbies) and social movements (undergrounds organizations, ethnic 
minorities, leagues of civil rights). To manage these contradictory forces and ensure their 
foreign policy, states have to do with such ‘inner enemies’ to maintain their coercive force 
and attempt to legitimate what Aron referred to as the monopoly of physical violence. 
While state-centrism assumes that states are the only efficient forces in IR, the aforemen-
tioned counter-forces often occur from the public opinion, especially medias.  
And conversely, a more comprehensive approach to IR should take into account the 
influential role of medias over mass beliefs: sometimes medias serve as a public weapon 
against the state policy; sometimes the states employ them to turn public opinion into 
a general will. It results in a two-fold behavior, that is to construct an official propaganda 
of state-nations or to provoke a reaction of public opinion against the state's action. The 
role of propaganda corroborates a previous objection to the positivist belief in bare facts, 
insofar as the power of mass media constructs a collective picture of reality beyond its 
duty to tell the truth to educated people.  
Concerning the very nature of the relata a,b in the general scheme R(a,b) embedding 
IR, a difference is to be made between state, nation, and country. Just as a state organizes 
the inner policy in a country, a nation means a homogeneous set of people ruled by a state 
(state-nation) whereas a country is the spatial territory on which a state rules its given na-
tion. My emphasis upon countries thereby enlarges the scope of IR while avoiding to reify 
the state as a static representation of a standing nation. Instead of talking about such static 
elements, the general trend of the following goes towards a dynamic approach to countries 
as the proper relata of IR A balance is to be found between total order and total chaos, as 
argued by Martres, neglecting slyness removes the agent while favoring deep forces and 
trends; extolling the uniqueness of a phenomenon cancels any logicality to the system of 
international relations and leads to chaos. 
For this purpose, a reference to countries amounts to a set of moving forces whose in-
terrelations are supposed to make sense of the worldwide history. Once the agents are 
identified (in a provisory way, at the very least), let us consider the nature of their relation 
in any foreign policy. What are they doing exactly that justifies the construction of a the-
ory of IR?  
2. The Relation: Force vs Power 
Here is the second question of our inquiry: Which sort of relation stands in IR?  
A brief overview of the origins helps to give a preliminary answer. Let us note indeed that 
the discipline has been founded to understand and warrant the conditions of peace between 
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states; it has been created in 1919 by the Welsh sponsor David Davies, who supported the 
first professorship of international politics at the University College of Wales in Aberyst-
wyth. Despite this primary goal of stable peaceful relations between states exhausted by 
the First World War, the breakdown of the League of Nations and the subsequent the Sec-
ond World War dramatically showed a patent failure of idealist optimism from the twen-
ties onwards and led to the shared conclusion that international right, democracy, and free 
trade would not be sufficient conditions for peace. In this sense, the external anarchy be-
tween states marked the triumph of state-centrism and the related view that states are the 
only necessary organizations of human societies. This accounts for the fall of idealism and 
the rise of realism, given the historical context of the young discipline.  
A philosophical, more general assessment of the situation consists in saying that the 
theory of IR is nothing but a social science whose agents are naturally determined by hu-
man desires, including power. Thus, any realist would say that she/he aims at assessing the 
action of states through their essential search for power. Note that while the realists equate 
power with the aggressive or offensive way to satisfy one's own interests, such a concept is 
not as clear as it stands. As a matter of fact, power has more to do with the status of a po-
litical force than the conditions under which it can preserve it, assuming force as  
a physical aggression at the forefront. In a sense, the relation of cooperation may be also 
viewed as a single mode of power obtained with the help of other means within a set of 
peaceful relations. Nevertheless, power is usually viewed as a one-sided action used by 
a single state for its unilateral interest. If power corresponds to a general situation of satis-
faction, however, its necessary and sufficient conditions are not given unanimously among 
the theorists. For the ones, power requires violence as the best defense of its own interests 
against the others’ (Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Schmitt, and Huntington); for the 
others, it requires peace in order to ensure a standing and fruitful cooperation between po-
tential partners (Rousseau, Kant, Fukuyama). Actually, the characterization of power de-
pends on how mankind and societies are viewed from an anthropological perspective. No 
wonder if the historical context contributes to the answers, as witnessed by, for example, 
the role played by the bloody civil war of England on Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) and 
his subsequent anthropological pessimism. Hence his words from the Leviathan (ch. XI), 
‘In the first place, I put for a general inclination of all mankind a perpetual and restless 
desire of power after power, that ceases only in death’. A similar description of mankind 
as a perpetual quest for maximizing power can be also found in the concepts of conatus 
(any effort to persist in being) by Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677), or the concept of will of 
power (‘Wille zur Macht’) by Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900). Between war and peace 
as preconditions for power, a primary dichotomy thereby occurred within the theory of IR 
between liberalism (or idealism) and realism. Marxism was introduced into IR only after 
the Second World War, to account for the economical relations between states.  
Whatever the answer given to the sources of power, each of these stands for a given 
paradigm, that is, a system of assumptions, concepts, values, and practices that constitutes 
a way of viewing reality. The role of paradigms in the theoretical construction of IR was 
represented as follows:  
Etymologically speaking, ‘paradigm’ means ‘declination’ and, without altering the sense, 
we can accept the view that paradigm functions as a dogma; dogma from which the sense 
of the object at hand can be gathered (Martres 2008: 37). 
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Returning to the difference between a paradigm and an ideology, the former can be 
taken to be a set of interrelated implicit beliefs whereas the latter reduces all these beliefs 
to a central one (compare with the Marxist reduction of superstructures to the economic 
infrastructure of production modes). In both cases, the problem concerns the way to organ-
ize values and the criteria attached to their political relevance. What is to be favored be-
tween economical and military power, for instance? Starting from a binary opposition be-
tween idealism and realism, the theory of IR increasingly introduced more complex data to 
explain historical events: no black-or-white scenario between either total war or total 
peace but, rather, a pale gray lore of interrelations between different agents and their 
common environment.  
A large literature on IR attempts to inject some rationality behind these international 
facts, while attempting to justify their own paradigms at hand. Let us go through a list of 
such theorists and their main assumptions.  
In response to the failure of British idealism, the American realist Hans Morgenthau 
supported a classical realism by advocating offensive power against the alleged threat of 
the Soviet Union.  
Then the complex evolution of the Cold War was paralleled by a general reflection 
about international regimes in the eighties and nineties, to do justice to the role of com-
mon objectives among the states through regular international institutions or general 
agreements.  
Although most of the theorists agree about the situation of anarchy between states (no 
higher authority rules them over and above their own sovereignty), the existence of re-
gional or worldwide organizations (UNO, NATO, and the like) refined the notion of anar-
chy in three ways: in a Hobbesian (states are mutual enemies), Lockean (states are mutual 
rivals), or Kantian (states are mutual friends) sense of the word. By augmenting the binary 
opposition friend-enemy with a third intermediary term of rivalty (following Carl Schmitt 
in this respect), Kenneth Waltz took the logic of Lockean anarchy to be the prominent way 
to understand the contemporary history (Waltz 2003); it resulted in a so-called neo-
realism, or structural realism, that differs from the classical version by strengthening the 
role of economic relations towards the global task of sustaining power.  
In other words, realists and idealists are at odds as to the fundamental objectives of  
a state; nevertheless, they may agree about the way to achieve it as in the common objec-
tive of economic growth (among the liberal-minded defenders of idealism and the neo-
realists). For example, Robert Gilpin equally defends neo-realism by arguing that econ-
omy takes growing interest in coercive relations; while Andrew Moravcsik claims that the 
rational individual is prime and supports neo-liberalism against the realist assumption of 
state-centrism. But trading is at any rate the central factor that most of the international 
relations rely upon, whether in a competing or in a friendlier way.  
Given the increasing influence of commercial relations after the Second World War 
and the ensuing hegemony of the United States, a large network of interrelations has de-
veloped between the states until then. The upshot is a number of more or less cooperative 
agreements, thus favoring a global status quo around two blocks (Western vs. Eastern 
blocks) with economic pressures and nuclear weapons as their major arguments. There-
fore, the history of the post-war world led to a number of more intricate paradigms be-
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tween the absolute relations of peace and war. On the one hand, the school of Neo-
Marxists (also known as dependency theory) emerged with Immanuel Wallerstein or Jo-
han Galtung during the period of decolonization, rendering the American hegemony in 
terms of dominant centers and dominated peripheries. On the other hand, the development 
of information through mass media strengthened the role of public opinion in the collec-
tive decisions; it followed from it some impetus on soft constructivism and transnational-
ism. The former has been famously formulated by Alexander Wendt as follows, ‘Anarchy 
is what states make of it’, in order to turn the realists' negative connotation of anarchy into 
a more positive field of rational and responsible relations between states. The latter weak-
ens the role of these states in the international relations, stressing upon the complex inter-
dependence of collective institutions around the states like non-governmental organiza-
tions and economic firms. Joseph Nye described this globalized situation in terms of soft 
power, according to which the states try to defend their interests by means of cooptation 
rather than the classical coercion of hard power. Likewise, James Rosenau argued for 
a general situation of interstate or multi-centered sphere between interdependent states. 
Again, the binary opposition of peace and war has been muddled by the historical context 
of the postwar world: Bretton Woods, oil crisis and liberal values produced a multi-polar 
framework where rigid masters and servants turned into flexible sellers and clients.  
That is a sketchy (not exhaustive) overview of the paradigms in IR, from the idealist 
sources of the theory to its interdisciplinary stance. To put all of this in order, a question 
naturally arises: How many schools or paradigms can there be in the discipline? To answer 
this question requires a capacity to specify the sort of questions that make sense of such 
worldwide relations between states or broader decision groups: the more questions there 
should be to define the properties of foreign relations, the more paradigms there can be to 
assign a definite value to each of these and establish a resulting hierarchy between them.  
Note that such a debate already occurred within the ‘Four Great Debates’ of the theory 
of IR, concerning the opposition between traditional and behaviorists: Morton Kaplan ad-
vocated the use of quantitative methods to characterize the relations between states, 
whereas Hedley Bull blamed the latter for not taking the random character of human deci-
sions into account. Between science and art, or determination and wisdom, a division oc-
curred as to the role of exact sciences while some of the writers called for the knowledge 
of balance theory, game theory of complex systems to model international relations. Does 
it make sense to use formal tools into a social science, insofar as the latter primarily deals 
with agent's intentions? How to find room inside such a debate between positivists and 
post-positivists, in order to make of history without reducing it to a mechanist and con-
tinuous line?  
3. The Value of the Relation: A Comparative Logic  
A general logic is to be found for the discipline, but not in the sense of explaining the oc-
currence of foreign relations by means of computing data. Rather, the point is to find 
a way to understand the reasons underlying any expected or unexpected relation between 
states or broader items like countries.  
For one thing, the theory of IR is naturally concerned with truth in two respects. It 
ought to respect the criteria of formal (or logical) truth as any normal science, insofar as 
science aims at truth by obeying criteria like consistency. Moreover, it is obviously con-
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cerned with material truth but should not access to it by a mere observation of allegedly 
bare facts: again, facts and interpretations cannot be disentangled in scientific theories. To 
discard the black-and-white picture of reality, Quine (1960: 374) noticed the point that 
‘The lore of our fathers is a fabric of sentences. A pale gray lore, black with fact and white 
with convention’. This means that one and the same political relation may take different 
meanings in different theories, that is depending upon the paradigm adopted to make sense 
of it. A way has been devised to go beyond the naïve distinction between facts and inter-
pretations, thus referring to the Chinese Yixing that emerged during the Warring States 
Period (around 475–221 BC) for political motivations. Thus,  
it is easy to imagine, by resorting to the fundamental matrices of Chinese thought, the con-
struction of a theory of international relations which, ignoring the Western binary distinc-
tion between Good and Evil, would give a much better account of the genuine sense of in-
ternational politics (Martres 2008: 36). 
I see a connection between this Eastern reference and IR, since I developed elsewhere 
(see Schang 2011) a translation of the Yiking in the form of Boolean bitstrings that ex-
press the context-sensitive identity of any meaningful sources of information. In our pre-
sent case, this purports to give a definite number of criteria to characterize the identity of 
context-sensitive countries within our globalized world. 
Consider a ‘guess-who’ game for IR, assuming that there is a finite number of maxi-
mally relevant questions to define the foreign relations between countries. Let us say that 
any yes-answer corresponds to an agreement, that is a friendly relation between two relata 
a and b, whereas any no-answer expresses a disagreement, that is an unfriendly relation 
between them. Four questions are meant to discriminate international relations between 
countries, viz. q1: ‘military agreement?’; q2: ‘economic agreement?’; q3: ‘cultural agree-
ment?’; q4: ‘social agreement?’. The source of agreement between countries relates to 
what is investigated in geopolitics, and the previous questions represent a set of meta-
questions to assess such relations. Indeed, any agreement between countries can be estab-
lished by the existence of international alliances, whether military, economical, or even 
cultural: EU, NATO, NAFTA, Mercosur, and the like. It can also be obtained according to 
the compatibility of their political system (democracy, dictatorship, etc.), their population 
(ethnical, religious kinship), or their standard of living (employment, way of life, mentali-
ties). Furthermore, the main import of paradigms is to establish a hierarchy between the 
previous domains included into the questions: the realists favor military over economic 
criterion; and the other way around for the liberals. In a context-sensitive process of identi-
fication, the relations are defined from a reference country to make sense of the answers.  
Following some previous works about the logic of opposition in Schang (2012), let us 
state that the logical value of a country varies according to this basic reference of a coun-
try. In the context of the Cold War, for example, the United States could be given as such 
a reference (or hegemonic) country. What are the foreign relations between the latter and 
other countries like Yugoslavia, the USSR, France, or Poland? Let ‘1’ be the symbol of 
a yes-answer and ‘0’ be a no-answer, this yields a set of logical values (an ordered set of 
answers A) to our preceding four questions: A(Yugoslavia) – 0100, A(USSR) – 0000, 
A(France) – 1110, and A(Poland) – 0010. Following the definition of the logical relations 
of opposition, any two countries are said to stand into a normal friendship if and only if 
they are subcontrary to each other – they have at last one common yes-answer, while they 
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stand into a mere non-friendship (as either rivals or enemies) if and only if they are con-
tradictory or even contrary to each other – they have no common yes-answer. How to 
make sense of the difference between contradiction and contrariety in IR, taking to be 
granted that such logical relations lead to a mutually hostile relation? Let us say that any 
two countries are mutual enemies whenever they are incompatible relata, and friends (al-
lies) as compatible relata. Insofar as international relations are more dynamic than static 
processes, we can refer to a relation of political integration between a given country and 
a reference country whenever there are more yes-answers than no-answers between them; 
as to the relation of political assimilation, it means that there are only yes-answers (no dis-
tinction) between these. A political preference between countries can be stated as follows: 
any country a prefers b to c if and only if the logical value of b is less different with a's 
one than c's one is. A balance of power obtains within a set of related countries once these 
are balanced poles with equivalent forces (logical values).  
In accordance to the notion of hegemony, the assumed hierarchy within friendly 
groups can be determined by their power measurement. Thus, a country can be said to be 
strong according to a set of criteria. The military criterion includes army capacity, techni-
cal equipment, and nuclear force. The economic criterion relies upon features like self-
sufficiency, or business resources (production, subsoil resources). The cultural criterion 
can be equated with cultural data like the religious or linguistic sources of a country. Fi-
nally, the social criterion refers to some inner harmony from base (public opinion) to tip 
(state). Now what is the hierarchy between these criteria themselves? It depends upon 
which paradigms are mentioned to order them, and a criterion for measurement can make 
use of coefficients in this respect (see Fig. 1). That is, the power of a country (superpower, 
average power, lower power) is characterized by the sum of its coefficients, and a refer-
ence country corresponds to any country such that its sum is maximal in a given pole (set 
of countries).  
To sum up, such a question-answer game results in a logic of IR that wants to account 
for the difference between enemies, rivals, and friends by more fine-grained relations than 
unique yes- and no-answers.  
There are some advantages in such a game. On the one hand, no quantitative methods 
from natural science have been used in the preceding presentation. As a reply to post-
positivists, this means that not any logical approach to the IR leads to mechanic equations. 
On the other hand, such an ‘IR game’ goes beyond the realist paradigm by taking into ac-
count the role of paradigms through the various coefficients assigned to each ordered 
question (definitional criterion of context-sensitive countries). 
There are some defects related to these political oppositions, however. Firstly,  
the number of questions required to individuate countries remains undetermined. Sec-
ondly, the logical calculus hinges upon paradigms which lead to a variable hierarchy of the 
criteria. Thirdly, there may be some interdependence between the given criteria of econ-
omy, culture, and social condition (following the statements of Marxists and constructiv-
ists). Fourthly, the amount of a given coefficient should be given by means of quantitative 
measurements after all; while it arguably corresponds to a quantity of efficient equipment 
in the military domains, any quantification of the cultural or social areas is a more trouble-
some affair. 
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Fig. 1. The criteria of power and their coefficients according to three main  
paradigms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A number of technical challenges remain open within such a logic of IR and its founda-
tions, accordingly. Let us quote three of these. Two of these are about the nature of foreign 
relations: Why need not ‘the enemies of my enemies’ be my friends (calculus of oppo-
sites)? How can a given country prefer a to b, b to c, but not a to c (compare with the so-
called Condorcet's Paradox)? Another one is about the criterion of identity and unity be-
tween countries: what makes them politically differ, and how many questions are required 
to individuate them (so as to make them minimally distinct from each other)? 
4. Conclusion and Prospects (So What?) 
Let us summarize the main statements of the present paper, before recalling its expected 
developments.  
a) The theory of IR is centered on countries, rather than states. 
b) It relies upon a variety of paradigms. 
These can be summarized in two main questions, namely: what the countries want 
above all, and how they proceed for this purpose. The variety of corresponding answers 
leads to a variety of paradigms, mostly based upon two core concepts: force (to be op-
posed to cooperation, and distinguished from the broader notion of power) and state. Thus, 
realism emphasizes the role of states to maximize the force of any homogeneous country; 
and conversely, liberals tamper the notion of power in the sense of a cooperative relation 
while sustaining the central role of states in the realm of international relations.  
c) No such paradigm normally prevails over the others, because IR is a social science.  
As a matter of fact, this sensibly differs from what is meant by a ‘normal’ science as 
any discipline which ought to change its theory after a scientific revolution: according to 
Thomas Kuhn's related works, the uniqueness of paradigms in natural science is warranted 
by the fact that the rule of consistency prevents several paradigms from ruling a given sci-
ence at once. If so, then IR proceeds as a non-normal science accordingly. 
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d) IR is an interdisciplinary social science requiring an investigation into human be-
liefs and intentions.  
Such a context-sensitive discipline must cope with randomness, thus leading to a set 
of unpredictable coefficients in the ‘IR game’. 
Fig. 2. A diagram for IR through two main imports: force and state 
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This formal epistemology of IR gives room for a number of prospects to implement its 
content. Three of these can be stated as follows. For one thing, the ontology of IR is based 
on countries, hence the need of a contemporary history of countries to characterize their 
relative identity and subsequent relations. Then, the role of opinions with respect to the 
construction of public opinions demands an investigation into mass media as belief form-
ers; such is the task of a so-called mediology. Last, but not least, the crucial role of criteria 
to make sense of relations between dynamic countries assumes a preliminary analysis of 
paradigms in the theory of IR. 
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The subject of this article is the impact of globalization on the political decision-
making process and the necessity to change the theory of political decision mak-
ing because of the new circumstances of current political reality. 
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The late twentieth century brought about the recognition that the world had become, in 
Marshall McLuhan's words, a ‘global village’ (McLuhan 1996). The phenomenon of glob-
alization has completely changed our perception of politics and of the nature of political 
interaction. The traditional view of politics used to be state-centric: the state was treated as 
the principal political actor, and attention was focused on the national level of government 
activity. Therefore, there was a clear distinction between domestic and foreign politics. 
Although nation-states continue to be the most significant actors in the world arena, one 
can hardly deny the growing impact of supranational bodies and transnational groups and 
organizations. 
Anyway, in the twentieth century, all philosophical schools of thought took the state 
and the state system for granted in politics, and therefore the task of political science was 
to proceed from this assumption and draw out its implications. In other words, the state 
was considered as a vehicle through which politics was conducted. The remaining ques-
tions in Political Philosophy concerns the way one should understand the state and its rela-
tions to other forms of association, or the way the state power could be used to solve social 
problems. For the utilitarians and pragmatists in particular, political theory became a form 
of problem-solving and with a growth of cognitive disciplines such as Economics and 
Law, many traditional issues of political theory were transformed into a technical matter 
best left to ‘experts’. This is also true for decision-making theory. 
But, unfortunately, in the early twenty-first century, in the era of ‘facilitated knowl-
edge’, political science is characterized by a considerable simplification. The prevalence 
of practical experience and political technologies prevent our assessing the current status 
of the decision-making theory. We should re-examine the existing methods of political 
science in terms of their congruence to the current situation in public administration in the 
context of globalization.  
Actually, the dominance of political technologies approach has become the reason 
why a political decision is not investigated as a philosophical category. Thus, many state-
ments, machinery, and technology in the decision-making theory can no longer work in 
full within current political reality, in the world of globalization. Concentrated on technol-
ogy and strategy, we forget about the complexity of such phenomena as a political issue, 
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political challenge, political solution, and political space. At present, the decision-making 
theory is more a technology, rather than a system of ideas and principles.  
In fact, the category of political decision is substantially similar to the category of po-
litical action that unfolds in space and time, it is based on some contacts and relations 
formed on the basis of information and values and put into practice within particular po-
litical discourse.  
The spatial and temporal ontological feature of political action is characterized by such a 
phenomenon as world globalization (which implies a territorial expansion of local political 
solutions) and time compression for problem-solving process. Categories of space and time 
are the key to any process of political decision making. In fact, when analyzing any action 
we have to take into account the territory or group where the decision will be distributed and 
how much time the decision making will take and what its implementations will be. Nowa-
days, the analysis of these two categories (space and time) is complicated by the multi-level 
relationships in the international community and swift information channels. 
When we are talking about ‘universality’ in the context of problem-solving and deci-
sion-making processes we reveal a significant intertwining of local and global challenges. 
This defines the integral and fragile character of the world order. Global problems develop 
in complex and increase global interconnectedness and interdependence of regions, coun-
tries, nations, peoples, and individuals (see, e.g., Grinin and Korotayev 2009).  
One of the features of the political decision-making process is its potential conse-
quences for the whole world. Of course, this is also related to economic integration, trans-
fer and exchange of material goods.  
Another characteristic within the framework of ontological analysis is the time com-
ponent. Any political decision-making process unfolds in time. Almost in any theory, for 
example, in the theory of bounded rationality, the decision-making process is divided into 
stages. Those phases can be defined as follows: to identify the problem, to analyze it, to 
develop optimal solutions, to choose the best solutions, to make a decision and to imple-
ment it. All these steps are time-constrained. The decision effectiveness mostly depends on 
the speed of problem detection and on the ability to quickly implement the decision. And, 
of course, the information and information processing play here a significant role. 
Epistemological characteristics of a political action consist in obtaining knowledge, 
accumulation, analysis and development of knowledge. In the global world this process is 
determined by the development of information technology, the increasing amounts of in-
formation, and, what is most important – by the ever more complicated procedure of dis-
tinguishing between false and true information.  
In the twentieth century, there were debates on how the value system of the state or 
the moral, psychological, and subjective expression of the ruler's will could restrain the 
policy-making process. But today we face another challenge. We question the whole ra-
tionality because the data for the policy making can turn false. And to reveal the truth is 
almost impossible as far as criteria of truth have been blurred for a long time. Besides, it is 
practically impossible to check the information that is propagated by modern information 
channels. And what is most important, nobody is interested in truth.  
False information being spread through the new media, either accidentally or deliber-
ately, can generate pseudo-issues for which we will have to search pseudo-solutions. And 
this would mislead the whole system of government, destabilize, endanger, and compro-
mise it. Of course, the media play the main role in this process, and thus, have fundamen-
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tally changed the motivation for survival in the twenty-first century. Today the media do 
not inform people about current events in the country and in the world; they have actually 
become a marginal factory of sensations and ‘hot news’, when it becomes common to 
transmit information inaccurately, to take it out of context and, finally, to sacrifice the 
truth for the sake of catching headlines.  
In the early 1970s, this trend has been brilliantly emphasized by Michel Foucault in 
his work devoted to Nietzsche's ‘Will to Knowledge’ (see, e.g., Eribon 1991). Foucault 
expressed his belief which in the future would become the theme and thesis of his main 
work Surveiller et punir [Discipline and Punish] (Foucault 1975). So Foucault underlined 
the mandatory falsification on which the true knowledge is based. Foucault points to the 
subjective base in the management and regulation of power. Decision is made not on the 
basis of pure truth, but on the basis of the corporeality, body, pleasure, and pain, limits and 
wishes of moral freedoms.  
So, moving on to axiological and praxeological characteristics of political action, we 
note that the value (axiological) characteristics of the political decision are determined by 
the influence of subjective factors, behavioral assessment, decision development, and de-
cision making. And here we also have to speak about the impact of globalization, in par-
ticular, about cultural globalization. National mentality, psychological contexts of the ac-
tions, human behavior and the way they influence the policy-making process became, per-
haps, even more significant than a mere technology.  
One should mention one of the most popular concepts in the theory of political deci-
sion making, namely, Harold Lasswell's behavioral model (see, e.g., Lasswell 2009). At 
the core of his model there is an idea of interpreting the decision-making process as human 
behavior regulated by mechanisms such as incentives and motivations, attitudes and reac-
tions. According to this model, a macro-political process consists in the distribution of key 
values (resources) by means of governmental institutions. Lasswell's early work Politics: 
Who Gets What, When, How (Lasswell 1951) puts forward four basic questions for the 
analysis of political process. 
Micro-level decision making is related to behavior of individuals who have personal 
motives, feelings, and emotions. Personal psychological characteristics have a strong in-
fluence on any decision of a person who is in power to take political decisions. Thus, in 
the mechanism of political decision-making we should take into account the psychological 
characteristics of an individual political leader.  
Meso-level. Private motives and public interest are considered as binding for meso-
policy. Within the political decision-making process, the politicians often sublimate their 
own feelings and release their personal egos, thus solving their personal problems.  
The decision-makers have to gradually shift the emphasis from their private motives to  
the public interest.  
In general, this model attempts at connecting the role of public institutions, interests, 
and values with the assessment of psychological parameters of individual behavior like 
irrational motives, emotions, perceptions, and attitudes which are considered in this case 
the dominant factors of the policy management. 
When analyzing the value aspect of political action one can hardly ignore the issues 
related to cultural globalization which has blurred the boundaries of national conscious-
ness, and this, in turn, made it possible to unify political decisions and political language 
(see, e.g., Grinin and Korotayev 2010). 
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The praxeological characteristics of the political decision define it as a discursive 
practice. It encompasses the experience of writing laws, using the political decision lan-
guage, and the creation of a modern law system as the formalization of political decision 
making in practice. This refers not to Political Science, but rather to Law. So everybody 
understands that the importance of a decision is determined by the degree of its formaliza-
tion, by the fact who signed the document and how the control over its implementation is 
performed. Power and language are inextricably linked not only because power is exer-
cised through the language itself (laws, orders, etc.), but also because it organizes the lan-
guage itself. And in the process of globalization and improvement of the global law the 
language of political decision becomes unified.  
In summary, we have an interconnected system of holistic formation of political deci-
sion and political action. Using the methods of systemic philosophy and with the account 
of the characteristics of globalization, we have focused our attention on the fundamental 
categories constituting the phenomenon of political decision (political action). In fact, we 
do not use such categories as state, society, sovereign, decision-maker, political cycle and 
so on; instead, we deal with other categories, actually, with the global categories like 
space, time, knowledge, information, value, language, and discourse. We go beyond those 
conceptual models that form the basis of the political decision-making theory. The shift in 
focus from technology to the internal nature of politics and political action does not mean 
diminishing their practical relevance. On the contrary, the philosophical categories help us 
to grasp those unchanged and permanent characteristics of the process and the nature of 
political action in the context of the world order. Playing with political strategies we forget 
about the nature of politics itself, its constants, about its existence in space and time, about 
the dangers of falsification and the attempts to approach the truth. We have to take into 
account the global information flow, the system of values, and human mental nature, the 
language as a means of transferring and analyzing information and of expressing deep 
feelings.  
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The analysis of long economic cycles allows us to understand long-term world-
system dynamics, to develop forecasts, to explain crises of the past, as well as the 
current global economic crisis. The article offers a historical sketch of research 
on K-waves; it analyzes the nature of Kondratieff waves that are considered as  
a special form of cyclical dynamics that emerged in the industrial period of the 
World System history. It offers a historical and theoretical analysis of K-wave 
dynamics in the World System framework; in particular, it studies the influence 
of the long wave dynamics on the changes of the world GDP growth rates during 
the last two centuries. Special attention is paid to the interaction between Kon-
dratieff waves and Juglar cycles. The article is based on substantial statistical da-
ta, it extensively employs quantitative analysis, contains numerous tables and dia-
grams. On the basis of the proposed analysis it offers some forecasts of the world 
economic development in the next two decades.  
The article concludes with a section that presents a hypothesis that the 
change of K-wave upswing and downswing phases correlates significantly with 
the phases of fluctuations in the relationships between the World-System Core 
and Periphery, as well as with the World System Core changes. 
Keywords: cyclical dynamics, Juglar cycles, Kondratieff waves, K-waves, World 
System, long waves, phases of long waves, world economy, Nikolay Kondratieff, 
world GDP, technological innovation, core and periphery, leading sector, tech-
nological system, technological style. 
Qualitative movement toward new unknown forms and levels cannot proceed infinitely, 
linearly and unhindered. There are always certain limitations; such movement is accompa-
nied by the emergence of disproportions, growth of competition for resources, and so on. 
On the other hand, continuous human effort to overcome environmental resistance to 
such movement has created conditions for the continuous emergence of more and more 
complex and effective structures at the level of both individual societies and the World 
System as a whole. However, relatively short periods of fast development alternated 
with periods of stagnation, crisis, and sometimes even collapse. This was one of the 
main causes that led to the formation of cyclical components of social macrodynamics 
that in pre-industrial epoch could include cycles with many different periods, including 
secular and even millennial ones (e.g., Korotayev, Malkov, and Khaltourina 2006; Koro-
tayev and Khaltourina 2006; Turchin 2003, 2005a, 2005b; Nefedov 2004; Turchin and 
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Nefedov 2009; Turchin and Korotayev 2006; Korotayev et al. 2010; Grinin and Koro-
tayev 2012).  
In the industrial period we see the emergence of new cyclical components including 
Juglar cycles1 with a characteristic period between 7 and 11 years that manifest themselves 
in energetic booms and crises that suddenly engulf social systems. Note that those cycles 
are intrinsic components of the developmental dynamics of such societies. However, they 
are not the only cycles that are characteristic for the industrial and postindustrial systems, 
whereas one of the most interesting aspects of their cyclical dynamics is represented by 
cycles with a characteristic period of 40 to 60 years known as Kondratieff waves (or just  
K-waves).  
The analysis of long economic cycles allows analysts to comprehend the long-term 
dynamics of the World System development, and helps to develop forecasts; it also facili-
tates our understanding of the crises of the past, as well as the current global economic cri-
sis. In the present article we will analyze the emergence of K-waves in the World System 
economic dynamics in the nineteenth century and the changes that can be traced in K-wave 
patterns in the twentieth century, but especially after the Second World War. We will also 
analyze the peculiarities of the study of K-waves within the World System scale and will 
demonstrate that an adequate understanding of the nature of the modern K-wave dynamics 
can only be achieved if this phenomenon is studied precisely within this framework. 
Long Waves in the World Economic Dynamics  
In the 1920s, the Russian economist Nikolay Kondratieff observed that the historical re-
cord of some economic indicators then available to him appeared to indicate a cyclic regu-
larity of phases of gradual increases in values of respective indicators followed by phases 
of decline (Kondratieff 1922: ch. 5; 1925, 1926, 1935, 2002); the period of these apparent 
oscillations seemed to him to be around 50 years. He found this pattern with respect to 
such indicators as prices, interest rates, foreign trade, coal and pig iron production (as well 
as some other production indicators) for some major Western economies (first of all Eng-
land, France, and the United States), whereas the long waves in pig iron and coal production 
were claimed to be detected since the 1870s for the world level as well (note that as regards 
the production indices during decline/downswing phases we deal with the slowdown of 
production growth rather than with actual production decline that rarely lasts longer than 
a year or two, whereas during the upswing phase we deal with a general acceleration of the 
production growth in comparison with the preceding downswing/slowdown period [see, 
e.g., Modelski 2001, 2006 who prefers quite logically to designate ‘decline/downswing’ 
phases as ‘phases of take-off’, whereas he designates the upswing phases as ‘high growth 
phases’]).  
Among important Kondratieff predecessors one should mention J. van Gelderen 
(1913), M. A. Bunyatyan (1915), and S. de Wolff (1924). One can also mention William 
Henry Beveridge (better known, perhaps, as Lord Beveridge, the author of the so-called 
Beveridge Report on Social Insurance and Allied Services (1942) that served as the basis 
for the British Welfare State, especially the National Health Service, after the Second 
World War), who discovered a number of cycles in the long-term dynamics of wheat pric-
es, whereas one of those cycles turned to have an average periodicity of 54 years (Beve-
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1958; Abramovitz 1961; Korotayev and Tsirel 2010c).  
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ridge 1921, 1922). Note that Kondratieff at the time of his discovery of long waves was 
unaware of the results of the above mentioned scientists (see, e.g., Kondratieff 1935: 115, 
note 1). 
Kondratieff himself identified the following long waves and their phases (see Table 1). 
Table 1. Long waves and their phases as identified by Kondratieff 
Long wave  
number Long wave phase Dates of the beginning Dates of the end 
A: upswing  The end of the 1780s or be-
ginning of the 1790s 
1810–1817 First 
B: downswing 1810–1817 1844–1851 
A: upswing  1844–1851 1870–1875 Second 
B: downswing 1870–1875 1890–1896 
A: upswing  1890–1896 1914–1920 Third  
B: downswing 1914–1920  
 
The subsequent students of Kondratieff cycles identified additionally the following long-
waves in the post-World War 1 period (see Table 2). 
Table 2. ‘Post-Kondratieff’ long waves and their phases 
Long wave  
number Long wave phase Dates of the beginning Dates of the end 
A: upswing  1890–1896 1914–1920 Third  
B: downswing From 1914 to 1928/29 1939–1950 
A: upswing  1939–1950 1968–1977 Fourth  
B: downswing 1968–1974 1984–1991 
A: upswing  1984–1991 2008–2010? Fifth  
B: downswing 2008–2010? ? 
Sources: Mandel 1980; Dickson 1983; Van Duijn 1983: 155; Wallerstein 1984; Goldstein 1988: 67; 
Modelski and Thompson 1996; Bobrovnikov 2004: 47; Pantin and Lapkin 2006: 283–285, 315; Ayres 
2006; Linstone 2006: fig. 1; Tausch 2006b: 101–104; Thompson 2007: table 5; Jourdon 2008: 1040–
1043. The last date is suggested by the authors of the present paper. It was also suggested earlier by Lynch 
2004; see also Akaev and Sadovnichy 2010; Akaev et al. 2011.  
A considerable number of explanations for the observed Kondratieff wave (or just K-wave 
[Modelski and Thompson 1996; Modelski 2001]) patterns have been proposed. At at the 
initial stage of K-wave research, the respective pattern was detected in the most secure 
way in terms of the price indices (see below). Most explanations proposed during that pe-
riod were monetary, or monetary-oriented. For example, K-waves were connected with the 
inflation shocks caused by major wars (e.g., Åkerman 1932; Bernstein 1940; Silberling 
1943, etc.). In recent decades such explanations became less popular, as the K-wave pat-
tern stopped being traced in the price indices after the Second World War (e.g., Goldstein 
1988: 75; Bobrovnikov 2004: 54).  
Kondratieff himself accounted for the K-wave dynamics first of all on the basis of 
capital investment dynamics (see Kondratieff 1928, 1984; 2002: 387–397). This trend was 
further developed by Jay W. Forrester and his colleagues (see, e.g., Forrester 1978, 1981, 
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1985; Senge 1982, etc.), as well as by A. van der Zwan (1980), Hans Glisman, Horst 
Rodemer, and Frank Wolter (1983), etc.  
However, in the recent decades the most popular explanation of K-wave dynamics was 
the one connecting them with the waves of technological innovations.  
Kondratieff himself noticed that ‘during the recession of the long waves an especially 
large number of important discoveries and inventions in production and communication 
technologies are made, which, however, are usually applied on a large scale only at the 
beginning of the next long upswing’ (Kondratieff 1935: 111, see also, e.g., Idem 2002: 
370–374).  
Schumpeter (1939) used this argument to develop a rather influential ‘cluster-of-
innovation’ version of K-waves theory, according to which, Kondratieff cycles were pre-
dicted primarily due to discontinuous rates of innovation (for more recent developments of 
the Schumpeterian version of K-wave theory see, e.g., Mensch 1979; Dickson 1983; Free-
man 1987; Berry 1991; Tylecote 1992; Glazyev 1993; Maevski 1997; Modelski and Thomp-
son 1996; Modelski 2001, 2006; Devezas and Modelski 2003; Yakovets 2001; Ayres 
2006; Dator 2006; Hirooka 2006; Papenhausen 2008; Perez 2011; for the most recent 
presentation of empirical evidence supporting Schumpeter's cluster-of-innovation hy-
pothesis see Kleinknecht and van der Panne 2006). Within this approach every Kondratieff 
wave is associated with a certain leading sector (or leading sectors), technological system 
or technological style. For example, the third Kondratieff wave is sometimes characterized 
as ‘the age of steel, electricity, and heavy engineering. The fourth wave takes in the age of 
oil, the automobile and mass production. Finally, the current fifth wave is described as the 
age of information and telecommunications (Papenhausen 2008: 789); whereas the forth-
coming sixth wave is sometimes supposed to be connected first of all with nano- and bio-
technologies (e.g., Lynch 2004; Dator 2006).  
There were also a number of attempts to combine capital investment and innovation 
theories of K-waves (e.g., Rostow 1975, 1978; van Duijn 1979, 1981, 1983; Akaev 2010, 
etc.). Of special interest is Devezas – Corredine model based on biological determinants 
(generations and learning rate) and information theory that explains (for the first time) the 
characteristic period (50–60 years) of Kondratieff cycles (Devezas and Corredine 2001, 
2002; see also Devezas, Linstone, and Santos 2005).  
Many social scientists consider Kondratieff waves as a very important component of 
the modern world-system dynamics. As has been phrased by one of the most important  
K-wave students:  
Long waves of economic growth possess a very strong claim to major significance in 
the social processes of the world system… Long waves of technological change, 
roughly 40–60 years in duration, help shape many important processes… They have 
become increasingly influential over the past thousand years. K-waves have become 
especially critical to an understanding of economic growth, wars, and systemic lead-
ership... But they also appear to be important to other processes such as domestic po-
litical change, culture, and generational change. This list may not exhaust the signifi-
cance of Kondratieff waves but it should help establish an argument for the impor-
tance of long waves to the world's set of social processes (Thompson 2007).  
Against this background it appears rather significant that evidence of the very presence of 
the Kondratieff waves in the world dynamics remains rather controversial. The presence  
of K-waves in price dynamics (at least before the Second World War) has a rather wide 
empirical support (see, e.g., Gordon 1978: 24; van Ewijk 1982; Cleary and Hobbs 1983, 
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etc.). However, as has been mentioned above, the K-wave pattern stopped being traced in 
the price indices after the Second World War (e.g., Goldstein 1988: 75; Bobrovnikov 
2004: 54).  
On the other hand, as has already been demonstrated (Scheglov 2009; Grinin, Koro-
tayev, and Tsirel 2011: 75–77), when inflation is taken into account and the price indices are 
expressed in grams of gold rather than in dollars, those indices continue to correlate with the 
K-wave pattern (see Fig. 1). Starting from the early 1970s, energy resources (oil in the first 
place) served as a sort of ‘reserve currency’ comparable with gold, and Kondratieff waves 
started to be traced in the price index dynamics when expressed in oil equivalent (see Fig. 2).  
Fig. 1. The USA producer price index used by Kondratieff and extended up to 2010 in 
the gold equivalent (100 = 1900–10 level) 
 
Sources: Scheglov 2009; Grinin, Korotayev, and Tsirel 2011: 76.  
Fig. 2. The USA producer price index in gold and oil equivalent (100 = 1900–10 level) 
 
Sources: BP 2010; Scheglov 2009; Grinin, Korotayev, and Tsirel 2011: 77. 
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Regarding long waves in production dynamics we will restrict ourselves to analyzing evi-
dence for the presence of K-waves in the world production indices. As Kondratieff waves 
tend to be considered an important component of the world-system social and economic 
dynamics, one would expect to detect them in terms of the major world macroeconomic 
indicators; first of all with respect to the world GDP dynamics (Chase-Dunn and Grimes 
1995: 405–411). However, until now the attempts to detect them in the dynamics of the-
world GDP (or similar indicators) have brought controversial results.  
Kondratieff himself claimed to have detected long waves in the dynamics of world 
production of coal and pig iron (e.g., Kondratieff 1935: 109–110). However, his evidence 
of the presence of long waves in these series (as well as in all the production dynamics 
series on national levels) was criticized most sharply: 
Foremost among the methodological criticisms have been those directed against 
Kondratieff's use of trend curves. Kondratieff's method is first to fit a long-term trend 
to a series and then to use moving averages to bring out long waves in the residuals 
(the fluctuations around the trend curve). 
But ‘when he eliminated the trend, Kondratieff failed to formulate clearly what the 
trend stands for’ (Garvy 1943: 209). The equations Kondratieff uses for these long-term 
trend curves… include rather elaborate (often cubic) functions.2 This casts doubt on the 
theoretical meaning and parsimony of the resulting long waves, which cannot be seen as 
simple variations in production growth rates (Goldstein 1988: 82; see also, e.g., Barr 1979: 
704; Eklund 1980: 398–399, etc.). 
However, quite a few scientists presented later new evidence supporting the presence 
of long waves in the dynamics of the world economic indicators. For example, Mandel 
(1975: 141; 1980: 3) demonstrated that, in full accordance with Kondratieff's theory, be-
tween 1820 and 1967 during Phases A of K-cycles the annual compound growth rates in 
world trade were on average significantly higher than in adjacent Phases B. David 
M. Gordon (1978: 24) got similar results with respect to world per capita production for 
1865–1938 based on world production data from Dupriez (1947: 567), world industrial dy-
namics (for 1830–1980) taken from Thomas Kuczynski (1982: 28), and average growth rates 
of the world economy (Kuczynski 1978: 86) for 1850–1977; similar results were obtained by 
Joshua Goldstein (1988: 211–217).  
Of special interest are the works by Marchetti and his co-workers at the International 
Institute for Advanced System Analysis who have shown extensively the evidence of K-waves 
using physical indicators, as for instance energy consumption, transportation systems dy-
namics, etc. (Marchetti 1980, 1986, 1988, etc.). Arno Tausch claims to have detected  
K-waves in the world industrial production growth rates dynamics using polynomial re-
gression methods (Tausch 2006a: 167–190). However, empirical tests produced by a few 
other scholars failed to support the hypothesis of presence of the K-waves in the world 
production dynamics (see, e.g., van der Zwan 1980: 192–197; Chase-Dunn and Grimes 
1995: 407–409, reporting the results of Peter Grimes' research).  
There were a few attempts to apply spectral analysis in order to detect the presence of 
K-waves in the world production dynamics. Thomas Kuczynski (1978) applied spectral 
analysis in order to detect K-waves in world agricultural production, total exports, inven-
tions, innovations, industrial production, and total production for the period between 1850 
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= 10^(0.0278 – 0.0166x – 0.00012x^2).  
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and 1976. Though Kuczynski suggests that his results ‘seem to corroborate’ the K-wave 
hypothesis, he himself does not find this support decisive and admits that ‘we cannot ex-
clude the possibility that the 60-year-cycle… is a random cycle’ (Kuczynski 1978: 81–82); 
note that Kuczynski did not make any formal test of statistic significance of the K-waves 
tentatively identified by his spectral analysis. K-waves were also claimed to have been 
found with spectral analysis by Rainer Metz (1992) both in GDP production series on 
eight European countries (for the 1850–1979 period) and in the world production index 
developed by Hans Bieshaar and Alfred Kleinknecht (1984) for 1780–1979; however, later 
he denounced those findings (Metz 1998, 2006).  
A few scientists using spectral analysis have failed to detect K-waves in production 
series on national levels of quite a few countries (e.g., van Ewijk 1982; Metz 1998, 2006; 
Diebolt and Doliger 2006).  
Against this background we (together with Sergey Tsirel) have found it appropriate to 
check the presence of K-waves in the world GDP dynamics using the most recent datasets 
on this variable dynamics covering the period between 1870 and 2007 (Maddison 1995, 
2001, 2003, 2009; World Bank 2012) and applying an upgraded methodology for the es-
timation of statistical significance of detected waves (see, e.g., Korotayev and Tsirel 
2010a, 2010b, 2010c; Grinin, Korotayev, and Tsirel 2011); it is worth emphasizing that 
our analysis made it possible for the first time to estimate statistical significance of the 
Kondratieff waves in the world GDP dynamics, as will be demonstrated in the following 
sections.  
Kondratieff Waves in the Post-Second World War GDP Data  
Note that the Kondratieff-wave component can be seen quite clearly in the post-World 
War II dynamics of the world GDP growth rates even directly, without application of any 
special statistical techniques (see Fig. 3):3 
Fig. 3. Dynamics of the annual world GDP growth rates (%), 1945–2007; 1945 
point corresponds to the average annual growth rate in the 1940s. Initial 
series: Maddison/World Bank empirical estimates 
 
                                                          
3 Note that K-waves (as well as Juglar cycles) are also quite visible for recent decades in the world dynamics of such 
important macroeconomic variables as the world gross fixed capital formation (as % of GDP) and the investment ef-
fectiveness (it indicates how many dollars of the world GDP growth is achieved with one dollar investments) – see 
Appendix, Figs S1 and S2. The dynamics of both variables are connected to the world GDP dynamics. Actually, the 
world GDP dynamics is determined to a considerable extent by the dynamics of those two variables.  
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However, the Kondratieff wave component becomes especially visible if a LOWESS 
(= LOcally WEighted Scatterplot Smoothing) line is fitted (see Fig. 4). 
Fig. 4. Maddison/World Bank empirical estimates with fitted LOWESS line. Kernel: 
Triweight. % of points to fit: 50 
 
As can be seen, Figs 3–4 indicate:  
1) that the Kondratieff-wave pattern can be detected up to the present in a surprisingly 
intact form (though, possibly, with a certain shortening of its period, suggested by a few 
authors [see, e.g., van der Zwan 1980; Bobrovnikov 2004; Tausch 2006a; Pantin and Lap-
kin 2006]);  
2) that the present world financial-economic crisis might really mark the beginning of 
a new Kondratieff Phase B (downswing). Indeed, consider the post-World War II dynamics 
of the world GDP growth rates taking into account the two years, 2008 and 2009 (using the 
World Bank forecast figure for the year 2012) (see Fig. 5).  
As we see, according to its magnitude the current financial-economic crisis does not 
appear to resemble a usual crisis marking the end of a Juglar cycle amidst an upswing 
phase (or a downswing) of a Kondratieff cycle (which one would expect with the second 
interpretation). Instead it resembles particularly deep crises (similar to the ones of 1973–
1974, 1929–1933, mid-1870s or mid-1820s) that are found just at the border of Phases A 
and B of the K-waves (see, e.g., Grinin and Korotayev 2010).  
Fig. 5. Dynamics of the Annual world GDP Growth Rates (%), 1945–2011  
 
Sources: World Bank 2011: NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.KD; Maddison 2010; Conference Board 2011.  
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Kondratieff Waves in the World GDP Data before 1945–1950 
As Fig. 6 shows, for the 1870–1945/50 period the K-wave pattern is not as easily detectable 
as after 1945/50. The turbulent second, third and fourth decades of the twentieth century are 
characterized by enormous magnitude of fluctuations of the world GDP growth rates (not 
observed either in previous or subsequent periods). The lowest (for 1871–2007) figures of 
the world GDP annual rates of change are observed just in these decades (during the Great 
Depression, World Wars I and II as well as immediately after the end of those wars). On 
the other hand, during the mid-20s and mid-30s booms the world GDP annual growth rates 
achieved historical maximums (they were only exceeded during the K-wave 4, Phase A, in 
the 1950s and 1960s, and were generally higher than during both the pre-World War I and 
recent [1990s and 2000s] upswings). This, of course, complicates the detection of the 
long-wave pattern during those decades.  
Fig. 6. Dynamics of the World GDP Annual Growth Rates (%), 1871–2007  
 
Source: Korotayev and Tsirel 2010c: 6.  
 
Actually, this pattern is somehow better visible in the diagrams for 5-year moving average, 
and, especially, for simple 5-year averages (see Figs 7 and 8).  
Fig. 7. Dynamics of the world GDP annual growth rates (%), moving 5-year aver-
ages, 1871–2007  
 
Sources: World Bank 2012; Maddison 2009. 
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Note: 1873 point corresponds to the average annual growth rate in 1871–1875, 1874 to 1872–1876, 1875 to 
1873–1877… 2005 to 2003–2007; 2006 and 2007 points correspond to the annual growth rates in years 
2006 and 2007 respectively.  
Fig. 8. Dynamics of the world GDP annual growth rates (%), 5-year averages, 1871–
2007 
 
Sources: World Bank 2012; Maddison 2009. 
The application of the LOWESS technique reveals a certain K-wave pattern in the pre-
1950 series (see Fig. 9).  
Fig. 9. World GDP annual growth rate dynamics (1870–1946): Maddison empirical 
estimates with fitted LOWESS line  
 
Note: Maddison-based empirical estimates with fitted LOWESS line. Kernel: Triweight. % of points to 
fit: 40.  
In fact, the LOWESS technique reveals quite clearly the K-wave pattern prior to World 
War I (in the period corresponding to Phase B of the 2nd Kondratieff wave and major part 
of Phase A of the 3rd wave) (see Fig. 10). 
W
or
ld
 G
D
P 
an
nu
al
 g
ro
w
th
 ra
te
 (%
 p
er
 y
ea
r)
 
W
or
ld
 G
D
P 
an
nu
al
 g
ro
w
th
 ra
te
 (%
)
W
or
ld
 G
D
P 
an
nu
al
 g
ro
w
th
 ra
te
 (%
 p
er
 y
ea
r)
 
Korotayev and Grinin • Kondratieff Waves and Global Studies 75 
Fig. 10. World GDP annual growth rate dynamics: Maddison-based empirical esti-
mates with fitted LOWESS line. Phase B (Downswing) of the 2nd Kon-
dratieff Wave and Phase A (Upswing) of the 3rd Wave, 1871–1913  
 
Note: Maddison-based empirical estimates with fitted LOWESS line. Kernel: Triweight. % of points to 
fit: 50.  
However, the 3rd K-wave (apparently strongly deformed by World War I) looks much less 
accurate (see Fig. 11).  
Phase B of the 3rd Kondratieff cycle presents the main problem as the timing of its 
start remains unclear (1914, or mid-1920s?). Our analysis does not make it possible to 
make the final choice between two options – either K3 Phase B started in 1914 and was 
interrupted by the mid-1920s boom; or K3 Phase A continued till the mid-1920s having 
been interrupted by the WWI bust.  
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Fig. 11. World GDP annual growth rate dynamics: Maddison-based empirical esti-
mates with fitted LOWESS line. The 3rd Kondratieff Wave  
 
Note: Maddison-based empirical estimates with fitted LOWESS line. Kernel: Triweight. % of points to 
fit: 60.  
However, the LOWESS technique produces an especially neat K-wave pattern with the 
second assumption – that is we get it when we omit the WWI influence (see Fig. 12). 
Fig. 12. World GDP annual growth rate dynamics, 5-year averages: Maddison-
based empirical estimates with fitted LOWESS line. 1870–2007, omitting 
World War I influence  
 
Note: Maddison-based empirical estimates with fitted LOWESS line. Kernel: Triweight. % of points to 
fit: 20.  
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This figure reveals rather distinctly double peaks of the upswings. With a stronger smooth-
ing (see Fig. 13) the form of the peaks becomes smoother, whereas the waves themselves 
become more distinct. 
Fig. 13. World GDP annual growth rate dynamics, 5-year moving average: Maddi-
son-based empirical estimates with fitted LOWESS line. 1870–2007, omit-
ting World War I influence  
 
Note: Maddison-based empirical estimates with fitted LOWESS line. Kernel: Triweight. % of points to 
fit: 20. 
Hence, it looks a bit more likely that K3 Phase A lasted till the mid-1920s (having been 
interrupted by WWI). Incidentally, if we take the WWI influence years (1914–1921) out, 
we arrive at a quite reasonable K3 Phase A length – 26 years, even if we take 1929 as  
the end of this phase:  
1929 – 1895 = 34 
34 – 8 = 26 
Note that with the first assumption (K3 Phase B started in 1914 and was interrupted by the 
mid-1920s boom) we would have an excessive length of K3 Phase B – 32 years (that 
would, however, become quite normal, if we take out the mid-1920s boom years).  
Yet, it seems necessary to stress that we find overall additional support for the Kon-
dratieff pattern in the world GDP dynamics data for the 1870–1950 period. First of all, this 
is manifested by the fact that both Phases A of this period have relatively higher rates of 
world GDP growth, whereas both Phases B are characterized by relatively lower rates. 
Note that this holds true without taking out either the World War I, or the 1920s boom 
influence, and irrespective of whatever dating for the beginnings and ends of the relevant 
phases we choose (see Table 3 and Fig. 14). 
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Table 3. Average annual world GDP growth rates (%) during phases A and B of 
Kondratieff waves, 1871–2007 
Years Average annual World GDP growth rates (%) during respective phase 
Kondra-
tieff wave 
number 
Phase 
Version 1 Version 2 Version 1 Version 2 
II End of 
Phase A 
1871–1875 1871–1875 2.09 2.09 
II B 1876–1894 1876–1894 1.68 1.68 
III A 1895–1913 1895–1929 2.57 2.34 
III B 1914–1946 1930–1946 1.50 0.98 
IV A 1947–1973 1947–1973 4.84 4.84 
IV B 1974–1991 1974–1983 3.05 2.88 
V A 1992–2007 1984–2007 3.49 3.42 
Fig. 14. Average annual world GDP growth rates (%) during phases A and B of 
Kondratieff waves, 1871–2007 
 
With different dates for beginnings and ends of various phases we have somehow different 
shapes of long waves, but the overall Kondratieff wave pattern remains intact. Note that the 
difference between the two versions can be partly regarded as a continuation of controversy 
between two approaches (‘the K-wave period is approximately constant in the last centuries’ 
vs. ‘the period of K-waves becomes shorter and shorter’).4 The first approach correlates 
better with the results of the spectral analysis that have been presented above and the op-
timistic forecast, whereas the second approach correlates better with the interpretation of 
the current crisis with the beginning of the downswing phase of the 5th K-wave. 
Kondratieff Waves in the World GDP Dynamics before 1870 
There are some grounds to doubt that Kondratieff waves can be traced back in the world 
GDP dynamics for the pre-1870 period (though for this period they appear to be detected 
for the GDP dynamics of the West).  
Note that for the period between 1700 and 1870, Maddison provides world GDP esti-
mate for one year only – for 1820. What is more, for the period before 1870, Maddison 
does not provide annual (or even per decade) estimates for many major economies, which 
                                                          
4 See, e.g., van der Zwan 1980; Bobrovnikov 2004; Tausch 2006a; Pantin and Lapkin 2006.  
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makes it virtually impossible to reconstruct the world GDP annual (or even per decade) 
growth rates for this period. However, it appears possible to reconstruct the world GDP 
estimate for 1850, as for this year Maddison does provide his estimates for all the major 
economies. Thus, it appears possible to estimate the world GDP average annual growth 
rates for 1820–1850 (i.e., the period that more or less coincides with K1 Phase B) and for 
1850–1870/1875 (i.e., K2 Phase A), and, consequently, to make a preliminary test whether 
the Kondratieff wave pattern can be observed for the 1820–1870 period.  
The results look as follows:  
Table 4. Average annual world GDP growth rates (%) during phases A and B of 
Kondratieff waves, 1820–1894 
Years 
Average annual 
world GDP 
growth rates (%) 
during respective 
phase 
Kondra-
tieff wave 
number P
ha
se
 
Version 1 Version 2 Version 1 Version 2
Average annual 
World GDP 
growth rate pre-
dicted by Kon-
dratieff wave 
pattern 
Observed 
I B 1820–
1850 
1820–1850 0.88 0.88   
II A 1851–
1875 
1851–1870 1.26 1.05 To be signifi-
cantly higher than 
during the subse-
quent phase 
Significantly low-
er than during the 
subsequent phase 
II B 1876–
1894 
1871–1894 1.68 1.76 To be signifi-
cantly lower than 
during the subse-
quent phase 
Significantly 
higher than during 
the subsequent 
phase 
Thus, whatever dating of the end of K2 Phase A we choose, we observe a rather strong 
deviation from the K-wave pattern. Indeed, according to this pattern, one would expect 
that in the 1850–1870/5 period (corresponding to Phase A of the 2nd Kondratieff wave) 
the World GDP average annual growth rate should be higher than in the subsequent period 
(corresponding to Phase B of this K-wave). However, the actual situation turns out to be 
quite opposite – in 1870/75–1894 the world GDP average annual growth rate was signifi-
cantly higher than in 1850–1870/75.  
Note, however, that the K-wave pattern still seems to be observed for this period with re-
spect to the GDP dynamics of the West (see Table 5 and Fig. 15).5 
                                                          
5 What is more, this pattern appears to be observed in the socio-economic dynamics of the European-centered world-
system for a few centuries prior to 1820 (see, e.g., Beveridge 1921, 1922; Goldstein 1988; Jourdon 2008; Modelski 
2006; Modelski and Thompson 1996; Pantin and Lapkin 2006; Thompson 2007).  
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Table 5. Average annual world GDP growth rates (%) of the West during phases A 
and B of Kondratieff waves, 1820–1894 
Kondra-
tieff wave 
number 
Phase Years 
Average annual 
world GDP 
growth rates (%) 
during respective 
phase 
Average annual world 
GDP growth rate pre-
dicted by Kondratieff 
wave pattern 
Observed 
I B 1820–
1850 
2.04 To be significantly low-
er than during the sub-
sequent phase 
Significantly lower 
than during the sub-
sequent phase 
II A 1851–
1875 
2.45 To be significantly 
higher than during the 
subsequent phase 
Significantly higher 
than during the sub-
sequent phase 
II B 1876–
1894 
2.16 To be significantly low-
er than during the sub-
sequent phase 
Significantly lower 
than during the sub-
sequent phase 
III A 1895–
1913 
2.94 To be significantly 
higher than during the 
previous phase 
Significantly higher 
than during the pre-
vious phase 
Note: Data are for 12 major West European countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom) and four 
‘Western offshoots’ (the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand).  
Fig. 15. Average annual world GDP growth rates (%) of the West during phases A 
and B of Kondratieff waves, 1820–1913  
 
We believe that the fact that K-wave pattern can be traced back in the GDP dynamics of 
the West for the pre-1870 period and that it is not found for the world GDP dynamics is 
not coincidental, and cannot be accounted for just on the basis of the unreliability of the 
world GDP estimates for this period. In fact, it is not surprising that the Western GDP 
growth rates were generally higher in 1851–1875 than in 1876–1894, and the world growth 
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rates were not. The proximate explanation is very simple. The world GDP growth rates in 
1851–1875 were relatively low (in comparison with 1876–1894) mostly due to the enor-
mous economic decline observed in China in 1852–1870 due to social-demographic col-
lapse in connection with the Taiping Rebellion and accompanying events of additional 
episodes of internal warfare, famines, epidemics and so on (Ilyushechkin 1967; Perkins 
1969: 204; Larin 1986; Kuhn 1978; Liu 1978; Nepomnin 2005, etc.) that resulted, for ex-
ample, in the human death toll as high as 118 million human lives (Huang 2002: 528). 
Note that in the mid-nineteenth century China was still a major world economic player, 
and the China's decline of that time affected the world GDP dynamics in a rather signifi-
cant way. According to Maddison's estimates, in 1850 the Chinese GDP was about 
247 billion international dollars (1990, PPP), as compared with about 63 billion in Great 
Britain, or 43 billion in the USA. By 1870, according to Maddison, it declined to less than 
$190 billion, which to a large degree compensated the acceleration of economic growth 
observed in the same years in the West (actually, Maddison appears to underestimate the 
magnitude of the Chinese economic decline in this period, so the actual influence of the 
Chinese 1852–1870 sociodemographic collapse might have been even much more signifi-
cant). K2 Phase A in the Western GDP dynamics started to be felt at the world level only 
in the very end of this phase, in 1871–1875, after the end of the collapse period in China 
and the beginning of the recovery growth in this country.  
In more general terms, it seems possible to maintain that in the pre-1870 epoch the 
Modern World System was not sufficiently integrated, and the World System core was not 
sufficiently strong yet – that is why the rhythm of the Western core's development was not 
quite felt at the world level. Only in the subsequent era does the World System reach such 
a level of integration and its core acquires such strength that it appears possible to trace 
quite securely Kondratieff waves in the world GDP dynamics.6  
Kondratieff Waves in the World Technological Innovation  
Dynamics  
Naturally, the connection between the K-waves and technological innovation processes de-
serves special attention. In order to re-test the Kondratieff – Schumpeter hypothesis for the 
presence of K-waves with regard to the world invention activities, we have used the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Statistics Database on the number of patents 
granted annually in the world per million of the world population in 1900–2008 (see Koro-
tayev, Zinkina, and Bogevolnov 2011 for more details). For 1985–2008 WIPO publishes 
direct data on the total number of patent grants in the world per year (WIPO 2012a). For the 
1900–1985 we calculated this figure by summing up the data for all the countries (that are 
                                                          
6 The fact that K-waves can be traced in Western economic dynamics earlier than at the world level has already been 
noticed by Reuveny and Thompson (2008) who provide the following explanation: if one takes the position that the 
core driver of K-waves is intermittent radical technological growth primarily originating in the system leader's econ-
omy, one would not expect world GDP to mirror K-wave shapes as well as the patterned fluctuations that are found 
in the lead economy and that world GDP might correspond more closely to the lead economy's fluctuations over time 
as the lead economy evolves into a more predominant central motor for the world economy. Reuveny and Thompson 
also argue that to the extent that technology drives long-term economic growth, the main problem (certainly not the 
only one) in diffusing economic growth throughout the system is that the technology spreads unevenly. Most of it 
stays in the already affluent North and the rest fell farther behind the technological frontier. Until recently very little 
trickled down to the global South (Reuveny and Thompson 2001, 2004, 2008, 2009). Our findings also seem to 
match this interpretation.  
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provided by the WIPO in a separate dataset [WIPO 2012b]). We used the databases of 
Maddison (2010), UN Population Division (2012), and U.S. Bureau of the Census (2012) 
as our sources of data on the world population dynamics.  
The results of our calculations are presented in Fig. 16. 
Fig. 16. Dynamics of number of patent grants per year per million of the world 
population, 1900–2008 
 
It is evident that the figure above reveals an unusually distinct K-wave pattern (note that  
a similar pattern has been detected in the dynamics of patent applications by Plakitkin 
[2011] who, however, did not appreciate that he dealt with K-wave dynamics). In general, 
we see rather steady increases in the number of patent grants per million during K-wave 
A-phases (‘upswings’), and we observe its rather pronounced decreases during K-wave  
B-phases (‘downswings’). Thus, the first period of the growth of the variable in question 
revealed by Fig. 16 more or less coincided (with a rather slight, about 2–3 years, lag) with 
A-phase of the 3rd K-wave (1896–1929); it was only interrupted by the First World War 
when the number of patent grants per million experienced a precipitous but rather short 
decline, whereas after the war the value of the variable in question returned as fast to the  
A-phase-specific trend line. The first prolonged period of decline of the number of patent 
grants per million corresponds rather accurately (except for the above mentioned 2–3 year 
lag) to B-phase of this wave (1929–1945); the second period of steady increase in the value 
of the variable in question correlates almost perfectly with A-phase of the 4th K-wave (1945–
1968/74), whereas the second period of decline corresponds rather well to its B-phase 
(1968/74–1984/1991); finally, the latest period of the growth of the number of patent 
grants per million correlates with A-phase of the 5th K-wave.  
Note, however, that this pattern apparently goes counter the logic suggested by Kon-
dratieff, Schumpeter and their followers who expected increases in invention activities dur-
ing B-phases and decreases during A-phases. Yet, this contradiction is only apparent. Indeed, 
as we have mentioned above, Kondratieff maintained that ‘during the recession of the long 
waves, an especially large number of important discoveries and inventions in the tech-
nique of production and communication are made, which, however, are usually applied on 
a large scale only at the beginning of the next long upswing’ (Kondratieff 1935: 111, our 
emphasis).  
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It has been suggested that it is necessary to distinguish between ‘breakthrough’ and 
‘improving’ inventions (e.g., Akaev 2010); breakthrough inventions are those that during  
a B-phase of a given K-wave create foundations for a new technological system corre-
sponding to a new K-wave. As Kondratieff suggested, they find their large-scale applica-
tion during the A-phase of the new K-wave based on this new technological system, which 
is accompanied by a flood of improving innovations that are essential for the diffusion of 
technologies produced by breakthrough inventions made during the B-phase of the preced-
ing K-wave (Ibid.; Hirooka 2006).  
Note that among the total number of patents a negligible proportion has been granted for 
breakthrough inventions, whereas the overwhelming majority of all the inventions is consti-
tuted just by ‘improving’ inventions. The exhaustion of the potential of the given K-wave's 
technological system leads to a decrease of the number of inventions that realize the poten-
tial created by the breakthroughs, which created the respective technological system. On 
the other hand, this very exhaustion of the previous technological system's potential for 
improvement creates powerful stimuli for new breakthrough inventions. However, the in-
crease in the number of breakthrough inventions in no way compensates the dramatic de-
crease of the number of innovations improving the potential of the previous technological 
system. Hence, on the basis of this logic there are theoretical grounds to expect that during 
the B-phases of K-waves the total number of inventions (and patent grants) per million of 
population should decrease, whereas during A-phases we should observe a pronounced 
increase in this number (as some decrease in the number of breakthrough inventions is by 
far compensated by a dramatic increase in the number of improving inventions).  
Therefore, our test has revealed this pattern.  
World System Effects and K-Wave Dynamics  
As has been already mentioned above, the adherents of the world-system approach con-
sider K-waves as one of the most important components of the World System dynamics.  
We quite agree with Thompson (2007) who maintains that K-waves may help to clar-
ify many important points in the World System processes. However, one could also trace 
another kind of logic – the analysis of the World System processes can contribute a lot to the 
clarification of the nature of the Kondratieff waves. We believe that the driving forces of 
the K-waves can be adequately understood if only we take into account the dynamics, phas-
es, and peculiarities of the World-System development. That is why we have tried to analyze 
K-waves on a World-System scale. Such an approach can integrate different points of 
view on the nature of Kondratieff waves.  
Actually, we can consider the following five points:  
1. Kondratieff waves are most relevant when considered at the System scale. As those 
waves always manifest themselves at supra-societal scales, the World System processes 
turn out to be very important for the understanding of the K-wave dynamics. 
2. The expansion and intensification of the World-System economic links lead to the 
formation of preconditions of new upswings. Note that Kondratieff himself noticed that 
‘the new long cycles usually coincide with the expansion of the orbit of the world eco-
nomic ties’ (Kondratieff 2002: 374). We would add that the begining of new cycles im-
plies not only expansion of those ties, but also the change of their nature (we will discuss 
this in more details below). 
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3. The World System processes are bound to influence economic processes (including 
medium period business cycles [e.g., Grinin and Korotayev 2009b]), hence, they are bound 
to influence K-wave dynamics. However, we also observe a reverse influence of those waves 
on World System development (which was actually noticed by Thompson). Kondratieff him-
self noticed the growth in the intensity of warfare and revolutionary activities during K-wave 
upswings (Kondratieff 2002: 373–374). On the other hand, it is quite clear that those proc-
esses themselves influenced K-wave dynamics in a very significant way and world wars 
provide salient illustrations). It is quite clear that those K-wave students who pointed to an 
important role of military expenses (and inflation shocks they produce) identified a signifi-
cant (though in no way sole) cause of price growth (and decline) in the course of Kondratieff 
cycles.  
4. As we have already mentioned above, the breakthrough inventions (producing new 
technological systems) tend to be made during downswings, whereas their wide imple-
mentation is observed during subsequent upswings. The diffusion of those innovations 
throughout the World System significantly affects the course of K-waves, as the opening 
of new zones of economic development can change the world dynamics in general. Thus, 
in Chapter 1 of our monograph on periodic economic crises (Grinin and Korotayev 2009b) 
we paid considerable attention to the point that the vigorous railway construction of the 
last decades of the nineteenth century produced a major vector in world economic devel-
opment (see, e.g., Tugan-Baranovsky 2008 [1913]; Mendelson 1959, vol. 2; Trakhtenberg 
1963; Lan 1975). Large-scale investments of British capital in the railway construction in 
the United States, Australia, India, etc. contributed to stagnation within the World System 
hegemon (and, finally, the change of the center of this hegemony). Technological changes 
that start in one zone of the World System after their diffusion to other zones may produce 
such consequences that could hardly be forecasted. Thus, the development of oceanic and 
railway transportation led to vigorous exportation of cereal crops from the USA, Russia, 
and Canada that caused in the 1870s, 1880s, and 1890s the so-called world agrarian crisis 
(which affected significantly the 2nd K-wave downswing but helped several countries to 
escape from the Malthusian trap [see, e.g., Grinin, Korotayev, and Malkov 2010]).  
5. Important events that take place within the World System sooner or later can lead to 
a switch from downswing to upswing (or, naturally, from upswing to downswing) within 
K-wave dynamics. As is well-known, the discovery of gold in California and Australia 
contributed in a rather significant way to the world economic (and price) growth during 
the 2nd K-wave upswing, which was already noticed by Kondratieff (Kondratieff 2002: 
384–385).  
Change of K-Wave Phases against the Background  
of the Interaction between the World-System Core and  
Periphery  
Core and Periphery. We contend that the change of K-wave upswing and downswing 
phases correlates significantly with the phases of fluctuations in the relationships between 
the World System Core and Periphery, as well as with World System Core changes  
(the growth or decline of its strength, emergence of competing centers, their movements, 
and so on). Below we present our ideas on the possible causes of such a correlation. How-
ever, it turns out necessary to study the following questions: does this correlation emerge as 
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a result of the casual link between the two processes? Is it caused by some other processes? 
Is not the causation pattern here even more complex? In any case this correlation appears 
especially important, as in the recent years one can observe an evident change in the inter-
action between the Core and Periphery of the World System. In particular, the World-
System Periphery (in contrast with what was observed not so long ago) tends to develop 
more rapidly than the core (see, e.g., Korotayev et al. 2011; Khaltourina and Korotayev 
2010; Korotayev, Khaltourina, Malkov et al. 2010; Malkov et al. 2010; Grinin and Koro-
tayev 2009b, 2010). This has become especially salient during the current global economic 
crisis. 
Thus, what is the correlation between structural changes of the World System and peri-
odic fluctuations within the K-wave dynamics?  
We suggest that during the K-wave downswings the Core tends to subjugate, integrate, 
and pull up the Periphery to a greater extent than it is observed during the K-wave up-
swings. It is during the K-wave downswings that the Core tends to expand vigorously (in 
various way) to the Periphery by investing resources into the latter and by actively modern-
izing it. Those efforts and resource flows contribute to the slow-down of the Core growth 
rates.  
In contrast, during K-wave upswings the Core's activities are concentrated within the 
core part of the World System; in the meantime the balance of resource movement turns out 
to be in favor of the Core. Such a situation leads to the acceleration of growth rates of the 
Core countries (note, however, that this situation was not observed during the most recent 
[5th K-wave] upswing).  
The resource flow from the World-System Core to the Semiperiphery and Periphery 
may proceed in various forms (military expenditures, FDI, aid, emigration, and so on). Of 
course, such actions were usually undertaken by the Core countries in order to obtain cer-
tain concrete gains: to get colonies, to obtain profits, to get influence in certain countries, 
to open markets, to get access to raw materials and so on (though the philanthropic com-
ponent tended to become more and more pronounced with the course of time). However, it 
takes any long-term investments a long time to pay for themselves (and sometimes they do 
not – especially when they are made by politicians rather than businessmen). Often such 
a resource flow proceeded in the form of loans many of which were never paid back.  
The resource flow to the Core could be also achieved in various forms – ranging from 
a direct plunder of colonies to importing very cheap commodities from them; it was also 
achieved through monopoly prices, unfair loans, and so on. The 2nd K-wave upswing (the 
late 1840s to the 1870s) was supported to a very considerable extent by the flow of gold 
from such peripheral areas as California and Australia. In recent years one could observe 
certain exportation of capitals from the Periphery and Semiperiphery to the Core, as has been 
observed for China, Brazil, and Russia as regards the U.S. securities; one may also note 
cheap Chinese exports, brain drain from India, etc.  
Let us study how this works with respect to particular K-waves and their phases.  
The First Wave: The Late 1780s / Early 1790s – 1844/1851 
Phase A: the late 1780s / early 1790s – 1810/1817. By that period the main colonial con-
quests of the pre-industrial epoch had been already finished, the independence wars of the 
New World colonies began, and the main interests of the European powers were focused on 
internal affairs. In this period the resource flow from the Core to the Periphery was rather 
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insignificant, whereas the one from the Periphery to the Core remained quite substantial.  
The Periphery and Semiperiphery (the USA in the first place) acted as suppliers of raw mate-
rials (cotton) for the development of the most advanced industrial sectors (Burstin 1993a, 
1993b; Sevostyanov 1983; DiBacco et al.1992; Zinn 1995).  
Phase B (downswing): 1810/1817–1844/1851. Europe (primarily Britain and France) 
engaged in rather active expansion on the Periphery – China, Algeria, Egypt, Turkey, and 
Latin America. British loans and investments went to Latin America and the USA (Tugan-
Baranovsky 2008 [1913]; Mendelson 1959). There was a massive emigration from Europe 
(and especially Britain) to the West European offshoots; one could observe the active 
opening of Australia (e.g., Malakhovski 1971), the South and the West of the USA. In this 
period resources moved from Britain rather than to Britain. This partly accounts for rela-
tively bad conditions of the working class in Britain at this time (vividly described by 
Engels 2009 [1845]).  
The Second Wave: 1844/1851–1890/1896  
Phase A: 1844/1851–1870/1875. Europe again concentrated on its internal affairs (includ-
ing the Crimean War, the unification of Germany and Italy and so on). The USA was tied 
by internal struggles, and Russia was focused on internal reforms. A free trade system is 
established (e.g., Held et al. 1999). The flow of Australian and Californian gold reached 
Europe; one could observe a rather active catch-up of the European Semiperiphery (Grinin 
and Korotayev 2009b).  
Phase B: 1870/1875–1890/1896. Europe actively expanded to the Periphery, actually 
the world was mostly divided between the Core powers that accomplish the final wave of 
colonial conquests (this involves some semiperipheral countries, first of all Russia con-
quered most part of Central Asia). One could observe an active opening of agricultural 
lands in the American West (Burstin 1993a, 1993b; Sevostyanov 1983; DiBacco, Mason, 
and Appy 1992; Zinn 1995) and a very rapid development of Australia (e.g., Malakhovski 
1971), as well as significant investments in the Periphery (especially in the railroad con-
struction). Actually, during this period resources moved rather actively from Britain and 
some other European countries to the Periphery – for example, as loans for Latin America 
(e.g., Tugan-Baranovsky 2008 [1913]; Mendelson 1959).  
The Third Wave: 1890/1896–1945  
Phase A: 1890/1896–1914/1928. Europe is concentrated on internal competition within 
itself (resulting finally in an outright warfare), the USA is also concentrated on its own 
internal affairs (with the exception of a war with Spain); the preparations for the war and 
competition between Germany and Britain stimulate the technological race and economic 
growth (e.g., Grenville 1999). One could observe a significant flow of resources from the 
Periphery, as well as the start of the transition of the World System hegemony to the USA 
that, however, continued to be an importer of capital for a long time (e.g., Lan 1975). Re-
sources also flowed actively to Russia, Japan and some other semiperipheral countries where 
investors could find opportunities to introduce new technologies and get high profits. 
Phase B: 1914/1928–1939/1950. Activation of the Periphery and Semiperiphery, its 
struggle with the Core in various forms (India, China, Egypt, the USSR, Japan, etc.),  
the finalizing of the transition of the World System hegemony from Europe to the USA 
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(see, e.g., Modelski and Thompson 1996; Grinin and Korotayev 2009b; Lan 1976).  
The continuation of the Core countries control over their colonies requires more and more 
efforts and expenses. 
The Fourth Wave: 1939/1950–1984/1991  
Phase A: 1939/1950–1968/1974. The Core lost direct political control over the Periphery 
and was concentrated on its own internal affairs (including the West European integration); 
as a result of this concentration and the redistribution of capitals and technologies within the 
World-System Core one could observe the Japanese, German, Italian, and Spanish economic 
miracles, as well as the consolidation of the Western world under the US hegemony (e.g., 
Lan 1978); one could also observe the emergence of new centers of development, including 
the Eastern Block and Japan (e.g., Popov 1978). 
Phase B: 1968/1974–1984/1991. The Periphery ‘attacked’ the Core in terms of 
economy – first of all through a radical increase in oil and some other raw material pric-
es. In the meantime the West invests rather actively in the Periphery (especially, through 
loans to the developing countries). 
The Fifth Wave: 1984/1991–2015/20 (?)  
Phase A: 1984/1991–2001/2007. This phase displays certain peculiarities in comparison 
with previous upswings, as during this period the main economic growth was generated 
not by the Core, but rather by the Periphery whose strongest countries moved to the Semi-
periphery and even became new centers of growth.7 Many Core countries (especially in 
Europe) were concentrated on their internal affairs. In the meantime one could observe a 
rather active exchange of resources between the Core and the Periphery. On the one hand, 
industrial production moved from the Core to the Periphery; on the other hand, one can 
observe a vigorous flow of cheap manufactured products from the Periphery to the Core, 
whereas the Western countries became financial net importers (especially, through the 
movement of petrodollars). The USA actively exchanged ‘paper’ dollars for manufactured 
goods from the periphery, which contributed to the explosive growth of the US public debt 
(see, e.g., Akaev, Korotayev, and Fomin 2012). One may also take into account the Pe-
riphery – Core labor migration. Thus, at the first glance the balance of exchange looked as 
if being in favor of the Core. On the other hand, one should take into account the fact that 
those processes were accompanied by the acceleration of the economic growth in the Pe-
riphery and its slowdown in the Core – so, actually the Periphery favored from them more 
than the Core. One may suppose that this was supported by a substantial transformation of 
national sovereignty that opened borders for the flows of foreign capitals and technologies 
(see Grinin 2005, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2008d; Grinin and Korotayev 2009a, 2009b, 2010; 
see Grinin 2008e, 2008f, 2009b on the processes of decrease of sovereignty prerogatives).  
Phase B: 2001/2007–2015/2020. By now we observe the weakening of the Core and the 
activation of new centers; one may expect a search for a new balance of power and new coa-
litions (see Grinin 2009a, 2010, 2011; Grinin and Korotayev 2010 for more details). 
Now let us consider some characteristics and causes of those processes. 
                                                          
7 This somehow resembles the situation during the 3rd K-wave upswing, when the growth was generated in still semi-
peripheral Germany, the USA, and Russia, rather than in still hegemonic Britain.  
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Possible causes of the expansion. It is natural to suppose that particular strong Juglar 
crises and depressions typical for K-wave downswings in the Core countries stimulate the 
Core expansion on the Periphery.8 Such an expansion can be considered a result (and as 
a part) of counter-crisis measures undertaken by the Core countries. In addition, one may 
take into account the imitation competition effect – the intensification of expansion efforts 
by one state tend to provoke such an intensification on the part of competing states.  
In what way does the expansion contribute to the additional slow-down of the eco-
nomic development during the downswing?  
1. In the course of such an expansion the energy of the Core tended to become ex-
hausted.  
2. In addition, the Core powers could be exhausted by their struggles over their control 
over the World System Periphery. In any case the growth of this control involved substan-
tial expenses (and sometimes serious destruction). In the previous periods this could addi-
tionally weaken the Periphery. On the other hand, results of mutually beneficial expansion 
may be felt with a substantial lag.  
3. On the other hand, the fast development was often hindered by the insufficient con-
gruence of the economic structures of the Core and Periphery, a huge gap in the levels of 
economic development that was observed in many cases.  
4. One cannot exclude that we deal here with a sort of positive feedback: the worsen-
ing of the economic situation in the Core stimulated its expansion to the Periphery, where-
as the growing expenses to support this expansion may have worsened the situation in the 
Core. 
5. As a result of the active integration of the Periphery into the World System, the 
transformation of the Hinterland into Periphery, a part of the Periphery into Semiperiph-
ery, and the formation of new centers in the Semiperiphery the World System expanded, 
the number of links and contact intensity within it increased explosively, etc.; this, how-
ever, led to a certain slowdown of the World System economic growth.  
6. Downswings are also connected with the weakening of the old Hegemon. This 
weakens the structural congruence of the World System and supports the trend toward the 
slowdown of the economic growth rates. We are likely to observe such a pattern in  
the forthcoming years. On the other hand, it appears virtually impossible to replace the 
USA as the Word System Hegemon, because the USA is a multifunctional Hegemon, 
whereas no other power will be able to play such a role in the forthcoming decades. That is 
why there are grounds to expect the reconfiguration of the World System as a whole (see 
Grinin 2009а, 2010; Grinin and Korotayev 2010 for more details).  
Slowdowns of the world economic growth are often connected with the slowdown of 
the economic growth of the Hegemon.  
During upswings the resource movement balance tends to be in favor of the Core.  
1. During the upswing, the World System Core tends to concentrate on its internal af-
fairs (including the struggles between the Core countries), and consequently it tends to 
move less resources to the Periphery.  
                                                          
8 On the other hand, the weakening of the Core makes it possible for the Periphery to undertake counter-expansion, as 
was observed in the 1970s and early 1980s as regards fuel prices. Their explosive growth led to the flow of resources 
from the Core to the Periphery.  
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2. Resource accumulation, restructuring of relationships within the core, as well as the 
emergence of new (and especially military) technologies stimulate the escalation of hege-
monic struggles within the Core.  
3. By themselves those struggles and wars contribute to the acceleration of both infla-
tion and economic growth (thus, we are dealing here with a certain positive feedback). 
4. An important factor of the change of the resource movement balance in favor of the 
Core was constituted by the fact that the previous investment started to produce returns; in 
particular, the long-term investments in the infrastructure started to produce results;  
the trade-financial links started to work, scarcely populated territories were peopled (as 
was observed, e.g., in Australia in the first half of the nineteenth century), and so on. 
5. On the other hand, new peripheral regions were involved in global trade. Those re-
gions in order to do this often had to export their commodities with reduced prices (which 
often implied non-equivalent exchange – see Grinin and Korotayev 2012 for more  
details).9  
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Appendix 
Supplementary Figures 
Fig. S1. Dynamics of Proportion of Investments in the World GDP (%), 1965–2005  
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Fig. S2. Dynamics of the World Investment Effectiveness, 1965–2005  
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Note: This variable indicates how many dollars of the world GDP growth are achieved with one dollar of 
investments.  
                                                          
10 Dynamics of this variable has been calculated by Justislav Bogevolnov (Moscow State University, Department of 
Global Studies) with the World Bank database by dividing the world gross fixed capital formation indicator (in con-
stant international 2000 dollars) for a given year by the world GDP (in constant international 2000 dollars) for the 
same year.  
11 Dynamics of this variable has been calculated by Justislav Bogevolnov.  
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Part II. GLOBAL AND REGIONAL RELATIONS 
AND PROCESSES 
 
Soft Power as a State's Foreign  
Policy Resource 
 
Olga G. Leonova 
 
 
The article examines the ‘soft power’ concept which is treated as a state's for-
eign policy resource and a specific tool for latent governance of international 
processes. The work gives an insight into the content of soft power, its goals and 
objectives and defines its features. The author explores the content of soft power 
in a number of European countries, African states as well as in Russia. The arti-
cle considers the conditions for implementation of Russia's soft power, the objec-
tives to be attained to implement it, and methods to increase its efficiency. 
Keywords: hard power, soft power, foreign policy resource, latent governance, 
impact, influence, attraction. 
The twenty-first century sees the expanding channels through which a state affects interna-
tional processes and other countries. Today a country's economic success, ideological per-
suasiveness, and cultural attractiveness are often more important factors than its military 
power and possession of nuclear weapons.  
It is the hard power that was quite recently considered to be almost the key tool of 
foreign policy. Hard power, as is well-known, is a policy of coercion resting on a threat 
of use and/or use of military force against a given country. However, in the globalizing 
world in the context of global interconnection and interdependence it is no longer effec-
tive to use outdated political tools, including nuclear weapons, which may result in a 
total economic collapse of the country that has initiated a nuclear attack (except for the 
‘rogue states’ that are not included in the global economy). A threat or use of hard power 
(warships cruising along the coast or planes patrolling sky above a country) is rather 
ineffective because it entails more negative side effects than potential doubtful gains for 
the aggressor. This is well exemplified by Libya, Afghanistan and Iraq. In any case it is 
fraught with serious losses of reputation capital, which may subsequently prove detri-
mental to quite tangible capital. 
Today the global world is gradually fragmented into macroregional systems compris-
ing several countries led by a strong regional power. Possessing simultaneously parameters 
of economic, political and military poles, such regional systems may well claim the status 
of global power centers in the future. With such a configuration of the geopolitical space,  
a potential aggressor should be aware that it will have to deal not with one particular coun-
try, but with a whole regional system whose economic, political and military potential can 
compare with or surpass the aggressor's potential. 
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Soft Power: Essence, Goals, and Objectives 
Soft power is a foreign policy resource and a specific tool of latent governance of interna-
tional processes, which is brought into focus in the era of globalization. 
Latent governance objects are international processes and relations as well as individual 
countries and regions of the world. Such latent governance has its own distinctive features: 
firstly, the governance subject's influence is converted into the governance object's action 
motivation; secondly, there are no formal institutes, methods and levers of governance. 
Globalization processes cause the geopolitical space to reformat, a new hierarchical 
system (poles, power centers and regional powers) to form and new geopolitical axes to 
emerge. Such conditions make it necessary to shape a foreign policy appropriate to new 
realities, look for new tools and methods to attain the state's strategic goals and fulfill na-
tional interests.  
Soft power allows even those countries which have a limited range of traditional in-
fluence resources (e.g., states non-members of the UN Security Council, non-nuclear-
weapon states or states on the geographic periphery) to latently influence international 
processes. In the context of a multipolar, polycentric world, any country, regardless of its 
position in the global hierarchy, can latently influence international processes going on 
within a given macroregion or even globally, provided that it makes efficient use of soft 
power tools.  
While reasoning on soft power, they tend to refer to Joseph Nye's work (Nye 2004) 
whose title has not been quite adequately translated into the Russian language. According 
to Nye's concept, soft power is a derivate from the state's three resources: its culture, po-
litical ideology and foreign policy. Our treatment of this term is broader: soft power is  
a set of external and internal factors of the state. 
External factors include the following: foreign policy and its authority in international 
affairs; a state's position in the global hierarchy and its geopolitical status; civilization sta-
tus (there is national culture in all countries, but not all countries are successors of  
a specific civilization); political and economic development model of a state; state's devel-
opment strategy and ability to put it into practice; a country's information resources, its 
communicative mobility and position on the Information superhighway. Internal (sociocul-
tural) factors are represented by the following parameters: ideology, life style, quality and 
standards, values (including the national ideas); the national mentality; national culture 
(art, literature, film industry, theatre, show business); the state's creative potential, ability 
to generate ideas and technologies, including the creative power of a nation. Soft power is 
where a country's national idea and its mission in the global world are expressed.  
In total, these factors contribute to an attractive and effective image of a country. 
However, since complete clarity as to the relationship between the categories of ‘image’ 
and ‘soft power’ remains yet to be achieved, there are two viewpoints on the issue. Ac-
cording to the first one, soft power is a tool to build the image. The second point of view 
regards the image as one of soft power components. The difference between these catego-
ries is that soft power is a strategy of action and the image is something that appears with-
in social interaction as well as in the process of implementing this strategy.  
Soft power can also be defined as an impact by influence. The essence of soft power is 
a country's ability to exert influence based on attractiveness and appeal of its image. This 
is how the essence of soft power is manifested: 
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 use of intangible assets to realize its interests and implement strategies in the global 
world; 
 a method to achieve the desired result in foreign policy by peaceful means; 
 a method for non-violent fulfillment of national interests in the global world.  
The possibility to exercise soft power is based on the principles of sympathy, attrac-
tiveness, appeal and voluntary participation. 
One of the critical tactical objectives of soft power is to create attraction, for example, 
by building an effective image of the country and influencing the governance object. Tak-
ing into account the definition suggested above, we can determine the strategic goal of soft 
power as motivating the governance object to act and make a political decision through  
an impact by influence.  
The most important tools of soft power are information flows, political PR intended 
for foreign audience, global marketing, country's positioning in the global hierarchy, coun-
try's language and its rating in the world, people's (public) diplomacy, tourism, sport and 
cultural exchanges, system of education and student (youth) exchanges, ability to wage 
media wars, migration policy, national expatriate community, and cultural dialogue. Effi-
cient use of the soft power tools may foster an illusion of mutual interest, trust, respect and 
mutual understanding, and provide possibilities for a given state to influence political and 
humanitarian processes in the world and particular countries. 
There are significant differences between the concepts and practical application of soft 
power and hard power, a study of which provides a deeper insight into the essence of the 
category under consideration. In particular, soft power influence methods are voluntary 
participation of another country in basic foreign policy arrangements of the influenced 
state and its geopolitical projects, acceptance of common aims and illusion of achieving 
the common result, as well as intensive communication flows. The hard power methods 
rest on armed violence (armed intervention), economic pressure, intimidation (military, 
political, energy, raw materials, food, etc.), and bribery of the national political elite. 
There is a flexible balance of applying soft power and hard power methods in the 
modern world. Soft power and hard power use different ways to obtain authority which 
may vary depending on the country's status. Typically for a rogue state, such influencing 
methods include a threat of use of force, for a satellite country these are remunerations or 
economic incentives; and for a partner or ally these are methods from the soft power tool 
package, that is declaration of common interests and goals and promising to achieve the 
common result with a ‘fair’ distribution of preferences. 
Soft Power Influence Limits 
Soft power has its limits. A natural limiter of soft power impact is the cultural and historic 
tradition of influence object. 
The liberal concept of soft power has its limitations in the non-Western world. Some 
constituents (as formulated by Nye) of soft power have no effective influence in the East-
ern World countries. Due to peculiar political culture of the Eastern countries, some politi-
cal values of liberal democracy, such as the idea of liberal democracy, human rights and 
freedom (as treated in the West) are not favored there. However, the idea of charity and 
social support of vulnerable social strata (constituting the essence of the social state con-
cept) are understood there rather well. 
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As for consumer preferences, despite the universal diffusion and really global inter-
vention of Coca-Cola, Sneakers, MacDonald's, jeans, innovative devices (mobile phones, 
iPads, tablet PCs) and technologies (including software), the Eastern society remains the 
same regarding its culture and essence. 
Limiting line of soft power goes along the so-called ‘tectonic fault of civilization plates’. 
Natural limiting factors of soft power are civilization filters and civilization barriers. 
Civilization barriers select (sort out) economic, political and sociocultural phenomena 
that are most inauthentic for the civilization matrix of a given country. Civilization barriers 
operate on the level of national consciousness archetypes and flatly reject (or fail to ac-
cept) certain phenomena of economic, political or cultural life invading from outside.  
In Russia, such civilization barriers are exemplified by our society not accepting the 
enforced cult of the strong personality, Lone Ranger and sexual revolution (in Islamic re-
publics) as well as imposed benchmark ‘career, money, success’ (as shown by social sur-
vey data, young people give more preference to family values). The doctrines of free mar-
ket and monetarism approaches, positioning of such spheres as education and healthcare as 
a service sector, etc. are deemed negatively. 
Civilization filters are mechanisms for interpretation and adaptation of exported eco-
nomic, political and sociocultural phenomena that, although inauthentic for a given civili-
zation matrix, may have certain elements getting in tune with civilization algorithms and 
may be adopted thereto. Such civilization filters functioning can be exemplified by the 
special Russian interpretation of the theory and practice of the Western parliamentary sys-
tem, democracy, presidency institution, election system, party system, banking system, etc. 
Where the soft power effect ends, political technologies are employed. However, most of-
ten soft power and political technologies methods are used simultaneously. In the broad sense 
soft power is a part of global political technologies. When a controversy arises between the 
necessity and opportunity to use soft power, political technologies are also put into play. 
National Features of Soft Power 
Recently, the political discourse has used the notion of smart power interpreted as a bal-
ance of hard and soft power. It allows us, therefore, to single out the following governance 
mechanisms and influence tools intended for international processes, applied in the mod-
ern global world: soft power, hard power, smart power and also wise power (that is usually 
attributed to China). Each country forms its own soft power content determined by politi-
cal, economic and sociocultural differences between different countries of the world. We 
suggest that these national varieties of soft power should be called dominant power of the 
USA, attractive power of Europe, wise power of China, sophisticated power of India and 
mysterious power of the East. 
How is Russia's soft power to be denoted? Different options may be offered: reserved, 
mild, calm, unbending power of Russia. Or probably, an unobvious one? The question re-
mains open. 
Russia's soft power  
Soft power policy enables Russia to render active those resources of its external influence 
that may turn out to be more efficient in the modern global world. Today Russia has no co-
herent concept of soft power, nor clear understanding of this phenomenon. And according to 
sociological surveys, the image of Russia abroad is mostlynegatively stereotyped. 
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While giving no due attention to soft power as a foreign policy resource, Russia posi-
tions itself in the global world as a military pole, drastically increasing its defense budget. 
Russia possesses nuclear weapons. It ranks second after the USA by sales of its weapons 
to the third countries. Among our partners one finds Venezuela, Algeria, Egypt, Syria, 
Azerbaijan, Iran, Indonesia, India, China, and Vietnam. The 2013 national budget provides 
2.1 trillion rubles for the National Defense purposes (to be increased to 3 trillion rubles, 
i.e. by one third, by 2015). Over 2 trillion rubles accounts for the National Defense and 
Law Enforcement Activities. Both items total over 30 per cent of the budget (Argu-
menty… 2012). Such military reinforcement may compensate Russia's weaker positions in 
the economic and technological spheres and preserve its image of a strong player. 
In order to implement its soft power Russia has to create its logical connection that 
would comply with Russia's image and mission in the complex multipolar world. This may 
be a logical connection ‘Russia – the guarantor of safety’. The mission of Russia is to guar-
antee safety and stability in the region, on the continent and in the global world in general, 
disregarding privations and needs of its own people and sparing no effort and money. Such  
a mission can be exemplified by Russia's prudent initiatives on Libya, Syria, and Iran etc. 
Here we can also refer to the thesis saying that Russia is an orthodox country striving 
to follow Christian commandment: ‘Blessed are the peacemakers…’  
It is important to emphasize Russia's status as a civilization pole. Parameters of such a pole 
in the multipolar world are thought to be as follows: definite civilization identity; potential 
of sociocultural influence; definite particularities of national mentality; identifiable civili-
zation algorithms;civilization filters and barriers in the course of sociocultural integration 
of the countries in the globalizing world; consolidation based on a uniting national idea 
shared by all citizens; protection of national interests, values and ideals; assurance of na-
tional security; and a coherent national project. 
The state's civilization resource is a rather sustainable, almost indestructible and con-
stantly renewing resource available to our country at present. Availability of a set of civili-
zation pole parameters may be converted into soft power. 
Notwithstanding the negative stereotype of perceiving its domestic and foreign policy, 
Russia undoubtedly has some soft power, although in a latent state. In addition to conven-
tional elements of cultural influence (Russian ballet, Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, Chekhov, 
Tchaikovsky, Rachmaninoff, Shostakovich), the concept of Russia's soft power may in-
clude the following components: membership in the UN Security Council, energy and raw 
material resources, dramatic history and great victories, unique fusion of cultures of multi-
ethnic Russia, unprecedented experience of interaction and cooperation of peoples of our 
country and dialogue of confessions, space power status, renowned weapon brands and 
new military developments, its vast territory and astonishingly beautiful nature.  
Positioning Russia as a dynamically developing country, whose leaders are invariably 
among the world's top influential people, a BRICS member and leading state of the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization will undoubtedly increase appeal of Russia's soft 
power. 
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The rise of ‘Confucian’ East Asia – Japan, the four mini-dragons – suggests that 
despite global trends defined primarily in economic and geopolitical terms, cul-
tural traditions continue to exert powerful influences in the modernizing process. 
The claim that Asian values, rather than Western Enlightenment values, are 
more congenial to current Asian conditions and, by implication, to the emergent 
global community in the twenty-first century is seriously flawed, if not totally 
mistaken. The challenge ahead is the need for global civilizational dialogue as a 
prerequisite for a peaceful world order. 
Keywords: modernity, Eastern values, Confucianism, modernization, humanism. 
Modernity is both a historical phenomenon and a conceptual framework. The idea of mul-
tiple modernities is predicated on three interrelated assumptions: the continuous presence 
of traditions as an active agent in defining the modernizing process, the relevance of non-
Western civilizations for the self-understanding of the modern West, and the global sig-
nificance of local knowledge. 
In an exploration of economic culture and moral education in Japan and the four mini-
dragons (Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore), the continuous relevance of 
the Confucian traditions in East Asian modernity is studied from cross-cultural and inter-
disciplinary perspectives. Each geographic area is greatly varied and each disciplinary ap-
proach (philosophical, religious, historical, sociological, political, or anthropological) is 
immensely complex, and the interaction among them layers the picture with ambiguities. 
A discussion of them together shows that an appreciation of the Confucian elite's articula-
tion and the habits of the heart of the people informed by Confucian values is crucial for 
understanding the political economy and the moral fabric of industrial East Asia (Tu Wei-
ming 1996). 
‘Modernization’ 
Historically the term ‘modernization’ was employed to replace ‘westernization’ in recog-
nition of the universal significance of the modernizing process. Although the modernizing 
process originated in Western Europe, it has so fundamentally transformed the rest of the 
world that it must be characterized by a concept much broader than geography. Including 
the temporal dimension in the conception reveals modernization as the unfolding global 
trend rather than as a geographically specific dynamic of change. 
The concept of modernization is relatively new in academic thinking. It was first for-
mulated in North America in the 1950s by sociologists, notably Talcott Parsons, who be-
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lieved that the forces unleashed in highly developed societies, such as industrialization and 
urbanization, would eventually engulf the whole world. Although these forces could be 
defined as ‘westernization’ or ‘Americanization’, in the spirit of ecumenicalism, the more 
appropriate and perhaps scientifically neutral term would be ‘modernization’. 
It is interesting to note that, probably under the influence of intellectual discussion in 
Japan, the Chinese term for ‘modernization’, xiandaihua, was coined in the 1930s in a se-
ries of debates to address issues of development strategies, organized by the most influen-
tial newspaper in China, Shenbao. The three major debates, which centered on whether 
agriculture or industry, socialism or capitalism, or Chinese culture or Western learning 
should have priority in China's attempt to catch up with imperialist powers (including Ja-
pan), provide a richly textured discourse in modern Chinese intellectual history (Lo 
Rongqu 1985). Furthermore, a focused investigation of the Chinese case will help deter-
mine the applicability of the concept of modernization to non-Western societies. 
However, the claim that East Asian modernity is relevant to the modern West's self-
understanding is built on the assumptive reason that if the modernizing process can as-
sume cultural forms substantially different from those of Western Europe and North 
America, it clearly indicates that neither westernization nor Americanization is adequate in 
characterizing the phenomenon. Furthermore, East Asian forms of modernization may 
help scholars of modernization develop a more differentiated arid subtle appreciation of 
the modern West as a complex mixture of great possibilities rather than a monolithic entity 
impregnated with a unilinear trajectory. 
If we begin to perceive modernization from multiple civilizational perspectives, the 
assertion that what the modern West has experienced must be repeated by the rest of the 
world is no longer believable. Indeed, upon scrutiny, the modern West itself exhibits con-
flictual and contradictory orientations, a far cry from a coherent model of development. 
The difference between European and American approaches to modernization broadly 
defined gives ample evidence to the argument for diversity within the modern West. Actu-
ally, three exemplifications of Western modernity – Britain, France, and Germany – are so 
significantly different from one another in some of the salient features of the modernizing 
process that, in essence, none of the local knowledge is really generalizable. This by no 
means undermines the strong impression that virtually all forms of local knowledge that 
can be generalized, if not universalized, are Western in origin. 
Nevertheless, we are at a critical juncture and must move beyond three prevalent but 
outmoded exclusive dichotomies: the traditional – modern, the West – the rest, and the 
local – global. Our effort to transcend these dichotomies has far-reaching implications for 
developing a sophisticated understanding of the dynamic interplay between globalization 
and localization. The case of East Asia is profoundly meaningful for this kind of inquiry.  
I will focus my attention on Confucian humanism as the basic value system underlying 
East Asian political economy. Let us begin with a historical observation. 
Whether or not Hegel's philosophy of history signaled a critical turn that relegated 
Confucianism, together with other spiritual traditions in the non-Western world, to the 
dawn of the Spirit, the common practice in cultural China of defining the Confucian ethic 
as ‘feudal’ is predicated on the strong thesis of historical inevitability implicit in the Hege-
lian vision. The irony is that the whole Enlightenment project as captured by the epoch-
making Kantian question, ‘What is Enlightenment?’ was actually an affirmation that cul-
tural traditions outside the West, notably Confucian China, had already developed an or-
dered society even without the benefit of revelatory religion. 
As understood by contemporary thinkers such as Jurgen Habermas, what happened in 
the nineteenth century when the dynamics of the modern West engulfed the world in a rest-
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less march toward material progress was definitely not the result of a straightforward 
working out of the Enlightenment. On the contrary, the perceived Enlightenment trajectory 
of rationality was thoroughly undermined by the unbound Prometheus, symbolizing an 
unmitigated quest for complete liberation from the past and thorough mastery of nature. 
The demand for liberation from all boundaries of authority and dogma may have been 
a defining characteristic of Enlightenment thinking; the aggressive attitude toward nature 
is also a constituent part of the Enlightenment mentality. To the rest of the world, the 
modern West, informed by the Enlightenment mentality, has been characterized by con-
quest, hegemony, and enslavement as well as by models of human flourishing. 
Hegel, Marx, and Weber shared the ethos that, despite all its shortcomings, the mod-
ern West was the only arena of progress from which the rest of the world could learn.  
The unfolding of the Spirit, the process of historical inevitability, or the ‘iron cage’ of mod-
ernity, was essentially a European Problematik. Confucian East Asia, the Islamic Middle 
East, Hindu India, and Buddhist Southeast Asia were on the receiving end of this process. 
Eventually, modernization as homogenization would make cultural diversity inoperative, if 
not totally meaningless. It was inconceivable that Confucianism, or for that matter any other 
non-Western spiritual traditions, could exert a shaping influence on the modernizing process. 
The development from traditional to modern was irreversible and inevitable. 
In the global context, what some of the most brilliant minds in the modern West as-
sumed to be self-evidently true turned out to be parochial. In the rest of the world, and 
definitely in Western Europe and North America, the anticipated clear transition from tra-
dition to modernity never occurred. As a norm, traditions continue to exert their presence 
as active agents in shaping distinctive forms of modernity, and, by implication, the mod-
ernizing process itself has continuously assumed a variety of cultural forms rooted in spe-
cific traditions. The recognition of the relevance of radical otherness to one's own self-
understanding of the eighteenth century seems more applicable to the current situation in 
the global community than the inattention to any challenges to the modern Western mind-
set of the nineteenth century and most of the twentieth century. In the twenty-first century, 
the openness of the eighteenth century as contrasted with the exclusivity of the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries may provide a better guide for the dialogue of civilizations. 
The current debate between the ‘end of history’ (Fukuyama 1992) and the ‘clash of 
civilizations’ (Huntington 1996) scratches only the surface of the Problematik I wish to 
explore. The euphoria produced by the triumph of capitalism and the expectation that the 
liberal democratic persuasion will be universally accepted is shortlived. The emergence of 
the ‘global village’, at best an imagined community, symbolizes difference, differentiation, 
and outright discrimination. The hope that economic globalization engenders equality, 
either of consequence or opportunity, is simple-minded. The world has never been so di-
vided in terms of wealth, power, and accessibility to information and knowledge. Social 
disintegration at all levels, from family to nation, is a serious concern throughout the 
world. Even if liberal democracy as an ideal is widely accepted as a universal aspiration by 
the rest of the world, the claim that it will automatically become the only dominant dis-
course in international politics is wishful thinking. 
Although the ‘clash of civilizations’ is based on the sound judgment that cultural plu-
ralism is an enduring feature of the global scene, it is still rooted in the obsolete notion of 
pitting the West against the rest of the world. The credible proposition that only Western 
forms of local knowledge are generalizable, even universalizable notwithstanding, the thesis 
of Western exceptionalism is defensible. If the ‘clash of civilizations’ is a strategy of en-
hancing the persuasive power of cherished Western values, its goal, in the last analysis, is 
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comparable to the ‘end of history’, except for the cautionary note that, as a process, the 
initial stage may be wearisome for the advocates of Western liberal democracy. 
In a deeper sense, neither the end of history nor the clash of civilizations captures the 
profound concern of modern Western intellectuals. Despite all of the ambiguities of  
the Enlightenment project, its continuation is both necessary and desirable for human 
flourishing. The anticipated fruitful interchange between Habermas' communicative ra-
tionality and John Rawls' political liberalism is, perhaps, the most promising sign of this 
endeavor. The challenges to this mode of thinking indiscriminately labeled as postmodern-
ism are formidable, but this is not the place to elaborate on them. Suffice it now to men-
tion that ecological consciousness, feminist sensitivity, religious pluralism, and communi-
tarian ethics all strongly suggest the centrality of nature and spirituality in human reflexiv-
ity. The inability of our contemporary Enlightenment thinkers to take seriously the ulti-
mate concerns and harmony with nature as constitutive parts of their philosophizing is  
the main reason for them to respond creatively to postmodern critique. Lurking behind the 
scene is the question of community. We urgently need a global perspective on the human 
condition that is predicated on our willingness to think in terms of global community. 
Among the Enlightenment values advocated by the French Revolution, fraternity –  
the functional equivalent of community – has received scant attention among modern po-
litical theorists. The preoccupation with establishing the relationship between the individ-
ual and the state since Locke's treatises on government is of course not the full picture of 
modern political thought, but it is undeniable that communities, notably the family, have 
been relegated to the background as insignificant in the mainstream of Western political 
discourse. Georg Hegel's fascination with the ‘civil society’ beyond the family and below 
the state was mainly prompted by the dynamics of the bourgeoisie, a distinct urban phe-
nomenon threatening to all traditional communities. It was a prophetic gaze into the future 
rather than a critical analysis of the value of community. The transition from gemeinschaft 
to gesellschaft was thought to have been such a rupture that Max Weber referred to ‘uni-
versal brotherhood’ as an outmoded medieval myth unrealizable in the disenchanted mod-
ern secular world. In political and ethical terms, strenuous effort is required for the family 
of nations to rise above the rhetoric of self-interest to recapture the cosmopolitan spirit of 
interdependence. 
The upsurge of interest in recent decades within North America regarding community 
may have been stimulated by a sense of crisis that social disintegration is a serious threat 
to the well-being of the republic, but the local conditions in the United States and Canada, 
precipitated by ethnic and linguistic conflicts, are visible throughout the highly industrial-
ized, if not postmodern, First World. The conflict between globalizing trends, including 
trade, finance, information, migration, and disease, and localism, rooted in ethnicity, lan-
guage, land, class, age, and faith, is not easily resolvable. We are compelled by brutal con-
frontations as well as encouraging reconciliation around the world to transcend the ‘either-
or’ epistemology and to perceive the imagined global community in a variety of colors and 
many shades of meaning. The case of East Asian modernity from a Confucian perspective 
helps us cultivate a new way of thinking. 
Confucian Humanism 
The revival of Confucian teaching as political ideology, intellectual discourse, merchant 
ethics, family values, or the spirit of protest in industrial East Asia since the 1960s and 
socialist East Asia more recently is the combination of many factors. Despite tension  
and conflict rooted in primordial ties (particularly ethnicity, language, cultural national-
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ism, and life orientation), the overall pattern in East Asia is an integration based on values 
significantly different from the Enlightenment mentality of the modern West. 
East Asian intellectuals have been the devoted students of Western learning for more 
than a century. In the case of Japan the samurai-bureaucrats learned the superior knowl-
edge of Western science, technology, manufacturing industries, and political institutions 
from the Dutch, British, French, Germans, and, in recent decades, Americans. In similar 
fashion, the Chinese scholar-officials, the Korean ‘forest intellectuals’, and Vietnamese 
literati acquired knowledge from the West to build their modern societies. Their commit-
ment to substantial, comprehensive, or even wholesale westernization enabled them to 
thoroughly transform their economy, polity, and society according to what they perceived, 
through firsthand experience, as the superior modus operandi of the modern way. 
This positive identification with the West and active participation in a fundamental re-
structuring of one's own world according to the Western model is unprecedented in human 
history. However, East Asia's deliberate effort to relegate its own rich spiritual resources 
to the background for the sake of massive cultural absorption enhanced the need to appeal 
to the native pattern to reshape what they had learned from the West. This model of crea-
tive adaptation following the end of the Second World War helped them to strategically 
position themselves in forging a new synthesis. 
The Confucian tradition, having been marginalized as a distant echo of the feudal past, 
is forever severed from its imperial institutional base, but it has kept its grounding in 
an agriculture-based economy, family-centered social structure, and paternalistic polity 
that are reconfigured in a new constellation. Confucian political ideology has been opera-
tive in the development states of Japan and the four mini-dragons. It is also evident in the 
political processes of the People's Republic of China, North Korea, and Vietnam.  
As the demarcation between capitalist and socialist East Asia begins to blur, the cultural 
form that cuts across the great divide becomes distinctively Confucian in character. 
Economic culture, family values, and merchant ethics in East Asia and cultural China 
have also expressed themselves in Confucian terms. It is too facile to explain these phe-
nomena as a postmodern justification. Even if we agree that the Confucian articulation is 
but an afterthought, the circulation of terms such as network capitalism, soft authoritarian-
ism, group spirit, consensus formation, and human relatedness in characterizing salient 
features of the East Asian economy, polity, and society suggests, among other things, the 
transformative potential of Confucian traditions in East Asian modernity. 
Specifically, East Asian modernity under the influence of Confucian traditions sug-
gests a coherent vision for governance and leadership: 
• Government leadership in a market economy is not only necessary but also desir-
able. The doctrine that government is a necessary evil and that the market in itself can 
provide an ‘invisible hand’ for ordering society is antithetical to modern experience, West 
or East. A government that is responsive to public needs, responsible for the welfare of the 
people, and accountable to society at large is vitally important for the creation and mainte-
nance of order. 
• Although law is essential as the minimum requirement for social stability, ‘organic 
solidarity’ can only result from the implementation of humane rites of interaction.  
The civilized mode of conduct can never be communicated through coercion. Exemplary 
teaching as a standard of inspiration invites voluntary participation. Law alone cannot 
generate a sense of shame to guide civilized behavior. It is the ritual act that encourages 
people to live up to their own aspirations. 
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• Family, as the basic unit of society, is the locus from which the core values are 
transmitted. The dyadic relationships within the family, differentiated by age, gender, author-
ity, status, and hierarchy, provide a richly textured natural environment for learning the 
proper way of being human. The principle of reciprocity as a two-way traffic of human 
interaction defines all forms of human relatedness in the family. Age and gender, poten-
tially two of the most serious gaps in the primordial environment of the human habitat, are 
brought into a continuous flow of intimate sentiments of human care. 
• Civil society does not flourish because it is an autonomous arena above the family 
and beyond the state. Its inner strength lies in its dynamic interplay between family and 
state. The image of the family as a microcosm of the state and the ideal of the state as an 
enlargement of the family indicate that family stability is vitally important for the politic 
body, and that a vitally important function of the state is to ensure organic solidarity of the 
family. Civil society provides a variety of mediating cultural institutions that allow a fruit-
ful articulation between family and state. The dynamic interplay between the private and 
public enables the civil society to offer diverse and enriching resources for human flour-
ishing. 
• Education ought to be the civil religion of society. The primary purpose of educa-
tion is character building. Intent on the cultivation of the full person, school should em-
phasize ethical as well as cognitive intelligence. Schools should teach the art of accumulat-
ing ‘social capital’ through communication. In addition to the acquisition of knowledge 
and skills, schooling must be congenial to the development of cultural competence and the 
appreciation of spiritual values. 
• Since self-cultivation is the root for the regulation of family, governance of state, 
and peace under heaven, the quality of life of a particular society depends on the level of 
self-cultivation of its members. A society that encourages self-cultivation as a necessary 
condition for human flourishing is a society that cherishes virtue-centered political leader-
ship, mutual exhortation as a communal way of self-realization, the value of the family as 
the proper home for learning to be human, civility as the normal pattern of human interac-
tion, and education as character building. 
Confucianism and Modernization 
It is far-fetched to suggest that these societal ideals are fully realized in East Asia. Actu-
ally, East Asian societies often exhibit behaviors and attitudes just the opposite of the sup-
posed salient features of Confucian modernity. Indeed, having been humiliated by imperi-
alism and colonialism for decades, East Asia now, on the surface at least, blatantly  
displays some of the most negative aspects of Western modernism with a vengeance: ex-
ploitation, mercantilism, consumerism, materialism, greed, egoism, and brutal competi-
tiveness. Nevertheless, as the first non-Western region to become modernized, the cultural 
implications of the rise of ‘Confucian’ East Asia are far-reaching. 
The modern West as informed by Enlightenment mentality provided the initial impe-
tus for worldwide social transformation. The historical reasons that prompted the modern-
izing process in Western Europe and North America are not necessarily structural compo-
nents of modernity. Surely, Enlightenment values such as instrumental rationality, liberty, 
rights consciousness, due process of law, privacy, and individualism are all universalizable 
modern values, but as the Confucian example suggests, ‘Asian values’ such as sympathy, 
distributive justice, duty consciousness, ritual, public-spiritedness, and group orientation 
are also universalizable modern values (see Bary 1998; Langguth 2003; Elgin 2010). Just 
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as the former ought to be incorporated into East Asian modernity, the latter may turn out 
to be a critical and timely reference for the American way of life. 
If Confucian modernity definitively refutes the strong claim that modernization is, in 
essence, westernization or Americanization, does this mean that the rise of East Asia, 
which augurs the advent of a Pacific century, symbolizes the replacement of an old para-
digm by a new one? The answer is definitely in the negative. The idea of a kind of reverse 
convergence, meaning that the time is ripe for Western Europe and North America to look 
toward East Asia for guidance, is ill-advised. Although the need for the West, especially 
the United States, to transform itself into a learning as well as a teaching civilization is 
obvious, what East Asian modernity signifies is pluralism rather than alternative monism. 
The success of Confucian East Asia in becoming fully modernized without being 
thoroughly westernized clearly indicates that modernization may assume different cultural 
forms. It is thus conceivable that Southeast Asia may become modernized in its own right, 
without being either westernized or East-Asianized. The very fact that Confucian East 
Asia has provided an inspiration for Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia to modernize signi-
fies that Buddhist and Islamic and, by implication, Hindu forms of modernity are not only 
possible but highly probable. There is no reason to doubt that Latin America, Central Asia, 
Africa, and indigenous traditions throughout the world all have the potential to develop 
their own alternatives to Western modernism. 
But this neat conclusion, resulting from a commitment to pluralism, may have been 
reached prematurely. Any indication that this is likely to happen, a sort of historical inevi-
tability, smacks of wishful thinking. We do not have to be tough-minded realists to recog-
nize the likelihood of this scenario occurring. If the First World insists on its right to over-
develop, if industrial East Asia forges ahead with its accelerated growth, if the People's 
Republic of China immerses itself in the ‘four modernizations’ at all costs, what shape will 
the world be in fifty years from now? Is East Asian modernity a promise or a nightmare? 
One wonders. 
The current financial crisis notwithstanding, the surge in the last four decades of Con-
fucian East Asia – the most vibrant economy the world has ever witnessed – has far-
reaching geopolitical implications. Japan's transformation from an obedient student under 
American tutelage to the single most powerful challenger to American economic suprem-
acy compels us to examine the global significance of this particular local knowledge.  
The ‘reform and open’ policy of the People's Republic of China since 1979 has propelled 
it to become a gigantic development state. 
Although the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the former Soviet 
Union signaled the end of international communism as a totalitarian experiment, socialist 
East Asia (mainland China, North Korea, and, for cultural reasons, Vietnam) seems to be 
in the process of reinventing itself in reality, if not in name. With thousands of political 
dissidents in the West and a worldwide network in support of Tibet's independence, 
China's radical otherness is widely perceived in the American mass media as a threat. It 
seems self-evident that since China has been humiliated by the imperialist West for more 
than a century, revenge may be China's principal motivation for restructuring world order. 
Memories of the Pacific theater of the Second World War and the Korean War, not to 
mention the Vietnam War, give credence to the myth of the Yellow Peril. The emigration 
of wealthy Chinese from Southeast Asia, Taiwan, and Hong Kong to North America, Aus-
tralia, and New Zealand further enhances the sense of crisis that there is a Chinese con-
spiracy to rearrange power relationships in the global community. 
Tu • Multiple Modernities 111 
The rise of ‘Confucian’ East Asia – Japan, the four mini-dragons, mainland China, 
Vietnam, and possibly North Korea – suggests that despite global trends defined primarily 
in economic and geopolitical terms, cultural traditions continue to exert powerful influ-
ences in the modernizing process. Although modernization originated from the West, East 
Asian modernization has already assumed cultural forms so significantly different from 
those in Western Europe and North America that, empirically, we must entertain alterna-
tives to Western modernism. However, this does not indicate that Western modernism is 
being eroded, let alone replaced, by East Asian modernism. The claim that Asian values, 
rather than Western Enlightenment values, are more congenial to current Asian conditions 
and, by implication, to the emergent global community in the twenty-first century is seri-
ously flawed, if not totally mistaken. The challenge ahead is the need for global civiliza-
tional dialogue as a prerequisite for a peaceful world order. The perceived clash of civili-
zations makes the dialogue imperative. 
The paradox, then, is our willingness and courage to understand radical otherness as  
a necessary step toward self-understanding. If the West takes East Asian modernity as a 
reference, it will begin to sharpen its vision of the strengths and weaknesses of its model 
for the rest of the world. The heightened self-reflexivity of the modern West will enable it 
to appreciate how primordial ties rooted in concrete living communities have helped to 
shape different configurations of the modern experience. 
This is a giant step toward true communication between the West and the rest, without 
which basic trust and fruitful mutuality across civilizational lines can never be established. 
Actually, from the perspective of the global community, the dichotomy of the West and 
the rest is unnecessary and undesirable. It is also empirically untenable. The West, as  
a hegemonic power, has been trying to dominate the rest by coercion, and the rest has fully 
penetrated the West as a result of multiple migration: labor, capital, talent, and religion. 
The time is ripe for a dialogue of civilizations based on the spirit of interdependence. 
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The complex relationship between democracy and human rights shows the 
need for education in democracy which overcomes the reductionist under-
standing of democracy to recognize only the will of the majority, the need for 
human rights education. Human rights education is the essential fundament of 
the implementation of human rights as every human being needs to know about 
her/his rights. Human rights education is a ‘must have’ and not a ‘nice to 
have’ in today's pluralistic society where human rights enable us to live in 
peaceful coexistence with respect for the human dignity of each other and with 
tolerance across the boundaries of traditions, cultures, religions, world views 
and opinions. 
Keywords: human fights, minority, democracy, human rights education, deci-
sion-making process. 
Introduction 
Having a Swiss passport as well as living and working in Switzerland, I start my reflection 
with the following concrete case from Switzerland which serves as a starting point for  
a critical reflection: on November 29, 2009, Swiss voters have supported a referendum 
proposal to ban the building of minarets. More than 57 per cent of electors voted in favor 
of the ban. In an official statement, the government said it accepted the decision. It stated: 
‘The Federal Council (government) respects this decision. Consequently the construction 
of new minarets in Switzerland is no longer permitted’ (SWI 2009). The result of a democ-
ratic opinion-building and decision-making process – in this case to ban the building of 
minarets – is violating human rights, in this case the ban violates the freedom of religion 
and is discriminatory.  
What does happen when a democratic decision constitutes a human rights violation? 
How should the reaction look like when a majority's decision discriminates a minority 
(e.g., when Swiss majority votes against minaret construction)? Is there a democracy 
without human rights? These questions gain more importance everyday as we live in a het-
erogenic society with a variety of values and goals. The demographic development of today's 
society, the prognoses of migration and the overall perspective of the development of world 
population indicate that the heterogeneity will intensify and a qualitative handling of it will 
be a key criterion of the human quality and of the living conditions of next generations. 
Could this handling be the result of democratic processes? Are human rights the minimal 
standards to enable the coexistence of a society? Does a direct democracy need a human 
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rights-based, juridical institution protecting the minorities from a dictatorship of the major-
ity? Does the universality of human rights, on the other hand, lead to a neglect of democ-
ratic decisions and a disrespect of national sovereignty in a globalized world? In my paper 
I will address these and related questions discussing the relation between democracy and 
human rights based on the observation of the challenge that a majority can vote in a de-
mocratic process in favor of a law which is discriminating a minority. I will elaborate the 
argument that the idea and concept of democracy includes human rights as democracy is 
built on the fundament of human rights, and I will discuss the concrete consequences of  
a holistic understanding of democracy. 
Human Rights Protect Every Human Being 
Human rights protect the essential elements and areas of a human existence, which are 
necessary for survival and for life as a human being. Human rights are those rights that 
belong to everyone as a member of the human race, regardless of skin color, nationality, 
political convictions or religious persuasion, social standing, gender or age. Every individ-
ual possesses human rights. They are subjective rights because the right-holders of human 
rights are individuals, not collectivities. Human rights are rights with a certain complexity 
because they are at the same time moral, legal, and political rights. In their legal dimension, 
human rights are part of a legal system and individuals living in this legal system are entitled 
to these rights. They are ‘legal entitlements of individuals against the state or state-like enti-
ties, guaranteed by international law for the purpose of protecting fundamental needs of the 
human person and his/her dignity in times of peace and war’ (Kaelin 2004: 17). The legal 
dimension of human rights is a positive achievement of human history as the international 
community found a consensus in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and 
created and ratified a human rights system in subsequent years. One can see a progress in 
the tradition of human rights from philosophical ideas of human rights (e.g., in the period 
of Enlightenment) to the implementation of the philosophical ideas of human rights on a 
national level (e.g., Declaration of Independence of 1776, Declaration des droits de 
l'homme et du citoyen de 1789) with its obvious limits (only white men of a certain socio-
economic class excluding other human beings, excluding all other men and women, and 
still not overcoming the theory and practice of slavery), initiating the implementation of 
human rights on a universal level (Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,  
the UN human rights treaty body system, regional human rights mechanisms) (Bobbio 
1998). One can see a progress which the tradition of human rights experienced in the legal 
dimension in their process of realization. Human rights are now legally defined, know  
a legal framework and are enforceable. Institutions like the UN Human Rights Council in 
Geneva, the UN Treaty Body System, … are elements of the realization of the idea of hu-
man rights and can enhance the fulfillment of human rights. They show that human rights 
are a concrete reality, not an illusion. Human rights are legal reality in all parts of  
the world. Human rights legal mechanisms, instruments and human rights institutions give  
the idea of the protection of human dignity embodied in human rights. 
Human rights gain weight and power when they become part of a particular legal sys-
tem (see Lohmann 2002), for example, of a national legal system through a democratic 
process, as they are then enforceable by law more directly and democratically legitimated.  
Obviously the implementation of human rights at the same time faces challenges eve-
rywhere. One of the main challenges belongs to the process of the incorporation of human 
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rights in national legal systems: the risk of a particularization of human rights. Human 
rights are integrated in a national legal system by becoming part of the fundamental rights 
of the constitution through a democratic process. Within the national legal system the legal 
subjects acknowledge each other as holders of these rights within the framework of inter-
nal logic of a legal system. At the same time this way undermines the universality of hu-
man rights, because then human rights would exist only within a particular legal system of 
a particular legal society. Human beings who are not citizens of this particular legal soci-
ety remain without human rights. Human rights run the risk of reduction of their universal-
ity through the particularization as parts of a national legal system. Justification models 
within the moral dimension can as already mentioned include the essential aspect of hu-
man rights that every human being – even living in a place on the planet where she or he 
does not benefit from a legal system respecting human rights – has human rights. 
On a practical level, the process of strengthening international law and of a global in-
stitutionalization of the implementation and protection of human rights – in parallel to the 
integration of human rights within national legal systems – is necessary. 
The legal dimension of human rights introduced above is the result of one part of the 
political dimension of human rights (see Kirchschlaeger 2013b: 255–260) including  
the political deliberation, political struggle, political opinion- and consensus-building 
processes, and political decisions leading to the legal entitlement of human beings to hu-
man rights. The political dimension of human rights embraces human rights as content and 
political arguments in public political discussion as well. Even if they do not lead to legal 
consequences, they can have political significance. 
Furthermore political opinion-building and decision-making processes can strive for 
human rights, as their aim is to guarantee every human being the enjoyment of human 
rights. These processes can be dominated by the political duty to take the adequate politi-
cal measures and decisions to further the implementation of human rights. 
Beyond that, the political instrumentalization and the abuse of human rights for other 
political ends belong to the political dimension of human rights. They can find their worse 
form when these ends represent themselves violations of human rights. 
From a procedural point of view, the human rights serve as a basis for a political opin-
ion-building and decision-making process allowing every human being political participa-
tion. I will argue below that human rights protect democratic processes. 
Finally, the political discourse and decisions could orient themselves at the frame of 
reference of human rights. 
I just mentioned above that the political process leading from the idea and concept of 
human rights to the establishment of human rights is one aspect of the political dimension 
of human rights. This point makes obvious the historical dimension of human rights. This 
development of human rights happens in human history. If one looks closer at this aspect 
of the historical dimension of human rights, one can see that usually experiences  
of injustices trigger a common feeling that humanity should stop these injustices, get rid of 
them, and avoid them in the future. For example, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights of 1948 can be understood as a reaction to the violation of essential elements and 
areas of human existence and to the attempt of denial of human dignity during the Holo-
caust. Johannes Morsink argues: ‘Most of the articles and rights in the Declaration were 
adopted as direct and immediate reactions to the horrors of the Holocaust’ (2010: 27). This 
historical dimension of human rights does neither exclude a dynamic understanding of 
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human rights, which remains open for further development if necessary. On the contrary, 
taking the historicity of human rights seriously opens the eyes for similar injustices and 
calls for support of reactions to injustices leading to the claim for human rights. ‘The hu-
man rights abuses on the minds of the 1948 drafters occurred during the Holocaust, while 
today we can point not only to the Nazi atrocities, but to atrocities in Bosnia, Cambodia, 
Rwanda, Darfur and in other contexts’ (Morsink 2010: 36). Nor this historical dimension 
of human rights leads to the end of the universality of human rights due to their historical 
contingency, because the historical location and explanation of the genesis of human rights 
explain historic injustices in their exemplary character without any potential for a moral 
justification of human rights. The analysis of the historical development of human rights 
brings an added value to the human rights discourse, as it discovers lines of argumentation 
and processes from a historical perspective which opens valuable systematic insights. 
While in the historic dimension of human rights the question of the ‘how’ regarding the 
genesis of human rights is addressed, the question of the ‘why’ every human being is enti-
tled to human rights remains open. 
It is part of the moral dimension of human rights to address the question of the ‘why’. 
The discourse about the reasons why every human being is a right-holder is of significance, 
because human rights did not ‘fall from heaven’. Human rights are not an ‘absolute truth’. 
The necessity of a justification of human rights is also provoked by the relation between 
human rights and corresponding duties: every human being is not only a right-holder but also 
needs to respect the human rights of others. In order to remain coherent with their own idea, 
the existence of human rights depends exclusively on the possibility of their justification 
(Alexy 1998). Human rights need to be justified to everyone concerned with human 
rights.  
Besides ‘internal necessity’, there is an ‘external necessity’ as well: a reflection of the 
justification of human rights is also provoked by the different forms of relativism which 
human rights are facing today. Human rights and their essential claim of universality are 
doubted in the actual philosophical discussion about human rights after Georg Lohmann in 
three ways:  
1. A cultural-relativistic way;  
2. A specific cultural-relativistic way which sees in the particular and partial emphasis 
of the individual freedom-rights a contradiction of the claim of universality of human 
rights;  
3. A critical relativism based on skepticism related to the small potential of realization 
of human rights and differences within the realization between the three categories of hu-
man rights. These cultural-relativistic criticisms on human rights and related theoretical 
approaches and reactions, and alternatives to those approaches must be discussed accu-
rately to establish a human rights culture. 
One possible approach of justifying human rights is based on the principle of vulner-
ability which I have developed more extensively on another occasion (Kirchschlaeger 
2013a), and which I mention here only shortly and so far as it serves the main focus of the 
article. The principle of vulnerability means that one is exposed to the possibility to be 
attacked or hurt physically or mentally including the incapability to liberate oneself from 
vulnerability. A human being perceives all other human beings and her/his living context 
and world as possible sources of her/his vulnerability. A human being depends upon her-
self/himself, other human beings, the context and the world, as all of them can activate 
Globalistics and Globalization Studies 116 
her/his vulnerability or protect her/him from it. The awareness of one's own vulnerability 
which is based on self-awareness and independent of the empirical correctness of this self-
perception, leads to uncertainty as it can also mean ‘loss of opportunities to live better, 
loss of abilities to live well, and, at its extreme, loss of living’ (Hoffmaster 2006: 42). Be-
cause of this awareness, human beings are willing to build social institutions in order to 
protect themselves from their own vulnerability. They find a consensus to protect them-
selves and all human beings from the possible consequences of their vulnerability regard-
ing the essential elements and areas of human existence through human rights. The latter 
represent the filter to distinguish between vulnerabilities that are relevant for the protection 
of human rights as the highest possible protection available to the human community and 
those that are not. Finally, I would like to point out that human rights are not justified by 
vulnerability itself – this would signify a naturalistic fallacy – but by the reaction to the 
perception of the principle of vulnerability by human beings. 
Human rights in their moral dimension are universal (every human being is a right-
holder), categorical (every human being has these rights, they cannot be denied to anyone), 
egalitarian (every human being has the same rights), individual (human rights apply to 
every human being as individual and protect the latter from violations by a collectivity, 
recognizing at the same time the important role of a collectivity for the individual), fun-
damental (human rights protect basic and essential elements of human existence) and indi-
visible (the whole catalogue of human rights must be respected, they are complementary), 
and they make legitimate demands with corresponding positive and negative duties (see 
Kirchschlaeger 2007). 
On the one hand human rights in their moral dimension are ‘weak rights’, because 
they are not enforceable but appellative, and the consequences of their violations are moral 
sanctions (like public shame) but not legal sanctions. On the other hand, human rights in 
their legal dimension depend in their justification on the moral dimension of human rights, 
because their legal justification is mostly limited to the boundaries of a national legal sys-
tem which can be compensated by the moral dimension of human rights.  
Vice versa, human rights in their legal dimension cannot justify human rights in their 
moral dimension, due to the limited validity of the first. Therefore human rights in  
their moral dimension need to find their justification in the moral dimension. Therefore at 
the end of the day, the justification of human rights can be realized legitimately only in the 
moral dimension. They depend on a moral justification.  
The significance of the moral dimension of human rights is built on this necessity, as 
human rights can only be claimed without any limits when there is a justification of human 
rights independent from legal or political decisions by state actors. This justification must 
be a moral justification, because it must be convincing for every human being, that is to 
say, it needs to be a universal moral justification which legitimates the concept that all 
human beings are equal and holders of human rights. 
In addition, the moral dimension of human rights creates an awareness of the constant 
challenge of a legal and a political reality which neither realizes nor respects human rights 
completely. This awareness includes the corresponding moral obligation and responsibility 
of everyone to enhance the implementation of the human rights of every individual in his 
or her sphere of influence. The theory leads to practice…  
Human rights practice needs this theoretical fundament:  
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Human rights are a theory-based social construct. Human rights practice is com-
monly understood as actions through which we advocate for the protection of human 
rights […] Social action and behaviour which actually do respect human rights, 
through which we promote their protection, protest against their violation, and organ-
ise action or establish institutions that realise and protect human rights, remain 
guided by theoretical considerations. Indeed, the theory must not become an end in 
itself; there is something like a prohibition of self-gratification for human rights the-
ory. However, a practice that renounces theoretical considerations will, like similar 
practices, become blind and runs the risk of getting lost or doing something wrong 
(Lohmann 2004: 307; translation mine – P.K.). 
Finally, the following five situations illustrate the necessity of understanding human 
rights in their moral dimension and not only in their legal, political and historical dimen-
sion. In these exemplary situations human rights could not be claimed at all, or at least not 
integrally, if their moral dimension were not considered:  
– In a state in which human rights cannot be claimed legally, every human being is 
still a holder of human rights independently of the official position of the state. 
The understanding of human rights as pre-state-rights (which means before becoming le-
gal positive rights respectively therefore in their moral dimension) needs to be upheld. 
‘Pre’ refers here to the validity of human rights, not the genesis, therefore they are not de-
pending upon the state (Sandkuehler 2010: 1539). If human rights were not understood 
with a moral dimension including its pre-state origin, human rights could not be claimed at 
all or at least not integrally. 
– Where theoretical and practical obstacles block or obstruct the implementation of 
human rights, or where the political will favors human rights violations, every human be-
ing is still a holder of human rights based on the moral dimension of human rights. 
– If majority-decisions try to reduce the rights of a minority, every human being is still 
a holder of human rights which means the protection of the minority and its members in 
their essential elements and areas of human existence. 
– When certain currents in traditions, cultures, religions and world-views interpret 
human rights in a way denying or restricting a right or some rights to some human beings 
(e.g., the equality of woman and man, the relation between individual and collective rights, 
etc.), every human being is a holder of human rights and (on the fundament of the above-
mentioned principle of indivisibility) of the entire catalogue of human rights to the same 
extent without any difference. 
– If human rights would only be understood in a horizontal way with negative conse-
quences from a human rights perspective regarding the human rights violations by non-
state actors and the responsibilities corresponding with human rights of non-state actors, 
the recognition of every human being as a holder of human rights in their moral dimension 
ensures that human rights can be applied in horizontal (between individuals) and vertical 
(between individual and state) relations with a critical potential. 
The Universality of Human Rights 
The universality of human rights (see Kirchschlaeger 2011) shows the significance of the 
moral dimension of human rights as background of the just mentioned exemplary five 
situations. Universality is mentioned above as one of the essential characteristics of human 
rights. By definition, human rights are rights that apply to all human beings and are there-
fore universal. All human beings are holders of human rights, independently of what they 
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do, where they come from, where they live and from their national citizenship, their com-
munity…  
The universality of human rights is constantly challenged by particular interests, for 
example, by states which claim the priority of their sovereignty or alleged democratic de-
cisions over the universality of human rights or by the private sector which claims self-
regulating approaches and uses this to define its sphere of influence within certain limits. 
These challenges are part of the political and legal dimension of human rights and as 
a consequence of the moral dimension of human rights as well. One can recognize a posi-
tive tendency to acceptance of human rights by states, a growth of an international institu-
tionalization for the protection of human rights and a progress of the mechanisms for 
monitoring human rights performances by states to respect the universality of human 
rights and some small steps by the corporate world. At the same time, it has to be stated 
that the implementation of human rights is not yet there where it should be, and that the 
vast majority of human beings are still victims of violations of their human rights. The 
universality is still a claim, not a reality. 
Furthermore, cultural diversity can be seen as an obstacle for the universality of hu-
man rights in the moral dimension of human rights. In spite of the different philosophical, 
religious, cultural and traditional sources and texts transmitting elements of the concept of 
human rights, although the broad inclusion of the international community in the drafting 
process of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the reconfirmation of the valid-
ity of the universality of human rights by the UN Conference in Vienna (1993), the univer-
sality faces criticisms from different sides because of its alleged Western origin, for exam-
ple, in the so-called ‘Asian values debate’ (see Senghaas 1995; Geiger and Kieserling 
2001; Burke 1987). 
The fact that the universality of human rights is challenged by cultural diversity is 
even more astonishing as firstly human rights protect the individual's freedom of religion 
and belief and the right to a cultural life (article 18 and 27 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights of 1948) and therefore are enhancing cultural diversity. Secondly human 
rights as individual rights protect especially the members of minorities from violations and 
injustices by majorities, for example, with the right to equality, right to non-
discrimination, etc. Simone Zurbuchen points out: ‘While I do not deny that human rights 
establish moral boundaries, it needs also to be seen that these rights enable members of 
religious communities and of other variants of cultural groups to maintain their distinct 
identity’ (Zurbuchen 2009: 285). Often religious, cultural, traditional or world-view com-
munities run the risk to be discriminated because of their religion, culture, tradition or 
world-view, and human rights protect them from this risk; thus religions, cultures, tradi-
tions, world views and beliefs benefit indirectly from the universality of human rights as 
they can find themselves somewhere in the world in the situation of a minority. Minorities 
benefit as well indirectly from the human right to freedom of religion and belief. This right 
enables and enhances the authentic practice of an individual and through that also the 
peaceful coexistence of religions, cultures, traditions and world-views, as well as the dia-
logue between them. It is an achievement of humanity that it seeks to protect this variety. 
As the fundament of protection of ideas, traditions and beliefs, human rights can therefore 
in exchange expect to be respected by religions, cultures, traditions, world views and be-
liefs (see Hoeffe 1999). Actually the realization of human rights needs the support and 
contribution by societal actors like religious, cultural, traditional or world-view communi-
ties (Kirchschlaeger 2013a, 2013b). 
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At this point, I need to emphasize that religions, cultures, traditions, world-views and 
beliefs should be understood as open for change, not as eternal absolute entities. Human 
rights do not find an end before religions, cultures, traditions, world-views and beliefs, but 
influence them on a theoretical level. On a practical level, cultural mediation and  
an adaption of the implementation of human rights to the specific religious, cultural 
and traditional context is necessary to respect cultural diversity which is protected by hu-
man rights. 
Concerning the dialogue about differences between religions, cultures, traditions and 
world views, the recognition of the differences leads to a better understanding and sup-
ports human rights on a practical level. This inter-cultural and inter-religious dialogue 
would benefit from a frame of reference, how this dialogue should be led in order to ex-
clude the possibilities of discrimination and of arbitrariness. Human rights could serve as 
this frame of reference. 
Of course, human rights are individual rights and embrace the perspective of the indi-
vidual, not of the community: human rights do not protect traditions, cultures, religions as 
such, but the freedom of the individual to share the beliefs, thoughts and world-views of a 
community, to be part of a community and to practice their way of life. This difference is 
criticized as an individualistic bias of human rights, overlooking article 29. The latter posi-
tions the individual within its community and underlines the important role of the commu-
nity for the development of the individual and the responsibilities of the individual within 
the community. 
Participation – A Human Right  
Discussing the relation between democracy and human rights it is of significance to em-
phasize firstly that democracy is based on the human right to participate in the political 
decision process (Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948), also 
called the ‘democracy principle’:  
1. Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or 
through freely chosen representatives.  
2. Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country.  
3. The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will 
shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and 
equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting 
procedures. 
We have a human right to democracy. Human rights and democracy go hand in hand 
as democracy is the political system which embodies the autonomy of the individual in-
herent within the idea and concept of human rights. 
Chances and Challenges of a Democratic Justification  
of Human Rights 
One possibility to legitimate human rights is on the legal or political dimension through  
a democratic process. Juergen Habermas (1994) and others link the reason why a human 
being is a holder of human rights to a national legal system in which human rights become 
part of the fundamental rights of the constitution through a democratic process. In the 
framework of internal logic of a legal system the legal subjects acknowledge each other as 
holders of these rights. At first sight, legitimating human rights through a process in which 
every human being has a right to participate seems to be convincing. But this approach 
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undermines the universality of human rights, because human rights can then exist only 
within a particular legal system of a particular legal society. Human beings who are not 
citizens of this particular legal society remain without human rights. This would be 
against the universality of human rights. Human rights open a global horizon and start 
locally at the same time. In 1958, Eleanor Roosevelt said, on the occasion of the tenth 
anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948:  
Where, after all, do universal human rights begin? In small places, close to home – so 
close and so small that they cannot be seen on any maps of the world. Yet they are 
the world of the individual person; the neighborhood he lives in; the school or col-
lege he attends; the factory, farm or office where he works. Such are the places where 
every man, woman and child seeks equal justice, equal opportunity, equal dignity 
without discrimination. Unless these rights have meaning there, they have little 
meaning anywhere. Without concerned citizen action to uphold them close to home, 
we shall look in vain for progress in the larger world.  
The perception of violations of human rights in one's own living context leads to rec-
ognition of one's own responsibility for the cause of human rights and one's own self-
understanding as a global citizen with her/his responsibility for the realization of human 
rights. 
Human Rights – Fundament of and Frame of Reference for  
a Democracy 
As the democratic principle is part of human rights, a democracy is built on the fundament of 
human rights. Democracy can also be seen as the institutional expression of the respect  
of the individual's autonomy, giving an individual the possibility to participate in the opin-
ion-building and decision-making process of the legal system she/he lives in as a citizen. 
At this point, one challenge of today's democratic societies appears to be the problem 
that within legal society not all right holders can participate in democratic decisions, for 
example, persons living in this particular legal society without citizenship of this particular 
state. Changes in the access to vote on the community level are first small steps to 
a solution of this problem. 
The second challenge is the following. It is imaginable that a majority is in favor of 
something which violates the human rights of a minority. We do not have to look back 
in history too far to find some examples for this theoretical observation. The Swiss case 
to ban the building of minarets is an example for this, I am afraid. A majority voted in 
a democratic process in favor of a law discriminating a minority within the national legal 
system, in this case that they are not allowed to build minarets at all. (Beforehand every-
body – religious communities and of course the Muslim community as well – had to re-
spect the Swiss building code in planning and raising a building.) Furthermore, the ban 
violates the freedom of religion of this minority as well. The example shows that a reduc-
tionist understanding of democracy can lead to human rights violations within so-called 
democratic processes. Why ‘reductionist’? The idea and concept of democracy includes 
human rights, as democracy is built on the fundament of human rights, in front of all on 
the democratic principle as part of human rights. Therefore, the respect of human rights is 
a part of a democratic system. So a democracy must integrate mechanisms which ensure 
that human rights are respected regarding the access to democratic opinion-building and 
decision-making processes and in the way these processes are taking place, as the possibil-
ity of a democratic decision violating human rights is excluded from the start. Human 
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rights are the frame of reference for a democracy. Different forms to guarantee the respect 
within a democratic system are known, for example, the Constitution, the Supreme Court, 
etc. and need to be established in democracies in which they do not exist for purposes of 
the further realization of human rights. 
What do I expect to happen in Switzerland? As Switzerland ratified the European 
Convention of Human Rights by a democratic decision, when for the first time a request to 
build a minaret in Switzerland will be denied based on the new legislation, this decision 
will be challenged in the European Court of Human Rights and lead to a judgment which 
then must be respected by Switzerland. Therefore, at the end of the day it will not be pos-
sible to implement this human-rights-violating law. 
In the aftermath of this vote, a public discussion started with the result that a new way 
of dealing with initiatives which are not respecting human rights is examined to prevent 
something like this can happen again. I see this as a positive reaction.  
At the same time I am concerned by the negative impact this entire process will have 
on the political participation. 
I am concerned by the attempts of political forces in Switzerland to create an alleged 
conflict between democracy and human rights – describing human rights as ‘foreign 
power’ violating the national sovereignty and the will of the people – in order to bash hu-
man rights and to damage the reputation of institutions working for the realization of hu-
man rights, for example, the UN human rights bodies, the European Court of Human 
Rights, and so on. 
I am concerned that in this way the ground is created for ridiculing the criticisms com-
ing from human rights institutions regarding human rights violations in Switzerland. 
Although these concerns are provoked by the concrete example from Switzerland, 
nothing indicates that this represents an isolated problem of Switzerland. This concrete 
example helps to illustrate some general challenges linked to the relation between democ-
racy and human rights which exist and could exist in every corner of the world. 
Automatically Democratic? Human Rights Education Contributing 
to the Functioning of a Democracy 
Human rights education could meet these challenges and address the naïve assumption as 
well that every human being is born democratic and with the skills and competencies to 
participate in a democratic opinion-building and decision-making process. Thomas Ham-
marberg emphasizes: ‘Educating citizens in their human rights creates an informed society 
which in turn strengthens democracy’ (Hammarberg 2008). In the occasion of an expert-
seminar during the preparation-process of the UN Declaration on Human Rights Education 
and Training in Marrakech 2009,1 Navanethem Pillay, UN-High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, outlined the expectations from human rights education: ‘Human Rights Education 
is essential for the prevention of human rights abuses, the promotion of non-
discrimination, equality and sustainable development, and the enhancement of people's 
participation in democratic decision making processes’. Human rights education contrib-
utes to the functioning of democracy. 
                                                          
1  The author has contributed as a consultative expert to the development of the UN Declaration on Human Rights 
Education and Training during the entire preparation process of the Declaration. 
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The fundamental role of human rights education is to empower citizens to defend their 
own rights and those of others. ‘This empowerment constitutes an important investment 
for the future, aimed at achieving a just society in which all human rights of all persons are 
valued and respected’ (de Mello 2004: 3). The idea of ‘empowerment’ means the capabil-
ity to determine one's own present and future with self confidence and awareness of one's 
own rights and to participate actively in the political decision process.  
The UN Declaration on Human Rights Education and Training (Article 2/2) defines 
human rights education and training as: 
Human rights education and training comprises all educational, training, information, 
awareness-raising and learning activities aimed at promoting universal respect for 
and observance of all human rights and fundamental freedoms and thus contributing, 
inter alia, to the prevention of human rights violations and abuses by providing per-
sons with knowledge, skills and understanding and developing their attitudes and be-
haviours, to empower them to contribute to the building and promotion of a universal 
culture of human rights. 
a) education about human rights, which includes providing knowledge and un-
derstanding of human rights norms and principles, the values that underpin them and 
the mechanisms for their protection; 
b) education through human rights, which includes learning and teaching in a way 
that respects the rights of both educators and learners; 
c) education for human rights, which includes empowering persons to enjoy 
and exercise their rights and to respect and uphold the rights of others. 
I suggest an understanding of human rights education (Kirchschlaeger and 
Kirchschlaeger 2009) including the ‘when’ (duration of the educational process), the 
‘why’ and the ‘how’ in the definition of human rights education. Regarding the ‘when’,  
I recognize human rights education as a ‘lifelong-learning process’ which can never be 
concluded completely. This echoes the understanding of human rights whose realization is 
always an on-going task and whose character is very dynamic as new elements and 
spheres of human rights protection can be explored or developed. Human rights education 
is not a subject which can be taught, learned, and tested and which will then be followed 
by another subject. Instead, it will be recognized as an aspect which accompanies the 
process of education beyond the boundaries of individual subjects. It will play the role of 
a leitmotif for teaching any subject matter. 
Regarding the ‘why’, I understand human rights education as ‘education to human 
rights’, a philosophy-based education process aiming at understanding the idea, the con-
cept and, before anything else, a profound examination of the justification of human rights 
respecting the reflected autonomy of every individual as coherent to the idea of human 
rights, acknowledging cultural diversity, diversity of religions, diversity of traditions, di-
versity of world views, etc. and emphasizing the critical maturity of every individual sup-
ported by the helpful framework of critical questioning – human rights. 
Regarding the ‘how’, ‘education in human rights’ means that the methods, instru-
ments, tools, context (which can be formal, non-formal and informal) and process of hu-
man rights education must be in coherence with human rights as well, for example they 
must convince in their participatory mode. 
In this definition of human rights education as ‘lifelong and formal, non-formal, in-
formal education to, in, about, through and for human rights’, the single elements are in-
terrelating and complementary, for example, the ‘education to’ is crucial for the ‘education 
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for’ human rights as human rights theory in general – corresponding to human rights prac-
tice – is a necessary fundament for human rights education and the human rights practice. 
Human rights education has a global horizon, as Irene Khan points out 
If citizenship education empowers people to become active citizens of their own 
country, human rights education empowers them to take up the challenges of global 
citizenship, by teaching them about global values. It is not just a question of learning 
skills and acquiring abilities. Human rights education teaches you to take action, and 
it empowers you to defend your rights and the rights of others (Khan 2006: 38). 
Based on the universality of human rights, human rights education uses an inclusive 
approach. 
Human rights can only be realized if every human being knows about her/his rights, 
understands her-/himself as a rights-holder and is able to identify the corresponding duty-
bearers. Only this way human beings can claim their rights and claim the rights of others 
in solidarity (‘empowerment’) (Lohrenscheit 2006). This awareness of human rights is the 
basis for the possibility to defend her-/himself and to prevent violations of her/his rights 
and the rights of others. Knowing and being aware of her/his own rights and the rights of 
others and corresponding duties make human rights alive (Tibbitts and Kirchschlaeger 
2010) – including the human right to participation.  
Conclusions 
I conclude with emphasizing that democracy and human rights go hand in hand. This 
means that every human being has a human right to democracy. Can human rights also be 
realized in a political and legal system which is not democratic? No, human rights cannot  
be fully implemented if the political and legal system is not democratic as every human 
being's participation in opinion-building and decision-making processes is protected by 
human rights. 
Going hand in hand means also that human rights can be legitimated by democratic 
processes, but in addition a moral justification which goes beyond the boundaries of na-
tional democratic systems is necessary to ensure that every human being – even outside of 
these boundaries – are holders of human rights. 
The going hand in hand of democracy and human rights embraces the essential role 
human rights play for a democracy as its fundament and its frame of reference. Democ-
ratic opinion-building and decision-making processes have to respect human rights in the 
access to them, in the way they are implemented, but also in their conclusions. 
This complex relationship between democracy and human rights shows the need for 
education in democracy which overcomes the reductionist understanding of democracy to 
recognize only the will of the majority, the need for human rights education. Human rights 
education is the essential fundament of the implementation of human rights as every hu-
man being needs to know about her/his rights. Human rights education is a ‘must have’ 
and not a ‘nice to have’ in today's pluralistic society where human rights enable us to live 
in peaceful coexistence with respect for the human dignity of each other and with toler-
ance across the boundaries of traditions, cultures, religions, world views and opinions; 
where human rights empower the individual to participate in a democratic opinion-
building and decision-making process; where human rights protect minorities from the 
human rights-violating decisions of a majority.   
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Drawing on advancements made in network analysis, statistical modeling, and 
computer science, this paper employs latent space modeling techniques to ex-
plore the role of geography in the global trade economy. Latent space models 
postulate that the probability of a link between pairs of actors depends on the 
distance between them in unobserved Euclidean social space and on observed 
covariates. Using probabilistic models, I investigate the effect that distance has 
on influencing trade ties in social space, while also controlling for several co-
variates, including region-based homophily (a proxy for regionalization), transi-
tivity and country wealth. The findings are posited within the ‘Geography is 
dead’ thesis and reveal that the distance-destroying result attributed to global-
ization may be overestimated in the global trade economy. 
Keywords: network analysis, latent space model, world trade network, geo-
graphy, regionalization, globalization. 
1. Introduction 
Since Toffler (1970) first argued that place is no longer an important determinant due to 
the evolution of transport and communication systems, numerous scholars have speculated 
the ‘death of geography’, giving rise to a heated debate (Ohmae 1990, 1995; Friedmann 
1995). O'Brian (1992) proclaimed that the globalization era equates to ‘the end of geogra-
phy’, because geographical location no longer matters for economic development due to 
the increasing rate of globalization. In this context, globalization is defined as ‘the deepen-
ing integration of global economic activity facilitated by the rapid development of infor-
mation and communications technology and the underlying trend towards liberalization in 
trade and investment’ (Staples 2007: 99).  
Despite the ‘geography is dead’ claims, many notable (economic) geographers empha-
size the critical role of geography in trade, as well as in innovation, knowledge and devel-
opment (Krugman 1993; Yeung 1998; Massey 1984, 1999; Morgan 2004). It is well 
known that the effects of globalization are not distributed uniformly throughout the global 
economy, and there are place- and region-based variations that require a geographical lens 
in order to understand issues of unequal development (Warwick 2005). Moreover, the 
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growing forms of regionalization shed further evidence that geography does matter for 
trade and economic development. Regionalization is defined here as a process, ‘whereby 
economic interaction, such as flows of goods and capital, increase faster among countries 
within a particular geographical area than between those countries and others outside the 
area’ (Moore 2007: 36). 
In the present paper, I apply latent space modeling – developed by Hoff et al. (2002) – 
to test the ‘geography is dead’ thesis. Hoff et al. (2002) postulate that the probability of  
a link between pairs of actors depends on the distance between them in unobserved Eu-
clidean social space and on observed covariates. Using the latent space modeling ap-
proach, I investigate the effect that distance has on trade ties in latent space, while also 
controlling for several covariates, including region-based homophily (a proxy for region-
alization), transitivity and country wealth.  
Stochastic models can be used to identify the specific processes that have led the net-
work to its particular configuration. Both the gravity model and the exponential random 
graph model (ERGM) are possible approaches to test the relationship between geography 
and trade. Aside from weak theoretical backing, another main shortcoming with these ap-
proaches is that they assume independence among all trade linkages between country 
pairs. In reality, it is very likely that there is inherent dependency between ties (Shortreed 
et al. 2006). For example, if South Africa and Brazil are trade partners, and China and 
Brazil are trade partners, then it is more likely that South Africa and China are trade part-
ners then it is if these previous trade relationships did not exist.  
By implementing proxies to take into account second- and third-order dependences in 
the network, the latent space model is one method to deal with this dependency.  
This paper attempts to add to the growing literature on the World Trade Network 
(WTN), as well as to test the ‘death of geography’ thesis, by statistically analyzing the role 
of geography and trade integration using latent space stochastic models. To carry out these 
objectives, I estimate several simple latent space models to capture the relationship be-
tween distance and the likelihood of two countries establishing a trade partnership in the 
WTN, while also taking into account higher order dependencies in the network. Results 
from the analysis support regionalization, in favor of the ‘geography is destiny’ thesis (Di-
eter 2007), implying that proponents of the ‘geography is dead’ overestimate the distance-
destroying effects of globalization on the global trade economy.  
The outline of this paper is as follows. In the subsequent section, I provide a brief 
background on relevant network analysis studies. In Section 3, I discuss issues related to 
building, specifying and representing the trade network. In Section 4, I provide 
an overview of the main network statistics and network properties commonly used to infer 
patterns in the trade network. Specifically, I consider connectivity, centrality, clustering 
and hierarchy, as well as homophily and transitivity. In Section 5, I specify several latent 
space models and test the principles of propinquity, homophily and transitivity. Lastly, 
Section 6 concludes with some final remarks. 
2. Background 
Due to advancements in physics and computer science, network analysis is increasingly 
relied upon to study the world trade network and is a powerful tool that can be used to re-
veal topological properties, as well as the underlying structure of the trade network (Fagi-
olo et al. 2009; Reyes et al. 2008, 2010). For instance, network analysis applications  
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of the world trade network (WTN) have most notably addressed two major questions:  
1) does the trade network follow a core-periphery structure (Clark 2008, 2010; Kali and 
Reyes 2007); and 2) do global elites tend to trade among themselves and what are the ef-
fects of international trade on economic growth (Bhattacharya et al. 2008; Serrano 2008; 
Fagiolo et al. 2009). 
Although comparatively underdeveloped, network analysis has also been employed to 
investigate the role of geography in the global trade economy. Kim and Shin (2002) argue 
that network analysis can naturally be extended from dependency/world-systems theory to 
test the globalization vs. regionalization thesis that indirectly tests the role of geography by 
determining whether countries in the network are globalizing or regionalizing (Aggarwal 
and Koo 2005; Kim and Shin 2002; He and Deem 2010).  
Findings from network analysis contribute to the debate over whether regionalization 
is a stepping stone or stumbling block to globalization (Bhagwati et al. 1999). On the one 
hand, some scholars believe that regionalization is a transitory step that some countries 
pursue to become more competitive on the global market, eventually promoting globaliza-
tion and rendering geography unimportant. On the other hand, other scholars suggest that 
regionalization impedes globalization by hurting the welfare of non-member countries and 
leading to inefficient production strategies that may work at the regional scale but not at 
the global scale. 
For instance, Kastelle et al. (2006) provides evidence that the ‘movement of trade, 
capital and people is a geographically heterogeneous and historically episodic process and 
can be interpreted to support regionalization rather than globalization’. The authors' find-
ing is significant because it highlights the power of geography to influence trade out-
comes; even in an ever-increasing globalized world, countries still pursue regional trade 
integration policies with nearby countries.  
Conversely, Kim and Shin (2002) argue that globalization and regionalization are not 
necessarily competitive, but complementary processes. From 1959–1996, the authors show 
that the WTN became globalized (overall network density increased significantly), while it 
also became regionalized (intraregional density also significantly increased). Based on 
their findings, the authors suggest that regionalization does not jeopardize globalization; 
rather the two processes are complimentary and can coincide with one another.  
While the authors' findings have far reaching implications into the effects of regionaliza-
tion and globalization on the global economy, the findings are predicated merely on descrip-
tive statistics, in this case, a network statistic called node degree. Node degree measures the 
probability of a randomly chosen vertex to have k-connections to other vertices and pro-
vides a summary of a node's overall activity.1 The problem with this network statistic, like 
any other descriptive statistic, is that no statistical model is used to control for other poten-
tial intermediating variables that may influence the outcome of a trade tie being estab-
lished.  
Most of the literature on the WTN only examines the network's summary statistics to 
track topological changes, and few attempts are made to statistically analyze the trade 
network using stochastic models (notable exceptions are Garlaschelli and Loffredo 2005; 
Garlaschelli et al. 2007). Fitting statistical models to networks, in general, is still in its 
infancy stages due to the complexity of modeling networks and the high level of computa-
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tion that is required (Hunter and Handcock 2005). It is not surprising, therefore, that the 
WTN literature has only recently begun to be modeled; despite the complicated nature 
of the WTN, pertinent topological properties of the global trade system can and should 
be extracted through modeling the system as a network (Serrano 2008).  
3. The Network Data: Specification and Representation 
Bilateral trade data are extracted from the United Nations COMTRADE database. Data for 
GDP per capita and the trade/GDP share are extracted from Penn World Table 6.2 (for a coun-
try listing, see Appendix). In the trade network, countries represent nodes and the links 
between two countries are their shared imports and exports. If a trade tie is not present, 
then yij = 0. The data offer information on both exports and imports, however, I use only 
import data because previous scholars suggest that these figures are more accurate than 
export figures (Kim and Shin 2002).  
A network can be set up as some combination of binary/weighted, directed/  
undirected and static/longitudinal. For the purposes of this research, I build a binary, undi-
rected and static network. These specifications are chosen for the following reasons: 
(1) Squartini et al. (2011) specify various combinations of the network and find that the 
projections made by the binary matrix are maximally informative and should be the focus 
of subsequent models of trade; (2) the number of in and out ties are highly correlated, and 
in accordance with Fagiolo et al. (2009) and Serrano and Boguna (2003), the WTN is suf-
ficiently symmetric to use an undirected analysis; and (3) while the descriptive statistics 
may change as new countries are incorporated into the network and trade relationships are 
established and/or strengthened, it is likely that the underlying processes that generate  
the network are likely to be stable over time (Schiavo et al. 2010). To avoid the complexi-
ties of using longitudinal data, it is suffice to select a stochastic model for a single year, 
2008, to examine the statistical properties of the WTN.  
Network Representation 
Graph theory, advanced by Harary and his collaborators (Harary 1959; Harary et al. 1965), 
is used to inform much of what we know about how networks work. A graph is a network 
model consisting of dichotomous (binary) relations. The network can be represented with 
the following graph notation: 
G = (V, E),                                                         (1)  
where V is a vertex set, V = {υ1, …, υ2}, and in the undirected graph, E  {(υi, υj) : υi, υj  V}. 
In the undirected case, if country i exports to country j or country j exports to country i, 
then yij = 1. Countries represent vertices, and edges between any two countries (υi, υj) exist 
if at least one million U.S. dollars in trade is transacted during the year in observation.  
The one million U.S. dollar threshold is common in the WTN literature (Kim and Shin 
2002) and is selected in order to focus on significant trade relationships that shape the 
network.  
I set Y to be the adjacency matrix for the random graph G. Yij is a binary random vari-
able which indicates the state of the i, j edge. The Pr (Y↓ij = y↓ij) is the probability of the Yij 
edge state. I can express yij in terms of the WTN as a dichotomous outcome:  
yij = 
 
otherwise
USmillionvolumetradeif ji
0
.1$),(1 
                          (2) 
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The density of a network is the proportion of present ties to the maximum possible 
lines in a graph. A gXg nodal graph can be computed as:  
)1(
,


gg
yijji .                                                           (3) 
The density for the WTN in 2008 is .59, which means based on the number of nodes, 
trade ties represent approximately 59 per cent of the total possible. There are 7,177 mutual 
ties in 2008, but 2,799 asymmetric trade ties. Germany, the U.S., and China are the biggest 
traders averaging around US $8 billion to each of its trading partners. Almost 40 per cent 
of countries export something to almost every other country, and every country exports to 
at least 20 other countries, indicating that the trade network is very concentrated.  
Table 1. Network statistics for 2008 
2008 
Countries Reporting Trade 190 
Graph Density .59 
Total number of dyad trade ties 7,177 
Total number of asymmetric trade ties 2,799 
Countries making up 50 % of exports 9 
Source: Author's calculations using COMTRADE database on reported trade 2008.  
4. Network Summary Measures: Definitions and Descriptive  
Statistics 
Each network statistic attempts to explore the underlying structure of the network along 
one of the four major dimensions: connectivity, assortativity, clustering and centrality. 
Within each dimension, various node level statistics can be employed to quantify individ-
ual positions in the network and describe the local neighborhood. For example, node de-
gree (ND) and node strength (NS) are network statistics used to measure node connec-
tivity. ND is used when dealing with a binary network, and is the fractional count of trad-
ing partners a country has relative to all possible trade links in the network. NS is used 
when dealing with weighted networks, and measures the intensity of these trade links.  
Both statistics calculate the number of direct ties coming in and going out of a node 
and represent how connected a country is within a trade network. High degree positions 
are influential in the network, and at the same time, may be vulnerable to other actors' in-
fluence. These statistical measures are used in the empirical studies to offer evidence for 
or against increasing globalization. If the statistics increase in value, they show the globe 
is becoming smaller or more integrated over time.  
The average nearest neighbor degree (ANND) and average nearest neighbor strength 
(ANNS) are the most common network statistics to test assortativity. They measure  
the number of trading partners and the intensity (volume of trade) of a given country's 
trading partners. For example, if country A has 20 trading partners and each of those 
20 countries trades with 20 other countries, ANND/ANNS gives ND/NS statistics for each 
of country A's trading partners. These two statistics are commonly employed to assess 
whether certain groupings of countries tend to trade with well- or less-connected countries. 
For example, ANND/ANNS can be used to test whether a ‘rich club phenomenon’ has 
emerged in the WTN.  
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The binary clustering coefficient (BCC) and the core clustering coefficient (CCC) are 
statistics for clustering. The BCC is a ratio that counts the number of triangles that exist 
compared to the total number of triangles that are possible in the network. CCC measures the 
trade intensity of these triangles. These statistics offer a perspective on the multi-lateralism 
vs. bilateralism debate. Clearly, if the statistics increase over time, the WTN is strengthening 
multi-lateral ties, whereas if the statistic is decreasing, it is associated with a rise in bilat-
eralism.  
Lastly, the centrality dimension has probably received the most attention in the net-
work analysis because of its explanatory power of describing the hierarchy that exists 
within the network. The betweenness (BET) and the random walk betweenness centrality 
(RWBC) measures are the most commonly employed statistic for the centrality dimension 
and are based on reach and flow mediation. Both statistics quantify the ability of the ego-
node to influence other vertices in the network. The higher is the measure for a country, 
the higher is the degree of influence that country has on the WTN. Most often, this meas-
ure has been found to show a core-periphery hierarchy in the WTN, thus strengthening the 
position of world-systems perspective.  
In addition to network statistics, homophily is an important feature in this study of so-
cial networks and helps to explain why we observe a particular type of network.  
The principle of homophily is predicated on the fact that people with similar characteristics 
will have a higher rate of contact between them than dissimilar people (Louch 2000; 
McPherson et al. 2001). One can scale this principle up to include, organizations, countries, 
regions, and so forth. In the present context, I am interested in whether homophily by region 
exists. That is, do regions delineated by geographical proximity and historical reference tend 
to trade more among themselves relative to ‘outsiders’ in other regions that do not share 
a similar degree of cultural and historical shared experience? While there are many different 
ways to delineate regions, the most basic source of homophily is space (McPherson et al. 
2001), so it makes intuitive sense to group countries based on geographic proximity (refer 
back to Appendix for a country listing by region).  
Transitivity is another main feature found within networks. Transitivity is a statistics 
that measures the degree of network integration. Balance theory predicts that people 
should adjust their relations until the network becomes stabilized around a pattern where 
all dyadic ties are largely transitive, that is triadic. This social phenomenon tends to be 
explained in terms of triadic relationships and by the adage ‘a friend of a friend is  
a friend’ (Krivitsky et al. 2009). Balance theory predicts that if ties exist between country 
A and country B and country B and country C, then country A and country C have  
a strong propensity to develop a tie. A triangle is defined to be any set f(i; j); (j; k);  
(k; i)g of three edges (Morris et al. 2008).  
Descriptive Network Statistics: Connectivity, Centrality and Ho-
mophily  
Mathematically, the node degree measures the probability of a randomly chosen vertex to 
have k-connections to other vertices and provides a summary of a node's overall activity. 
The number of incoming ties is called in-degree, expressed as the sum of incoming ties 
over the number of actors in the network minus 1. In-degree ties will equal out-degree 
ones, expressed as: 
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Histograms of the node degree show that the distribution of trading partners is right-
skewed, meaning that most countries in the network have a small number of trading part-
ners but a smaller number of countries, referred to as ‘hubs’, have a comparatively larger 
number of trading partners (see Fig. 1).  
Along the second dimension, centrality measures the quantity of walks that pass 
through the ego-node, that is betweenness. Betweenness (BET) is the tendency for an ego-
node to reside on the shortest paths between third parties, that is, to serve as a bridge be-
tween two other nodes.  
Fig. 1. Node degree distribution for the world trade network 
 
Betweenness relies on the concept of geodesic distance, which is the shortest path between 
two nodes, i and j. Betweenness can be quantified and expressed as:  
 
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where gjk is the number of j, k geodesics (the shortest path between j, k) and gik (ni)  
is the number of j, k geodesics that include i. High betweenness positions are associated 
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with the term ‘broker’. In the network literature, a ‘broker’ is an actor that mediates be-
tween third parties who are not directly tied. Both the node degree and betweenness meas-
ures are standardized and are compared to the theoretical maximum number of edges pos-
sible for that graph, values ranging from 0 to 1.  
Another centrality measure that is less commonly explored in the world trade network 
is the eigenvalue centrality (EC). This measure quantifies the position of the actor in terms 
of the sum of the centralities of its neighbors, attenuated by a scaling constant (). Eigen-
vector centrality can be expressed numerically as: 
   jDg
j
ijiD nCxnC 


1
1
 .                                           (6) 
Actors with high eigenvector centrality are those with many central neighbors. This 
centrality measure is often overlooked by the previous articles on the WTN, which is bi-
zarre considering this statistics is ideally suited to test core-periphery relations, a major 
focus point for the WTN analyses in the past.  
Table 2 reports the statistics for a selective number of measures, including connec-
tivity (ND) and centrality (BET, EC) by region. The findings reveal the most connected 
countries within regions, as well as compare the degree of influence across regions. For 
example, NAFTA and East Asian countries are the most connected and central/influential 
regions in the global economy. Despite the high connectivity and centrality scores for the 
United Kingdom, Germany and France, the EU consists of many small Eastern European 
countries not very well connected, thereby lowering overall average scores for the EU. 
SAA and the Arab league are the least connected and least central regions in the global 
economy.  
Table 2. Connectivity and centrality measures by region and select countries 
Region ND BET EC 
1 2 3 4 
NAFTA (n = 3)  279.3 218.9 .107 
  USA 346 439.39 .121 
  CAN 284 186.2 .11 
  MEX 208 31.2 .09 
EU 2 (n = 40) 210.3 103.8 .084 
  UKG 344 522.9 .12 
  GFR 340 376.9 .121 
  FRN 338 304.3 .11 
East Asia (n = 5) 246 177.7 .094 
  JPN 342 477.7 .12 
China   332 270.8 .121 
  ROK 310 177.21 .11 
ECE (n = 11) 156.2 27.4 .079 
  RUS 278 104 .11 
  UKR 276 109 .12 
  BLR 194 39.5 .082 
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1 2 3 4 
ASEAN (n = 10) 191.4 78.5 .079 
  THI  304 233.7 .113 
  MAL  298 170.4 .113 
  INS 292 144.4 .112 
SAA (n = 9) 136.7 45.6 .058 
  IND 314 222.7 .116 
  PAK 262 107.6 .102 
  BNG 196 57.68 .082 
Arab League  (n = 17) 155.4 24.4 .068 
  SAU 234 90.2 .093 
  ISR 232 65.3 .095 
  UAE 218 62.1 .09 
Pacific Islands (n = 13)   80 38.04 .033 
  AUL 294 246.7 .11 
  AUS 266 114.12 .106 
  NEW 220 120.7 .09 
Latin America (31)   132.9 21.2 .059 
  BRA 294 175.2 .11 
  ARG 244 65.3 .101 
  RUM 242 69.4 .1 
African Union (50) 106.3 11.2 .049 
  SAF 280 131.2 .109 
  EGY 228 49.5 .096 
 
Within East Asia, China has only ten fewer trading partners than Japan (i.e. connec-
tivity), yet its BET centrality score is almost half as big as Japan's. This distinction be-
tween connectivity and centrality is a key feature of network analysis. It reveals that al-
though China is increasing the number of its trading partners and becoming better con-
nected with the global economy, its actual influence in the network in terms of trade re-
mains limited relative to Japan. Japan, along with the UK, and the USA have the highest 
BET centrality score, representing the brokers in the network; China, on the other hand, is 
plotted much lower than any of these three countries (see Fig. 2).  
To gain a better understanding on whether homophily by region is present in the 
WTN, I present the mixing matrix for each region (Table 3). The mixing matrix presents 
the count of trade relationships cross-tabulated by the region of the two countries involved. 
If a strong presence of homophily is present, then there would be large values along  
the diagonal relative to off-diagonal values. Based on the fact that the diagonal values in 
the matrix do not tend to be higher than the off-diagonal values, countries do not appear to 
be overwhelmingly trading within their particular region; homophily by region does not 
appear to be a major factor.  
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Fig. 2. Centrality score by country  
 
Table 3. Mixing matrix by region 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 3 104 3 12 21 23 18 40 19 81 92 
2 104 590 37 144 302 250 168 388 141 599 893 
3 3 37 NA 5 11 10 7 16 7 27 43 
4 12 144 5 7 38 37 25 52 23 99 123 
5 21 302 11 38 47 48 43 71 27 98 106 
6 23 250 10 37 48 40 51 93 43 128 194 
7 18 168 7 25 43 51 16 62 29 62 118 
8 40 388 16 52 71 93 62 83 44 142 247 
9 19 141 7 23 27 43 29 44 13 80 81 
10 81 599 27 99 98 128 62 142 80 243 259 
11 92 893 43 123 106 194 118 247 81 259 251 
 
There are two caveats to this interpretation. First, marginal totals can be misleading and do 
not statistically test for the presence of homophily (this will be carried out in the modeling 
section below). The trade network is also very complex and strict interpretations of homo-
phily are not always straight forward. For example, the largest value in the matrix is be-
tween Europe (region 2) and Africa (region 11). Due to the colonization era, African and 
European countries still maintain a strong, client-like relationship in many cases. Second, 
there are likely some misleading results due to the way countries are grouped. While there 
is no ‘right’ way to group countries into regions, defining China (region 4) as its own re-
gion has some drawbacks in certain cases, since its value along the diagonal is 0, and the 
data only cover international trade. Therefore, it is not possible to see China's intra-trade 
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relationships and how it compares to other countries' international trade within a particular 
region.  
The number of triangles found in the network area is a proxy for measuring the transi-
tivity. Of the 7,177 ties in the network, the number of triangles is surprisingly large – 
157,645. This number is far larger than what would be expected by chance and offers ini-
tial evidence that the trade network has a high degree of transitivity. This is significant 
because it reveals the dyadic trade dependencies among countries supporting the use of  
a latent space modeling approach.  
5. Latent Space and Latent Position Model: Is Geography Dead?  
Latent space models have replaced block-modeling as the primary approach to study is-
sues of propinquity, the tendency of spatially proximate vertices to be tied. In other words, 
latent space models are used to determine the role of geography in the international trade 
context, and can help examine whether the trade network is globalizing or regionalizing.  
If proponents of globalization who suggest ‘geography is dead’ are correct in their asser-
tion, then the results of the latent space model will confirm that distance does not play a 
significant role in influencing the probability that a trade tie is established between country 
i and country j. 
In order to test the role of geography in determining the probability two countries  
(i, j) form a trade relationship, I specify several latent space models. Based on the presence 
of homophily indicated by the descriptive statistics, there is evidence that propinquity – 
the probability of a link between two actors is a function of the distance between them in 
an unobserved latent space – exists in the trade network.  
The latent position model assumes a conditional independence approach to modeling. 
Let {zi} be the positions of the actors in the social space Rk and {xi, j} denote the observed 
characteristics that are dyad-specific. That is the presence or absence of a trade tie between 
two countries is independent of all other ties in the system, given the unobserved positions 
in social space of the two individuals: 
P(Y|Z, X, θ) = P(yi, j | zi, zj, xi, θ),                                     (7) 
where X and xi and xi, j are observed characteristics that are pair-specific and vector-valued 
and θ and Z are parameters and positions to be estimated (Hoff et al. 2002).  
I use logistic regression to parameterize equation (3).  
   ,,,,1log ,,, jijijiji xzzyodds  .                                    (8) 
jijiji zzx  ,,  ,                                                 (9) 
where the log odds ratio for two actors j and k, equidistant from i, is  kiji xxB ,,,  .  
I estimate i, j using the log-likelihood of a conditional independence model, expressed as      


ji
jiji
jieyYP ,1loglog ,,
 ,                                      (10) 
where  is a function of parameters and unknown positions. As such, I use maximum-
likelihood to estimate . Model degeneracy is a serious problem that frequently occurs 
when dealing with networks. If a model is degenerate then the terms in the model are 
grossly unsuitable at describing the underlying processes that form the observed network. 
That is, even under the maximum likelihood coefficients in the model, the observed net-
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work is so unlikely to occur that the model cannot even be properly estimated (Goodreau 
et al. 2008). To check for issues of degeneracy, I carry out an MCMC estimation proce-
dure for each model that I estimate. The results show that the model statistics do not di-
verge from the mean, meaning that the models are not degenerate and the maximum like-
lihood estimates are reliable.  
I specify several simple latent space models to test the role of distance and region-
based homophily. Table 4 reports the coefficients generated from the latent space models. 
Model 1 only examines the role of distance in establishing a trade partner. The coefficient 
on EDGES is highly significant and positive, indicating that larger distances increase the 
likelihood of two countries establishing a tie. This finding is bizarre and at odds with pre-
dictions made by gravity models that predict trade decreases as a function of distance. In 
Models 2 and 3, I give additional measures to control for underlying structures within the 
network that may affect whether a trade tie is established.  
Table 4. Latent space models (d=2) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Edges  2.56*** –5.73*** –6.21*** –6.13*** 
Latentcov (homoregion)  26.25*** 27.20*** 27.81*** 
Triangle 
Nodecov.GDP 
  1.84*** 2.02*** 
1.42*** 
A good model is the one that accounts for a country's tendency for assortative mixing, 
which is based on the notion of homophily (Ibid.). In the present context, I want to account 
for assortative mixing that may occur for countries that belong to a particular region. If 
assortative mixing is present, then countries within the same region have a greater prob-
ability of forming a tie relative to countries in other regions.  
Model 2 introduces Homoregion, a covariate that accounts for homophily. In this 
model, I find the sign of the EDGES coefficient switches from negative to positive, con-
firming the conventional relationship between trade and distance. In other words, the like-
lihood of two countries forming a tie decreases as distance between countries in latent 
space increases. The coefficient on Homoregion is very large and statistically significant. 
This finding indicates that countries classified into the same regional grouping will be 
more likely to form a trade tie within their own region than with countries from other re-
gional groupings, in support of the regionalization thesis. Model 3 adds Triangle to take 
into account the transitive nature of the network. The significant, positive coefficient for 
Triangle confirms that if two countries i, j, have a mutual trading partner, m, then the like-
lihood that countries i, j begin to trade increases.  
In addition to controlling for network statistics, Model 4 adds real per capita GDP, 
Nodecov.GDP as an additional covariate to control for the effect of wealth on countries 
forming a tie. The positive, statistically significant coefficient produced by the wealth co-
variate reveals the hierarchical structure of the network, meaning that rich countries tend 
to trade disproportionately among themselves.  
6. Conclusion 
The findings presented in this paper suggest that regionalization is a particularly important 
strategy pursued by countries in the global economy. The integration of regional blocs, 
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along with the proliferation of regional trade agreements (RTAs) promote regionalization 
and have emerged as individual countries attempt to mitigate the new economic and secu-
rity vulnerabilities (unregulated capital flows, human and drug trafficking, transnational 
terrorist networks, disease, etc.) brought about by globalizing forces that undermine indi-
vidual states' territorial sovereignty. The process of regionalization signals that ‘geography 
is destiny’ (Dieter 2007: 11), as opposed to ‘geography is dead’.  
The results of the descriptive analyses in this report agree with other previous work. 
The WTN network has a high density, the node degree has a high right-skew, trade part-
ners of well-connected countries are less interconnected relative to those of poorly con-
nected ones, and countries holding many trade partners are on average connected with 
countries holding relatively few countries. The latent space model tests directly the role of 
space in determining the likelihood of whether or not a tie will be established. When con-
trolling for regional homophily and other covariates, the Euclidean distance – calculated in 
social space – is returned negative, significant, and large in magnitude. This result sup-
ports findings in the gravitas literature on trade and reaffirms that the probability that trade 
ties are established decreases as distance increases. Lastly, the latent space models add an 
additional dimension of analysis of the WTN by controlling for network dependencies, 
and reveals that region-based homophily – the proxy for regionalization – has a large and 
significant influence on trade outcomes, even more so than a country's wealth.  
Despite the complicated nature of the WTN, pertinent topological properties of the 
global trade system are extracted through modeling the system as a network, and are used 
to show the significance of geography in influencing trade outcomes. Understanding the 
structure of the global trade network has implications for research across numerous social 
science disciplines trying to examine the effects of geography on economic integration and 
internationalization. Future areas of research can extend the latent space model applied in 
this paper to examine the evolutionary role of geography over time. Although evidence 
reported in this paper suggests that geography maintains a crucial role in the trade net-
work, it is indeterminate whether geography's impact on trade ties is increasing or decreas-
ing over time.  
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Appendix 
190 countries are placed into 11 regions. These regions are based on present-day trading 
blocs and/or geographical location. Several regions combine two or more economic trad-
ing blocks that span a certain geographic region. For example, the EU, EFTA and Central 
European FTA member countries are all categorized as one European region based on 
their geographical proximity. Similarly, UNASUL, Caribbean Community and the Central 
American Integration System member countries are all categorized as Latin America.  
 
Regional Groupings 
NAFTA (Region 1) 
CAN 
MEX 
USA 
Europe (Region 2) 
ALG 
AND 
ANG 
ARG 
ARM 
AUL 
AUS 
AZE 
BAH 
BAR 
BEL 
BEN 
BFO 
BHM 
BHU 
BLR 
BLZ  
BNG  
BOL 
BOS 
BOT 
BRA 
BRU  
BUI 
BUL 
CAM 
 
CAN 
CAO 
CAP 
CDI 
CEN 
CHA 
CHL 
CHN 
COL 
COM 
CON 
COS 
CRO 
CUB 
East Asia (Region 3) 
(Also Region 4) 
JPN 
MON 
PRK 
ROK 
TAW 
CHN  
Eurasian Economic 
Community  
(Region 5) 
ARM 
AZE 
BLR 
GRG 
KYR 
KZK 
 
 
 
 
RUS 
TAJ 
TKM 
UKR 
UZB 
ASEAN (Region 6) 
BRU 
CAM  
DRV 
INS 
LAO 
MAL 
DRV 
MYA 
PHI 
SIN 
THI 
South Asia Association (Re-
gion 7) 
AFG 
BHU 
BNG 
IND 
MAD 
NEP 
PAK 
SOL 
SRI 
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Arab League (Region 8) 
BAH 
EQG 
IRN 
IRQ 
ISR 
JOR 
KUW 
LEB 
MOR 
OMA 
PAL 
QAT 
SAU 
SUD 
SYR 
UAE 
YEM 
Pacific Islands  
(Region 9) 
AAB 
AUL 
AUS 
DMA 
FJI 
FSM 
KBI 
NAU 
NEW 
PNG 
TON 
TUV 
VAN 
Latin America (Region 10) 
ARG 
BAR 
BHM 
BLZ 
BOL 
BRA 
BRA 
CHL 
COL 
COS 
CUB 
DOM 
ECU 
GRN 
GUA 
GUI 
GUY 
HAI 
HON 
JAM 
MSI 
NIC 
PAN 
RUM 
SAL 
SKN 
SLU 
SUR 
SVG 
TRI 
URU 
VEN 
African Union  
(Region 11) 
ANG 
BEN 
BFO 
BOT 
BUI 
CAO 
CAP  
CDI 
CEN 
CHA 
COM 
CON 
DJI 
DRC 
EGY 
ERI 
ETH 
GAB 
GAM 
GHA 
GNB 
KEN 
LBR 
LES 
LIB 
LIE 
MAG 
MAS  
MAW 
MLI 
MZM 
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NIG 
NIR 
PAR 
PER  
RWA 
SAF  
SEN 
SEY 
SIE 
SOM 
STP 
SWA 
TAZ 
TOG 
TUN 
UGA  
ZAM 
ZIM 
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Regionalism, Globalization, and Economic  
Development of the World* 
 
Hae Kim 
 
 
This study evaluates the effects of regionalism on economic development in the 
world basing on the panel data of 217 countries. In general, regionalism pur-
sued by countries via their respective regional organizations was found to have 
no significant independent effect on the economic development. Regardless of 
regionalism, the international economic variables such as globalization and 
terms of trade, as well as domestic variables such as population growth, urbani-
zation and ethnic composition were found to have significant impact on eco-
nomic development. In affecting economic development, the individual sovereign 
member states of regional organizations are independent of the collective institu-
tional design of the regional organization they are affiliated with. 
Keywords: regionalism, regional intergovernmental organizations, globaliza-
tion, suppressor variable, economic development. 
The purpose of the present article is to analyze the effectiveness of regionalism by regional 
organizations in the world in affecting economic development. Not only regional intergov-
ernmental organizations (RIGOs) like the European Union (EU), African Union (AU) and 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), but also the regional free trade agree-
ments (RFTAs) like North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) are the driving 
forces of regionalism. The task of empirically assessing the effects of regionalism on eco-
nomic development has been a critical challenge not only in developing but also in devel-
oped countries. There are many other international as well as domestic variables that could 
also affect economic development. The effect study of regionalism should also cover ‘all’ 
regions in the world and this study is based on major regionalisms, aiming at covering all 
regions/subregions in the world: Europe, Africa, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Pacific Rim, 
Central Asia, North and South America, and Middle East.  
Different Views on Regionalism  
Regionalism is based on the following three ingredients: identifiable geographical region, 
geographical proximity and an organization with a common sense of identity and purpose 
(economic, political, security/military, etc.) among the member states. There are many views 
of the whys and wherefores of the joining the regional organizations. One of them is the effi-
ciency of collective activities (Abbott and Snidal 1998; Karns and Mingst 2010: 6). The eco-
nomic integration via regional organizations generates economies of scale. The regional-
ism by RIGOs is also viewed from the perspectives of global and/or regional governance 
                                                          
* This article was first published in Journal of Globalization Studies, Vol. 4, Num. 2, 2013, pp. 21–31. 
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as well. Rosenau (1995) has used the ‘governance’ to denote the regulation of interde-
pendent relations in the absence of an overarching political authority such as in interna-
tional system. Najam (2003) has also defined global governance as the management of 
global processes in the absence of global government. According to Weiss (2000), global 
governance refers to concrete cooperative problem-solving arrangements. The governance 
undertaken by international organizations (IOs), global or regional, over the member states 
is to deal with many global and regional issues, which are related to economic develop-
ment, among others. If the member states wish to benefit from regionalism, they must 
align with the principles, norms, and rules of the IOs. According to the constructivism, IOs 
serve as agents of social construction and they can construct a social world in which inter-
national cooperation and interaction take place. That is, global governance is possible via 
international cooperation and interaction, which shape identities and interests of member 
states as argued by the constructivism (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001).  
International Economic Variables and Economic Development 
Regionalism is not the only determinant of economic development. Many other international 
economic variables could also affect it. Globalization is one of them.1 There have been 
pros and cons of the role of globalization in enhancing economic growth and/or quality of 
life. Stiglitz (2003) was critical of globalization, as it has deepened global inequality be-
tween the haves and have-nots, especially in the less developed countries. Goklany (2007) 
argued for a positive effect of economic globalization based on free trade, and demon-
strated that the free trade helped to enhance the human well-being. Foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI), a cross-border investment, is undeniably an important ingredient of economic 
globalization. Multinational corporations (MNCs) are international ‘carriers’ of the FDI. 
The role of MNCs in economic development in host countries, developing or developed, 
has nevertheless been controversial (Nunnenkamp and Spatz 2003). 
Terms of trade, favorable or unfavorable, could also affect economic development. It 
is not necessarily the ‘quantity’ but the ‘quality’ (‘terms’) of trade that affects economic 
development. Unfavorable terms of trade will result in a negative or low economic growth 
particularly in developing countries, as they rely on the export of a single or a few primary 
commodities (Chow 1987; Appleyard et al. 2006: 214–215 and 416–417). External (for-
eign) debt sustainability, strong or weak, is assumed to affect economic development as 
well. The debt sustainability is an essential condition for economic development (Loser 
2004). 
Domestic Variables and Economic Development: Politics,  
Defense Spending, and Ethnic-Demographic Conditions 
Russet (2005) found that democracies are considered efficient in generating wealth and 
economic growth, which also lessen the frequency of internal conflicts. The authoritarian 
political systems turn out to be more conflict-ridden than democratic counterparts and they 
lower the quality of life. The authoritarian political systems are unable to effectively man-
age external debt and foreign assistance as well. Many developing countries have imple-
                                                          
1 The globalization based on the KOF globalization index was used in this analysis. The KOF Index of Globalization 
was introduced in 2002. The KOF Index of Globalization measures the three main dimensions of globalization: eco-
nomic, social and political. KOF index of globalization is released annually by the KOF Swiss Economic Institute 
(Dreher, Gaston, and Martens). 
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mented liberal economic reforms in recent decades. They have been successful in eco-
nomic growth (e.g., Chile, Brazil, etc.), yet there are still many other developing countries 
that remain poor and have not experienced any significant economic growth. While politi-
cal liberalizations and reforms with minimal corruption are required for sustainable eco-
nomic growth, China and Singapore, for example, with their respective ‘authoritarian capi-
talism’ have documented a rapid economic growth without undertaking significant politi-
cal liberalization. South Korea was able to rapidly develop in the 1970s and 80s while its 
political system still remained authoritarian.  
When inequality of income distribution is related to ethnicity, gender, or geographic 
region, Clemens (2007) argues that a stronger role for the state (i.e., authoritarian political 
system) is advantageous for equal distribution of income, and the most vulnerable mem-
bers of societies can be safeguarded by the role of stronger authoritarian government. 
Stiglitz (2003) argues that policies emanating from the Washington Consensus produce 
disappointing result as they are anchored in a free-market dogma, which ignores the 
unique socio-cultural contexts of countries where they are applied. The G20 group of gov-
ernments agreed in 2010 on a ‘new’ Seoul Development Consensus. In contrast with the 
‘older’ Washington Consensus, the Seoul Consensus allows a larger role for state interven-
tion. Rather than seeking to impose a uniform top-down solution, the Seoul Consensus 
postulates that solutions should be tailored to the requirements of individual developing 
countries.2 
A huge military spending disproportionate to the economic capacity is siphoning off 
the resources, which otherwise could have been used for economic growth and improve-
ment of the quality of life (Sivard 1991). Some found the interaction between the defense 
spending and economic growth. Benoit (1978), basing on data on the 44 developing coun-
tries, argued that there is a positive correlation between military expenditures and eco-
nomic growth over the period from 1950 to 1965. Klare (1987) demonstrates that every 
additional dollar spent on defense in developing countries reduces domestic investment by 
25 cents and agricultural output by 20 cents. Their findings supporting the trade-offs were 
based on the Cold War period. Defense spending was still found to have a significant ef-
fect on the level of quality of life during the post-Cold war era. Countries with greater de-
fense burden retain a lower quality of life regardless of population growth, urbanization 
and ethnic diversity (Kim 1996). Ethnic heterogeneity has been impeding the enhancement 
of quality of life (Collier 1999, 2007). Empirical evidences have shown that demographic 
variables such as ethnic composition (Alesina et al. 2003), urbanization (Todaro and Ste-
phen 2009: 320–359) and population growth (McNicoll 1995) have significant effects on 
quality of life. What affects economic development is not only domestic but also interna-
tional. In our study we will employ ‘multiple’ variables, domestic and international, in-
cluding the regionalism. In order to identify an independent (i.e., a ‘pure’) effect of re-
gionalism on economic development, all other international and domestic variables as-
sumed to affect economic development will be also controlled.  
                                                          
2 The term Washington Consensus (1989) refers to market-friendly policies, which were generally advised and imple-
mented both for advanced and emerging economies. It is also used to refer to economic reforms that were prescribed 
just for developing countries. In November 2010, the G20 group of governments agreed on a ‘new’ Seoul Develop-
ment Consensus. The Seoul Development Consensus for Shared Growth is a set of principles and guidelines set up  
to assist the G20 nations and other global actors in working collaboratively with less developed countries in order to 
boost their economic growth and to achieve the UN's Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
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Methodology 
Dependent Variable: Economic Development 
Economic development was treated as dependent variable. Economic development incor-
porates not only economic growth (quantitative) but also standard of living (qualitative). 
PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) indicates the real GDP using a common set of international 
prices for all goods and services and provides more accurate comparisons of both eco-
nomic growth and standard of living. Per Capita PPP was used to measure the economic 
development. 
Independent Variable: Regionalism 
The regionalism is based on the membership of each country with a regional intergovern-
mental organization or regional free trade agreements. The regionalism is measured by the 
affiliation of countries with each of the 14 regional intergovernmental organizations (RI-
GOs) or regional free trade agreements (RFTAs) selected. The affiliated countries are cod-
ed as 1, while others (non-affiliated) as 0. The regionalism is treated as a dummy variable. 
The major RIGOs and RFTAs, along with their respective regions, are as follows: 
 ANDEAN (Andean Community of Nations: 4 countries) / South American  
region; 
 APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation: 21 countries) / Asia-Pacific region; 
 ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations: 10 countries) / Southeast Asian 
Region; 
 AU (African Union: 54 countries) / African region (note: South Sudan became the 
African Union's 54th Member on July 28, 2011 and the new country's data was not in-
cluded in this analysis);  
 CARICOM (Caribbean Community: 15 countries and dependencies);  
 ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States: 5 countries); 
 EU (European Union: 27 countries) / European region; 
 LAS (League of Arab States: 22 countries) / Arab region (Middle East); 
 MERCOSUR (Common Southern Market: 4 countries); 
 NAFTA (North America Free Trade Agreement: 3 countries) / North American re-
gion; 
 OAS (Organization of American States: 35 countries); 
 PC (The Secretariat of the Pacific Community or Pacific Community: 22 countries 
and territories); 
 SAARC (The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation: 8 countries) / 
South Asian region; 
 SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization: 6 countries) / Central Asian region. 
Control Variables  
Both international economic variables and domestic variables were treated as control vari-
ables: globalization, terms of trade and external (foreign) debt sustainability are selected as 
international economic variables, while ethnic homogeneity, population growth, urbaniza-
tion, types of political system and military expenses as domestic variables. Each of the 
eight control variables is also operationalized (measured) as follows: 
 Globalization: it is based on the KOF Index of Globalization, which measures the 
three (‘plural’) dimensions of globalization: economic, social, and political (see Note 1 for 
the detailed measures of globalization). 
 Terms of trade: the measure is based on the index of the price of a country's exports 
(benefits) in terms of its imports (costs).  
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 Debt sustainability: it is measured by per capita amount of external (foreign) debt 
divided by per capita amount of export. The large ratio means a weak sustainability, while 
the low ratio means a strong sustainability.  
 Ethnic homogeneity: it is measured by percentage of the dominant ethnic-racial 
groups within each nation. 
 Urbanization: the measure is based on urban-rural dichotomy; ‘urban’ refers to 
a group of allegedly nonagricultural pursuits while ‘rural’ to agriculturally oriented em-
ployment. 
 Population growth: the natural increase per 1,000 of the population, based on the 
difference between birth and death rates of respective population. 
 Types of political system: countries are classified as ‘not free’, ‘partly free’, and ‘free’ in 
terms of the degree of political freedom represented by both political rights and civil liberties. 
Countries with ‘not free’ were coded as 1 (highly authoritarian), ‘partly free’ as 2 (authori-
tarian), and ‘free’ as 3 (democratic). 
 Military expenditure: the measure is based on military expenditure as a percentage 
of GDP. 
The data on 217 countries are used in this analysis. The data cover the period from 
2005 to 2011 depending on their availability for each and every of the countries. This 
study, for that matter, is not amenable to a time-series analysis but to a cross-national 
comparative analysis. A multiple regression analysis is used. The multiple regressions will 
test whether the regionalism affects economic development regardless of other interna-
tional economic and domestic variables.  
Results 
Table 1. Multiple regression: Regionalism ALONE and economic development (per 
capita PPP) 
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Note: Standardized regression coefficients (beta) are presented and the underlined ones are significant at 
.05 level. All variables are log-transformed. 
Source: Data from CIA, World Factbook (2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011); Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 
The Nations of the World / Britannica Book of the Year (2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, Chicago: Ency-
clopedia Britannica); Index 2011 (URL: http://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Quality-of-life_index). 
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Table 1 presents the regression analysis, which assesses the effect of regionalism on eco-
nomic development. The Table (Regionalism ALONE) aims at assessing how regionalism 
‘alone’ affects economic development. The finding demonstrates different effect of re-
gionalism on economic development: positive, negative and no effects. Out of the 14 re-
gionalisms, six (6) regionalisms such as EU, NAFTA, AU, APEC, SAARC and ECOWAS 
were found to have significant effects, positive or negative, on economic development; 
EU, NAFTA and APEC were found to have positive effects on economic development, 
while AU, SAARC and ECOWAS were found to have negative effects. But the remaining 
eight (8) regionalisms such as SCO, LAS, ANDEAN, ASEAN, MERCOSUR, OAS, 
CARICOM and PC were found to have no significant effects on economic development. 
Table 2. Multiple regression/regionalism CONTROLLED: Regionalism and economic 
development controlling international economic and domestic variables 
 AU EU ASEAN NAFTA APEC CARICOM OAS 
Regionalism –.166 .063 –.008 .089 –.008 .159 .101 
Globalization .196 .212 .223 .220 .222 .231 .223 
Terms of trade .178 .177 .183 .182 .184 .203 .196 
Debt Sustainabil-
ity 
–.046 –.070 –.053 –.061 –.053 –.004 .052 
Urbanization .343 .373 .373 .362 .375 .399 .346 
Ethnic homoge-
neity 
.073 .150 .152 .155 .153 .150 .136 
Population 
growth  
–.215 –.176 –.212 –.214 –.212 –.216 –.246 
Political system .101 .111 .114 .108 .116 .084 .101 
Military expen-
diture 
.022 .027 .030 .031 .030 .062 .060 
R square (%)  (76.3) (75.0) (74.8) (75.6) (74.9) (77.0) (75.6) 
 
 SAARC SCO ANDEAN LAS ECOWAS MERCOSUR PC 
Regionalism .079 –.011 –.025 .051 –.136 –.033 –.127 
Globalization .238 .222 .219 .211 .216 .214 .214 
Terms of trade .177 .183 .186 .180 .164 .181 .182 
Debt sustain-
ability  
–.059 –.052 –.050 –.048 –.038 –.050 –.080 
Urbanization .396 .376 .378 .369 .374. .384 .381 
Ethnic homoge-
neity 
.139 .153 .152  .145 .110 .158 .163 
Population 
growth  
–.214  –.213 –.209 –.229 –.196 –.211 –.193 
Political system .103 .111 .118 .127 .134 .115 .124 
Military expen-
diture 
.021 .028 .032 .013 .032 .025 .015 
R square (%)  (75.4) (74.9) (74.9) (75.0) (76.3) (74.9) (76.3) 
Note: Standardized regression coefficients (beta) are presented and the underlined ones are significant at 
.05 level. All variables are log-transformed. 
Source: Data from CIA, World Factbook (2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011); Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 
The Nations of the World / Britannica Book of the Year (2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011); Index 2011 
(URL: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quality-of-life_index); http://www. economist.com/media/pdf/QUALITY_ 
OF_LIFE.pdf.)  
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Multiple regressions in Table 2 (Regionalism CONTROLLED) assess whether the region-
alism in Table 1 has significant ‘independent’ effect on economic development  
regardless of international economic and domestic variables, which are also assumed to 
affect economic development. Table 2 shows a ‘pure’ effect of regionalism on economic 
development when controlling the effects of international economic and domestic vari-
ables. The findings based on both Tables 1 and 2 indicate the following four different pat-
terns of effect of regionalism (see Fig. 1 below) on economic development. The figure 
shows how the effect of regionalism on economic development changes between the ‘re-
gionalism alone’ and the ‘regionalism controlled’. 
Fig. 1. Different patterns of regionalism 
PATTERNS Regionalism ALONE  Regionalism CONTROLLED 
    
I. Spurious Significant TO Insignificant 
Regionalism EU/APEC (+)  (0) 
  SAARC     (–)   (0) 
    
II. Suppressed/Hidden Insignificant TO Significant 
Regionalism CARICOM (0)  (+) 
  PC               (0)   (–) 
    
III. Affective Significant TO Significant 
Regionalism AU/ECOWAS (–)  (–) 
  NAFTA             (+)   (+) 
    
IV. Non-Affective Insignificant TO Insignificant 
Regionalism SCO, OAS, LAS,    
  
 
MERCOSUR, AN-
DEAN 
and ASEAN (0s)  (0s) 
Note: (+) positive significant; (–) negative significant; (0) insignificant. 
Each of the four different patterns is discussed as follows. 
Pattern I. Some regionalisms, previously (see Table 1) found significant, were found 
to have no significant ‘independent’ effects on economic development. That is, once the 
effects of international economic and domestic variables are controlled, all of those sig-
nificant effects of the regionalisms on economic development disappear.3 They are the EU, 
APEC and SAARC. Both the EU and APEC were previously found to have significant 
positive effects on economic development, while SAARC would have a negative effect.  
                                                          
3  It is very important to take into account at this point that the author speaks here about the disappearance of  
a significant impact of regional organizations of the first type in their mathematical model and not in reality. In no 
way this statement should be understood as claiming that such an impact existed sometime ago and later it disap-
peared. – Editors. 
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It was found that the original positive effects of the EU and APEC on economic develop-
ment were a product of the effects of high globalization and favorable terms of trade as 
well as the effects of low population growth, high urbanization and ethnic homogeneity of 
individual member states. The positive effects were not a function of the collective institu-
tional capacity of each of the two respective regional organizations. The original negative 
relationship between the SAARC and economic development was also a product of inter-
national economic variables featuring low globalization and unfavorable terms of trade as 
well as domestic conditions of low urbanization, high population growth and heterogene-
ous ethnic composition of individual member states. The SAARC was found to have no 
independent effect on economic development. In these three regionalisms, international 
economic and domestic variables of ‘individual’ member states make it difficult for the 
‘collective’ regional organization to significantly affect economic development. The abil-
ity of the collective regional organization is constrained by the individual member states. 
The original significant, positive or negative, effects of the regionalism were found spuri-
ous. This pattern of regionalism is labeled as ‘spurious regionalism’.4 
Pattern II. Some regionalisms were found to have no significant effects on economic 
development. But once the effects of international economic variables as well as domestic 
variables of the member states are controlled, the effect of regionalism on economic de-
velopment appears significant, whether positive or negative. CARICOM was found to 
have a positive effect on economic development, while PC – the negative one (see also 
Tables 2 and 3). The change from insignificant to significant effects indicates that the orig-
inal effects of the regionalism on economic development were suppressed (hidden). That 
is to say, the international economic variables such as economic globalization and terms of 
trade as well as domestic variables such as population growth, urbanization and ethnic 
composition were found to hide/conceal the ‘true’ relationship between regionalism and 
economic development. These are suppressor variables, concealing this true relationship. 
This pattern of regionalism is denoted as ‘suppressed/hidden regionalism’. 
Pattern III. There are regionalisms whose effects on economic development remain 
unchanged regardless of international economic and domestic variables of the member 
states. They are the AU, ECOWAS and NAFTA. The AU and ECOWAS were previously 
found to have negative effects on economic development, while NAFTA's effect was posi-
tive. The significant negative effects of the two regional organizations in Africa (i.e., of 
the AU and ECOWAS) on economic development remain unchanged regardless of inter-
national economic and domestic variables of the member states. Regardless of low global-
ization and unfavorable terms of trade as well as of low urbanization, high population 
growth, and heterogeneous ethnic composition of the member states associated with each 
of the two regional organizations, the institutional design of these two respective organiza-
tions was still found to have significant independent and negative effects on economic  
development. NAFTA was found to have positive, although weak, effect on economic de-
velopment and the effect remains unchanged regardless of international economic and 
                                                          
4 Note that the author considers the regional organizations as units of his analysis. It is quite clear that if he studied, for 
example, the impact of the joining the European Union by individual countries on the economic development of par-
ticular countries, he would discover that this impact in many cases is rather significant. At such a level of analysis 
one would have to take into account many other factors not considered by the author – for example, the requirements 
that regional organizations impose on new members with respect to particular social, economic, and institutional in-
dicators. – Editors. 
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domestic variables of the member states. This pattern of regionalism is labeled as ‘affec-
tive regionalism’. 
Pattern IV. There are regionalisms whose effects on economic development remain 
solidly unchanged with their respective insignificant effects on economic development 
regardless the international economic and domestic variables of individual member states: 
they are the SCO, OAS, LAS, MERCOSUR, ANDEAN and ASEAN (see also Tables 2 
and 3). These regional organizations were found incapable of affecting economic devel-
opment, whether positively or negatively, under any international economic and domestic 
conditions of the member states. They are simply insignificant. This pattern of regionalism 
is labeled as ‘non-affective regionalism’. 
The Effects of International Economic and Domestic Variables 
Table 2 shows that regardless of any ‘patterns’ of regionalism discussed above, globaliza-
tion was found to have strong and positive effects on economic development across all 
fourteen regionalisms. Regardless of regionalism, the favorable terms of trade in the mem-
ber states were also found able to enhance economic development. External (foreign) debt 
sustainability, however, was found to have no significant effect on economic development, 
indicating that external debt, whether sustainable or unsustainable, is neither necessarily 
negative nor positive in affecting economic development. The effect of political system, 
democratic or authoritarian, on economic development is mixed. In the AU, EU, ASEAN, 
NAFTA, APEC, CARICOM, OAS, SAARC and SCO, the political system was found to 
have no significant effects on economic development, while the ANDEAN, LAS, ECO-
WAS, MERCOSUR and PC show that the more democratic political system, the higher 
economic development, yet the positive effect of political system on economic develop-
ment was found relatively weak. Military expenditures were found to have no significant 
independent effect on economic development. Our findings do question a long-held view 
of the trade-offs, positive or negative, between the defense spending and economic devel-
opment. Urbanization, ethnic homogeneity, and population growth were found to have 
significant independent effects on economic development. Regardless of regionalism, the 
more urbanized, ethnically homogeneous countries, which are also associated with a lower 
population growth, are likely to maintain a higher level of economic development than the 
rural, ethnically heterogeneous countries with a high population growth. The AU and 
ECOWAS in Africa, however, are exceptional in that their ethnic composition, heteroge-
neous or homogeneous, was found to have no significant effects on economic develop-
ment regardless of their respective regionalisms.  
Conclusions 
The regionalism realized by the collective institutional design via regional organizations 
was found to depend from the conditions and constrains of individual sovereign member 
states. Collective regional/global governance as well as institutional capacity of the re-
gional organizations was found to be dependent of the individual member states when af-
fecting economic development. The effects of regionalism on economic development var-
ied. Some regionalisms were found spurious or suppressed by the effects of conditions and 
constraints of the member states. Some regionalisms were found affective, indicating they 
are significant, positive or negative, in affecting economic development. But still many 
other regionalisms were found non-affective, indicating that they are simply insignificant 
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in affecting economic development regardless of international economic and domestic 
variables of the member states. 
Regardless of regionalism, both globalization and favorable terms of trade of individ-
ual member state were found to have strong positive effects on economic development. 
The rapid population growth and heterogeneous ethnic composition have a negative effect 
on economic development, while urbanization has a positive effect. In some regionalisms, 
political democracy was found to have a positive effect on economic development, while 
many other regionalisms show that political democracy is not necessarily a significant de-
terminant of economic development. The debt sustainability/unsustainability, as well as 
defense spending, was found to have no significant effect on economic development re-
gardless of regionalism.  
When/if regionalism via regional organization aims at enhancing the economic devel-
opment, then the institutional capacity of regional organization based on the rules, norms 
and principles should be able to increase globalization as well as to produce favorable 
terms of trade for the member states. This is irrespective of the domestic socioeconomic, 
demographic and political conditions of the member states. Unless the regional organiza-
tions are institutionally capable of making their respective regionalism globalize beyond 
their internal integration and global/regional governance they aim, ‘collective’ regionalism 
alone is not likely to have a positive determining impact on economic development that 
‘individual’ sovereign member states pursue. 
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Africa and International Relations Theory:  
Acquiescence and Responses 
 
Olukayode A. Faleye 
 
 
The Westphalian narrative has been the compass of International Relations (IR). 
It sustains a Eurocentric hegemony in IR theory – ascribing to itself the nucleus 
of the international system. Indeed, international theory acts as a tool that le-
gitimizes Anglo-American imperialism in international studies. For instance, 
colonization in Africa entails the force-feeding of African materials into the 
Western-centric structures. This phenomenon produced a distinct (hybrid) sys-
tem with exotic challenges in Africa. The manifestation of these challenges in the 
decolonization process is often ignored in the neo-liberal, neo-realist and struc-
tural theories. This suggests a gap in the existing literature, especially in the 
area of conceptualizing Statehood, sovereignty, power, border, and security. 
This work canvasses interdisciplinary approach to the subject matter. Thus, us-
ing case study analysis, this paper argues that the Westphalian narrative lacks 
the understanding of the dynamics of contemporary African societies, and con-
cluded by examining alternative pathways that can promote global understand-
ing. 
Keywords: African Studies, Global Studies, intellectual imperialism, Interna-
tional Relations Theory, state. 
Introduction 
The Westphalian narrative has been the guide of International Relations (IR). Conse-
quently, the non-European world has been neglected through fabrications in Eurocentric 
texts. While the Westphalian European States were able to resolve the anarchical chal-
lenges through cultural reconstruction, the non-European cultures were often appraised 
based on the Eurocentric paradigms. Indeed, international theory acts as a tool that legiti-
mizes Anglo-American imperialism in International Studies. For instance, colonization in 
Africa1 entails the force-feeding of African materials into the Western-centric structures. 
This phenomenon produced a distinct (hybrid) system with exotic challenges in Africa. 
The manifestation of these challenges in the decolonization process is often ignored in the 
neo-liberal, neo-realist and structural theories. As Craig Murphy put it, ‘More than one out 
of ten people are African. More than one out of four nations are African. Yet, I would war-
rant that fewer than one in a hundred university lectures on International Relations given 
in Europe or North America even mention the continent’ (Murphy 2001: ix). This is not 
surprising, considering the annals of European imperialism in the continent – slave trade, 
colonialism and neo-colonialism. The Afro-European relations since the fifteenth century 
                                                          
1 Note that ‘Africa’ throughout this article refers mostly to Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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have been colored by European dominance and characterized by the mythologies of Afri-
can inferiority (Ofonagoro 1980: 58–59; Awolowo 1977: 18–21). Consequently, many 
Eurocentric scholars often ignore the African contribution to the field. This was an attempt 
to justify the western centric hegemony in world affairs.  
The decolonization process in Africa involved an attempt at political, economic and 
intellectual emancipation of the African people. Intellectual decolonization in Africa in-
volved the review of the colonial curriculum to accommodate the African experience. For 
example, a review of academic curriculums pioneered in the field of History led to the 
development of the subfield of African History despite stiff opposition from Eurocentric 
historians. The decolonization of intellectual materials is a continuous process, and the 
failure of the existing Eurocentric outlook to comprehend the African experience necessi-
tated a review of the existing IR paradigms to enhance global understanding. This work 
canvasses interdisciplinary approach to the subject matter. Thus, using case study analysis, 
this paper argues that IR theory lacks the understanding of the dynamics of contemporary 
African societies, and concluded by examining alternative path ways that can promote 
global understanding. 
This paper is divided into four sections. The first is this introductory section followed 
by the conceptual framework for the analysis, while the third section examines the contri-
butions of Africa to IR theory; the concluding section summarizes the analysis and offers 
clues to further studies. 
Mapping Intellectual Imperialism 
Imperialism is multidimensional involving the subjugation and exploitation of a people by 
another. The elements of imperialism can be divided into three major categories – exploi-
tation, cultural domination, and intellectual rationalization (Atalas 2000: 23–25; Mudimbe 
1988: 2). In this regard, imperialism involves the exploitation of the human and natural 
resources of a society by another. It entails the bastardization of the colonized culture and 
an attempt to replace it with that of the colonialist. The exploitation and domination that 
are inherent in imperialism are often justified within an intellectual framework of the co-
lonialist. Political and economic imperialism in Africa involved the integration of the con-
tinent into the Eurocentric political, economic and social system. In this respect, Africa 
became the source of raw materials and market for European industries. Its pre-colonial 
political institutions were made subservient to Western European democratic governance, 
while its culture was eroded by Western centric values. Scholars have argued that this 
phenomenon impeded the development of the continent (Awolowo 1977: 28–29; Rodney 
2012: 17–31). The themes of political and economic imperialism in the history of Afro-
European relations are widely documented and need not bother us in this study. However, 
this paper takes a departure from the traditional perspective of imperialism which lays em-
phasis on the political and economic dimension of imperialism. It examines the dynamics 
of intellectual imperialism in Africa with a special concern about its impact in interna-
tional studies.  
Intellectual imperialism is the unjustified tendency of the intelligentsia to ignore alter-
native theories, perspectives, or methodologies (Jussim 2002: 18). Indeed, intellectual im-
perialism is a shared fate of all colonized people. Ward Churchill reminds us about  
the curriculum challenges in the post independent United States. According to Churchill:  
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The American educational system as a whole seems hopelessly locked into a monolithic 
European paradigm in terms of acknowledgeable heritage, methodology, and conceptual 
structure… Reliance upon a monocultural tradition within a multicultural arena constitutes 
an essentially transparent form of intellectual domination, achievable only within the 
power context of parallel forms of domination (Churchill 1981: 51). 
Colonialism involves both the material and intellectual subjugation of the colonized. 
The Europeans armed with Eurocentric pedagogies planted Western education vis-à-vis 
Christianity in Africa. Consequently, for a period of about 100 years after the British bom-
bardment of Lagos (1851), the continent applied the Eurocentric educational curriculum 
hook-line and sinker. This era witnessed the writing of ‘African History’ through the 
lenses of European traders, missionaries, travelers, and adventurers, who sought to justify 
European imperialism in Africa. For instance, the Regius Professor of Modern History at 
Oxford University, Professor Hugh Trevor-Roper asserts: 
Perhaps, in the future, there will be some African History to teach. But at present there is 
none: there is only the history of the Europeans in Africa. The rest is darkness… and dark-
ness is not a subject of history. Please, do not misunderstand me. I do not deny that men 
existed even in the dark countries and dark centuries, nor that they had political life and 
culture, interesting to sociologists and Anthropologists; but History, I believe, is essen-
tially a form of movement, and purposive movement too. It is not a mere phantasmagoria 
of changing shapes and costumes, of battles and conquests, dynasties and usurpations, so-
cial forms and social disintegration (Trevor-Roper 1963: 871 cited in Fage 1981: 31). 
This Eurocentric view of African History was conceived out of the desire to justify 
European imperialism in the continent (Fage 1981: 32). In this period, the history of the 
world was viewed through the Eurocentric lenses of the colonialists. This was exemplified 
by the text of the Cambridge Modern History, Volume 14 published between 1902 and 
1910. Describing the content of this volume, Fage lamented ‘This is Eurocentric to the 
point at which it almost totally ignores even European activities in the outside world’ 
(Ibid.: 33). 
The emergence of African History as a field of historical inquiry gained momentum 
with the rise of African nationalism after the World War II. It was an attempt at intellec-
tual decolonization of the African past. The authentication of non-written sources such as, 
African oral tradition was promoted through the convergence of historical and cultural 
disciplines – History, Archaeology, Anthropology, Linguistic and Art History under the 
umbrella of African Studies. Today, African History is a celebrated discipline in the world 
of academia. Amongst others, African historiography has enriched historical methodology 
by extending the scope of the discipline to encompass the Eurocentric sacred writings and 
oral tradition. Also, prior to the eighteenth century, African arts were regarded as primitive 
objects and products of a barbaric culture (Mudimbe 1988: 10). It is interesting to note that 
by the twentieth century, African arts have strongly influenced European arts as exempli-
fied by the works of Pablo Picasso and Henri Matisse. This shows a transition from an 
unproductive ethnocentric standpoint to an objective paradigm in the discipline of History 
and Art History. 
The most enduring colonial institutions in Africa are the Universities. The African na-
tionalists failed to domesticate Western education to soothe the yearnings of the African 
environment. Thus, the post-independence period witnessed a continuous dependence of 
the African universities on European structures (Mazrui 2003: 141–142). These universi-
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ties remain the agent of neo-colonialism in Africa. Most university teachings, research and 
reading texts emphasize western philosophies and Eurocentric realities. European lan-
guages became the language of prestige while the African languages were relegated as 
vernacular (with a salient exception of Swahili in East Africa). The university curricular 
reflected the western experience (Mazrui 2002: 68–69). For instance, the National Univer-
sity Commission (NUC) is empowered by the Decree (Acts) No. 16 of 1985 and Decree 
(Acts) No. 48 of 1988 to administer a minimum standard for all programs taught in Nige-
rian Universities (NUC-Benchmark for Undergraduate Programs in Nigerian Universities 
2007: i–ii). An analysis of the NUC Benchmark Minimum Academic Standards (BMAS) 
for the undergraduate program in International Relations reveals that out of 45 courses 
offered, only six (that is IRS103, IRS308, IRS309, IRS402, IRS409, and IRS411) reflect 
the African experience, others are rooted in the Eurocentric school of thought (Table 1).  
Table 1. NUC-benchmark minimum academic standard for international relations’ 
program 
S/N COURSE CODE DESCRIPTION CREDIT UNITS 
1 2 3 4 
 100 LEVEL 100 LEVEL  
1 IRS 101 Ancestors of the Contemporary Intl' System 2 
2 IRS 102 Evolution of the Contemporary Intl' System 2 
3 IRS 103 Introduction to African Politics 2 
4 IRS 104 History of Europe 1300–1914 2 
5 IRS 105 History of Europe 1300–1914  II 2 
6 IRS 106 Introduction to Management 2 
7 IRS 107 Introduction to Political Science 2 
  200 LEVEL  
8 IRS 201 Use of English 2 
9 IRS 202 Structure of International Society 2 
10 IRS 203 Introduction to Political Analysis 2 
11 IRS 204 Political Thought Plato-Machiavelli 2 
12 IRS 205 Political Thought Since Hobbes 2 
13 IRS 206 Foundation of Political Economy 2 
14 IRS 207 New States in World Politics 2 
15 IRS 208 Nigerian Politics 2 
16 IRS 209 French / Portuguese / Arabic 2 
17 IRS 210 Elements of Contemporary Global Studies 2 
  300 LEVEL  
18 IRS 301 International Economic Relations I  2 
19 IRS 302 International Economic Relations II 2 
20 IRS 303 The International Political System 2 
21 IRS 304 Diplomacy 2 
22 IRS 305 Law of Nations 2 
23 IRS 306 Logic and Methods of Political Inquiry 2 
24 IRS 307 International Politics in the Post-Cold War Era 2 
25 IRS 308 International Politics of Africa 2 
26 IRS 309 Field Trip 2 
27 IRS 310 Theories of International Relations 2 
28 IRS 311 Theory and Practice of Administration 2 
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1 2 3 4 
  400 LEVEL  
29 IRS 401 Foreign Policy Analysis 2 
30  IRS 402 Nigerian Foreign Policy 2 
31 IRS 403 Human Rights 2 
32 IRS 404 Contemporary Strategic Studies 2 
33 IRS 405 Foreign Policies of the Powers 2 
34 IRS 406 International Institutions 2 
35 IRS 407 Research Project 6 
36 IRS 408 Race and Ethnicity in International Relations 2 
37 IRS 409 Africa and the Middle East 2 
38 IRS 410 Asia in World Politics 2 
39 IRS 411 International Relations in Southern Africa 2 
40 IRS 412 Europe in World Politics 2 
41 IRS 413 Technology, Ecology and Environment in IR 2 
42 IRS 414 IR in North Africa and the Maghreb 2 
43 IRS 415 Politics of Intl' Economic Relations 2 
44 IRS 416 The Intl' Politics of Mass Communication 2 
45 IRS 417 Middle East in World Politics 2 
Source: National University Commission 2007: 96–101. 
In this circumstance, the products of the IR program are automatically dislocated from the 
realities on the ground in Africa. While the African experience showcases the supremacy 
of the informal non-state cross-border relations in the region, the leading scholars in the 
field continued to ignore the phenomenon. In this purview, the western-centric hegemony 
in international studies is a form of intellectual imperialism – a closed system with subjec-
tive paradigms. Thus, this paper attempts to fill the gap in the existing literature by exam-
ining how the ‘African antithesis’ can help expand the existing monolithic paradigms of 
International Relations to reflect global understanding.  
African International Relations: Challenges and Prospects 
The peace of Westphalia marked a departure from the traditional religious aristocracy of 
medieval Europe. Its resolutions concluded the internecine wars and evolved a geopolitical 
framework for European relations. IR theory is rooted in the treaty of Westphalia. The 
Westphalian order was established on two major principles – sovereignty and equality of 
states. Indeed, it emphasizes the supremacy of the nation state in the international system; 
State-centric International Relations evolved as a solution to the cycle of European hostili-
ties and political disorder. This Eurocentric philosophy was later planted around the world 
through colonialism.   
The Afro-European intercourse during the colonial era involved the subjugation of 
traditional African International Relations and the formalization of European type interna-
tional order. This entails the force-feeding of African materials into the European struc-
ture. Notwithstanding, the informal transnational African politics continued to flow as  
a vital under-current – the nucleus of the postcolonial African International Relations. This 
undercurrent in the form of informal regional politics characterized by failed borders, and 
incoherent sovereignty is what Lisa Anderson regarded as alternatives to the states. Ac-
cording to Lisa Anderson, ‘Many of these alternatives, vast religions and ethnic networks… 
compete with the state and while they may convey fewer rights than established states, they 
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often protect those rights they do extend far more effectively’ (Anderson 2004: 3). The post-
colonial period therefore, marked a rebirth of a new Africa in form of distinct hybrid states 
that are neither European states nor pre-colonial African kingdoms in character.  
The African deviancy to the state centric perspective of International Relations can 
only be understood through an appraisal of the pattern of intergroup relations in Sub-
Saharan Africa. The integration between the peoples of West Africa goes beyond trading 
and involved transnational kinship. The scramble and partition of Africa involved the de-
marcation of the continent across established ethnic nationalities. For example, in Nigeria, 
the Hausa pre-colonial state was divided between Nigeria and Niger, the Yoruba people 
were divided between Nigeria, Benin and Togo, while the Fulani people were divided 
across the Nigeria-Cameroonian border axis. The new created states were never a nation-
state. This phenomenon created social capital across African colonial boundaries. Also, it 
created social solidarity across borders which serve as a platform for disloyalty to the hy-
brid states. A major challenge to state planting in Africa is the fluidity of the colonial 
boundaries. As the concept of sovereignty connotes the formalization of national bounda-
ries, according to Robert Rotberg, states ‘constituted repositories of power and authority 
within borders’ (Rotberg 2004: 28). Hence, the erosion of this power across the inherited 
colonial boundaries owing to uncontrollable informal large scale trans-border movements 
is contrary to the Westphalian model. It is not surprising therefore, that as of the late twen-
tieth and early twenty-first century this scenario was accelerated by the de-bordering 
forces of globalization.  
This phenomenon created channels of power for transnational non-state actors.  
The result was the rise of transnational militia networks comprising the Al Qaeda in the 
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko-Haram in Nigeria, Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in the 
Central African Republic, Janjaweed in Chad, and the Arab Islamic Front of the Azawad 
in Mali. These militia groups have seized the opportunity created by the rapid erosion of 
power across the national boundaries to challenge the state actors. While the security ar-
chitecture of Africa is unfolding, informal trans-border trade is exceedingly high in Africa, 
starving the states of vital revenue, and strengthening the economic power base of the 
transnational non-state actors (Delvaux 2001: 13–17). According to Christopher Chase-
Dunn, this is a response to the globalization of Western neoliberal democracy and its at-
tendant stress on the World's proletariats (Chase-Dunn 2010: 51). Considering the forego-
ing, it can be deduced that informal trans-border relations in Africa exceed formal Interna-
tional Relations by state actors. This scenario challenges the use of state as a major unit of 
analysis in Africa. Also, this shows that the functioning of the political entity referred to as 
‘states’ in Africa differs considerably from what constitutes a state in Europe. Indeed, this 
dichotomy is a major challenge to the existing state-centric theory of International Rela-
tions. Observing this phenomenon, Justin Rosenberg posits: 
The disciplinary division of labor between the modern social sciences itself reflects un-
critically and thereby naturalizes the distinctive social forms of modernity. State, markets, 
individuals – precisely the things we need to explain – are already assumed to be natural 
starting points. By conceptualizing particular structures of modern social relations in isola-
tion from each other, this division of labor tends to reify them into self-sufficient actors 
with their own distinctive properties – hiding both the historical novelty of these forms and 
the specific social relations which constitute them. And it almost goes without saying that 
this also effects an ideological closure, drawing in of the horizons of collective human pos-
sibility (Rosenberg 1994: 4). 
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The failure of IR theory to reflect issues in African studies is no longer news. Scholars 
have rejected the static and mono-cultural conception of IR theory, pointing to the con-
structivist advances as an outreach to Africa and other non-Western cultures (Price and 
Reus-Smit 1998: 266; Brown 2006: 125). Constructivists have been preoccupied with the 
social construction of International Relations with a special focus on trans-border socio-
cultural relations. This seems to hold promise for the understanding of the African infor-
mal transnational undercurrent. According to Brown: 
If IR theory presupposes functioning states and these do not exist in parts of Africa, then 
the IR theory cannot apply; if IR theory is focused on relations between states, and there 
are international social processes crossing state borders that are in some sense, non-state, 
then alternative theories are needed, and so on (Brown 2006: 123). 
Brown admitted that IR theory like other theories is limited in scope. He argues that 
‘they reduce the complexity of the world in order to highlight certain important features… 
they rely on conceptual abstractions such as ‘state’ and ‘anarchy’ to refer to real aspects of 
the world but in a necessarily imperfect, generalized way’ (Ibid.: 124). Advancing this 
discussion, it can be deduced that the problem lies with the disciplinary philosophy of In-
ternational Relations. This is obvious in the concept of what constitutes the ‘international’ 
and the ‘transnational’, for African challenges to IR theory is embedded in the informal 
transnational relations fiercely competing with the formal state-centered International Re-
lations. In this perspective, the ‘international’ that is, state-centered relations are the foun-
dation of IR theory and fits well into the European reality while the African experience 
emphasizes the ‘transnational’ which focuses on non-state relations involving a de-
bordering process. In this purview, antagonists of the African challenge to IR may be justi-
fied if the discipline continues to be defined from the Eurocentric viewpoint. In this re-
gard, IR theory will be extremely handicapped to explain the African situation and the 
continent will continue to be ignored in the discipline as a precaution against theoretical 
complications. Hence, the inadequacy of IR theory to diagnose the African dilemma is 
inherent in the discipline. A call for a distinct framework outside of the mainstream IR 
theory to address the African phenomenon is a call to liquidate the discipline and the con-
structivist agenda is a step towards this direction. No wonder, many IR scholars are re-
stricting a shift away from the fundamental IR theory for self-preservation. Apart from the 
Africa's challenge to International Relations, the emerging pattern of globalization poses 
a major threat to the field. The state-centric explanation to the global intercourse can no 
longer stand the complexity of the emerging world order. It seems that the establishment 
of Global Studies as a distinct discipline is a reaction to the narrowness of IR theory.  
As Phyllis Pomerantz puts it: 
IR has increasingly dealt with voluntary associations of states (international organizations) 
and non-state actors, such as private companies, terrorist groups, and non-governmental 
organizations. Nonetheless, much of the analysis still revolves around the relationships of 
those actors with the state. In contrast, the state is only one of multiple units of analysis 
used in Global Studies. Perhaps the best characterization of those units is that of informal 
and formal networks of groups of individuals and organizations linked to each other and to 
the global economy and polity (Pomerantz 2008).  
Indeed, Global Studies (GS) offers a broader framework for the analysis of the Afri-
can experience. The transition in world history necessitates a transition of IR theory from  
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a state-centric pedagogy to a holistic transnational global framework as exemplified by the 
experience of the Global South. Unfortunately, the discipline of International Relations is 
fundamentally subjective, ethnocentric and therefore imperialistic. It cannot expand its 
theoretical basis without self-liquidation. This circumstance is what Rodrigue and Stasko 
(2010: 132), refers to as ‘social entropy’ – ‘the result of generations of people thinking in 
traditional ways. IR is entrenched in the state system, even while other units of analysis 
are involved, the state remains dominant. The failure of state planting in Africa vis-à-vis 
other parts of the Global South rubs International Relations of its universality. Also, the 
emerging globalization phenomenon, I bet, will continue to erode its foundation in  
the West – its stronghold. International Relations evolved out of the Western hegemony  
in world affairs. Its preferences are the great power politics which necessitated the treat-
ment of the colonized Global South as the world's periphery. However, the challenges of 
International Relations came with decolonization and the failure of the Westphalian state 
system in post-colonial Africa. This transition in world history poses a potent challenge to 
the mainstream IR theory, as the concept of an all sovereign state becomes untenable in 
Africa and elsewhere in the Global South. Unfortunately, IR is genetically conditioned to 
be Eurocentric and the failure of this mirage necessitated the decline of the discipline. This 
frustration is exemplified by the writing of William Brown who tends to redefine Interna-
tional Relations away from the state-centric debacle. Borrowing a phrase from Justin 
Rosenberg's ‘The Empire of Civil Society’; Brown agreed that emphasis on critical social 
theory should be restricted within the discipline, otherwise International Relations will 
‘disappear into Sociology’ (Brown 2006: 124–125). Hence, for self-preservation, Interna-
tional Relations could only survive by assigning nuisance value to realities in non-
European cultures, especially when such contribution conflicted with its cardinal doc-
trines. Alternatively, in the quest for objectivity and global outlook, International Relations 
will inevitably dissolve into Global Studies (GS). 
The existing IR theory despite its narrowness represents a first but an incomplete step 
towards holistic global understanding. It is now being expanded to accommodate experi-
ences of non-European regions within the expansive theoretical framework in Global 
Studies. Thus, Global Studies represents a new and broader branding of International Rela-
tions. According to Rodrigue and Stasko:  
It is our job as academics to begin transformation towards new models. We, as scholars 
and educators, must find ways to address global problems using global linkages between 
ourselves, our students and our communities. It is commonly reported that when our cos-
monauts and astronauts went into space, they saw no political boundaries on the Earth and 
came back confirmed internationalists and activists. It is in this spirit of global endeavor 
that we educators need to ignite world change by empowering our world citizens with new 
ideas (Rodrigue and Stasko 2010: 139). 
Thus, in order to involve the African experience into Global Studies, it becomes nec-
essary to re-conceptualize existing paradigms of IR such as state, sovereignty, power, and 
border to reflect the African scenario. In this regard, IR theory will converge with African 
Studies (AS) to produce a new knowledge. According to Hegel, the steps towards the dis-
covery of a truly scientific knowledge involve the development of a thesis, antithesis and  
a synthesis. In this perspective, the Eurocentric IR theory represents the thesis, regional 
studies such as African studies constitute the antithesis and, a critical appraisal of the two 
stages of enquiry will produce the synthesis – a holistic and universal Global Theory. 
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Conclusion 
European Imperialism in Africa involved the political, economic and intellectual domi-
nation over the African people. The disadvantaged position of Africa in the history of 
Afro-European relations made the continent subservient to Eurocentric ideologies. It 
was discovered that decolonization in Africa is an ongoing process which entails an at-
tempt at political, economic and intellectual liberation of the continent. Intellectual de-
colonization of the continent started with the review of Academic curricular in the field 
of History and now International Relations (IR). The lessons learnt from the decoloniza-
tion of the field of History in Africa suggest that the successes recorded can be attributed 
to the elastic philosophy of history that cuts across all human cultures. In the case of 
International Relations, the discipline is deeply entrenched in the Eurocentric experi-
ence; it is an invention of Europe. Its cardinal doctrines of the superiority of state are  
a political bible of the West and any challenge from Africa or elsewhere in the Global 
South to the status quo is deemed heretic. No wonder, renowned IR scholars have 
treated the Africa's challenge to International Relations passively and with disdain. In  
a nutshell, the limitation of the discipline to answer the African question is inherent in 
its genetics – its philosophy cannot accommodate such defiance. To do otherwise, is to 
face theoretical complications and risk the liquidation of the discipline as whole. How-
ever, it was discovered that it may be possible to expand the pioneering paradigms in 
International Relations to accommodate African realities within the disciplinary phi-
losophy of Global Studies (GS). This should be done by re-conceptualizing cardinal 
concepts of International Relations such as statehood, sovereignty, power, and border 
within a global framework.  
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Part III. GLOBAL TRENDS AND PERSPECTIVES 
 
Advances in Development Reverse  
Global Inequality Trends* 
 
Andrey V. Korotayev and Victor De Munck 
 
 
In recent decades countries have gone through unprecedented growth in human 
development. In 1980, there were two countries with a human development index 
near to or higher than 0.90, now there are 22. It is a well-established fact that 
growth in human development is positively related with economic growth. Large-
ly as a result of this correspondence, Ranis posited a positive feedback loop be-
tween countries with high economic growth and human development (a ‘virtuous 
cycle’) and countries with stagnant or negative economic growth and human de-
velopment (a ‘vicious’ cycle). Using longitudinal statistical analysis we show 
that there is an ‘old model’ of the relationship between human development and 
economic growth that supports the existence of these cycles and a ‘new model’ 
that refutes them. This is good news since the vicious-virtuous cycles imply that 
the rich get richer and the poor get poorer whereas the ‘new model’ shows  
a conditional and eventual absolute convergence between rich and poor coun-
tries in terms of human development. We show that this change is due to two fac-
tors: The rise in middle and high developed countries and the high rates of eco-
nomic growth and human development among somewhat poor and mid-level 
countries. Our findings correspond to those published in Nature by Myrskylä, 
Kohler and Billari (2009) demonstrating that for countries at the high end of the 
human development index (HDI), between 0.85 and 0.95, there occurs a reversal 
of the previously well-established negative, development-fertility relationship. 
Our research, supportive of Myrskylä et.al's findings, demonstrates a more com-
plex relationship between HDI and economic growth rates than previously 
thought and that socio-cultural factors independent of economic or human de-
velopment should be taken into account to construct a fuller model of rates of 
change in economic and human development. 
Keywords: global inequality, human development, economic growth, conver-
gence. 
The relationships between human development and economic growth have already been  
a subject of substantial research (Sen 1985, 2000; Streeten 1994; Ramirez, Ranis, and 
Stewart 1998; Boozer et al. 2003; Ranis 2004; Afzal et al. 2009; Özcan and Bjørnskov 
2011; Conceição, Mukherjee, and Nayyar 2011; Cox, Arkoubi, and Estrada 2006; Po-
veda 2011; Tridico 2007). The main findings of this research may be summarized as 
following. 
                                                          
* This research has been supported by the Russian Foundation for the Humanities (project No. 14-02-00330). 
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Economic growth is positively related to human development; it is one of its major de-
terminants (Ramirez, Ranis, and Stewart 1998: 3–8; Boozer et al. 2003; Ranis 2004, etc.).  
Indeed, logarithm of per capita gross national income correlates almost perfectly with 
the Human Development Index (HDI) values (see Fig. 1).  
Fig. 1. Correlation between decimal logarithm of per capita national income  
(in 2005 PPP $) and the Human Development Index for 2011 
 
Note: r = 0.940, p << 0.0001, R2 = 0.884. Data source: Klugman 2011: 127–130.  
Of course, there is a substantial degree of autocorrelation here, as per capita GNI is one of 
four components that are used for the HDI calculation according to the current methodol-
ogy (Klugman 2011: 167–173).  
However, the economic prosperity (measured through per capita GNI) also demon-
strates very strong correlations with all the other HDI components – life expectancy at 
birth, mean years of schooling, and expected years of schooling (see Figs 2–4). 
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Fig. 2. Correlation between decimal logarithm of per capita national income  
(in 2005 PPP $) and life expectancy at birth for 2011 
 
Note: r = 0.800, p << 0.0001, R2 = 0.640. Data source: Klugman 2011: 127–130.  
Fig. 3. Correlation between decimal logarithm of per capita national income  
(in 2005 PPP $) and mean years of schooling for 2011 
 
Note: r = 0.764, p << .0001, R2 = 0.584. Data source: Klugman 2011: 127–130. 
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Fig. 4. Correlation between decimal logarithm of per capita national income (in 2005 
PPP $) and expected years of schooling for 2011 
 
Note: r = 0.784, p << 0.0001, R2 = 0.615. Data source: Klugman 2011: 127–130.  
It also demonstrates an even stronger correlation with ‘nonincome HDI’ (computed on the 
basis of human development subindices excluding per capita GNI; hence, in this case all 
the autocorrelation present in the first correlation above [Fig. 1] is eliminated, see Fig. 5). 
Fig. 5. Correlation between decimal logarithm of per capita national income  
(in 2005 PPP $) and the ‘nonincome’ Human Development Index for 2011 
 
Note: r = 0.846, p << 0.0001, R2 = 0.615. Data source: Klugman 2011: 127–130.  
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In general, there is a strong consensus that economic growth tends to affect human devel-
opment positively. ‘Income growth clearly strikes one as the main contributor to directly 
increasing the capabilities of individuals and consequently the human development of a 
nation since it encapsulates the economy's command over resources’ (Ranis 2004: 3; see 
also Sen 2000). For example, while the citizens of the Indian state of Kerala have life ex-
pectancies and literacy rates comparable to those of many developed countries, the fact 
that they cannot enjoy many of the benefits of citizens of such countries (such as better 
housing, transportation, or entertainment) demonstrates the importance of GDP as an in-
strument for achieving a wide range of capabilities. Many researchers have observed the 
importance of higher income ‘facilitating achieving crucial human development objec-
tives’ as well as having ‘an indirect effect on human development’ (Ranis 2004: 3; see 
also, e.g., Afzal, Butt, and Rehman 2009; Dash and Sahoo 2010; Dao 2011; Alderman et 
al. 1996; Moore 2006, etc.). 
On the other hand, it has been shown that human development also has a positive ef-
fect on economic growth. Indeed, as people become healthier, better nourished and edu-
cated they contribute more to economic growth. Higher levels of HD are not only  
an end in themselves but also indirectly effect economic growth by enhancing people's 
creative and productive capacities (see Ramirez, Ranis, and Stewart 1998: 9; Ranis, Stew-
art, and Samman 2006; Korotayev, Malkov, and Khaltourina 2006; Cox, Arkoubi, and 
Estrada 2006; Korotayev 2009; Afzal et al. 2009; Özcan and Bjørnskov 2011; Poveda 
2011; and Tridico 2007 for evidence supporting the positive influence of human develop-
ment on economic growth).1  
The above discussion suggests that we should expect a positive correlation between Hu-
man Development Index values and economic growth rates. If we take a closer look at the rela-
tionship between HDI and economic growth rates longitudinally, by decades and five-year 
periods, we see that the predicted positive correlation holds up for the 1980s (see Fig. 6).  
                                                          
1 In fact, Ranis and his colleagues (Ramirez, Ranis, and Stewart 1998: 3–8; Boozer et al. 2003; Ranis 2004; Ranis, 
Stewart, and Samman 2006) demonstrate that the positive influence of human development on economic growth, on 
the one hand, and the positive influence of economic growth on human development, on the other hand, tend to form 
positive feedback loops that could result both in virtuous (more human development – faster economic growth – ac-
celeration of human development – even faster economic growth) and vicious (decline of human development – de-
crease of per capita incomes – further decline of human development – a continuing decrease in per capita incomes – 
an accelerated decline of human development) cycles. 
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Fig. 6. Correlation between Human Development Index and Average Growth Rate 
(1980–1990) 
 
Note: r = 0.271, p = 0.006.  
Data sources: Klugman 2011; World Bank 2014. The economic growth rate here and elsewhere was cal-
culated as the average annual growth rate of per capita GDP (counted in 2005 international purchasing 
power parity [PPP] dollars) for respective periods.  
This correlation becomes substantially weaker for the 1990s, but it still remains significant 
(see Fig. 7).  
Fig. 7. Correlation between Human Development Index and Average Growth Rate 
(1990–2000) 
 
Note: r = .21, p = .021 Data sources: Klugman 2011; World Bank 2014. 
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However, for the 2000–2005 period this correlation becomes negative (though insignifi-
cant) (see Fig. 8).  
Fig. 8. Correlation between Human Development Index and Average Growth Rate 
(2000–2005) 
 
Note: r = –0.079, p = 0.349. Data sources: Klugman 2011; World Bank 2014.  
For the 2005–2010 period the correlation is not only negative, but also highly significant 
(see Fig. 9).  
Fig. 9. Correlation between Human Development Index and Average Growth Rate 
(2005–2010) 
 
Note: r = –0.255, p = 0.002. Data sources: Klugman 2011; World Bank 2014.  
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Thus, since 1980 (the first year for which UNDP presents HDI values according to its new 
computing system) we observe a rather pronounced downward trend in the correlations be-
tween the HDI and economic growth rates – indicated by the shift from a significant positive 
correlation in the 1980s to a significant negative correlation in the late 2000s (see Fig. 10). 
Fig. 10. Dynamics of the correlation between the Human Development Index Values 
and Economic Growth Rates, 1980–2010 
 
Note that the relationship between HDI and economic growth for 2005–2010 is actually 
curvilinear (see Fig. 14). In general, a problem with the above graphs is that they presume 
a uniform relationship between HDI and economic growth across countries regardless of 
HDI level. In fact, for 2005 we still observe a positive (albeit rather weak) relationship 
between HDI and economic growth for low- and middle-HDI countries in the 0.250– 
0.675 range (see Fig. 11). 
Fig. 11. Correlation between Human Development Index and Average Growth Rate 
in the 0.250–0.675 range (2005–2010) 
 
Note: r = 0.194, p = 0.045 (1-tailed). Data sources: Klugman 2011; World Bank 2014.  
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On the other hand, for the right-hand part of the diagram (that is for middle and high-HDI 
countries in the 0.6–0.95 range) we observe a much higher and rather significant negative 
correlation (see Fig. 12). 
Fig. 12. Correlation between Human Development Index and Average Growth Rate 
in the 0.60–0.95 range for 2005–2010 
 
Note: r = –0.468, p = 0.000001. Data sources: Klugman 2011; World Bank 2014. 
Note that the overall pattern turns out to be rather similar to the correlation between HDI 
and Total Fertility Rates (TFR) discovered by Myrskylä, Kohler and Billari (2009).  
In August 2009, Mikko Myrskylä, Hans-Peter Kohler and Francesco C. Billari pub-
lished in Nature their striking finding of a curvilinear relationship between fertility rates 
and the Human Development Index (HDI). Their findings demonstrated that for countries at 
the tail end (between 0.85 and –0.95) where countries with the highest HDI are clustered 
there was a reversal of the previously negative, development-fertility relationship. Instead, 
for these countries, their findings indicate that ‘further development’ can lead to increasing 
fertility rate (Myrskylä, Kohler, and Billari 2009: 741) (see Fig. 13). 
Their findings might not be an isolated phenomenon as demonstrated by our investiga-
tions into the relationship between the Human Development Index and economic growth 
rates. Our findings show that the relationship between HDI and Economic growth rates 
changes depending on the level of HDI a nation has attained. Our research, supportive of 
Myrskylä et al.'s findings, demonstrates a more complex relationship between HDI and 
economic growth rates than previously thought and that socio-cultural factors independent 
of economic or human development should also be taken into account to construct a fuller 
model of rates of change in economic and human development.  
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Fig. 13. Cross-sectional relationship between TFR and HDI in 1975 and 2005 
 
Source: Myrskylä, Kohler, and Billari 2009: 741.  
That is, prior to Myrskylä et al. we observe a linear relationship between HDI and  
a respective variable for the whole HDI range, and now we discover that there is, in fact, a 
curvilinear relationship whereby the old correlation persists among countries with low and 
low-middle HDI but not among countries with high-middle and high HDIs, which display 
a correlation directly opposite to the old one. There is, of course, a strikingly apparent rea-
son for the recent finding of a curvilinear relationship between HDI and TFR as the ‘old’ 
(negative) relationship exists in the HDI range 0.3–0.9,2 while the ‘new’ (positive) rela-
tionship is found in a totally new range (one in which no countries had reached in 1975). 
On the other hand, as regards the HDI – economic growth relationship, we find the ‘old’ 
(positive) relationship in HDI 0.15–0.6 ranges in both cases; however, with respect to the 
range beyond 0.6 Fig. 14 suggests that it is strongly negative for 2005–2010 and strongly 
positive for the 1980s. 
                                                          
2 In fact, Ranis and his colleagues (Ramirez, Ranis, and Stewart 1998: 3–8; Boozer et al. 2003; Ranis 2004; Ranis, 
Stewart, and Samman 2006) demonstrate that the positive influence of human development on economic growth, on 
the one hand, and the positive influence of economic growth on human development, on the other hand, tend to form 
positive feedback loops that could result both in virtuous (more human development – faster economic growth – ac-
celeration of human development – even faster economic growth) and vicious (decline of human development – de-
crease of per capita incomes – further decline of human development – a continuing decrease in per capita incomes – 
an accelerated decline of human development) cycles. 
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Fig. 14. Comparing HDI values and annual per capita growth rates for the 1980s 
and 2005–2010, a scatterplot with fitted LOWESS lines 
 
Human Development Index in 1980/2005 
However, a closer inspection of the dataset reflected in Fig. 14 indicates that the negative 
correlation between HDI levels and economic growth rates among the countries with the top 
HDI scores (over 0.7) can be also detected for the 1980s (see Fig. 15).3 
Fig. 15. Correlation between Human Development Index and Average Growth Rate 
in the > 0.70 range for the 1980s and HDI 
 
Note: r = –.422, p = .04 (omitting an outlier [Argentine] that experienced a severe crisis in the 1980s due to 
some idiosyncratic causes).  
Data sources: Klugman 2011; World Bank 2014.  
                                                          
3 Though the Locally Weighed Scatterplot Smoothing (LOWESS) technique employed in Fig. 14 was unable to capture 
this with those parameters that we used (Kernel: Epanechnikov; % of points to fit: 85). 
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However, the difference between the two cases still remains. In the case of the relation-
ships between the HDI and TFR, the emergence of a correlation in a new direction is ac-
counted for by the emergence of a considerable number of countries with HDI values > 0.9 
by 2005. In the case of the relationship between the HDI and economic growth rates, the 
emergence of a salient negative correlation among the high-HDI countries is connected 
both with the growth of the number of countries with HDI scores4 higher than 0.7 and with 
the expansion of the negative correlation zone to the 0.6–0.7 range. As a result, with re-
gards to the HDI – TFR relationship, in 2005, the general (world-wide) negative correla-
tion became substantially weaker than it was in 1975 but it still remained negative. With 
respect to the second case the overall positive correlation of 1980–1990 turns into an over-
all negative correlation by 2005–2010.  
It might not be quite clear, but the change of the correlation between the HDI values 
and economic growth rates is actually good news as the positive correlation implies the 
growth of inequality between countries with regards to their human development levels 
(i.e., reflecting Ranis et al.'s vicious cycle) while the negative correlation implies a process 
of reducing inequality in HDI between countries.  
The previous research surveyed earlier demonstrates that economic growth has  
a strong positive effect on the HDI. This implies that in countries with higher HDIs, HDI 
will grow at a faster rate than in countries with lower HDI which will lead to increasing 
the gap in human development between highly developed and less developed countries, 
that would lead in turn to growing divergence in the rates of economic growth, and so on. 
Of course, the perfectly positive relationship between HDI and economic growth rate 
would imply actual increasing returns and a positive feedback between those variables 
(‘virtuous cycle’). In fact, though such notions as ‘increasing returns’ and ‘positive feed-
back’ (‘virtuous cycle’) look intuitively very attractive, with respect to global development 
the respective phenomena actually imply just the growth of global inequality in human 
development, in general, and in per capita incomes, in particular. This was already noticed 
by Paul M. Romer (1986) who wrote that the model of increasing returns offered ‘an alter-
native view of long-run prospects for growth’ that was contrary to the assumptions of con-
vergence theory: ‘per capita output can grow without bound, possibly at a rate that is mono-
tonically increasing over time. The rate of investment and the rate of return on capital may 
increase rather than decrease with increases in the capital stock. The level of per capita out-
put in different countries need not converge; growth may be persistently slower in less de-
veloped countries and may even fail to take place at all’ (Romer 1986: 1003). Thus, a consis-
tently positive feedback loop of increasing return would imply divergence rather than con-
vergence of countries with different incomes – and growing rather than diminishing global 
inequality. Note that this was just the case in the 1980s when Romer's article was written.  
On the other hand, the negative correlation we found implies that countries with lower 
HDIs tend to have higher economic growth rates than high-HDI countries and (due to the 
remaining strong positive correlation between per capita incomes and HDI) their HDI would 
tend to grow faster than the high-HDI countries – hence, the level of HDI inequality should 
tend to decrease over time. Indeed, as we see in Fig. 16, the global HDI inequality levels 
(calculated as the value of standard deviation from the mean) have tended to increase when 
                                                          
4 We would like to remind the readers that we use HDI scores computed according to the new UNDP methodology 
introduced in 2010, whereas Myrskylä, Kohler and Billari used the old ones; whereas the same countries for the same 
years tend to have significantly lower HDI scores in comparison with the older ones. 
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the correlation in question was positive (that is, in 1980–2000) and tended to decrease when 
this correlation became negative (see Fig. 16). 
Fig. 16. World Human Development Inequality Index, 1980–2010 
 
Data source: calculated on the basis of data published in Klugman 2011.  
Above we presented a theoretical framework for explaining the grounds for expecting  
a positive correlation between HDI scores and economic growth rates; indeed we have 
argued that this has been a running theme of most articles that relate HDI and economic 
growth. So why then do we recently observe negative correlations? What theory may ac-
count for the recent negative correlation (especially between 2005 and 2010) that we have 
demonstrated in this paper.  
This new trend that we have described thus far can in part be accounted for by the 
phenomenon of convergence. The cornerstone for the theory of convergence was laid in an 
essay Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective by Alexander Gerschenkron 
(1952), who developed the ‘theory of relative backwardness’ relying on data obtained 
from the history of European countries. The main tenet of his theory is as follows:  
‘the opportunities inherent in industrialization may be said to vary directly with the back-
wardness of the country’ (Gerschenkron 1952: 6). Remarkably, Gerschenkron emphasized 
that the conditions inevitably required for a country to take advantage of its backwardness 
included ‘adequate endowments of usable resources’ and the absence of ‘great blocks to 
industrialization’ (Ibid.: 6). Thus, backward countries (provided that the outlined condi-
tions are observed) were bound to grow faster than countries with developed economies, 
the former thus gradually converging with the latter. As Samuelson and Nordhaus put it,  
poorer countries have important advantages that the first pioneers along the path of in-
dustrialization did not. Developing nations can now draw upon the capital, skills, and 
technology of more advanced countries Gerschenkron suggests that relative back-
wardness itself may aid development. Countries can buy modern textile machinery, 
efficient pumps, miracle seeds, chemical fertilizers, and medical supplies. Because 
they can lean on the technologies of advanced countries, today's developing countries 
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can grow more rapidly… As low-income countries draw upon the more productive 
technologies of the leaders, we would expect to see convergence of countries toward 
the technological frontier. Convergence occurs when those countries or regions that 
have initially low incomes tend to grow more rapidly than ones with high incomes 
(Samuelson and Nordhaus 2005: 584).  
The roots of the issue of unconditional convergence are also frequently traced to  
‘A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth’ by Robert M. Solow (1956). This 
work is sometimes regarded as the pioneering one in laying the tenets for the hypothesis of 
unconditional convergence in the economic growth among the world countries (see, e.g., 
Abel and Bernanke 2005: 235).  
As Mankiw notes,  
the diminishing returns to capital [implied by the Solow model] have another impor-
tant implication: Other things being equal, it is easier for a country to grow fast if it 
starts out relatively poor. This effect of initial conditions on subsequent growth is 
sometimes called the catch-up effect. In poor countries, workers lack even the most 
rudimentary tools and, as a result, have low productivity. Small amounts of capital 
investment would substantially raise these workers' productivity. By contrast, work-
ers in rich countries have large amounts of capital with which to work, and this partly 
explains their high productivity. Yet with the amount of capital per worker already so 
high, additional capital investment has a relatively small effect on productivity. Stud-
ies of international data on economic growth confirm this catch-up effect: Control-
ling for other variables such as the percentage of GDP devoted to investments, poor 
countries tend to grow at faster rates than rich countries (Mankiw 2008: 258).  
Abel and Bernanke note that according to the Solow model, if the economy is open, 
the absolute convergence gets support from some additional economic forces. Since poorer 
countries have less capital per worker and therefore a higher marginal product of capital 
than more affluent countries, investors from richer countries will be able to get greater 
profits by investing in poor countries. Therefore, foreign investment should provide a 
more rapid increase in capital stock in poor countries, even if the level of domestic savings 
in these countries is low (Abel and Bernanke 2005: 234).  
It is easy to see that both the ‘Gershenkron’ factor and the ‘Solow’ factor for the faster 
growth of the peripheral (and especially semi-peripheral) economies are mutually com-
plementary, as capital diffusion tends to be accompanied by technological diffusion (fur-
thermore, capital diffusion is one of the main creators of channels for technological diffu-
sion). On the other hand, Solow's model implies that output levels per capita should  
be higher the higher the savings rate in the country or the lower the population growth 
rate.  
Of course, as low income countries tend to have lower HDI and (according to the con-
vergence theory) higher economic growth, the mechanisms above would also produce 
convergence of HDI scores through the positive influence of the economic development 
on the HDI growth. Note that in the 1980s and 1990s the convergence theory became the 
subject of intensive critique as many authors pointed out, rightly, that the global post-
World War II pattern was one of general divergence rather than convergence (Romer 
1986; Barro 1991; Desdoigts 1994; Lee, Pesaran, and Smith 1997, etc.). Indeed, this was 
generally the case through the 1950–2000 period (e.g., Malkov et al. 2010; Khaltourina 
and Korotayev 2010; Korotayev et al. 2010, 2011, 2012). The suggested failure of general 
(unconditional) convergence was attributed to different factors by various scholars, but 
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human development factors figured prominently in their arguments. Barro (1991: 437) con-
cluded that ‘the relatively weak growth performances of countries in sub-Saharan Africa 
and Latin America’ and their failure to catch up with the developed countries (i.e. the ab-
sence of absolute convergence) could be attributed to the lack of human capital develop-
ment. Indeed, Barro demonstrated that in his data set of 98 countries during the period be-
tween 1960–1985, the growth rate of real per capita GDP was positively related to initial 
human capital. Cohen (1996: 351) stated that ‘the poor countries have failed to catch up 
with rich ones because the progress that they have achieved in educating their workers 
(which is evidenced in the convergence of domestic inputs) is not sufficient to compensate 
for their poor endowment in the knowledge on which the education of workers stands’. 
This research suggested the presence of conditional rather than unconditional conver-
gence, which implies convergence among countries with similar basic characteristics, with 
human capital figuring prominently among those characteristics (e.g., Barro 1991; 
Mankiw, Romer, and Weil 1992; Cohen 1996). Note that by the 1980s we can already ob-
serve convergence among countries with high HDIs. Since that time, many more countries 
have moved to the HDI > 0.7 range. In general, with regards to human capital indicators, 
the gap between developing and developed decreased substantially between 1950 and 
2000 (see Figs 17 and 18).  
Fig. 17. The comparative decrease in the gap in literacy between Europe and de-
veloping areas of the world 
 
Data source: Morrison and Murtin 2006.  
    Korotayev and Munck • Advances Reverse Global Inequality Trends 179 
Fig. 18. The comparative decrease in the gap in life expectancy between the USA 
and developing areas of the world 
 
Data source: World Bank 2014.  
Thus, the switch from the conditional to unconditional convergence pattern that we appear 
to be recently observing seems to be accounted for by the fact that by the late 1990s a very 
large number of countries began to satisfy (more or less) some major conditions of condi-
tional convergence (see, e.g., Korotayev et al. 2010, 2011, 2012; Korotayev and Khal-
tourina 2009; Malkov, Korotayev, and Bogevolnov 2010; Khaltourina and Korotayev 
2010; Malkov et al. 2010).  
This, however, does not appear to account for the above-described growth of the con-
vergence zone. Thus, in the 1980s, countries with 0.6 < HDI < 0.7 tended to grow slower 
than countries with an HDI > 0.7, whereas in recent years they grew faster (quite in accor-
dance with convergence theory, but obviously there is still a high gap in human capital 
development level in comparison with advanced countries). One of the possible explana-
tions can be connected to a sufficient degree of economic openness, which we noted is a 
condition of the conditional convergence model of economic growth (e.g., Ben-David 
1993: 653; Sachs et al. 1995: 199, etc.). Indeed, Sachs et al. (1995) noticed a clear conver-
gence pattern in 1970–1995 for countries with open economies. They maintain that ‘the ab-
sence of overall convergence in the world economy during the past few decades [before 
1995] might well result from the closed trading regimes of most of the poorer countries’ 
(Sachs et al. 1995: 37). They present evidence indicating that the lack of convergence ob-
served across the world in 1970–1995 can be ‘explained by the trade regime: open econo-
mies tend to converge, but closed economies do not. The lack of convergence in recent 
decades results from the fact that the poorer countries have been closed to the world’ 
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(Sachs et al. 1995: 3).5 Actually this finding seems to be quite congruent with classical 
convergence theories specified above. Indeed, according to those theories convergence is 
propelled by the movement of technologies and capitals from the more advanced higher-
HDI countries to less advanced lower-HDI ones, where such a movement is much more 
likely among open economies. Note that by the early 21st century a very high number of 
developing and traditional economies had become much more open than before (among 
other things through the process that is usually denoted as globalization), which appears to 
be a major factor for the emergence of the general convergence pattern in the first decade 
of this century.  
On the other hand, as Fig. 14 above (and Fig. 19 below) indicates, the highest eco-
nomic growth rates in the recent decade tended to be observed in countries with middle 
levels of HDI. In low-HDI countries they were generally higher than in the high-HDI ones, 
but lower than in countries with middle HDI. This implies that the gap between middle-
HDI countries (where most of the world population lives) and the high-HDI ones is de-
creasing (and this results in the overall convergence trend); but this gap is still growing 
between the middle- and low-HDI countries (and this makes the overall convergence trend 
much weaker than it would have been otherwise). 
Note that those results are still rather congruent with recommendations produces by 
Ranis and his colleagues in their series of studies of the relationships between human de-
velopment and economic growth (Ramirez, Ranis, and Stewart 1998: 3–8; Boozer et al. 
2003; Ranis 2004): 
If human development improvements are indeed a precondition for sustainable eco-
nomic growth, government policy and public funding may be necessary to move a 
nation above the human development threshold level. Nations stuck in vicious cycles, 
or low-human development poverty traps may need targeted government investments 
to meet the fixed costs of human development improvements that will lead to later 
economic growth. These fixed cost investments may include schools, hospitals, and 
the necessary governance improvements to effectively implement investment pro-
jects. The crucial lesson that emerges is that the old-fashioned view of ‘grow first and 
worry about human development later’ is not supported by the evidence. Improving 
levels of education and health should have priority or at least move together with ef-
forts to directly enhance growth (Ranis 2004: 10).  
Addenda: But Was Not It All Just Because of the Crisis?  
One may, of course, argue that the positive correlation among middle- and high-HDI 
countries visible in Fig. 14 for 2005–2010 is entirely an artifact of the 2008–2009 cri-
sis, and not a result of reversal of some deep inequality trends. Indeed, the advanced 
countries were struck by the crisis most painfully, whereas most developing countries 
fared much better during the crisis (see, e.g., Grinin and Korotayev 2010). However, 
Fig. 19 below indicates that a pattern visible in Fig. 14 for 2005–2010 could hardly be 
accounted for by crisis only, as an essentially similar pattern is also found for 2000–
2005. 
                                                          
5 Note that Sachs et al. quite remarkably state at this point: ‘This is now changing with the spread of trade 
liberalization programs, so that presumably the tendencies toward convergence will be markedly 
strengthened’ (Sachs et al. 1995: 3). As we see, this forecast has turned out to be quite correct. 
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Fig. 19. Correlation between the HDI value in 2000 and average annual per capita 
GDP growth rates in 2000–2005, a scatterplot with a fitted LOWESS line 
 
This indicates that our analysis of convergence between high and mid-level HDI countries 
and a second pattern of divergence in the economic growth rates between mid-level HDI 
countries and low-level HDI countries is not a result of this economic crisis.  
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In the coming decades in the process of globalization the position of the USA and 
Europe will weaken, while the role of developing countries will increase. The role 
of the two largest emerging economies – China and India – will be of special sig-
nificance. What future will these fast-growing giants face? The demographers 
agree that pretty soon India will lead the world in population and thus surpass 
China, while China will encounter serious population ageing. But economic and 
political scenarios of the future are quite different: from resounding success and 
world leadership to collapse caused by demographic and socio-political troubles. 
Which of them is more feasible? In the present article I analyze the Chinese and 
Indian development models separately and comparatively and make prognosis of 
their perspectives in the twenty-first century. Such an analysis could be helpful for 
understanding Russia's ways of development. 
Keywords: China, India, globalization, the Third World, East Asian model, Chi-
nese model, Indian model, emerging economies, struggle against poverty, au-
thoritarianism, democracy, centre, periphery. 
Introduction: Globalization Closes the Developmental Gap  
between the States 
It is obvious that in the next decades the global political landscape will undergo dramatic 
changes. The role of the USA and Europe will diminish while that of the developing coun-
tries (especially of the large ones) will increase. Numerous reasons determining this process 
have been defined (see, e.g., Frank 1997; Arrighi 1994, 2007; Todd 2003; Buchanan 2002; 
Mandelbaum 2005; The USA National Intelligence Council 2009; NIC 2012; Korotayev et 
al. 2011). They have been analyzed in other works of mine (Grinin 2009b, 2011, 2012a, 
2012c; Grinin and Korotayev 2010; 2011). In any case the diversity of opinions cannot sup-
press the fact that it is globalization that makes this tendency inevitable. Having originated in 
the world with a deep developmental gap between rich and poor countries, later it contrib-
uted to closing this gap. I think that globalization itself presupposes that developing coun-
tries should advance faster than the developed ones (for more details see Grinin 2013), be-
cause it strengthens economic openness which, in turn, brings into effect a kind of ‘law of 
communicating vessels’. As a result, the development of the periphery has accelerated, and 
that of the core has slowed down.1 No doubt, this is one of the most significant results in the 
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1 Thus, developing countries generally benefit globalization despite all the statements about the growing disparity 
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past two decades. The gap will keep on narrowing (of course, to a certain extent) in the next 
decades. It will involve economic expansion, as well as poverty reduction and rapid growth 
of the middle class in the developing countries (see, e.g., NIC 2012). 
In the 1960s and the 1970s, many economists had no illusions that in the near future 
the Eastern and South countries would overcome backwardness and depression. They 
fairly considered those peoples' unwillingness to have a better life as the main obstacle. 
Poverty did not oppress them; they did not consider it as an unbearable state (see, e.g., the 
book by the Nobelist Myrdal [1968]; one can find a similar view in Braudel 1981–1984). 
Such a mentality is still typical for peoples in the underdeveloped regions, especially in 
Tropical Africa. 
But in many developing countries the situation has changed, and now the inert Third 
World is turning vibrant. One of the main transformations seems to be the change of life 
priorities of hundreds million of people who increasingly aspire to break out of poverty 
and illiteracy to a different life.  
Thus, to waken population of poor countries to activity (that demands great efforts for 
initial modernization and education) appears to be the major obstacle to a breakthrough. 
When the desire for better living conditions eventually appears in the undeveloped countries, 
there starts to work a sort of ‘engine’. It may lead to a qualitative result (though such a 
‘Brownian motion’ always entails all kinds of iniquities, abnormalities, nonsense, and injus-
tice, etc.). Once started, the movement for the better will generate social energy for many 
decades. Furthermore, if people's and authorities' efforts are consolidated, the emerging syn-
ergy may bring a resounding success. That was the case in China, India and a number of 
other developing countries. In wealthy societies with all their advantages in culture, educa-
tion and qualification, this resource of development ran short long ago. With the account of 
population ageing, opportunities for rapid development are seeping away. This state of af-
fairs defines the system of globalization ‘communicating vessels’. In order to reduce produc-
tion costs, the developed countries move their capital and production capacities to the devel-
oping ones where millions of young people seek for jobs. The engine of the world economic 
growth, consequently, moves from the core to the periphery. Thus, the role of developing 
countries in the world economy (especially in its surplus production) grows. 
At present, the role of the two largest economies – China and India – is especially sig-
nificant, and their impact will continue to grow in coming decades. It is not surprising, as 
in 2030 these two countries will account for one third of the world population and, per-
haps, 35 per cent of world energy consumption (see, e.g., BP 2012: 45). In the present arti-
cle I analyze the Chinese and Indian development models separately and comparatively. 
Such analysis allows detecting some commonalities of all the fast growing countries 
whose joint influence in 2030 will be great as well.  
1. The Chinese Model. Three Drivers: Investments, Export, and 
Competition between Provinces 
1.1. The Chinese Model: General and Specific Features.  
Growth Factors2 
The East Asian model of economic development. Many analysts suppose that China gen-
erally follows the East Asian development path (see, e.g., Selischev A. S. and Selischev N. 
                                                                                                                                                         
between developing and developed states. We should note that Jagdish Bhagwati appears to be right when advocating 
globalization against its critics (Bhagwati 2004). 
2 For the detailed analysis of the Chinese development model see Grinin 2011; Grinin, Korotayev, and Tsirel 2014. 
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A. 2004: 166–175; Popov 2002; Anderson 2008). This model originated in post-war Japan 
and then it was implemented in the so-called ‘Asian Tigers’ – South Korea, Taiwan, Singa-
pore and Hong Kong. Later it spread to South East Asia and to the Pacific Basin.  
Despite various peculiarities, the following features of the model are inherent in each 
country and fully realized in China as well: a) export-oriented economy, especially indus-
try; b) cheap labor force; c) mobilization of foreign investments and creation of favorable 
business environment, as well as an active import of technology; d) high investment rates 
(accounting for 30 to 40 per cent of GDP and even more); e) an active participation of a 
more or less authoritarian state in economic development; f) creation of special economic 
zones (in China and some other countries). 
This model generally provides a high economic growth rate over a long period, while 
the involvement of capital and technologies allows raising technological level and labor 
productivity. However, some analysts assume that after per capita GDP in the country 
reaches $10,000, China's development rate will slow down as it was the case in Japan and 
other countries (see Eichengreen 2011; Anderson 2008). 
Specific features of the Chinese model. In comparison with other countries follow-
ing the East Asian pattern, China has unique (and at the same time fundamental) features 
of the development model such as enormous population and the greatest (if compared with 
other countries) role of the state governed by the Communist Party. In China, it is just the 
great role of the state that provides an extra high savings rate in GDP (see Diagram 1) and 
makes it possible to invest huge capital and maintain high growth rates.  
The Chinese overseas capital, accumulated mainly in states and administrative districts 
with the ethnic Chinese populations (Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and most of Singapore) also 
plays an important role. This capital is the source of the vast majority of FDI. 
Factors and sources of China's growth (at present their potential is depleting, so 
these factors can also be considered as potential weaknesses). 
 A huge pool of cheap labor and the so-called demographic dividend (connected 
with reducing birth rate and ‘young’ structure of population). The policy of birth control 
also reduces expenditures on the growing generation;  
 low-cost social policies introduced when there was a young age structure (an op-
portunity for the state to disregard its obligation with respect to pensions and benefits for a 
huge part of the population; paid education and medical service for the population; low 
level of safety at work, etc.);  
 plentiful supplies of some mineral resources (coal, iron, oil, rare metals, etc.);  
 ‘cheap ecology’ (lack of proper care for environmental protection); 
 low exchange rate of yuan, favoring export.  
The driving forces of the Chinese development. In China a unique system of forces 
driving development has emerged in which, unlike in developed countries, it is not domestic 
private capital but foreign business, local authorities of different levels of administrative divi-
sion and national corporations that play the major role.  
The role of foreign investors in the Chinese economy is extremely significant, and in 
this very sector, dealing with foreign capital, a major part of export and innovative goods 
are produced. China has become the world workshop for the processing of raw materials 
and for the assembly of finished products. This means that local and foreign manufacturers 
import into China enormous amounts of raw materials, accessory parts, intermediate 
goods, etc. and, after processing or assembling, the finished or semi-finished products are 
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exported. This specialization explains the fabulous figures of the Chinese export and im-
port reaching 4 trillion dollars. There are only few large corporations in the world that are 
not represented in China. Foreign capital activity is essential to understanding the sources 
of China's miracle.  
As regards a pure Chinese constituent of the miracle, one should point out the special 
and extremely effective mechanism of state participation for achieving such a high eco-
nomic growth rate in production development – that is, a strong competition for invest-
ments and high annual growth rates at all provincial and local levels (see, e.g., Berger 
2006, 2009). According to the estimates of economist John Lee, domestic investments 
make up 40 per cent of China's growth, while export sector and foreign direct investments 
contribute approximately 30 per cent (see Berthelsen 2011). In my opinion, the successful 
stimulation of the administrative machinery's interest in economic growth is the key ex-
planation of Chinese development phenomenon. Another powerful source of growth com-
prises large-scale (including monopolistic) national corporations, tending to invest their 
benefit in new projects. 
Limitations and drawbacks of the Chinese model. In spite of the fact that its tech-
nology and innovative level is increasing, the Chinese economy remains generally exten-
sive, based on extremely huge resources and capitals involved. At the same time it still 
remains: a) too resource-intensive; b) too energy-intensive; c) extremely polluting; and 
d) too export-oriented. Despite a proliferation of patents (see, e.g., The World Bank… 
2012: 177; Boeing and Sandner 2011: 17; WIPO 2012; Nasibov 2012) the economy gen-
erally remains non-innovative.  
The Chinese leaders are quite aware of the drawbacks of the existing developmental 
model. They continue to set the objectives of its transformation and make some efforts in 
this direction. Nevertheless, despite a certain progress the results fall short. 
1.2. Growth Limits 
Within the current model of development the constraints on China's extreme economic 
growth have clearly shown up. 
1. Scarcity of energy resources and raw materials sharply manifests as China is un-
able to supply itself with energy and raw materials any more and depends heavily on import. 
At the same time, the increasing import of fuel, mineral and other resources drives the world 
prices which raise the cost of Chinese export products. Within the current unprofitable ex-
port-led model the reliance on energy and resources consumption will only increase. 
2. The coming labor shortage and its increasing cost. Despite high unemployment 
rates one can also observe labor shortages. After 2013–2016, labor shortage is supposed to 
gradually increase, while work-force size – to decrease by 2 million people a year  
(see, e.g., NIC 2012: 15). Due to the existing unemployment and number of rural migrants, 
the labor shortage will not be sharply perceived at once, but even now in some provinces it 
leads to a continuing rise in wages. With a limited labor force and wage-push, it will be 
very difficult to maintain rapid growth. 
3. An inevitable appreciation of export production and risk of capital inflow re-
duction. The severe restrictions like the costs of energy, raw materials, labor, and other 
expenditures, a probable revaluation of the yuan and rivalry of the states with cheaper la-
bor force will be an obstacle for sustaining export growth. But once growth decelerates, 
the investment flow will also decrease, as it is mainly joint ventures with foreign capital 
participation that are engaged in export. In 2012, one could observe the export growth de-
celeration and reduction of foreign investments. Foreign direct investment (FDI) in China 
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declined by 3.7 per cent. Moreover, FDI in the production sector fell by 6 per cent (see 
Mereminskaya 2013). The cause is in the growth of labor cost, protests against environ-
mental pollution and, perhaps, anti-Japanese sentiments, forcing Japanese companies to 
move out to other countries. This tendency continues in the beginning of 2013. 
4. The decline of return on investment. Today the investment rate in China ap-
proaches and even exceeds 50 per cent of GDP (see Diagram 1). This provides a huge 
share of growth. Since the early 2000s, the investment return has sharply declined and, 
despite all efforts, remains generally low. At the same time the burden of maintaining un-
profitable facilities and the value of potentially unrecoverable debts is increasing. China 
has an enormous number of excessive facilities in almost all sectors of its economy.  
The government quite often forces closures of excessive facilities; nonetheless, their num-
ber keeps growing. This results both in wasted expenditures and in excessive competition 
which reduce profit. Of course, this cannot go on endlessly, and sooner or later the invest-
ments will decrease, accompanied by a lower growth rate. 
5. Environment. China takes the lead in the whole world with respect to water, air 
and soil pollution, acid rains, and the number of sick people suffering from pollution ef-
fects (see Zitan 2013). The 12-year plan proposes considerable efforts for a better envi-
ronment, but the solution to these problems requires huge funding over a long period 
which will raise the production and export values and affect the growth rate.  
6. The increasing social expenditures. The population ageing, rising living stan-
dards, necessity to maintain social peace and to prevent the development of an extreme 
gap in living standards and an abnormally high Gini coefficient (see Yu 2013), as well as 
concern for an increase of domestic consumption will lead to the growth of the state's re-
sponsibilities. Every year China will have to spend more on social needs; that has already 
had a certain impact, and in medium- and especially in long-term perspectives it will be-
come a heavy burden. 
7. Growing disproportions and the necessity to restrain the growing inequality 
and to control inflation have a severe impact on economic policy and growth rates be-
cause they constantly threaten the stability of the Chinese society. A too wide income gap 
contradicts the very idea of ‘building a harmonious society’. Permanent changes of mone-
tary policy in connection with inflation risks also lead to business loss.  
The inevitability of the growth slowdown. It is difficult to change the existing 
growth model due to influential forces interested in its maintenance, namely, different au-
thoritative levels and large-scale state corporations. For decades they have made great 
progress in production expansion as well as in manipulating statistic figures. Moreover, 
the Chinese bureaucratic and social system is actually unprepared to switch to a new de-
velopment model. For example, there is the only instrument to avoid overinvestment that 
every year creates additional excessive capacities in China – the restrictive directives. But 
this means to tie the provinces' hands, and, in fact, to stop the major engine for growth. 
Taking into account the above-mentioned limitations, one can suppose that despite all 
the Chinese authorities' efforts, the growth rates will gradually decelerate. Even under fa-
vorable conditions within the next three years the growth rate will not exceed six-seven per 
cent. And after 2016, it will fall to four-six per cent. Although, objectively speaking, such 
a deceleration can be considered positive for China, the Chinese government has a very 
different view.3 
                                                          
3 In my opinion, the development model cannot be changed if at the same time to pursuit the extreme growth rates at any 
cost. To change the pattern, one should slow down in order not to swerve. If unchanged, the model raises a possibility for 
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2. The Indian Model: A Synthesis of Three Worlds  
2.1. The General Description of the Model 
The Indian model substantially differs both from the East Asian pattern in general and 
from the Chinese one in particular. It bears no resemblance to any other model; this is 
a peculiar type of development model. India has a unique social and cultural setting. All 
its aspects are specific, starting from the fact that the subcontinent lies on a separate tec-
tonic plate. For example, India's attitude with respect to cultural globalization differs in 
essential ways from that of China's. China's government attempts to control diverse 
global influences, especially the cultural ones (Yan Yunxiang [2002] gives an adequate 
definition for this phenomenon – ‘the controllable globalization’). India is much more 
open. This country itself is an exporter of a number of different cultural patterns, which 
have become the heritage of the world, for example, yoga, meditation, Tantrism, etc. 
(for details see Srinivas 2002; Mondal 2012). 
A unified and controversial transitional society. India is a world with a popula-
tion surpassing that of some continents. In political terms it is founded on the principles 
of modern national federal state, and at the same time represents a model of a multicul-
tural world where diverse religions, ethnic groups, classes and castes coexist. With re-
spect to cultural, linguistic and religious diversity, India trails only Africa. For almost 
seven decades, India has been actively transforming from an agrarian, patriarchal and 
almost illiterate society to an urban, industrial and information-oriented one. Today In-
dia is actually an integration of several types of social systems. That said, the old agrar-
ian system, adherent to caste ranking and community structure, on the one hand, pro-
vides the modern system with a steady social energy resource in the form of an abundant 
labor force. On the other hand, the traditional system becomes a source of major prob-
lems, as Indians themselves now consider poverty, illiteracy and lack of qualification 
incompatible with modern standards. 
In short, we observe a great transitional economy with distinct contrasts. In particu-
larly, a high educational level and a large share of high-skilled specialists coexist with 
hundred millions of illiterate people; a large middle class (which is not characteristic of all 
emerging economies) – with mass poverty. Perhaps, one fifth of the population already 
lives close to the European standards, but a huge part of India's population lives below the 
poverty line (this line is set too low at that). Of course, there are strong regional imbal-
ances. A true (not imitation) and established democracy – quite a rare case for the Third 
World countries – goes together with high (for similar states) corruption and inequality. 
The European-style democracy and the middle class, consisting mainly of graduates, go 
hand in hand with specific Indian prejudices, including those connected with caste system. 
At the same time, it is the caste traditions that serve as an important damper to suppress 
discontent with social inequality. The caste system preaches that inequality is a natural 
state and people belonging to different castes should live in different ways. That is why an 
ultimate decay of caste's ideology and psychology can lead to increasing social tensions 
(see, e.g., Khoros 2009: 93). Today the number of people belonging to the lowest castes 
and tribes is much more than 250 million (Yurlov 2007: 9). The share of the poor among 
them is especially large.  
                                                                                                                                                         
a deep crisis in the future. That is why the growth rates deceleration, though causing problems and social discontent, is a 
better alternative to a structural crisis. 
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All these and other issues (which are discussed later on) represent the current chal-
lenges as well as threats to India's future. Nevertheless, one can hope that the country will 
cope with them so that they would not be the source of irreparable perturbations.  
2.2. Three Worlds Combined in a Single Model 
Contrasts are typical for all fast emerging countries with a transition economy. But India 
has its own distinct feature. I would rather call it ‘a combination of three worlds’. The mat-
ter is that India's model is a peculiar and still a harmonic mixture of important features of 
the developed capitalist, socialist and developing countries, that is of all three worlds  
(the First, the Second and the Third one) of the modern world map.4 In my opinion, no 
other country has such a unique combination, which in many respects determines the pecu-
liarity of the Indian development model. Let us consider it in detail. 
It is clear that the Third World is associated with poverty and population pressure that 
drives young people to leave villages for cities. The share of peasants in India's demo-
graphic structure is still dominant, the shortage of land and gradual growth of labor pro-
ductivity in farming generate rural overpopulation, poverty and high unemployment rates. 
One should also mention widespread adult illiteracy especially among females5 (see Ta-
ble 1). The Indian ethnic and civilizational peculiarity, including a modern version  
of community self-government in villages (officially these self-governing bodies are called 
‘panchayats’) and vivid remnants of the caste system, is also important. 
The Second World manifests in an active state policy in the sphere of infrastructure 
and economic development on the basis of five-year plans. The state regulates economic 
activity and social life. It results, for instance, in supporting small business through regula-
tion, licensing and setting quotas, in the protection of workers' rights by special laws, in 
attempts to provide the peasants with minimal means of subsistence (e.g., through their 
involvement in paid public works, including land reclamation), quotas for women and 
members of lower castes in representative self-government bodies and so on. Here one 
should also mention the vigorous struggle against poverty and illiteracy, as well as efforts 
in demographic regulation. 
The First World. The positive features of the First World (which imply democratic 
traditions and high level of development) are uncommon for developing countries. Mean-
while, India is considered a well-established democracy; it has a mature institution of 
private property and other important institutions of non-state economy such as large pri-
vate corporations and financial market. The social stratum of self-employed people and 
high-skilled specialists engaged in private business has also been formed. Some of these 
features were introduced already in the colonial period. At present other peculiarities 
supplement them, including achievements in the field of innovations and fundamental 
science. India has the third largest scientific and technical labor force in the world. 
About 200 of the Fortune 500 companies use Indian software services (O'Neill and Pod-
dar 2008; Planning Commission 2008, Vol. 3: 251). Alongside with China, India has its 
own space program.6 
                                                          
4 The Second (that is the socialist) World, though having reduced its representation, still persists in some Asian coun-
tries and (in some spheres) in the CIS countries and also in Europe. It is worth noting that, according to the constitu-
tion, India is officially named a socialist secular democratic republic. 
5 The law on universal primary education for children has already been passed. But there are many problems here. 
6 It is important to mention that according to the government (Planning Commission 2008, Vol. 3: 251), the unprece-
dented progress in IT-technology was achieved through the realization of the Government Resolution on software 
technology parks which was adopted in 1993 (Software Technology Parks) (Ibid.: 255–256). 
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There is no such a singular combination of three worlds in any other developing 
country. China combines only two worlds: the Third and the Second one. The features of 
the First world are only emerging on the basis of the Western technology. In Asia, even 
in the former provinces of British India (such as Pakistan and Bangladesh), democracy 
can hardly take roots. We can speak about a kind of combination of three worlds in 
some Latin American countries (especially in Argentine, Chile or Mexico), with the 
qualification that the institution of private property was formed there long ago. As for 
Mexico, its development is a result of its active relations with the USA. But the level of 
democracy there is much lower than in India, and the number of high-tech specialists is 
quite limited.  
In my opinion, the synthesis of the three worlds gives advantages to India in terms of 
adjustment to different phenomena (see below). 
For the purposes of this article it is very important to view all achievements, advan-
tages and problems through the lens of an Indian harmonic combination of the three 
worlds. Firstly, the features of the First World manifest in India's economic structure with 
its prevailing services sector (including high-tech services) as is the case in developed 
economies.7 Secondly, they are evident in its export structure where the high-tech services 
also predominate. 
The features of the Second World result among regulations and other things in gov-
ernment's plans of economic transformation, in particular, in the development of innova-
tive industries, agricultural productivity growth, infrastructure and medicine development 
(see Planning Commission 2011). The features of the Third World constantly show up 
while in the field of demographic resources they will even sharpen. 
Table 1. Adult literacy rate (% of people ages 15 and above) 
 Both sexes 
 2000 2010 
China 90.9 94.3 
India 61.0 (2001) 62.8 (2006) 
 
 Female 
 2000 2010 
China 86.5 91.3 
India 47.8 (2001) 50.8 (2006) 
 Male 
 2000 2010 
China 95.1 97.1 
India 73.4 (2001) 75.2 (2006) 
Source: ADB 2012. 
                                                          
7 In the GDP structure services account for 59 per cent, industry – 27 per cent, agriculture – 14 per cent. At the same 
time, the industry's share remains the same for 30 years, while the services sector considerably increased at the ex-
pense of agriculture declining share. 
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2.3. Characteristics, Peculiarities, and Advantages 
The main features and purposes of state economic policy. The role of the state in In-
dia's economic growth is significant (but the state intervenes in quite a different way than 
it does in China), so it makes sense to consider some of its aspects. The Indian state ini-
tially aimed at creating a powerful economy and pursuing social policy. That is why most 
objectives as well as the means for their achievement (governmental planning and invest-
ments, control and regulations) remain consistent. However, in the course of time, espe-
cially after the 1991 reforms, the attitude to foreign investments drastically changed. In 
addition, the problem of growth acceleration was solved and a breakthrough in India's ex-
port potential was achieved. As a result, according to the WTO data, India's openness ratio 
is about 30 per cent (see Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation 
2012), it is several times larger than it was in the 1970s. And the contribution of foreign 
trade to India's total GDP is growing. It has considerably come close to the share of inter-
national trade in the Chinese GDP (see Syed and Walsh 2012). However, India's depend-
ence on the world economy is also increasing. 
The state's main economic objectives and the means for their achievement are as fol-
lows: 
1. Achievement of high economic growth rates (up to 8–10 % per year) by means of: 
a) federal and regional planning and government investments; b) infrastructure improve-
ment; c) attraction of FDI; d) development of high technologies; e) development of the 
education sector; f) import substitution and creation of necessary economic sectors; g) ex-
port promotion; h) other measures.  
2. Support for small business and the peasantry through restrictions on large-scale 
business and foreign capital, different privileges, organization of public works, etc. In ad-
dition, in India such support combines with recognition of corporate giants' special role 
and necessity to attract foreign investments. Thus, for instance, large foreign retailers can-
not expand today, because there are fears that they will drive out small traders. But they 
are likely to enter the Indian market under certain conditions. 
3. Fight against poverty and illiteracy. 
The general description of the model. The modern Indian development strategy has 
many features similar to those of other more or less successful emerging economies. At 
the same time there are some indigenous features that will be scrutinized below. In the 
present section I will try to formulate and comment the most important characteristics of 
the Indian development model. 
The main features of the Indian economic model are the following: 
1. The large role of the state in all spheres which, however, has diminished since 1991 
(see Vijay Joshi and Little 1996; Malyarov 2010; Braghina 2010; Mahajan et al. 2011). 
2. The state control over banking sector and quite strict currency regulations, which 
are gradually loosening (see Malyarov 2010).  
3. The large role of large multi-sectoral private and state companies which coexist 
with abundant (up to 45–50 million) small and smallest businesses in industry and espe-
cially in services (see Braghina 2010; Malyarov 2010; The Main… 2012).  
4. Predominance of the services sector, including financial and other ones, in the eco-
nomic structure (see paragraph 5), accompanied with a rapid growth of industry (Ministry 
of Finance 2010; Braghina 2010; Malyarov 2010). 
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5. Large export high-tech sectors and professional services (information and commu-
nication technology (ICT), software engineering, outsourcing) which allowed India to oc-
cupy a special place in international labor division.8 
6. Active attraction of foreign investments and technologies (see Revina 2009; Gal-
ischeva 2012). 
7. Rather high savings rate, attention to infrastructure, scientific and technological in-
novations (see Scientific and Technological Achievements 2008; Lunyov 2009; Akimov 
2010а). 
8. Emphasis on domestic consumption, which serves as an engine of growth, in addi-
tion to export stimulation, import restriction and development of import substitution 
(Braghina 2010).9 
9. An important role of the overseas Indian communities (see Cheshkov 2009; Aki-
mov 2010a).10. 
Resources and advantages (presented in two aspects). 
Among the advantages, which are India's historical peculiarities or achievements, are 
the following: 
 The widespread use of the English language, especially among well-educated Indi-
ans, and dissemination of English literature and information: many books and periodicals 
are published simultaneously in Great Britain, India and the USA. 
 A considerable level of higher education in India and attention to fundamental sci-
ences that allows for training specialists in different areas (engineers, doctors, and econo-
mists, etc.) with sufficient competence and with a good command of English.11  
 A large number of high-skilled workers in innovative fields as a benefit of the first 
two advantages combined with the Indian government's special efforts (see Planning 
Commission 2008, Vol. 3: 255–256). First of all, this allowed creating a huge high-tech 
services sector (software, engineering, banking, management, accounting, legal, consult-
ing, auditing and other business and information services; see Kurbanov 2012: 11),12 
which exceeds 100 billion dollars. It also provides the export of high-tech production of 
                                                          
8 See, for example, Dahlman and Utz 2005; Dossani 2008; Raychaudhuri and De 2012; Cong Liang 2012; on outsourcing 
see Ashmyanskaya 2007, 2008. In 2000–2006, this sector grew more than four times: from 7 to 30 billion dollars (Idem 
2007: 7). Whereas in 1999 it amounted to 1.2 per cent of GDP, in 2008 it was already 7 % (Idem 2008: 20). The pharma-
ceutical industry based on production of the so-called generics, that is drugs with expired patent protection, is one of the 
most important industries in India. The world production of such drugs is supposed to double and reach 230 billion dol-
lars by 2018. 
9 Footwear industries can serve an example here. It is export-oriented in many developing countries, in particular in China, 
while in India only five per cent of its production is exported (see Akimov 2009: 9). Already in 1993, a famous Indian 
sociologist Rajni Kothary (1993: 77) pointed (though with sharp criticism) that India has formed a consumer society 
which has adopted an ultra-modernization model. 
10 It is slightly reminiscent of the situation with Turkish communities in Germany in the 1960s, with the Mexicans – in 
the USA, except that the Indian emigrants are high-skilled and well-educated unlike Mexican semiliterate day-
laborers and uneducated Turkish workers. 
11 The Indian specialists studied in Europe and especially in England for a long time. Since the nineteenthcentury that 
was an Indian advantage over China as the latter was for a long time a closed country or in a state of war. Independ-
ent India from the very beginning paid much attention to the level of higher education and the quality of trained spe-
cialists. It is indirectly confirmed by the fact that many specialists from India have been working in international or-
ganizations. 
Certainly, the Indian system of higher education has many problems, including the task to increase the number of 
universities and improve their quality of work (O'Neill and Poddar 2008). 
12 According to the IT Department of Ministry of communications and information technologies, in 2011 the IT production 
and electronics output in India amounted 88.1 billion dollars (i.e. a 19 percent increase from that in 2010), including 
software and services – 76.1 billion dollars (Kurbanov 2012: 15). 
Globalistics and Globalization Studies 194 
knowledge economy. This is a rare and even a unique phenomenon for the Third World. 
Second, the fact that such specialists are low-paid (by international standards) provides the 
demand for their work in the USA and all over the world, realized both through recruitment 
in India and immigration. Of course, this involves a shortage of specialists in India, but at 
the same time promotes creation of large overseas community which is an important source 
of currency earnings, advanced concepts and contacts. 
Problems as a downside of advantages. In developing countries (India is not 
an exception) many advantages can bring about problems as well. With respect to India 
these are: 1) demographic resources which are a source of unemployment, poverty and 
large-scale rural-to-urban migration; 2) low living standards which attract manufacturers. 
But poverty impedes progress, that is why elimination of poverty is the most important, 
complicated and expensive task. It is vitally important to solve it. But the solution will 
make the country's advantages disappear as well; 3) large territory, the development of 
which requires significant investments in infrastructure (according to some estimates, up 
to a trillion dollars); 4) receptive domestic market which plays a much more important role 
in India than in any other developing countries. But along with the market development 
the problem of protecting the small and smallest businesses from destructive competition 
of foreign and large-scale capital is rising. 
To summarize, the most important peculiarities of the Indian model are as follows: 
 comprehensive state-led development strategy which regulates financial flows, in-
vestments and support of different sectors (large, small and foreign business); 
 developed high-tech services sector and industry which are the basis of the Indian 
export; 
 focus on development of domestic consumption rather than an intensive develop-
ment of export sectors; 
 significant role of overseas Indian communities with a large number of high-skilled 
workers; 
 mineral wealth, particularly large deposits of iron ore and other metals, as well as 
coal, etc. 
2.4. Limitations of the Indian Model 
The limitations are integral with advantages, first of all, with the extraordinary demo-
graphic resources. Besides, one should also take into account that in the near future 
an unprecedented number of young people will flood the Indian economy. 
The social aspect. Rapid population growth makes issues of poverty, unemployment 
and illiteracy rather challenging. Besides, one should note that social tensions often exac-
erbate just at the moment when there appear opportunities to solve the problems in the 
short term. This circumstance can become the most important reason for social crisis and 
even collapse.13 One can clearly perceive that in India the growing expectations exceed 
capabilities and increase discontent, which is typical of countries with fast catching-up 
development (see, e.g., Mehta 2012; Volodin 2008: 346–347). However, social unrest of-
ten causes the growth of ethnic, regional and separatist sentiments and movements. 
The democratic government and traditions are India's advantages as they help to 
achieve a consensus and quell discontent when changing government and governing par-
ties. But under certain circumstances they can give rise to political weakness, uncertainty, 
                                                          
13 On the nature of such modernization crises that tend to occur in many countries see Grinin 2012a. 
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growth of the populist and nationalist movements impact, conflicts, etc. (for an analysis of 
the current political situation see Mehta 2012). 
So the future of the Indian economy and India as a powerful state depends on solidity 
of its social and political system. In my opinion, such strength is guaranteed to a degree by 
its current state system which is based on both the constitutional regulations confirmed at 
practice and on old traditions (e.g., the elite's conviction in the necessity of seeking appro-
priate balance of power distribution between its different levels or views that consensus 
and ideological tolerance are more preferable than struggle). Mahatma Gandhi liked to 
emphasize ‘the beauty of compromise’ that allows achieving moral victory with the help 
of the opponent himself. All this holds out a hope that India has a safety margin and will 
not collapse when facing challenges. 
The resource aspect. Enormous population will keep on growing over a long period 
and together with a planned rapid industrial and urban growth this will aggravate the ur-
gency of old problems including the shortage of farmlands and fresh water (see Rastyan-
nikov 2010; Goryacheva 2010). This requires agricultural intensification and investing in 
augmentation of water resources. India greatly relies on energy imports whose amounts 
will continue to grow (see BP 2012; Malyarov 2010; Volodin 2008; Skosyrev 2007). 
Environmental protection is the country's most vulnerable problem. In this respect 
India follows China – the planet's leading environmental polluter (Melyantsev 2007).  
The necessity to substitute coal as the main fuel and energy resource will greatly aggravate 
Indian reliance on energy imports. Ecological problems are closely connected with the 
shortage of fresh water and farmlands, which are also included in the industry's sphere of 
interest.  
Bureaucratic and political aspects. India has a strong state power, but bureaucracy 
puts severe obstacles on progress; corruption also tends to impede progress. We have 
already mentioned some political risks. In some cases the democratic form of govern-
ment hampers decisive measures and reforms as the leaders have to consider voters' 
opinion. The political impasse is also quite frequent when a political party fails to take 
an advantage and then political (legislative) process stagnates. There is also a danger of 
strengthening foreign policy ambitions which can involve the country in unnecessary 
confrontation. 
Overall, in spite of all dangers, India has no limitations to confound its hopes for suc-
cessful development and becoming a leader. Of course, there is a possibility of the middle-
income trap, when a country attains a per capita income of US $10,000–15,000 and then 
cannot make a further decisive breakthrough. But India has not reached that level so far. 
3. China and India: Common Features, Differences, Relative  
Advantages and Forecasts 
India and China have always been compared to each other. Lately, this tendency has even 
intensified (see Syed and Walsh 2012; Zeng 2006; Winters and Yusuf 2007; Bardhan 
2010; sections about these countries see in Khoros 2010) because the future of global 
economy depends on these countries' development. Not without reason, these countries 
have been often called to exchange experience (see Syed and Walsh 2012; Cong Liang 
2012). 
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3.1. Similarities and Differences 
In many respects, the common points are determined by similar tasks and problems the 
two countries face: maintenance of high growth rates, necessity to provide employment 
opportunities for youth, rapid urbanization, fight against poverty, agriculture underdevel-
opment, shortage of resources; poor environmental conditions, reliance on energy imports, 
etc., as well as limited means of solving these problems, which include attraction of in-
vestments, innovations, infrastructure development and so on. The differences naturally 
stem both from historical, cultural and geographical settings and from different strategies. 
Common features: 
 large demographic resources; 
 high savings rate; 
 a big role of the state and public sector in economy and in regulating different 
spheres; stimulation of national corporations development; a big role of the state in infra-
structure development; 
 active attraction of foreign direct investments which are, however, regulated and ca-
nalized; a significant role of companies with foreign participation; 
 export expansion and specific position in the international division of labor;14 
 striving for technological progress, innovations and education development; 
 rapid agricultural development which provides these countries with major food re-
sources, though the productivity of agricultural labor is still rather low and there are 
a number of problems to solve; 
 a lot of similar problems (in addition to those mentioned above are increasing in-
come and regional inequality,15 poverty, permanent danger of inflation; insufficient politi-
cal reforms; heavy national debt, etc.); 
 each country has some important advantages promoting its successful development 
but all of them are quite specific (they have already been mentioned above);16  
 both countries implemented the reforms without a full break with the past as hap-
pened in Russia, the CIS, and some countries of Eastern Europe. It is supposed to be a 
positive factor promoting high growth rates, whereas in Russia and some European coun-
tries the reforms were marked by a severe fall in GDP;  
 the population of both countries positively evaluates major government's efforts and 
favors the high growth course and aspiration for leadership (about India see Mehta 2012; 
Rogozhin 2009; about China see Selischev A. S. and Selischev N. A. 2004; Berger 2006, 
2009). Their leaders' ability to pursue a flexible policy and to alter the strategy is also im-
portant, although the possibilities for maneuver are limited by the peculiarities of their 
political systems. 
Differences: 
 although the reforms in both countries followed the path of reducing government 
control, in China the role of the state is traditionally more important, particularly in the 
banking and credit spheres. This determines many other differences; 
                                                          
14 Here one should also mention the expansion of capital export (see Pakhomov 2012; Galischeva 2011; Lebedeva 
2011; Kuznetsov 2012; Leksyutina 2012), although in China this is a more powerful process. 
15 In China, the inequality between rural and urban population (as well as other regulations including different rights to 
retirement pension) is legalized, which helps to restrain the increasing discontent and endure privations, while in In-
dia this function is performed by the caste system. 
16 Including the role of overseas ethnic diaspora. For comparison of peculiarities of the Chinese and Indian diasporas 
see Valeyev 2011. 
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 China's savings rate is higher than India's: in 2007–2011 in China it exceeded 50 per 
cent, in India it was in the range between 32 and 36 per cent (see Diagram 1). This probably 
contributes to China's higher growth rates and larger GDP (see Diagram  2); 
 in China, the economy is generally more export-oriented with a larger role of for-
eign investment than it is in India; 
 the Indian economy is evidently more based on domestic consumption as a source of 
growth;  
 the structures of the economy and export are different: in China industry and export 
of goods prevail, while in India this role belongs to services sector and export of services; 
 due to its export orientation, China always has a positive balance of foreign trade, 
while India – a negative one; 
 in India the role of private capital and small business is larger than in China; 
 Indian companies are more often listed on stock exchanges; 
 each country has its own economic mechanisms to drive the development –  
a kind of hallmarks of their success (in China these are special economic zones, in India – 
technological parks). 
Diagram 1. Gross domestic saving (% of GDP) 
 
Source: ADB 2014. 
Note: Data for India, 2011, are quoted from http://be5.biz/makroekonomika/capital_formation/capital_ 
formation_india.html. 
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Diagram 2. Gross domestic product at PPP (current international dollars, billion) 
 
Source: ADB 2014. 
3.2. Advantages over each other. Some Forecasts:  
Difficult Thresholds on the Way to Mature Economy  
The above analysis shows that both countries possess great opportunities and face great 
challenges. One should distinguish between medium-term (i.e. the next one-two decades – 
roughly up to 2030) and long-term prospects (i.e. over the next three to five decades – ap-
proximately up to 2050–2060). In the medium-term, it is worth considering growth rates, 
the present level of development and immediate tasks. In this respect China has consider-
able advantages. However, different crises and explosive aggravation of problems can oc-
cur, which will significantly change the situation. As regards the long-term prospects and 
dangers, the change of demographic situation will be of critical importance (fast popula-
tion ageing and labor shortage in China and, on the contrary, India's still unexhausted 
demographic dividend and the fact that the Indian population will exceed the Chinese one 
[see Tables 2–3 and Diagram 3]). Besides, in our opinion, it is the state system's capacity 
to transform and cope with major problems that will be more important, rather than aver-
age annual growth rates. The latter will substantially decrease in both countries by that 
time. In other words, it is important who will be able to avoid catastrophe and/or over-
come problems with less losses. 
Advantages over each other: Indian democracy versus Chinese authoritarianism. 
One can mention the following advantages over each other. 
Political aspects. In the short run the necessity to consider the electorate's opinion, to 
seek political compromise and similar problems associated with the peculiarities of de-
mocratic power will be India's vulnerability. In this respect, the Chinese leaders have more 
opportunities, as they can ignore the voters' expectations. But in the long term, the democ-
ratic regime and different political powers' influence can turn to be India's definite advan-
tage over China. First, with all shortcomings of India's government no one in the world 
doubts the foundations of its state system or calls for sweeping political reforms. There are 
no problems with observance of human rights and political persecution which are typical 
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for China. Thus, as compared with China, India will not have to undertake extensive po-
litical reforms, as its political system generally conforms to the modern standards. On the 
contrary, China's political system which has greatly contributed to its success will be more 
and more frequently criticized at home and abroad. The criticism will intensify coupled 
with growing living standards and increase of the middle class. In the situation of dimin-
ishing resources for economic growth and increasing government liability to citizens, sub-
stantial or radical changes in China's political regime are undesirable. The transition from 
authoritarianism to democracy is not only problematic but also very dangerous and can 
cause destabilization, extension of populism and the country's disintegration (in this re-
spect, the USSR is a very instructive example). Nevertheless, it is quite possible that some 
circumstances, social expectations or internal political struggle (combined with outside 
pressure) will make leaders take that direction. The fact that the Chinese people have 
never lived under democracy can lead to a severe government crisis and affect economic 
development. 
Of course, India also has certain obstacles on its political pathway. As literacy grows 
and poverty reduces, new voters will play an increasing role in determining a political 
party to rule, and this can significantly change the political landscape. There is a danger 
that India will stumble over political scandals, crisis of the ruling party, etc. before even 
reaching China's current level.17 On the other hand, China also has chances to gradually 
transform its political regime.  
Political and ideological openness. India's another advantage is its greater openness 
and (in comparison with China) political-ideological resemblance to the West, despite all 
India's uniqueness. Besides, in the leading countries there are large Indian diasporas 
through which Western culture can penetrate into India.  
Separatism threatens both countries. Dozens of ethnic groups populate China. But 
Han Chinese make up the vast majority of population. Therefore, the country's ethnic 
composition is more homogeneous than it is in India. With respect to the number of ethnic 
groups (more than 700), India is a unique country. In addition, it is a federation, whose 
states, according to the States Reorganization Act of 1956, were reorganized on linguistic 
basis. In short, given an appropriate public mood, there is a perfect opportunity for separa-
tion, as growth of living standards and literacy often awakes local nationalism. That is why 
India's disintegration on the basis of nationality and language is quite possible, though the 
traditions of consensus will most likely keep the country together. At present, separatist 
movements are active in the border territories of India and China (Tibet and Xinjiang in 
China, northwestern Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, as well as northeastern states – in India).18 
The dangers connected with hypothetical separation of restive states are difficult to assess. 
But I think the consequences of the separation of Punjab would not be as drastic for India as 
the separation of the western areas for China. Besides, one should take into account that 
separatism in western China enjoys much more international support than that in India. 
There is a real danger of separation of the western Chinese provinces during the transition to 
democracy. In China the transition to democracy can also generate various forms of national-
ism due to the striking difference of the southern and northern provinces' dialects which dis-
                                                          
17 According to some estimates, India can reach this level roughly by 2030 (e.g., see NIC 2012: 15). 
18 In the 2000s, Assam, Manipur, Nagaland were the most volatile states in North-East India (Likhachev 2011). 
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tinguishes Han Chinese from other groups. On the other hand, community traditions are very 
strong in China. 
In short, there are a number of different scenarios for the future of India and China. 
Both countries risk drifting into a political and social crisis which may lead to a collapse. 
Still they have a chance to achieve economic maturity without disastrous consequences. 
But in general, if one estimates the potential of both countries to resist perturbations, In-
dia's chances seem better.  
The demographic aspect. In the following decade, India will most likely catch up 
and overtake China in terms of population number; by that time each of these countries 
will have about 1.4 billion people. Then, India will lead the world in population (see Dia-
gram 3). By 2050, India's population will probably reach 1.7 billion people (or a bit less), 
while in China, even if birth control (the one-child policy) is abolished, population will 
start declining (as forecasted by the UN, as early as in 2030).19 China's population by that 
time will reach 1.3–1.4 billion people (depending on the demographic policy). Conse-
quently, by the second half of the twenty-first century India's population will be 20–30 per 
cent larger than China's. But the most important factor is that the difference in the size of 
economically active population will be much larger: in India it will be 30–40 per cent lar-
ger than in China. However, by that time both countries will face an ageing population 
problem, but China will suffer from it much more (see Table 2 and 3). According to the 
estimates, by 2050 about 30 per cent of China's population will be aged over 60 (United 
Nations 2002), while in India – only 15 per cent (or a bit more).  
Table 2. Population Growth Rates (%) 
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Table 3. Population aged 0–14 years (% of total population) 
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19 Two demographic scenarios, the first of which implies a preserved restriction and the second – its abolition, will 
differ not in the expected maximum of China's population number (in the first case it will not achieve even 1.4 bil-
lion people, in the second one it will slightly exceed the number), but rather in the rate of the population decrease 
(drastic – in the former case and less dramatic in the latter one). Consequently, the size of the working-age popula-
tion in two cases can be very different. 
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Thus, India's main long-term advantage over China is the huge demographic dividend 
which it can benefit for another 30 years, annually engaging in employment millions of 
young people. On the contrary, China will experience increasing labor shortages which 
will raise labor costs. Meanwhile, it will be easier for India to attract foreign capital and 
produce industrial capacities, taking advantage of low wages combined with rather devel-
oped infrastructure and abundance of qualified specialists in different areas. Though, as 
has been said above, such large numbers of potential of workers and urban dwellers 
threaten the country with severe trials. 
Diagram 3. Population projections up to 2100 (the UN average estimates) 
 
Source: Population Division… 2012.  
Meanwhile, by 2030 India will significantly narrow the economic gap with China and by 
2050–2060 it will be able to overtake or even surpass China in terms of GDP. Still China's 
production per capita will be larger, because, as mentioned above, India's population by 
that time will dramatically increase. At present there is a considerable gap in GDP (see 
Diagram 2). 
We have already touched upon the social aspect and resource scarcity. The growing 
shortage of farmland and water resources, and increasing demand for fossil fuel, etc. may 
lead to troubles and crises in both countries. But, given the authorities' growing financial 
resources and increasing living standards, the problems are solvable to a certain extent.    
Conclusion. New Economic Leaders in the World without  
a Leader  
The analysis of the two giant states' development strategies and their potentials argues for 
the fact that in the next decades their role (and that of the developing countries as well) 
will increase, while the influence of the West will diminish. China and India will be cer-
tainly among the world leading economies in terms of GDP, but not always in terms of 
growth rates. As has been said above, China's growth rates will inevitably decelerate 
(among other things this will be caused by demographic problems). In long-term perspec-
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tives, India has more resources to maintain a high growth rate; however, in this respect it 
will be constrained to yield to some fast-growing emerging countries.  
It is easily arguable that we will face several upsurges in the peripheral countries, 
while the current leaders' growth rates will decelerate. Besides, globalization will launch 
a leveling process among developing countries. In other words, new states, currently rep-
resenting an example of poverty and underdevelopment, could occasionally take the lead 
in terms of economic growth rates. Today scholars often speak about (and in the next dec-
ades will constantly discuss) a number of new fast-growing economies, including Viet-
nam, Bangladesh, Turkey, Indonesia, and Nigeria, etc., which already deprive China of 
foreign investments and a part of the export market. In addition to the familiar acronyms 
BRIC and BRICS, many new acronyms appear, formed of combinations of different 
states. The common point for the states included in such combinations is the forecast of 
their fast economic growth (though one can find some states almost in every such a list, 
e.g., Indonesia and Turkey). For example, already in 2005 the Goldman Sachs said about 
‘Next Eleven’20 that this group of rapidly developing middle-tier countries would collec-
tively overtake the EU-27 in global power by 2030 (Wilson and Stupnytska 2007; NIC 
2012; O'Neill et al. 2005). In 2009, Robert Ward coined a new acronym CIVETS (Colom-
bia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey, and South Africa). These countries are favored 
for several reasons, such as ‘a diverse and dynamic economy’ and ‘a young, growing 
population’ (Russell 2010). 
In his article Jack Goldstone (2011) introduced an acronym TIMBI (Turkey, India, 
Mexico, Brazil, and Indonesia). Their combined GDP has already exceeded China's and 
will be growing much faster in the coming decades. The economist Jim O'Neill, who in 
2001 invented the acronym BRIC, a decade later, coined a new one – TIMS – for the four 
fast-growing markets (Turkey, Indonesia, Mexico and South Korea). Of course, it is not 
the matter of more or less suitable acronym or economists' fancy for this game. This phe-
nomenon actually reflects the growing importance of developing countries.   
The analysis of the Indian and Chinese models, as well as those of other successfully 
developing countries, allow speaking about common features of all fast-growing coun-
tries (though with wide divergence of their development models), including the following 
characteristics: 1) state's active economic policy, including public provision for education; 
2) a tendency of high gross domestic savings rate; 3) active FDI and technological flows; 
4) export orientation (with simultaneous tendency for import substitution); 5) exploitation 
of cheap labor; 6) in many cases, aggressive exploration and extraction of mineral re-
sources. Sometimes it is supplemented with country's benefits of diaspora engagement 
(e.g., the Turkish diasporas in Germany) or geographical proximity to a developed state, 
for example, in Mexico, etc.  
Finally, we can conclude that due to all transformations the world will face a funda-
mental reconfiguration. The USA position in the world will weaken at that. But those 
who suppose that another leader, for example China, will supersede the USA are quite 
mistaken. The weakening of the USA hegemony will not lead to the emergence of a new 
leader capable of substituting the USA in a comparable number of functions (Grinin 
                                                          
20 Next Eleven consists of Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, The Philippines, South Ko-
rea, Turkey, and Vietnam. 
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2009a, 2011, 2012a, 2012b; Grinin and Korotayev 2010; see also NIC 2012: IV). Nei-
ther China, nor India will be able to assume the burden of such leadership because of 
economic limits and factors (the problem of poverty, social discontent, etc.), the lack of 
experience and required alliances, as well as the intolerable burden imposed by such 
leadership. So, despite the tendencies, a new absolute world leader will not emerge in 
the next decades. But a number of countries and associations will start dominating  
in different spheres. In short, we will have to live in a new situation and adapt to new 
realities. 
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Energy Impact of Coming Eurasian Union and 
Relations between Russia and Turkey 
 
Tuğçe Varol Sevim 
 
 
Not so long ago Vladimir Putin declared to the world the formation of the Eura-
sian Union of Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus and called all the former Soviet 
states to the Union. Hence, Russia officially announced a regional organization 
that resembles to European Union. Although Russia has Eurasian ideology and 
perspective, Turkey also has projections and ideological infrastructure for the ini-
tiative of Eurasia. It seems that Turkey will be in between of two regional organi-
zations – the European Union to the west and the Eurasian Union to the east. It is 
well-known that Turkey is a long time candidate of the EU, yet the level of rela-
tions with the EU is in a trend of decline and relations with Russia are improving 
every year (including energy and trade areas of cooperation). In the near future, 
could Turkish foreign policy orientation shift to the Eurasian Union? Then, what 
will happen to Turkish and Russian cooperation on the energy issues?  
Keywords: Eurasian Union, Russian Federation, Turkey, energy, pipelines. 
Introduction 
One of the Russian fundamental objectives behind the formation of the Eurasian Union is 
to secure and improve Russian energy strategy in terms of both oil and natural gas. Be-
sides, Russia with Kazakhstan and Belarus announced the establishment of the Eurasian 
Union and called all near abroad states to join the new organization. Following that, during 
the negotiations between Russia and Ukraine on the issue of natural gas prices, Russia of-
ficially declared that if Ukraine joined the Eurasian Union, then they could get supplies at 
the domestic prices as Belarus do (this issue, however, has become irrelevant after the 
2014 Ukrainian Revolution). On the one hand, Russia heads a new giant energy resource 
organization; Turkey is in a position of both consuming and transporting energy resources. 
For instance, Turkey supports the projects of Nabucco (a natural gas pipeline supported by 
the West), TANAP (originally an Azerbaijanian natural gas pipeline) and South Stream 
(the Russian project of natural gas pipeline). It seems that Turkey stands between Western, 
Caspian, and Russian pipeline projects including its own oil pipeline project of the Sam-
sun-Ceyhan which is planned to carry Russian and Kazakh oil from the North to the South 
of the Turkey coast. In this sense, ‘energy’ factor will be the biggest impulse behind the 
Eurasian Union and during Putin's third term, the organization will be on top of the Krem-
lin's agenda. Therefore, as the number of players grows every year, the number of organi-
zations grows too. At this point, the aim of this study is to analyze the energy relations 
between Russia and Turkey by taking into consideration the Eurasian Union and its energy 
impacts.  
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Russian Foreign Energy Policy 
Throughout history every nation tried to use its political leverage, economic relations, mil-
itary capability and other available means in the most effective way to strengthen the na-
tion's position in the international arena, and Russia is no exception. Therefore energy is 
the biggest tool for the Russian foreign policy. After the collapse of the USSR, although 
for Russia the first decade was catastrophic in terms of economics and social development, 
the second decade was a success for the Kremlin as a result of high incomes from energy 
exports. Furthermore, Russia managed to almost double its real GDP during Putin's first 
and second terms before the 2008 global crisis. During the global crisis of 2008–2009, 
Russian economy tested well, albeit economy numbers dropped in that period, and then 
began to improve by 3–6 per cent annually. On the other hand, compared to the economic 
crisis of the 1990s, Russia managed to control social stability in the country (Liuhto 2010).  
Two thirds of Russia's exports consist of oil and gas and a quarter of the country's 
GDP is generated by the energy sector, 10 per cent by Gazprom alone. Approximately 
40 per cent of the budget revenues originate from hydrocarbons (Ibid.). In 2008, Russia's 
oil and gas revenues were approximately 310 billion dollars – 66 per cent of Russia's total 
export revenues (Koyama 2009). Therefore, Russia's GDP has become increasingly de-
pendent on oil and gas revenues (Beck et al. 2007). Putin's own words also underline the 
situation well, ‘energy is, at least today, the most important motive force of world eco-
nomic progress. The present and future prosperity of Russia depends directly on the place 
we occupy in the global energy context’ (cited in Legvold 2008). Smith (2008) thinks that 
Putin has made it clear that Russia intends to use its energy export power to regain Rus-
sia's Cold War influence around the world, and particularly in Central Europe, the Cau-
cuses and Central Asia. 
The energy demands of the world (and competition over energy resources) grow every 
year. China, India, Europe, and the United States are the biggest consumers of hydrocar-
bon resources. It is estimated that up to 2030, these countries will require almost doubling 
of energy imports. Hence, Russia, Central Asia, and the Caspian region are increasingly 
important sources of energy for other countries, particularly in the West (Fredholm 2005). 
For instance, by 2030, gas imports into the EU could rise by another 200 bcm a year, from 
around 300 bcm today. At the same time, the most recent forecasts from the Russian ex-
perts are for an increase in gas exports of some 100 bcm per year by 2030 to all destina-
tions, including the Asian markets (Cleutinx and Piper 2008; Helen 2010). 
The Russian energy strategy aims at strengthening Russia's position in the global en-
ergy market and at maximizing the efficiency of the export possibilities of the Russian 
energy sector with the best prices. In order to implement this strategy, Russia uses its 
unique geopolitical location. In other words, the energy factor is a fundamental constituent 
of the Russian diplomacy (Fredholm 2005). An important aim of the Russian foreign en-
ergy policy is to establish common energy area among the CIS states. Initially, the goal is 
to strengthen, promote, and improve the integration of the common fuel and energy system 
for the benefits of its participants (Ibid.).  
According to Kremlin, energy is a natural monopoly to be kept under state control. In 
order to fulfill this ambition, the Russian state works through some major companies such 
as Gazprom, Transneft, UES (Unified Energy Systems of Russia) (Fredholm 2005), and 
Lukoil. In order to increase control over oil production, the government controls Russia's 
oil and refined product pipelines, through the state-controlled company Transneft. This 
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monopoly gives the Russian government a leverage against Russian private companies, 
foreign investors and foreign countries, if needed (Woehrel 2009). Russian energy diplo-
macy is becoming increasingly active as the Russian government and Russian companies 
are seeking to alter the basis of existing relationships and develop new relationships on the 
basis of protecting relatively vaguely defined Russian national interests (Monaghan 2007).  
In prevailing conditions, with the Caspian states becoming increasingly dependent on 
foreign capital, particularly American capital, and Russia's own financial means remaining 
limited, Russian goals have been threefold: first, to insist on the priority use by these states 
of the export infrastructure that Russia already has in place; second, to promote Russian 
oil and gas companies and help them to obtain the maximum shares possible in available 
projects; and third, to try to use a variety of instruments to block projects that do not pro-
mote Russia's perceived interests (Allison 2004). The strategic goals of Russia's foreign 
energy policy described below are based on two assumptions: 1) Russia's inherited desire 
to regain leverage in the post-Soviet space in order to become a great power; and 2) a pos-
sible rise of Russia's neighbor, China, into the world's leading economic power in the 
forthcoming decades (Liuhto 2010). 
Dmitri Trenin (2008) asks the question, ‘Should one worry about Russia as an energy 
superpower?’ and gives the negative answer because according to Trenin, Russia's energy 
policy is much more about seeking profits than about establishing political domination. 
Furthermore, Saunders (2008) claims that Russia's energy wealth and power will encour-
age broader assertiveness in Moscow's foreign policy to the detriment of U.S. and Euro-
pean interests. Another argument is that the contemporary Russian energy policy is no 
longer a choice between staying West or going East; a combination of (geo)-political-
economic considerations has resulted in a multidimensional policy (Shadrina 2010). Re-
gionally, Russia seeks to move from ‘good‐neighborly’ to ‘friendly’ relations with the 
former Soviet republics, and then to ‘strategic partnerships and alliances’ with those who 
wish it (Petro 2011). A decade ago Hill (2002) advocated the idea of Russia as an emerg-
ing energy power and even an energy superpower in the next 20 years. With the third 
Presidential term of Putin, Russia entered the second decade of Hill's perception. 
Custom Union аnd Expansion оf Eurasian Union 
The Economic Union Treaty was signed in 1993 to encourage economic integration 
among the members (Obydenkova 2011) and the Customs Union initiative started in 1994 
that would entail free trade between Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Kyrgyzstan, with 
Tajikistan joining in 1999 (Sakwa 2008). According to the first agreement signed between 
the parties, an economic union would be established following the formation of a multilat-
eral free trade association, a customs union, a common market and a currency union 
(Shadikhodjaev 2009). Moreover, in 1999 five countries agreed on the Treaty of the Cus-
toms Union and Single Economic Space. When Vladimir Putin came to power, he initiated 
the idea of a new economic structure, which is called EurAsEC created by the five CIS 
Customs Union members in October 2000, and went into effect in April 2001 (Nygren 
2008). The Customs Union of the Republic of Belarus, the Russian Federation and the 
Republic of Kazakhstan is an integrated customs area that forms a part of the Eurasian 
Economic Community and came into effect on January 1, 2010. It has a population of 
more than 165 million, a total GDP of $2 trillion and a goods turnover of $900 billion 
(Krotov 2012). Custom barriers were lifted for cross-border trade among the three states in 
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July 2011. Since January 2012, the Customs Union turned into a Common Economic 
Space in which questions over the rules on competition, transportation, agricultural subsi-
dies and visa and migration policy started to be jointly regulated by the member states 
(Halbach 2012). 
In terms of the energy relations between Russia and Belarus, Russia is the main hy-
drocarbon supplier of Minsk, while Belarus is one of the transit states of Russian hydro-
carbon supplies. Many years, Russia actually supplied natural gas to Belarus at lower pric-
es which helped the Belarus leader to keep his popularity and a reasonable standard of liv-
ing. In other words, gas from Russia is not only vital for country's economic growth but 
also for political stability (Bruce 2005). While a share of Russian gas in energy consump-
tion of Belarus economy is about 75–80 per cent, Belarus has a capacity of 13–15 per cent 
to fulfill its energy need by its own reserves (Manenok 2010). And Belarus transits of Rus-
sian oil and gas supply to Europe amount about 20 per cent and constitute 30 per cent of 
all the transits respectively. Due to Gazprom's ambition to buy the Belarus gas distribution 
company Beltransgaz, Russia attempted to buy assets of Beltransgaz in September 1993. 
The Russian side offered to double its gas deliveries to Belarus by 2000 and in return 
transfer Beltransgaz to Gazprom control for 99 years (Bruce 2005). Although the agree-
ment was signed between Beltransgaz and Gazprom, the agreement was not ratified by the 
Belarusian parliament. Afterwards, as a result of the swelling debt of Minsk, Gazprom 
increased pressure on Belarus to pay its overdue payments that Belarus refused to pay. 
Therefore, Russia reduced gas supplies to Belarus twice (1997 and 1998) and demanded 
cash payment instead of barter (Götz 2007). Lukashenko refused to privatize Beltransgaz, 
because he was heavily dependent on profits from the gas sector for his political livelihood 
(Zaitseva 2005).  
During Putin's second term, at the end of March 2006, right after the presidential elec-
tions that confirmed Lukashenko in office for another 5 years, Gazprom announced that it 
would raise the gas prices starting from 2007 according to the market prices (PONTIS 
2007). At the first stage of the negotiations, Gazprom claimed that Belarus should pay 
$200, but then lowered the price down to around $100. Still, Belarus insisted that this 
would be a violation of the Customs Union Agreement, according to which Belarus should 
receive gas at Russian domestic prices (Yafimava and Stern 2007). Finally Belarus agreed 
to pay US$ 100 in 2007 that doubles the previous price. 
Table 1. Gas prices paid by Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus in 2006–2007 (in $/tcm) 
(Gromadzki and Kononczuk 2007) 
 2005 2006 2007 
Ukraine 50 95 130 
Moldova 80 110–160 170 
Belarus 47 47 100 
Additionally, Belarus received stabilization loans amounting to US$ 1.5 billion from Rus-
sia to offset increased energy costs (Dura 2008). Another crisis between Russia and Bela-
rus in June 2010 once again revealed the subject of the debt payments (Yafimava 2010). 
Finally, in July 2010, Beltransgaz and Gazprom agreed on the prices and payment sched-
ules. While stepping towards the integration with Russia and Kazakhstan, Minsk began to 
get rewards from Moscow. For instance, in the middle of 2011, it was announced that Bel-
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arus would get $3–3.5 billion from the EurAsEC anti-crisis fund.1 Moreover at the end of 
2011, Belarus and Russia agreed on 2012–2014 gas contracts. According to the new con-
tract, Belarus will pay $164 per 1000 cubic meter for Russian gas in the first quarter of 
2012 compared with an average price of $400 paid by European countries. The deal also 
included the increase of Gazprom's stake in Beltransgaz from 50 to 100 per cent. As a re-
sult, Belarus won the cheap price for its budget and gave up its income from Belarus gas 
market.2 
Kazakhstan is a landlocked country and has common borders with Russia, China, Uz-
bekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan. At the beginning of its independence, Kazakh-
stan declared ‘multivectoral’ foreign policy, which means a willingness to develop and 
improve strategic, diplomatic and economic relations with major geopolitical powers, 
namely China, Russia, the United States, and Europe. However, multivectoral foreign pol-
icy of Kazakhstan turned into ‘bilateralism’ as seen in the process of proximity between 
Russia and Kazakhstan in recent years (Wood 2008). Since independence Russia has re-
mained Kazakhstan's most important economic partner, especially for Kazakh energy ex-
port, which is still heavily dependent on Russian controlled pipelines constructed during 
the Soviet period (Weitz 2008). In 2005, the President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazar-
bayev outlined his foreign policy priority in the following way: ‘…we have a choice be-
tween remaining the supplier of raw materials to the global markets and waiting patiently 
for the emergence of the next imperial master or to pursue genuine economic integration 
of the Central Asia region. I choose the latter’ (Blank 2005). Few years later, during the 
Second Astana Forum in March 2009, Nazarbayev said that the integration process should 
continue under the aegis of the Customs Union (Vinokurov 2010).  
Kazakhstan has the Caspian Sea region's largest recoverable crude oil reserves and its 
production reached to 81.b m/t in 2010 (BP 2011). Kazakhstan's growing petroleum indus-
try accounts for roughly 30 per cent of the country's GDP and over half of its export reve-
nues (Barry 2009). Although Kazakhstan consumes slightly more than it produces, domes-
tic consumption has been increasing at 9.5 per cent per year in the last decade compared 
with production growth of 22 per cent per year. Natural gas production of Kazakhstan was 
33.5 bcm in 2010 and almost 12 bcm was exported to Russia (BP 2011). According to 
EIA, Kazakhstan is shifting from being a net natural gas importer to becoming a net ex-
porter within the next few years (EIA 2009). KazRosGaz will actually determine the en-
ergy relations between Russia and Kazakhstan. Gazprom and KazMunaiGaz formed Kaz-
RosGaz joint venture in June 2002 aiming to buy and sell gas and process it at Russia's gas 
treatment facilities. As a result of the process of the Customs Union, Kazakhstan expects 
large Russian investments into Kazakh gas fields and an increase in gas production. For 
that reason, Russia and Kazakhstan signed an intergovernmental agreement on the joint 
geological survey and exploration of the Imoslevsky gas condensate field.3 
In terms of political expansion, the Eurasian Union will increase Russia's weight in the 
world political arena in order to become a superpower again or at least manage to voice 
multipolar system. In this respect, according to Putin's first proposal, target countries are 
                                                          
1 Ria Novosti. Belarus to Get $3 bln loan from EurAsEC – Premier. May 19, 2011. URL: http://en.rian.ru/business/ 
20110519/164117956.html. 
2 Ria Novosti. Lukashenko Says Beltransgaz Sale to Gazprom ‘Very Profitable’. December 23, 2011. URL: http:// 
en.rian.ru/world/20111223/170444388.html. 
3 Gazeta.Kz. Gazprom Increases Gas Exports to Kazakhstan by 10% in 2011. January 19, 2012. URL: 
http://engarticles.gazeta.kz/art.asp?aid=356030. 
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Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan which are small and economically weak countries of the CIS. 
Esengul (2012) thinks that they will support the scheme not only because their societies 
are loyal toward Russia and Russians, but also because their economy and security depend 
on Russia. It is no secret, that the EurAsEC will be the economic pillar of the Eurasian 
Union. For that reason, it was announced that the preparations to sign the agreement on the 
Eurasian Economic Union, composed of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan, must be completed by January 1, 2013.4 In other words, economic cooperation 
between the post-Soviet states has started to gain momentum, although in different forms 
and in varying combinations of its participants. Within this context, the intention of Rus-
sia, Kazakhstan and Belarus to move to the next stage of economic integration and to es-
tablish a full-scale economic union by 2015 constitutes an important part of this process 
(Chufrin 2012). 
In this context, Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and 
Georgia will be the target countries for the second wave of expansion of the Russian influ-
ence. Although it is known that most of the CIS countries have certain limits of interest to 
become a member of the Eurasian (Economic) Union (Hoffmann 2012), Ukraine is 
a significant target country for Russia. In the Ukrainian case, Russia employs the gas prices 
in order to convince Kiev to become a member of the Customs Union. While Ukraine com-
plains about high gas prices, Russia responses that, ‘if you become a member of the Customs 
Union like Belarus, you can get natural gas at the domestic prices’ (Olearchyk 2011). Gas 
prices are significant for Ukrainian problematic economy and before the 2014 Revolution 
Ukraine even considered joining the Eurasian Economic Union rather than the Eurasian Un-
ion (in a short term this resembles the Turkish case in the European Union at some points).  
On the other hand, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan do not display an interest in the idea 
of the Eurasian Union. The President of Uzbekistan Karimov has stated that Moscow's 
strategies of integration represent no more than a return to a disguised Russian imperialism 
and that his country had no need for integration with ‘a political flavor’ (Laurelle 2012). 
Turkmenistan also aims to be the Switzerland of Central Asia and attempts to stay away 
from a regional organization that required strict loyalty. And Azerbaijan is the only coun-
try that has access to western markets and that has broken the monopoly of Russian pipe-
line system. Therefore, it is likely that Azerbaijan will resist the political expansion of the 
Eurasian Union. Nevertheless, Armenia, Moldova, South Ossetia and Abkhazia are 
the weakest links of the CIS region. South Ossetia and Abkhazia might consider joining 
such an organization in order to gain international recognition that would divide Georgia 
and redraw the Caucasian map. Moreover, Armenia is highly dependent on Russian energy 
resources and geographically isolated. Instead, Russia might be unwilling to disrupt Azer-
baijan-Russian relations with the early membership of Armenia. And finally Moldova (that 
is an important country for the transmission of Russian energy supplies) has domestic 
problems with its Transnistria region. If Moldova resists Russian foreign policy or energy 
policy interests, the Kremlin might provoke Transnistria to join the Customs Union or the 
Eurasian Union afterwards. Still, the range of expansion is not clear, because so far there 
are no criteria or obligations for membership modified by the founders of the Customs 
Union. Most probably, President Putin will determine expansion according to the Russian 
national interests.  
                                                          
4 Ria Novosti. Putin Says Deal on Eurasian Economic Union Must be Ready by 2013. May 19, 2011. URL: 
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20110519/164123753.html. 
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Russia-Turkey Energy Relations 
After the end of the Cold War, Turkey has improved its geopolitical importance in terms of 
energy politics as a result of new pipelines either constructed for Turkish demand or passing 
through Turkish lands to reach world markets (Tekin and Walterova 2007). Therefore, par-
ticularly after the construction of the Blue Stream natural gas pipeline, Turkish demand for 
natural gas increased, and as a result Turkish economy revealed as a consumer, transporter 
and producer in terms of hydrocarbon supplies. According to the EIA results, Turkey is one 
of the fastest growing energy economies of the world and it is expected by the Turkish Min-
istry of Energy and Natural Resources that energy demand of Turkey will double in 15 years 
(Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009: 1). The latest Deloitte report about the Turkish 
natural gas market (published in March 2012) also marks the urgent need of gas for Turkey's 
economy in short term due to the Turkish economic growth. 
Graph 1. Demand and Supply Projection of Turkey (Deloitte 2012) 
 
Although Turkey is highly dependent on energy exports, it is also considered as a ‘natural 
bridge’ between Central Asia, the Caucasus and Europe. For instance, concerning the oil 
transportation, according to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 3.7 per cent of the 
world's daily oil consumption is shipped through the Turkish straits (Baykal 2009). Ac-
cording to the Turkish Energy Strategy Paper 2012–2013 published by Turkish Ministry of 
Energy, the Turkey aims at accomplishing several objectives which are boasting supply 
security and Turkey's influence in regional and global energy markets, protecting the envi-
ronment, making greater use of domestic resources and restructuring the legal-institutional 
infrastructure of the national energy market (Kardas 2010). In terms of energy politics, the 
Russian Federation is Turkey's main partner for many years, because Turkey is dependent 
not only on Russian natural gas for about 50 per cent, but also on Russian oil for about 
35 per cent. Other than that Turkey is part of the gas pipeline projects aimed at bypassing 
the Russian monopoly pipeline system in order to reach the Caspian or Middle East re-
serves. Besides, Turkey has its own oil pipeline project aimed at transporting Russian and 
Kazakh oil from the Black Sea Cost to the Mediterranean Cost of Turkey. 
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Table 2. Oil and Natural Gas Pipeline Projects Related to Turkey (Sevim Varol 
2011) 
Project Type 
Meas-
ure/an
nually 
Countries Route 
Esti-
mated 
Date 
Cost 
South 
Stream 
Natural 
Gas 
63 bcm Gazprom-
Russia, ENI-
Italy 
Total route is 
2.000 km including 
900 km subsea route 
of Black Sea. Bul-
garia, Serbia, Hun-
gary and Austria, 
Slovenia, Italy 
2015 €12.8 
billion 
Nabucco Natural 
Gas 
31 bcm BEH-Bulgaria, 
BOTAŞ-
Turkey, MOL-
Hungary, OMV-
Austria, RWE-
Germany, 
Transgaz-
Romania 
Total is 3.300. After 
passing through 
Turkey enters or-
derly Bulgaria, Ro-
mania, Hungary and 
Austria. 
 
 
 
2018 €7.9 
billion 
TANAP Natural 
Gas 
16– 
24 bcm 
Azerbaijan, 
Turkey  
Total route 2.000 
km 
2017 €5–8 
billion 
Burgas-
Alexan-
droupolis  
Oil 35– 
50 m/t 
 
Russia, Bul-
garia, Greece 
280 km 2014–
2015 
€1 bil-
lion 
Samsun-
Ceyhan 
Oil 50– 
70 m/t 
25–30 
m/t 
Russia, 
Turkey 
Pipeline will reach 
Ceyhan port in 
Mediterranean coast 
of Turkey after 
passing through the 
Black Sea and en-
ters from Samsun 
port. 
2015 US$ 5.6 
billion 
 
At the end of 2011, there were two developments regarding Russia-Turkey energy rela-
tions. First, Turkey and Azerbaijan signed a new agreement on the natural gas pipeline 
TANAP whose capacity will be 16–24 bcm. By signing that deal both Turkish and Azeri 
sides suspended the Nabucco pipeline project and structured a new rival project against 
Russia's South Stream gas pipeline. Western countries support Turkey as an alternative 
route from the Caspian Sea to create competition to Gazprom and Russia. Furthermore, 
some Caspian producers also perceive Turkey as a better transit country for their exports. 
This fuels the rivalry between Russia and Turkey in the energy field and forces Russia to 
take into consideration the importance of Turkey in the geopolitics of the region (Tekin 
and Walterova 2007). Secondly, few days after the signature of TANAP, Turkey con-
firmed the official permission for the construction of South Stream pipeline project. Not 
long ago Nabucco and South Stream seemed to rival to each other. According to some 
Western and Russian analysts, now TANAP and South Stream seem to be new competi-
tors for the European energy market and Turkey is in the middle of this competition. With 
the advent of TANAP project there had been raised questions, especially in the West, 
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about the possibility of implementation of the Nabucco project. The answer was found 
when Nabucco Company announced that it had changed its name to Nabucco West that 
would bring Caspian gas from the Bulgarian-Turkish border to Baumgarten and beyond.5 
Although its name is still ‘Nabucco’, one thing is certain, and it is that Turkey is out of 
Nabucco. Furthermore, in the middle of 2013, the Nabucco Company was abolished and 
withdrew from the energy game.  
Another important aspect of Russian-Turkish energy relations is the Samsun-Ceyhan 
oil pipeline planned to carry crude oil between the Black Sea oil terminal in Samsun and 
Mediterranean oil terminal in Ceyhan/Turkey. The 550-km pipeline has a normal capacity 
of 1.5 mil/bbl/d (Popovici 2009). The aim of this project is to provide an alternative route 
for Russian and Kazakh oil and also ease the traffic burden of the Bosporus and the Dar-
danelles. It is expected that the Russian oil production will reach 11.5 m/bbl per day by 
2030, regarding that the Russian consumption anticipated to grow more slowly than pro-
duction, export capacity would eventually increase (Roberts 2007). At this point, how will 
these oil output reach markets, regarding that the Turkish straits are limited? It is well 
known that the Kremlin supported the idea of the Burgas-Alexandroupolis Pipeline (BAP) 
to bypass the Turkish straits, then how Russian energy strategy changed towards to de-
pendence on Turkish lands for the Russian oil export instead of the BAP option? In this 
context, Russia chose to support the Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline project in exchange for the 
Turkish support of South Stream. It is a geopolitical opportunity to accomplish a historical 
project for the Turkish foreign policy and economy. During St. Petersburg Economic Fo-
rum in June 2011, the Russian deputy Energy Minister told that Russia remained commit-
ted to the BAP; and then Energy Minister Sergei Shmatko stated that ‘today within the 
sidelines of the talks we are holding, there is no chance for development on the project. 
Being aware about the position of the current Bulgarian government we do not expect any 
progress’ (Kennedy 2011). However, it is clear that the BAP is still on the agenda of the 
Russian administration, because Russia has reiterated its determination to construct the 
Burgas-Alexandroupolis oil pipeline and reduce the price tag of the project, following 
Bulgaria's withdrawal (Balkans 2012). 
No doubt that the Russian main target is to accomplish the South Stream gas pipeline 
project and avoid or at least suspend other rival projects. Thus, Russia will increase its 
dominant status over the European gas market and guarantee its energy export income, 
which is vital for its energy export-oriented economy. In order to achieve this goal, Russia 
must guarantee to purchase Central Asian gas import to Gazprom due to reason that Rus-
sian own natural gas production capacity is not sufficient to fulfill its export requirements. 
At first stage, Russia will expand the Customs Union by the membership of Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan and will pressure Uzbekistan to join the Union. Under these circumstances, 
Russia will increase its great power status in the region and will keep foreign energy poli-
cies of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan harmonious to Russian national interests. At the sec-
ond stage, Russia shall effort to guarantee gas market of Europe by increasing its market 
representation in the energy sector of Europe. For instance, Gazprom announced its inten-
tion to purchase Greece's DEPA (the state owned gas company) in 2012 (Bouras 2012). 
Moreover, Bulgaria is also highly dependent on Russian energy resources that withdrew 
from the BAP, but not from South Stream. Hence, Russia tried to avoid or suspend 
TANAP's efforts to reach South European markets before South Stream by increasing its 
                                                          
5 See http://www.nabucco-pipeline.com/portal/page/portal/en. 
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market representation and decision-making role in the region. And if TANAP would not 
find a market to sell its gas until 2017, Azerbaijan might consider selling its whole surplus 
gas to Russian Gazprom instead of Europe (UPI 2012). As a result, Russia forced Azerbai-
jan to choose the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) in Southern Europe and leave Central Eu-
rope gas market to Gazprom. In 2013, Azerbaijan declared that consortium members had 
selected the TAP for TANAP and had suspended the TANAP-South Stream pipeline ri-
valry for a while. In order to guarantee South Stream gas supply, Russia will definitely 
need Central Asian gas resources in the near future. Therefore, it is expected that Russia 
will employ Central Asian gas (prospect Eurasian Union members) to surround Europe 
and Turkey and will try to control Azerbaijan gas routes.  
The creation of the Eurasian Union will form a giant ‘Energy Union’ in the north and 
east of Turkey with the advantages of determining routes and prices as well. First of all, 
Turkey is highly dependent on export of oil and natural gas and pays high bills every year 
from its budget. The main aim of Turkey (and the European countries as well) is to pro-
vide reliable and cheap energy resources. However, the advent of such a union will pro-
vide a great advantage to the Kremlin in order to determine prices and impose foreign pol-
icy actions. The main question is whether Russia will offer Turkey to become a member of 
the Customs Union and receive cheap gas on terms of Turkish withdrawal from the Euro-
pean Customs Union. It is not so easy to answer it but it is worth considering. Europe is 
a significant export and import market for the Turkish economy; however the latter needs 
much more gas with its current economic growth rates that means high natural gas bills 
annually. In addition, Russia and vast Eurasia promises a new market for the Turkish 
economy. It is possible that as long as Turkish membership of the European Union is de-
layed, Turkey will be much more close to Russia and Eurasia. The fact that Turkey was 
accepted as a ‘dialog partner’ into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization well exempli-
fies this proximity approach. 
Conclusion 
Since the formation of the Russian Federation from the heritages of the Soviet Union, en-
ergy resources turned out to be the main pillars of the Russia foreign policy due to energy 
export income for the budget. Therefore, in order to sustain its dominance over energy 
pipelines, Russia focused on keeping its ‘Near Abroad’ close to Russian politics by means 
of new regional organizations. The Eurasian Union is the latest version of a regional or-
ganization in this part of the world that has the capacity to accelerate the energy groupings 
as well. One of the main questions is whether Russia aims at creating a respective energy 
grouping. In this sense, evidence of many centuries demonstrates that Russia cannot sur-
vive without creating an influence area. But this time, Russia looks for creating economic 
and diplomatic dependency of the ‘Near Abroad’ states on Moscow, instead of sending 
troops to these regions.  
Inherently, Russia aims at strengthening, promoting and improving the integration of 
common energy system by signing long-term supply contracts, exploration and production 
contracts and buying assets of energy companies of these countries. Within such a sce-
nario, Russia would probably reveal itself as an energy superpower of the world which is 
capable of influencing both Asia and Europe through the ways of pipelines. In this context, 
Turkey will definitely be affected by the developments of the Eurasian Union in the re-
gion. Integration of Belarus and Kazakhstan with Russia under the umbrella of the Cus-
toms Union and its growing influence area is significant for the Turkish foreign policy, 
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because Turkey is highly dependent on Russian hydrocarbon reserves and pays consider-
able prices every year. Moreover, according to some reports, Turkey's natural gas and oil 
consumption will grow, yet Ankara could not manage to sign a supply contract in order to 
satisfy short-term requirements. Due to the geographic location of Turkey, the list of oil 
and natural supplier countries is restricted to a few countries such as Azerbaijan, Iran and 
Iraq. As long as Russia has a significant role in Turkish energy requirements, Turkey 
should accurately observe the evaluation of the Eurasian Union.  
The period of 2012–2013 was a time of competition between South Stream and 
TANAP natural gas pipelines and between Samsun-Ceyhan and Burgas-Alexandroupolis 
oil pipelines. However, the rivalry between these two pipelines was not terminated. As, on 
the one hand, Turkey is highly dependent on Russian energy supply and wants to construct 
a new oil pipeline that would tighten energy relations between Russia and Kazakhstan. 
And, on the other hand, Turkey wants to establish the TANAP gas pipeline with Azerbai-
jan that would diminish the importance of South Stream and prevent the expansion of the 
Eurasian Union to the Caspian region. It seems like a chess game that both Ankara and 
Moscow should play inevitably. It is expected that Russian and Turkish energy coopera-
tion in the region will continue, because it is too risky for Turkey to stand as a challenger 
against the Russian energy projects.  
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As we look forward into the mid-twenty-first century, the demographers forecast 
dramatic increases in cultural diversity in the general population of the globe, 
which will also be reflected in increasing ageing populations. Globalization is  
a complex phenomenon which includes increasing human interconnectedness fa-
cilitated by new information technologies and huge volumes of trade, capital, 
people, and cultures flowing across national borders, and an evermore inte-
grated global economy. Globalization can be experienced as structural forces 
impinging on our daily lives, as the creation of new spaces and interconnection 
between locales and also as ideological resources (Chen and Powell 2012). 
A key issue is the relationship between globalization and population ageing 
which has possibilities and consequences for social change across the globe. 
Keywords: population ageing, globalization, economic crisis, health. 
Introduction 
Population ageing is considered to be an important aspect in this age of globalization as it 
has huge impacts on diverse areas of our daily life. Past literature has highlighted the im-
pact of ageing on various levels at societal and economic of a country, however, little is 
known about the interconnectedness between the ageing and globalization. This paper 
therefore aims at providing an exploratory investigation on the linkages between global-
ization and ageing of population across the world.  
Discussion on Ageing and Globalization 
While the highest proportions of older people are currently found in more developed coun-
tries, the most rapid growth of this age group is actually occurring in the less developed 
world (McDaniel and Zimmer 2013). Between 2006 and 2030, the increasing number of 
older people in less developed countries is projected to grow by 140 per cent as compared 
to an increase of 51 per cent in more developed countries (Krug 2002). A key feature of 
population ageing is the progressive ageing of the older population itself. Over time, more 
older people survive to even more advanced ages (Chen and Powell 2012). The forecast 
rise in the number of older people aged 75+ over the next two decades will lead to an ex-
pansion of demand for health, housing accommodation and pensions for ageing popula-
tions and is thus of crucial importance for governments, policy makers, planners, and re-
searchers in all nation states (McDaniel and Zimmer 2013). On a global scale, the popula-
tion aged 85 and over is projected to increase by 151 per cent between 2005 and 2030, 
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compared to a 104 per cent increase for the population aged 65 and over and a 21 per cent 
increase for the population under 65 (Bengston and Lowenstein 2004). The most striking 
increase will occur in Japan: by 2030, nearly 24 per cent of all older Japanese are expected 
to be at least 85 years old. As life expectancy increases and people aged 85 and over in-
crease in number, four-generation families may become more common (Chen and Powell 
2012). 
In advanced capitalist or First World countries fertility decline that started in the early 
1900s have resulted in current fertility levels below the population replacement rate of two 
live births per woman. Perhaps, the most surprising demographic development of the past 
two decades has been the pace of fertility decline in many less developed countries (Gid-
dens 1993). In 2006, for example, the total fertility rate (TFR) was at or below the re-
placement rate in 44 less developed countries (Cook and Powell 2007). Most of the more 
developed nations have had decades to adjust to this change in age structure. For example, 
it took more than a century for France's population aged 65 and over to increase from 7 per 
cent to 14 per cent of the total population. In contrast, many less developed or Third World 
countries are experiencing rapid increases in the number and percentage of older people, 
often within a single generation. The same demographic ageing process that unfolded over 
more than a century in France will occur in two decades in Brazil (OECD 2007). In re-
sponse to this compression of ageing, institutions must adapt quickly to accommodate 
a new age structure. Some less developed nations will be forced to confront issues, such as 
social support and the allocation of resources across generations, without accompanying 
economic growth that characterized the experience of ageing societies in the West. In 
other words, some countries ‘may grow old before they grow rich’ (Cook and Powell 
2010: 77).  
Globalization has also produced a distinctive stage in the social history of population 
ageing, with a growing tension between nation state-based solutions (and anxieties) about 
growing old and those formulated by global institutions (Heshmati and Lee 2010). Global-
ization, defined here as the process, whereby nation-states are influenced (and sometimes 
undermined) by transnational actors (Powell 2005), has become an influential force in 
shaping responses to population ageing. Growing old has itself become relocated within 
a transnational context with international organizations (such as the World Bank and In-
ternational Monetary Fund) and cross-border migrations, creating new conditions and en-
vironments for older people (Phillipson 2003).  
Ageing can no longer be viewed just as a ‘national’ problem but the one that affects 
transnational agencies and communities. Local or national interpretations of ageing had 
some meaning in the world where states were in control of their own destiny (Estes et al. 
2003). They also carried force where social policies were being designed with the aim or 
aspiration of levelling inequalities, and where citizenship was still largely a national affair 
(and where there was some degree of confidence over what constituted ‘national borders’). 
The crisis affecting each of these areas, largely set in motion by different aspects of glob-
alization, is now posing acute challenges for understanding ‘global ageing’ in the twenty-
first century.  
If these examples illustrate the complexity and impact of global ageing – then, it may 
be pertinent to highlight how globalization is impacting more specifically across different 
continents around the world.  
Since the turn of the last century, the life expectancy of people born in North America 
has increased by approximately 25 years and the proportion of persons 65 years or older 
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has increased from 4 per cent to over 13 per cent (Estes and Associates 2001). By 2030, 
one in five individuals in the USA is expected to be 65 years or older and people aged 
85 and older make up the fastest growing segment of the population. In 2000, there were 
34 million people aged 65 or older in the United States that represented 13 per cent of the 
overall population (Estes and Associates 2001). By 2030, there will be 70 million people 
over 65 in the United States, more than twice their number in 2000. 31 million people, or 
12 per cent of the total population, are aged 65 and older. In another 35 years, the elderly 
population should double again. The ageing population is not only growing rapidly, but it 
is also getting older:  
In 1990, less than one in ten elderly persons was age 85 or older. By 2045, the oldest old 
will be one in five. Increasing longevity and the steady movement of baby boomers into 
the oldest age group will drive this trend (Longino 1994: 856). 
The percentage of the oldest old will vary considerably from country to country.  
In the United States, for example, the oldest old accounted for 14 per cent of all older people 
in 2005. By 2030, this percentage is unlikely to change because the ageing baby boom 
generation will continue to enter the ranks of the 65-and-over population (Bengston and 
Lowenstein 2004). This is obviously causing much concern among policy-makers but 
Longino (1994), for instance, believes that thanks to better health care service, changing 
living arrangements and improved assistive devices, the future may not be as negative as 
we think when we consider an ageing population. Ageing is, therefore, seen as a triumph 
of the twenty-first century (UNFPA 2012). 
Estimates suggest that there is an increasing trend of share portion of older people 
(60+ years) globally (UNFPA 2012; McDaniel and Zimmer 2013) and a significant varia-
tion exists between developed and developing countries in terms of responding policy ac-
tions to emerging issues particularly in bearing the cost of care for the elderly persons 
(Khan et al. 2013). In many countries of the world the progress of solving global ageing 
issues has become slower or somehow impossible due to the 2008–2012 global financial 
crises. Recent study shows that the global economic crisis has exacerbated the financial 
pressure in every country to ensure both the economic security and the access to health 
care in old age (UNFPA 2012). 
It will be different, however, not least because people currently divorced constitute 
a small proportion of older populations. This will soon change in many countries as younger 
populations with higher divorce and separation rates age. In the United States, for example,  
nine per cent of the 65-and-over population is divorced or separated compared to 17 per cent 
of people aged 55 to 64 and 18 per cent of people aged 45 to 54 (Manton and Gu 2001). This 
trend has gender-specific implications: in all probability non-married women are less likely 
than non-married men to have accumulated assets and pension wealth for use in older age, 
while older men are less likely to form and maintain supportive social networks. 
Shoring up public pensions is hardly the only path the nations of North and South 
America are exploring. In many countries, privately managed saving accounts have been 
strongly advocated (Estes and Associates 2001). Two decades ago, nearly every South 
American nation had pay-as-you-go systems similar to the U.S. Social Security system. 
Some granted civil servants retiring in their 50s full salaries for life. Widening budget 
deficits changed that. In 1981, Chile replaced its public system with retirement accounts 
funded by worker contributions and managed by private firms. The World Bank encour-
aged 11 other Latin nations to introduce similar features. For example, in Chile the gov-
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ernment addressed its fiscal budget deficit by mobilizing $49 billion of pension-fund as-
sets that make it easier for companies and corporations to fund investments in the local 
currency with bond offerings, and most workers have some retirement benefits from this 
(OECD 2007). At the same time, the downside has been those people who cannot afford  
a private pension and have been left to a low state pension which has intensified poverty 
(Estes and Associates 2001); an enduring feature of all nation states in America. For the 
future, there is no safety guarantee that private pension schemes are protected and pay out 
for people who invest their savings in such provision. In the deregulated U.S. pension sys-
tem, the issue of corporate crime has highlighted the continuing problem of private pen-
sion provision. For example, it can be clearly seen with the energy corporation of Enron's 
embezzlement of billions of dollars of employees private pension schemes (Powell 2005). 
This debate amounts to a significant global discourse about pension provision and retire-
ment ages, but one which has largely excluded perspectives which might suggest an 
enlarged role for the state, and those which might question the stability and cost effective-
ness of private schemes. The International Labour Organization (ILO) concluded that in-
vesting in financial markets is an uncertain and volatile business: that under present pen-
sion plans people may save up to 30 per cent more than they need, which would reduce 
their spending during their working life; or they may save 30 per cent too little – which 
would severely cut their spending in retirement (Phillipson 1998; Estes et. al. 2003). 
Holtzman (1997), in a paper outlining a World Bank perspective on pension reform, 
has argued for reducing state pay-as-you-go (PAYG) schemes to a minimal role of basic 
pension provision. This position has influenced both national governments and transna-
tional bodies, such as the International Labour Organization (ILO), with the latter now 
conceding to the World Bank's position with their advocacy of a mean-tested first pension, 
the promotion of an extended role for individualized and capitalized private pensions, and 
the call for Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) member 
countries to raise the age of retirement. 
There is also the impact of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) on the pension de-
bate in South America. Such arguments are to create a climate of fear, inevitability and sci-
entific certainty that public pension provision will fail. In so far as this strategy succeeds, it 
creates a self-fulfilling prophecy. If people believe the ‘experts’ who say publicly sponsored 
PAYG systems cannot be sustained, they are more likely to act in ways that mean they are 
unsustainable in practice. Certainly, in Europe and elsewhere, the state pension is an ex-
tremely popular institution. To have it removed or curtailed creates massive opposition. Only 
by demoralizing the population with the belief that it is demographically unsustainable has 
room for the private financiers been created and a mass pensions market formed. 
Increasingly, the social infrastructure of welfare states is being targeted as a major 
area of opportunity for global investors. The World Bank has expressed the belief that the 
public sector is less efficient in managing new infrastructure activities and that the time 
has come for private actors to provide what were once assumed to be public services. This 
view has been strongly endorsed by a variety of multinational companies, especially in 
their work with the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The WTO enforces more than 
twenty separate international agreements, using international trade tribunals that adjudicate 
disputes. Such agreements include the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), 
the first multilateral legally enforceable agreement covering banking, insurance, financial 
services and related areas (Estes et al. 2003). 
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Asia has the fastest increase in the ageing population in the world. Kim and Lee 
(2007) claim the growing elderly population is beginning to exert pressure on the East 
Asian countries' economies. Three decades ago, major industrialized countries have begun 
to grapple with the similar problem. With increasing drop in fertility rates, more East 
Asian economies such as Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan are ex-
pected to turn into ‘super-ageing societies’ by 2025 (Kim and Lee 2007). However, the 
magnitude of the future impact depends on the (in)ability of individual economies to re-
solve the demographic changes problem through increased privatization, pension reforms, 
migration to more productive countries and extension of retirement age. Like western 
countries, Asia will ultimately have to tackle issues related to pension reform and the pro-
vision of long term health care services (Cook and Powell 2010). 
For Japan, the basic statistical reality of its demographic profile is escalating. Already 
17 of every 100 of its people are over 65, and this ratio will approach 30 in 15 years. From 
2005 to 2012, Japan's workforce is projected to shrink by around a per cent every year – a pace 
that will accelerate after that. Economists fear that, besides blowing an even bigger hole in 
Japan's underfunded pension system (Cook and Powell 2010), the decline of workers and 
young families will make it harder for Japan to generate new wealth. 
The future challenge of providing for the elderly is especially urgent in the world's 
two biggest nations – India and China. Only 11 per cent of Indians have pensions, and they 
tend to be civil servants and the affluent. With a young population and relatively big fami-
lies, many of the elderly population still count on their children for support. This is not the 
case in China. By 2030, there will be only two working-age people to support every re-
tiree. Yet only 20 per cent of workers have government- or company-funded pensions or 
medical coverage (Chen and Powell 2012). However, as a counterbalance to such 
a gloomy perspective, ‘Chindia’ (China and India taken together) is currently accumulat-
ing vast wealth as a result of globalization, wealth that could potentially be redirected for 
the support of their elderly populations. 
The population structure of Western European countries has changed since the turn of 
the twentieth century. Whereas in 1901, just over six per cent of the population were at or 
over current pension age (65 in the UK for men and women), this figure rose steadily to 
reach 18 per cent in 2001 (Powell 2005). At the same time, the population of younger peo-
ple under age 16 fell from 35 per cent to 20 per cent. As European countries reach a rela-
tively high level of population ageing, the proportion of workers tends to decline. Euro-
pean countries, including France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Russia, and the Ukraine, already 
have seen an absolute decline in the size of their workforce. And in countries where tax 
increases are needed to pay for transfers to growing older populations, the tax burden may 
discourage future workforce participation. The impact on the Nation States' gross domestic 
product will depend on increases in labor productivity and that State's ability to substitute 
capital for labor. Less developed countries can shift their economies from labor-intensive 
to capital-intensive sectors as population ageing advances. Options for more European 
nation states may be more constrained. The ‘rolling back’ of pensions promises is just one 
symptom of a shift in European history: the ‘graying of the baby-boom generation’ (Chen 
and Powell 2012). The percentage of 60-year-olds and older are growing 1.9 per cent a year. 
This is 60 per cent faster than the overall global population. In 1950 there were 12 people 
aged 15 to 64 to support each one of retirement age. Currently, the global average is nine. 
It will be only four-to-one by 2050 (McDaniel and Zimmer 2013). By then, the numbers of 
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older people will outnumber children for the first time. Some economists fear this will lead 
to bankrupt pensions and lower living standards. It is interesting that in Germany this fear 
is becoming a battleground for political electioneering. For example, Germany has the 
highest population in Europe and the third oldest population in the world, which presents 
both critical questions on public finances to provide pensions and healthcare and an oppor-
tunity for innovations in the marketplace. Currently, ageing has started to figure promi-
nently in political discussions prior to 2009 elections, as political parties vie for the elderly 
vote. The current Merkel administration has been criticized for increasing pensions while 
opponents talk about a ‘war of generations’ requiring young people to pay for taxation for 
elder care. 
The trend has drawn further attention across Europe, where the working-age population 
declined by 0.6 per cent in 2010. By 2025, the number of people aged 15 to 64 is projected to 
dwindle by 10.4 per cent in Spain, 10.7 per cent in Germany and 14.8 per cent in Italy. But 
ageing is just as dramatic in such emerging markets as China – which is expected to have 
265 million 65-year-olds by 2020 – and Russia and the Ukraine (Cook and Powell 2007). 
Using evidence from the UK, the percentage of people of working age, that is 16–64, 
will drop from 64 per cent in 1994 to 58 per cent in 2031 (Powell 2005). As the number of 
workers per pensioner decreases there will be pressure on pension provision. This is evi-
dent now, in such areas of pensions and long term care, the retreat of the state made evi-
dent in the erosion of State Earnings Related Pensions Scheme are forcing people to devise 
their own strategies for economic survival in old age (Phillipson 1998). In the British con-
text that also impinges on global societies in general, private pensions are slowly being 
introduced in order to prevent the ‘burden’ of an ageing population. These are ways in 
which the State continues to rely on apocalyptic projections such as ‘demographic time 
bomb’ about ageing populations in order to justify cuts in public expenditure (Powell 
2005). Hence, the population of Great Britain, like that of other European countries, is 
ageing rapidly. There are only enough young people to fill one in three of the new and 
replacement jobs that will need to be taken up over the next decade. Older people take 
much of the responsibility for our social and civic life and for the care of children, the sick 
and the very old in the community. Yet, the gap between wealth and poverty, choice and 
the absence of choice for older people is stark and growing wider (Phillipson 1998).  
The UK government is at the time of writing seeking to promote a debate over what they 
envisage as a multi-billion pound deficit that will be found in care for the elderly in future. 
Economic security, health and disability, and living conditions in old age are policy 
concerns throughout the world, but the nature of the problem differs considerably from 
continent to continent and between and within countries – especially within Africa.  
In Africa older people make up a relatively small fraction of the total population, and 
traditionally their main source of support has been the household and family, supple-
mented in many cases by other informal mechanisms, such as kinship networks and mu-
tual aid societies. In 2005, Nigeria ranked among the top 30 countries in the world on the 
basis of the size of its population aged 60 and over. Nigeria had the largest older popula-
tion in sub-Saharan Africa, with over 6 million people of age 60 and over; South Africa 
had just over 3.4 million. Congo and South Africa are projected to have nearly 5 million 
older people in 2030. Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Madagascar, Mozambique, 
Niger, Senegal, and Uganda are all projected to have their older populations grow to over 
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one million people by 2030 (HIV/AIDS Alliance and HelpAge International 2004). Very 
little careful empirical research has been undertaken on long-term trends in the welfare of 
older people, but there are a number of reasons to believe that traditional caring and social 
support mechanisms in Africa are under increasing strain (OECD 2007). 
Located on the least developed and poorest continent, according to the World Bank 
report, the average per capita income for 25 sub-Saharan African countries was only 130 
(GDP per capita in current US$), this increased to US$ 1315 by 2011. In addition, reduc-
tions in fertility and child mortality have meant that, despite the huge impact of the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic across much of the region, both the absolute size and the proportion 
of the population of age 60 and over have grown and will continue to grow over the next 
30 years (Estes et al. 2003). 
In Africa, as in other traditional societies such as those in India or China, older people 
have traditionally been viewed in a positive light, as repositories of information and wis-
dom. And while African families are generally still intact, development and modernization 
are closely connected with social and economic changes that can weaken traditional social 
values and networks that provide care and support in later life. Africa has long carried 
a high burden of disease, including malaria and tuberculosis; today it is home for more 
than 60 per cent of all people living with HIV – some 25.8 million in 2005. The vast ma-
jority of those affected are still in their prime wage-earning years, at an age when, nor-
mally, they would be expected to be the main wage earners and principal sources of finan-
cial and material support for older people and children in their families. Many older people 
have had to deal with the loss of their own support while absorbing the additional respon-
sibilities of caring for their orphaned grandchildren. Increasingly, then, it appears that Af-
rican societies are being asked to cope with population ageing with neither a comprehen-
sive formal social security system nor a well-functioning traditional care system in place 
(HIV/AIDS Alliance and HelpAge International 2004). 
According to the 2010 UN database, the big issue is that the majority of the world's 
population of older people aged 60 years and over (461 million) live in Asian countries out 
of world's total 865 million. There is also a remarkable difference between geographical 
locations. For example, in 2012, only 6 per cent of the population in Africa was 60 years 
and over, compared with 11 per cent in Asia, and 22 per cent in Europe. By 2050, it is ex-
pected that ten per cent of the population in Africa will be 60+ years, compared with 
24 per cent in Asia and 34 per cent in Europe (UNFPA 2012). For many countries, how-
ever, population ageing has been accompanied by reductions in per capita income and living 
standards decline. Epstein (2001) notes that between 1950 and the late 1970s, life expec-
tancy increased by at least 10 per cent in every developing country of the world, or on aver-
age by about 15 years. Life expectancy is generally accelerating with the passage of time and 
varies largely across geographical regions (UNFPA 2012). However, at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century, life expectancy remains under fifty years in more than twenty develop-
ing countries, and in those countries since 1970 life expectancy has actually fallen (e.g., 
Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland), or has barely risen  
(e.g., Burundi, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, Nigeria, Mali, Chad and Somalia) (UN 
2013). 
The AIDS epidemic is certainly a major factor here, but development loans requir-
ing the privatization of health care have also had an impact. Epstein (2001) reports, for 
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example, that by the mid-1990s the African continent was transferring four times more 
in debt repayment than on health or education. More generally, HelpAge International 
argues that:  
Older people's poverty is still not a core concern in the social, economic and ethical 
debates of our time. Their right to development is routinely denied, with ageing seen 
as a minority interest or case for special pleading. Poverty and social exclusion re-
main the main stumbling blocks to the realisation of the human rights of older people 
worldwide (HelpAge International 2000: 8). 
Conclusions 
The globalization of ageing will have dramatic effects on local, regional, and global econo-
mies (Powell and Chen 2012). Most significantly, financial expenditures, labor supply, and 
total savings will be affected. Changes in the age structures of societies also affect total lev-
els of labor force participation in society, because the likelihood that an individual will be in 
the labor force varies systematically by age. Concurrently, global population ageing is pro-
jected to lead to lower proportions of the population in the labor force in highly industrial-
ized nations, threatening both productivity and the ability to support an ageing population. 
At the same time, as age structural transition takes place quite rapidly, globally there are 
concerns regarding the actual capacities of societies to address the challenges of ageing 
population, particularly during the global economic crisis. The first thing would be to un-
derstand the extent of ageing issues with each society and to take steps to remedy the prob-
lems. For that we need real data on elderly people and their families. Countries need 
strong political commitments as to how they can utilize the resources for wellbeing of eld-
erly by providing social pension or restructuring workforces in order to accommodate 
older persons at workplace or enhancing social care by encouraging intergenerational rela-
tionships within societies and communities (Khan et al. 2013). People should be encour-
aged for taking part in voluntary activities within the community at large. Mass campaign 
is necessary in order to educate the society that older person is not a burden instead they 
are contributing more to the family as well as to the society. We should highlight positive 
news on older people. At the same time, ‘young old’ should be prepared for the life-long 
saving as the future benefit system is likely to be uncertain. 
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The article elaborates the author's ideas on the two paradigms of the human sys-
tem development formulated in her previous works (Bondarenko 2011, 2012). 
The first development paradigm is expressed in the direct connection between 
production and consumption. The essence of the second development paradigm 
is seen in the indirect and desynchronized (both in space and time) interconnec-
tion of different commodity production technologies and consumption of such 
commodities by a specific human individual. The new (third) model of life or-
ganization is at the same time the first development paradigm based on the direct 
interconnection between production and consumption of specific human beings, 
but raised onto the new high-tech level. Practical realization of this model is the 
only feasible precondition for the transition to sustainable and crisis-free devel-
opment. Cycles, crises, chaos and all negative phenomena are nothing else but 
natural products of the second, indirect paradigm of development.  
Keywords: systemic crisis, sustainable development, new methodology of cogni-
tion, objective, specific human being, time, efficiency criteria, two development 
paradigms, coordination of interests, new model of life organization. 
Introduction 
The global systemic crisis, hitting all facets of the human community's life, is becoming 
more and more profound and wider in scope. This fact has been recognized at all summits 
of G20 (including the latest in Mexico), summits of G8, as well as the latest economic fo-
rums in Davos and Saint-Petersburg. The panic in the world markets (including the market 
of raw materials) has been generated by publication of negative data on almost all major 
economies of the world (i.e., US, Europe, China and India).  
China's economy demonstrates slower growth rates, too. Investors and economists 
once again started to talk about the threat of China's ‘hard landing’ and to call for resolute 
measures that would stimulate economic growth. But, as experts in China's economy sug-
gest, in order to become ‘an engine of global economy’, the Celestial Empire first needs to 
make its people wealthy. However, in this case China would lose its main advantage, that 
is, its cheap labor. 
India, with its second largest population in the world, that has become the world's 
tenth largest economy by staking on development of the innovation sector, also has faced 
the crisis situation. Its GDP growth rates fell down sharply, while the rupee exchange rate 
against the USD dropped to historical minimum. Meanwhile, according to some expert 
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assessments, the crisis in India can catalyze new recession in the entire world. Corruption, 
inflation, expensive credit and political paralysis result in the outflow of capital and termi-
nation of business projects. In particular, this applies to strategic sectors, where the state 
actively regulates the process, while in the less regulated spheres (e.g., IT and pharmacol-
ogy) the situation is more favorable. In this sense India differs strongly from China, where 
exactly the sectors with strong presence of the state and use of cheap labor drive the pro-
gress of national economy. 
Many economists hold the view that all the current developments in the world provide 
ample evidence of the already surged second wave of the crisis. However, the monetary 
means (also used before) such as printing money and its investment in all sorts of assets 
(shares, raw resources, or real-estate property) are prevailing over investments in the fixed 
capital, and this latter circumstance will result in the further slow-down of growth. This 
means that the old patterns designed to cope with crisis by monetary injections into econ-
omy no longer work, and hence this mode is not an anti-crisis remedy that would eliminate 
the prime cause of the crisis either. Moreover, on the one hand, it is recognized that at pre-
sent there is no serious discussion on how to cope with the crisis. On the other hand, since 
the latest World Economic Forum in Davos we hear the ever more loudly voiced argu-
ments that the crisis of 2008 and its current second wave signify the crisis of the contem-
porary economic model. In such circumstances, unless the root-cause of the economic cri-
sis is identified, any system of institutes and mechanisms designed to eliminate tensions in 
the course of anti-crisis measures would be inefficient, to say the least.  
In his introduction to Grzegorz W. Kolodko's book Globalization, Transformation, 
Crisis – What's Next?, Prof. Rouslan Grinberg notes: ‘Economics and sociology arrived to 
one shared conclusion: organization and functioning of the surrounding world is the ever 
less comprehensible, as it becomes the ever more illogical and hence uncertain’ (Grinberg 
2011: 9). 
Therefore, the main precondition to proceed to crisis-free development is to receive 
and master knowledge on objective causes of the global crisis, to find ways to the crisis-
free development and to understand the implications of each decision made. The time for 
development by the trial-and-error method has already passed.  
New Methodology for Cognition of Regularities in the Human 
System Development 
Elsewhere (Bondarenko 2011, 2012) we have presented the new methodology of compre-
hension of the regularities in the human system development that we have formulated in 
the recent thirty years. We have also been conducting a research aimed at identification of 
objective causes for the crisis condition in the human system development as well as at 
visualization of the future. As a result, our new methodology was worked out.   
In the present paper we find it appropriate to repeat some ideas of our methodological 
pattern and elaborate them with some new speculations. The essence of the new methodo-
logical tool-kit and its scientific novelty are represented by the fact that it is based on the 
discovered objective target in the human community development. In order to arrive at this 
conclusion, it was required not only to define the goal of the human system development, 
but to identify the final objective that cannot be a sub-goal of a higher objective within the 
mundane human existence, but represents the objective reason of the human system devel-
opment – and then to understand that each particular person, each individual lives not to 
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provide GDP growth or to manufacture the maximal possible amount of weapons for self-
annihilation. A human individual must and can live in order to develop and realize maxi-
mally his/her spiritual and intellectual potential while at the same time raising the level of 
consciousness and physical perfection.  
In other words, each specific human individual in his/her development must and can 
attain the Supreme Reason or to reach the image and liking of the Creator. Otherwise, de-
velopment would follow a different, entirely opposite scenario – i.e., the blind-alley op-
tion: retrograde development for the purpose of starting everything anew, or a catastrophic 
finish, the apocalypse. Even now some technologies have been created that can very well 
work without human interference. For example, the IBM Corporation is working on the 
Smart City project providing interaction of municipal intellectual systems without in-
volvement of human mind. 
The modern bio-computers can force human cells to communicate independently with 
one another so that this would pave the way to construction of their complex configura-
tions. Hence, to overcome and eliminate crises and all problems facing the government, 
business and society at large would be only possible if all decisions in the end provide 
continuous, evolutional and irreversible movement towards attainment of development 
objective. Only in such a case it will be possible to find a way for sustainable development 
and practical realization of the ‘Millennium Development Goals’ (by our logic – the sub-
goals of the higher objective), announced by the UN as the guiding landmarks for all na-
tions of the Earth. 
Held in Rio-de-Janeiro in 1992, the UN Conference on Environment and Develop-
ment formulated the major ideas on sustainable development of the humankind. The sus-
tainable development concept fundamentally differed from traditional views and economic 
practices in the sense that it contained an integral approach to development as an overall 
process. At that time the sustainable development was defined schematically as a ‘triune’ 
interaction process of ‘nature – population – economy’. However, for this classical triad to 
be viable, its emphases must be modified in the context of our visionary approach as 
‘goal – sustainable – development’. The sustainable and steadfast movement ahead, i.e., 
development must and can be only provided in relation to nothing else but the objectively 
set goal.  
Therefore, whether we like it or not, the society should develop so that to create for 
any human individual the area of habitation, in which equal and free access to all diversi-
fied benefits of civilization would be available – not in order to reach a new level of ‘con-
sumerism’ or supremacy of technologies over humans, but in order to attain the final ob-
jective – let humans become perfect. This is the human being's mission on the Earth, and it 
must be fulfilled! 
The second component of the new methodological toolkit – integrity, systemic nature 
and cross-disciplinary approach – proceeds from the basis that the world is single, the laws 
of nature and society are in unity, while the world is an integral system and can be cog-
nized only with unification of all scientific and spiritual knowledge into some unified, sys-
temic, integral and cross-disciplinary (or, rather, trans-disciplinary) knowledge. Therefore 
all these elements had to be unified systemically through identification of the target func-
tion of development of the entire system and its any part in any section (civilization-
related, formational, national, confessional, territorial, natural-scientific, socio-economic, 
socio-cultural, political, organizational, etc.), and irrespectively of whatever development 
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model (neo-Liberal, Keynesian, totalitarian, or a mixture thereof) would be prevailing. 
Only through such knowledge one would understand that the financial, economic, social, 
organizational, science-tech and, as a whole, systemic crisis in the world as well as all ex-
isting negative phenomena are links of the same chain. Therefore the decision, too, must 
be integral, systemic and unified for the entire world, but the interests of all people living 
on the planet must be taken into account.  
Third, we identified the only possible index to measure and juxtapose all processes 
and phenomena – that is time. By applying the latter, we can measure and juxtapose in 
other indices something immeasurable or incomparable, and, what is the most important, 
to correlate all facets of human and societal life with the target ideal, and to find out as at 
what step of human progress they are located in relation to the objective. 
Fourth and finally, the new methodological toolkit contains the single criteria of effi-
ciency of the human system development – the time between the need to approach realiza-
tion of the single objective of development and the reality, in which society (in whatever 
the section) and each specific individual are placed in relation to such objective. If the time 
between arising and satisfaction of a specific individual's need tends to reduce continu-
ously and evolutionally, as well as gravitates to zero, then the human system develops in 
relation to the objective sustainably and efficiently. This conclusion provides us with the 
absolutely new understanding of the human system development. Application of this crite-
ria helps to control time between arising and satisfaction of any need of any specific indi-
vidual. To control time means to control development so that to ensure evolutional and 
irreversible reduction and approach the criteria value, equal to zero. Only in this case the 
human system would start developing sustainably in relation to the objective in the inter-
ests of any specific human individual. 
The Fundamental Conclusions Obtained by Means of  
a New Methodology of Knowledge 
In the theoretical plane of the new methodology, the time between arising of a need and its 
satisfaction in terms of the goal attainment is the vector of time (or axis of time) from infin-
ity to zero (see Fig. 1).    
Fig. 1. Vector (Axis) of Time 
 
Development of the humankind and its different structures in whatever the section is dis-
tributed along this vector in different points, and at any given moment, the time between 
arising and satisfaction of a need may decrease or grow, thus approaching or moving away 
Objective 
t = 0 t – time between arising and satisfaction  of a need 
t = ∞ 
Objective 
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from the goal. The time vector represents the linear vision of the problem which can be 
discussed, if the human community's life is considered in statics, as of the given moment 
of time. In reality, in dynamics, everything takes place in a much more complicated way. 
Today the time between arising and satisfaction of needs is different for different commu-
nities. Moreover, the processes of change in the time can be positive or negative, cyclical 
and undulated, direct and reverse. If these processes are considered not in relation to 
communities but to a specific individual, then the numerical value of this diversity would 
be most probably determined by digital values in multiple degrees. So, every human indi-
vidual lives in a kind of his/her own sphere, under the effect of his/her own centrifugal and 
centripetal forces, within some Brownian motion, in his/her own microcosm which does 
not coincide with the microcosm of others (see Fig. 2). This would produce a peculiar hy-
per-tetrahedron of the habitation area, and each specific human individual is situated in the 
center thereof. Vertexes of this hyper-tetrahedron would be equidistant from the center, 
when the whole humankind happens to be in one and the same space of time, and when the 
time between arising and satisfaction of a need will be equal for all people. Such outcome 
can be only attained if equal access to the maximum variety of goods is available.  
Fig. 2. Microcosm of Human Individual 
 
So, if civilizations, nations, countries, small and large communities as well as separate 
individuals stay in different linear and spherical spaces of time, they would have different 
levels of consciousness and would never be able to conciliate their interests or understand 
one another. Exactly this circumstance causes origination and aggravation of all troubles 
of the humankind. Hence, the crisis in development of global civilization, wars, terrorism, 
man-made and natural disasters are a result of the effect of profound laws common to na-
ture and society. Moreover, as long as people stay in different linear and spherical spaces 
of time, it will appear that the planet hosts many local civilizations, which are different 
from one another as they were described in length by Spengler and Huntington.   
Therefore to resolve all the implicit problems of society development and to modern-
ize the latter on the basis of R&D and realization of advanced technologies of the twenty-
first century would be possible only on condition that the way is found which in the end 
will provide continuous, evolutional, irreversible and simultaneous attainment of the ob-
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jectively set development goal for each concrete human person with due regard of his/her 
individual interests. 
This methodology and results of its applications are described in detail in the book 
Forecasting the Future: A New Paradigm (Bondarenko 2008) as well as in numerous arti-
cles published in Russia and other countries.  
As a result, the methodological toolkit made it possible:  
– to surpass the limits of the entire human system and to see it as a unified whole of 
‘past-present-future’ in relation to the objectively set development goal;  
– not to rely upon empirical and subjective data of the past and present; 
– to comprehend the objective picture of the human system development depending 
on the positive (sustainable) or negative (unsustainable) orientation to realization of the 
unified, single objective.   
This methodological toolkit allows us to see that in the whole course of many-
centuries-long development of human community, there have been only two paradigms of 
the human system development: 
– a direct connection between production and consumption; and,   
– production and consumption are interconnected indirectly.   
The schematic outlay of human community development we presented in our other ar-
ticles on the issue (see Bondarenko 2011, 2012) in which the reader can also find a figure 
demonstrating when and how each development paradigm was formed, is being formed 
and can be formed in future along or around the axis of time equal to zero, between the 
moments of arising and satisfaction of a need.   
According to this outlay, the entire history of humankind can be divided into three 
phases.  
Phase 1 is featured by prevalence of the first development paradigm expressed in di-
rect connection between production and consumption.  
Everything that was produced at that level of manual labor being mastered by human-
kind was consumed thereby. Hence the time between the arising and satisfaction of a spe-
cific individual's need was minimal. That was the pre-industrial type of production – any 
manufacturer was producing goods for him self and, by order, for specific consumers at 
the household level (craftsmen).  
Advent of primitive technologies, division of labor, market, class of brokers (mer-
chants) and the universal equivalent to exchange with results of such labor – that is, mon-
ey, as well as the gradual territorial expansion and development of foreign trade – all these 
resulted in transformation of direct interconnection between production and consumption 
into indirect one. Thus the second development paradigm was taking shape, and its devel-
opment in time and space was accelerated by transition to the industrial type of develop-
ment.   
The industrial revolution, epochs of steam and railroads, steel, electricity and heavy 
industry, oil, automobile and mass commodity production entailed building the consumer-
communication infrastructure including the network of roads, ports, shops (from small 
shops to grand shopping centers and highly mechanized warehouses), radio-technical, 
electric and information networks, etc. Those were the major landmarks that evidenced 
formation of mass conveyer-type industrial production (accompanied by development of 
domestic and foreign trade as well as territorial expansion up to the global level) and mass 
consumption. Production of such type is oriented to satisfy demand and needs of an ab-
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stract end consumer through the elemental, archaic, mediated by longer time and space, 
market-based form of communication with any specific human individual.   
In such circumstances uncertainty of production resulted in the emergence and in the 
global growth of disproportion, and then in the entire de-synchronization between the time 
of production and the time for circulation of goods/money. The dynamics of movement  
of material and real factors of production, despite their multiply increased volume, has 
turned to be torn far apart from their monetary form, both the real and (especially) the vir-
tual. Monetary methods of coping with financial crisis made this gap in the movement of 
real products and money even wider and contributed to the further growth of disproportion 
between the time for production and time for circulation of commodities and money. As  
a chain reaction, the financial crisis is growing the ever more rapidly to the level of sys-
temic crisis. Therefore it is clear why philosophers, economists and political scientists, 
proceeding from the works written on the basis of empirical information about the already 
happened events of the past, started to argue that complexity, nonlinearity and chaos as 
well as cycles and crisis are an inevitable condition for development. This would be the 
case – unless we understand that all the afore-listed phenomena are a natural product of 
the second paradigm of development.  
Appeared in the 1970s, information technologies providing direct communication with 
consumers, and flexible production systems that can be adapted to specific orders in the 
real-time regime, did not change the given development paradigm, and did not consolidate 
the embryonic opportunity to establish direct connection between production and con-
sumption and to conciliate their interests. Information technology became ‘an end in itself’ 
for development and a means to create global markets. 
So, the essence of the second development paradigm is seen in the indirect and desyn-
chronized (both in space and time) interconnection of different commodity production 
technologies and consumption of such commodities by a specific human individual.  
All crisis of this development paradigm occurred at the peak of growing time-related 
disproportion between the arising and satisfaction of a need. The current systemic crisis is 
the peak of this development paradigm. Globalization of all relations in its current form, 
started to negate itself as soon as it appeared.  
Why so?  
Together with globalization of all processes and the free movement of ideas, goods, 
money and information, the conveyer-type mass type of production survived and has 
grown to the global level. Time between arising and satisfaction of an individual's certain 
need has become even longer. It does not appear possible to conciliate interests of states, 
society, business and specific individuals. This long road of time and space, available for 
the afore-mentioned movement, offers perfect conditions for absolutely all negative phe-
nomena. Poverty and inequality, primitive economy, underdeveloped production and 
trade, terrorism and corruption, natural abnormalities and disasters, growing prices  
and inflation, etc., – all these are links of one and the same chain, and a product of the in-
direct development model. In the given case, the factor of time plays an extremely nega-
tive role. In such circumstances the scattered and narrowly specialized scientific knowl-
edge undergoes crisis in the solvency of different theories and there explanatory abilities 
to make a subjective assessment of the occurring events.    
However, in the age of cosmic speeds and application of digital, info-, cognitive, 
nano- and other technologies, we see the onrush change of economic and other realities 
Bondarenko • The Main Trends of the Global Dynamics 239 
that are incompatible with such a type of production and consumption, and, in particular, 
with such a type of interconnection with a specific individual and impossibility to concili-
ate specific individuals' interests.  
New Model Applied for Life Organization 
At the same time, it is only now, owing to development of ICT and other high technolo-
gies of the twenty-first century that we again have an opportunity to proceed to the direct 
connection pattern between production and consumption, that is, to proceed to the first 
development paradigm once again. 
An efficient means to eliminate disproportions and de-synchronization of all processes 
in time and space can be found provided only that the production-consumption relations 
are properly synchronized, and interests are agreed with each specific human individual 
within the whole range of her/his spiritual and material needs, while goods and services 
that would satisfy the given needs would be produced under the given individual's order, 
without manufacturing anything redundant. Only such production, oriented to satisfaction 
of needs of a specific individual under his/her order, would serve the basis for preservation 
and replenishment of natural ecological life-support systems for the current and future 
generations.   
Return to the first development paradigm would provide resolution of the two inter-
connected strategic tasks, that is:  
(1) to modify the contents of economic and social policy by the state so that it would 
be aimed at transition to reproduction trajectory of domestic development, provided only 
that the entire process of reproduction would be oriented to the ultimate result – evolu-
tional reduction of time between arising and satisfaction of needs (demand) of each spe-
cific individual. This can be attained only provided that commodities are produced under 
the order of any specific individual. 
To this end, it appears necessary to draw and realize a program for re-industrialization 
of the entire production – that is, to put production on the track of advanced engineering 
and technologies connected with attainments of science-tech progress. The end target is to 
have smaller high-tech forms of production with distributed systems that can be ‘re-tuned’ 
in the real-time regime with due regard of a specific individual's order covering the whole 
range of the customer's needs;  
(2) At each local level, to form a mechanism of real-time conciliation of all actors in 
such relationship – that is, the state, business and end consumers (specific individuals). As 
a result, only a minimum number of problems that cannot be coordinated at the local level 
would be presented for conciliation of interests at the regional or national level. Such con-
ciliation must be realized through the shared cross-communication infrastructure, universal 
for all types of production and all consumers, and based on application of digital informa-
tion and communication technologies, broad-band television and other innovations that are 
so widely and eloquently discussed at all domestic and international levels.  
As early as by the end of the twentieth century, when information technologies just 
appeared, E. Toffler wrote that quite soon everyone, operating his/her personal computer, 
would control the technological process to manufacture products for her/his personal con-
sumption without producing anything redundant (Toffler 1990). Today, for example, Toy-
ota disclosed its plans to develop interactive communications between owners of its brand 
cars, dealers and head office of the given company. The social network that would unify 
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millions of people throughout the world was to start functioning in 2012. The system 
would be based on technologies of corporate social networks, and access thereto will not 
be available for outsiders. ‘Social networks change the means of communication and 
format of interaction among people’, said Toyota President Akio Toyoda. The new so-
cial network will be named ‘Toyota Friend’. The users will be able to ‘communicate’ 
with their cars by sending messages like they do in Twitter and Facebook, while every 
car will have its own profile. On the other side, electric motor cars will be able to send 
SMS to the owners' mobile phones in order to remind that, for example, time is coming 
to charge the battery. Thus, drivers would be able to conduct a sort of conversation with 
their own cars.  
In her book Technological Revolutions and Financial Capital, Carlota Perez writes 
that technological revolutions occurring once per about half-century deliver their out-
comes with a time lag. It takes two or three decades of turbulent adaptation and assimi-
lation before the new technologies, sectors and infrastructures would start facilitating the 
advent of the ‘golden age’ (belle époque), or ‘era of prosperity’ (Perez 2011: 17). That 
is, owing to technologies of the twenty-first century that were originated some thirty 
years ago, production again returns through the household level to a specific human in-
dividual.  
Consideration of each individual's interests at every local level and conciliation of 
such interests in real-time regime are the only available driving force that would provide 
motivation for the higher productivity of labor and accelerated innovative development 
of socially oriented high-tech forms of production. In such conditions, every specific 
consumer can become a stakeholder and investor of the given business. Today, however, 
notwithstanding the crisis, reduction of deposit interest rates and growth of inflation, 
Russian depositors increase their bank deposits. Here arises the wider disproportion be-
tween the time of production and circulation of commodities and money. Channeling of 
those funds directly to the real sector would favor the more efficient resolution of the 
task to make our economy much less dependent on raw-resource supplies and to enrich 
it with the long-expected intellectual dimension. This will be attained due to emergence 
of new possibilities to create conditions for any person to generate new knowledge in the 
interests of the entire society and at the same in his/her own interests. Only in such con-
ditions it will be possible to build actually the new, ‘smart’ economy based on intellec-
tual excellence and production of unique knowledge as well as oriented to continuous 
improvement of human life quality. Only in such conditions it will be possible ‘to re-
place the resource-based primitive economy by smart economy producing unique 
knowledge, unique things and technologies, as well as things and technologies being 
useful for people’. And, only such economy will be the most competitive in creating an 
absolutely quality of life for people.   
Our Proposals 
For accelerated formation of the new and at the same time former model of life organiza-
tion, it appears rational: 
 within the shortest period of time to accomplish modernization of Russia and any 
country of the world through transition to the model of life organization for the state, busi-
ness, society and each specific human individual with due conciliation of their interests in 
the real time by systemic application of advanced technologies of the twenty-first century. 
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As the major precondition for realization of this task, national leaders must have political 
will to form such level at the municipal, regional and federal level;  
 within the shortest periods of time to draw the ‘Comprehensive Target Program 
for Formation of the New Life-Organization Model’ and to realize the latter at each local 
level; 
 for elaboration of such ‘Comprehensive Target Program’, it would be advisable to 
establish, within the Russian Academy of Sciences, Russian Academy of Natural Sciences 
and academic communities of concerned countries, an inter-academy and inter-
institutional cross-disciplinary cooperation of scientists and practical specialists; 
 to provide participation of all national science towns and innovation towns as well as 
the entire global intellectual community, unified by network cooperation within the Inter-
net in development of the afore-described model with due regard of tax preferences and 
legal acts. For realization of this program, it is most strongly required to ‘energy of 
youth’ – that the best young minds of IT-specialists, software and hardware engineers, 
researchers, inventors, and others. Armed with new knowledge and understanding of the 
fact that this projects meets their own interests as well as interests of their relatives, friends 
and whole society, young talents would be able to formulate their demands to the state and 
business in precise terms and to build the basis for realization of the new sustainable de-
velopment paradigm;   
 to provide for transfer of the new life-organization model throughout the whole terri-
tory of Russia and, probably, the entire planet – may be, under the auspices of the United 
Nations. 
As early as in the book Forecasting the Future: A New Paradigm I noted:  
The key to the philosophy for building the global society and all its institutions must be 
served by the following premise: All inhabitants of the Universe share the same origin; all 
people share the same human nature; all religions share the same divinity, while the entire 
global community and each human individual share one the same sole objective – to attain 
the Supreme Reason in their development (Bondarenko 2008).  
The major task of the UN or any other institute, established on its basis or within its 
framework, will be to include a structure that would accumulate all knowledge – from 
origination of the Humankind to the current time. From this science-tech data pool, it 
would be possible to receive any knowledge so that in any corner of the planet technologi-
cal chains could be built between arising and satisfaction of a specific human need, and 
thus to provide the growing synchronization of all processes in space and at the same for 
their reduction in time. The missing knowledge is an order for new R&D, new research, 
experiments and designs (Ibid.). 
Realization of the given project for the entire global world would be a breakthrough to 
the future, in which the ‘sustainable and crisis-free development’ would at last become 
a logical and regular reality rather than a beautiful abstract slogan. Such a future can and 
must be formed right today, here and now, with due regard of each specific individual's 
interests as well as interests of the entire global world. For the contemporary generation of 
people, harmonization and synchronization of human relations in time and space is the 
only available chance to create a new quality of life for our contemporaries as well as for 
future generations. The main point is not to lose time again and not to admit a destructive 
wave of the new crisis!   
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Part IV. TEACHING GLOBAL STUDIES 
 
Section 1. TEACHING GLOBAL STUDIES:  
REFLECTIONS AND EXPERIENCES 
 
Multi-Disciplinary Didactics for Curricula  
of ‘Global Studies’ 
 
Gilbert Ahamer 
 
 
Technological innovations can be used in many ways to enhance the suitability 
of global learning. A newly developed online-supported curriculum ‘Global 
Studies’ takes account of the necessities of interdisciplinary, intercultural and in-
terparadigmatic learning. The history and genesis of such an innovative curricu-
lum is embedded in a national umbrella organisation focusing on development 
studies. As the interdisciplinary core, a new lecture on the fundamentals of 
Global Studies has been implemented in 2010/11 that envisions team teaching 
and interdisciplinary perspectives. The web platform allows students to present 
their professional views and discuss them in a peer review. Dialogue and dis-
course are enhanced by repeated change of roles which is enriched by the broad 
international and intercultural backgrounds of the participating students. Cul-
tures of understanding are generated and widened as a prerequisite for future 
careers in development cooperation, diplomacy and transnational organisations. 
Keywords: Global learning, intercultural, interdisciplinary, interparadigmatic, 
web-based dialogue, development cooperation. 
1. Underlying Didactics 
The didactic thesis of this paper is that web-supported learning tools (Schwartz et al. 
2003) have to facilitate intercultural understanding.  
This paper's approach suggests that deeper dialogue-induced cognition in Dewey's 
sense (Berding 1999) can enhance interparadigmatic understanding, civilisational evolu-
tion and multicultural education towards democratisation (Purnendu and Tripathi 2003). In 
a ‘learning society’, the integration of views and perspectives constitutes the core of multi-
cultural processes.  
Moreover, learning technologies will hopefully contribute to entrepreneurialism 
(Woods and Woods 2011), to a learning community (Robertson 2011), to reflecting on 
others' philosophies (Wang 2011: 51), and finally achieve mutual integration of learners' 
views into a consensus. Here the change of roles is enabled and prompts learning; this 
opens up the possibility of using the wide range of game-based learning and role play 
(Prensky 2001). Managed learning environments are optimally designed in a way to suit 
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various learner types and may offer opportunities for different personal cognitive and 
communicative rhythms and patterns (Ahamer 2010: 287; 2011d; 2014). 
Concrete usage of learning technologies is a clear function of the underlying didactic 
concept. 
Well-coordinated exchange and mutual approximation of academically substantiated 
views is the central didactic-pedagogic task in the area of multiculturally and developmen-
tally oriented interparadigmatic curricula such as ‘Global Studies’ described earlier (GS 
2010: 2; Ahamer et al. 2011).  
‘Views on realities’ are the core element of consideration in intercultural and multicul-
tural learning. Fig.1 symbolizes ‘realities to be learned’ by the globe and – in a more dif-
ferentiated manner – by a Greek temple. The ‘learning individual’ (up right) uses glasses 
to view realities ‘through a lens’. The usual concept of interdisciplinarity refers to looking 
at reality through different parts of the lenses, using different rays from the eye onto the 
world for different scientific disciplines, when staying in this symbolism. 
Fig. 1. Interdisciplinarity means to look through different lenses 
 
2. Interdisciplinarity, Interculturality and Beyond 
This paper clearly distinguishes between (1) interdisciplinarity, (2) interculturality and  
(3) an interperpectivist or interparadigmatic approach. 
2.1. Interdisciplinarity  
Interdisciplinarity here means to look at one complex issue in the world using different 
lenses of perception (traditionally described as ‘disciplines’). These ‘disciplinary perspec-
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tives’ are often associated with different faculties. Hence it was imperative for the GS ini-
tiative to involve members of all university faculties: law, history, economics, sociology, 
natural sciences, technology (symbolized by the pillars in Fig. 1). 
2.2. Interculturality 
As distinct from interdisciplinarity, interculturality means in this article that different ac-
tors most likely have different views regarding the same issue in the world (at left in  
Fig. 2) because they look at it from different standpoints. The framework of Fig. 2 goes 
beyond ‘truths as such’ that would have to be recognized during lectures and repeated 
‘correctly’ during exams. What is called for instead is the ability to assess the scope of the 
area of applicability of competing concepts of understanding. 
Fig. 2. Interculturality means to look at the world from different standpoints and 
hence viewing angles 
 
In a collaborative learning environment – hopefully among students and teachers – inter-
culturality means to allow for different views of the ‘truth’ among learners (Cools et al., 
2009: 9) who are rooted in different cultural traditions (to varying degrees geographically, 
religiously, institutionally, socially, corporatively, or individually co-determined) and have 
different (epistemological) beliefs. This notion of culture refers to a ‘systemic way of per-
ception’ and is composed of ‘beliefs, norms, assumptions, knowledge, values or sets of 
practice that are shared and form a system’ (Rapport and Overing 2000; Economides 
2008: 244). In this sense, there have been many attempts of rationalising ‘cultures’ by re-
ferring to Hofstede's (2010) cultural dimensions (Sulimma 2006: 75). Clearly there is 
a need to suitably and integratively understand cross-cultural issues such as dimensions of 
cultural variability (Hofstede 1980, 2001; Olaniran and Agnello 2005: 74) for target-
oriented intercultural work.  
2.3. An interperspectivist and interparadigmatic approach 
However, in this paper we focus on the students' ability to slip into the roles of members of 
different cultures. This is exactly the skill needed to successfully participate in profes-
sional international projects – and this skill should be trained by ‘Global Studies’. 
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It is essential for the interperspectivistic approach used in ‘Global Studies’ to concen-
trate not only on ‘facts’ but rather on ‘views’ as learning objectives. Fig. 2 proposes to 
depict views as viewing angles. Fig. 3 contrasts such fundamentally different acts of learn-
ing: namely to either understand only facts (left, the points symbolize the globes to be 
cognized in Fig. 1) or rather the views on facts (right, the angles symbolize the perspec-
tives in Fig. 1). 
Fig. 3. Learners (symbolized by glasses) can either concentrate on facts (symbol-
ized by points, at left) or concentrate on perspectives on facts (symbolized 
by viewing angles, at right) 
 
It is the target of ‘GS’ to train interperspectivism and interparadigmatic understand-
ing. 
3. The Mission of Global Studies in Graz  
Since 2004 a bundle of electives has been implemented and in 2010 a master's curriculum 
was started at Graz University after seven years of work led by the ‘Steering Committee 
Global Studies’ (SC GS 2010).  
Dr. Karl Kumpfmüller, an Austrian pioneer in peace research, initiated ‘Global Stud-
ies’ in 2004 as a joint effort of NGOs and all departments at Graz University. Around fifty 
sessions of the ‘Steering Committee Global Studies’ (SC GS 2010) constituted the core 
driving force of the GS initiative in Graz and were overseen by its founder. The spirit in 
the SC GS is an inclusive one with a respectful academic peer-oriented culture where the 
inputs and views of all members are equally valued based on commonly accepted ethical 
values (Tibi 2009) of a (socially and ecologically) sustainable global development and 
(transparent & peer-oriented) academic discoursive practice.  
Understood in a positive sense, ‘Globalisation could (literally) mean international co-
operation, worldwide networking, democratic shared ownership, justices of distribution, 
fair exchange, existential security for all people on Earth – in brief this notion suggests a 
dynamically developing worldwide system that grants and secures for each single human 
being his/her unalienable share of existing economic, political, cultural and spiritual 
power’ (Kumpfmüller 2005: 18). However, ‘globalisation as an ideological construct and 
as a political reality means the contrary, namely increasing inequality and injustice; it im-
pedes development and increases poverty, and is inclined to military power’. Throughout 
history, two opposite concepts of human conviviance have striven for implementation (de-
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noted in Latin): pax relies on ruling by dominance, and concordia seeks to achieve har-
mony of interests (Kumpfmüller 2009: 329). Emphasising its opportunities, ‘another glob-
alisation, a bottom-up globalisation is needed, including respect of human rights, social 
and economic justice and an open dialogue of cultures (…)’ (Kumpfmüller 2005: 19; 
2001).  
3.1. The roots of GS Graz  
Since GS was founded in 2004, all strategic decisions have been taken by the Steering 
Committee on the basis of respectful discussion among all involved faculty members from 
all six university departments in the spirit of participative democracy and have been trans-
parently documented in the protocols of the Steering Committee prepared by the SC mem-
bers from the Afro-Asian Institute (AAI 2010) who provided office space for the bi-
monthly meetings. The location of the Steering Committee's sessions at the Afro-Asian 
Institute is a symbol for the engagement of NGOs in the spirit of mutual cooperation with 
the university. The following section comprising the entire chapter 3 is taken from the 
seminal definition of Global Studies addressed to the Senate of Graz University that led to 
the inauguration of a curricula commission (Kumpfmüller 2007). 
3.2. The need for Global Studies 
The idea and initiative to set up a curricula commission for a ‘Global Studies’ Master's 
degree program at the Karl-Franzens University Graz as a separate Master's curriculum for 
Global Studies (Kumpfmüller 2007: 1) is based on the growing importance of issues such 
as climate change and the shortage of resources, famine and mass poverty, terrorism and 
violence that are a proxy for a large number of unresolved global problems and challenges. 
Universities are seismographic places in a learning society and are apt for mediation 
among stakeholders. Particularly young people need both comprehensive and specialised 
training including basic academic knowledge and awareness, cosmopolitan orientation and 
empowerment in an increasingly complex globalised world.  
3.3. The goals of Global Studies 
The primary goal of the ‘Global Studies’ Master's program is to convey and promote un-
derstanding of the global society, its mechanisms, interdependencies and problems as the 
basis for strengthening responsible governance to confront the resulting issues. The par-
ticipants in the GS program will, amongst others, be able to: 
 develop a basic understanding of different cultures and world views from different 
perspectives and disciplines (history, philosophy, economics, politics, law, culture, litera-
ture, religion etc. ) and to understand global interconnections;  
 understand the interdependence of global phenomena and processes in an intercon-
nected world and to recognize it as a historical process;  
 analyse the structural disadvantage of a majority of people (poverty, hunger, illiter-
acy, marginalisation and lawlessness etc.) and its various causes and be capable of discuss-
ing alternative scenarios and different approaches for a solution; 
 recognise the importance of sustainably dealing with the environment, particularly 
the protection of the climate and species as a joint global challenge; 
 take account of the gender issue as crucial for local and global social development 
processes;  
 acquire basic knowledge in the fields of international law, human rights and interna-
tional organizations; 
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 understand and analyze the current dynamics of modern-day economy, world trade 
and global financial systems; 
 recognize the role and responsibility of globally effective players and institutions in 
their impact on peace and development; 
 gain understanding and a greater empowerment for development cooperation and 
independent development processes; 
 develop on the basis of selected country studies and thematic studies concrete global 
situation analyses and appropriate strategies for solutions;  
 receive insights into issues pertaining to intercultural communication and world re-
ligions.  
In ‘Global Studies Graz’, ‘development’ is understood as growing jointly in responsi-
bility. 
3.4. The institutional context of the GS initiative 
At the University of Graz, existing structures already comprise a large number of experts 
and institutions in the areas of GS, for example:  
 the Wegener Center for Climate and Global Change (WegCenter 2010);  
 the Research Cluster ‘Environment and Global Change’ headed by the Wegener 
Center;  
 the Curriculum in Environmental Systems Science (USW 2011);  
 the Academy for New Media and Technology Transfer (ANM 2010); 
 the UNESCO Chair for Intercultural and Interreligious Dialogue; 
 the Regional Center of Expertise in Education for Sustainable Development (RCE 
2010). 
Within the institutional landscape outside the university, several separate NGOs as 
well as the national umbrella organisation have cooperated with and contributed to GS:  
 the European Training and Research Centre for Human Rights & Democracy (ETC 
2010); 
 the Peace Centre of the City of Graz;  
 the Afro-Asian Institute and the ‘Welthaus’ of the Graz diocese (all located in 
Graz);  
 the former AGEZ (Work Group on Developmental Cooperation), now ‘Global Re-
sponsibility’ (2010) with its over 40 national member organizations; 
 the Austria-wide umbrella research cluster ‘Environment and Global Change’;  
 the Mattersburg Circle of Developmental Policy as a national umbrella organisation 
(Fig. 4) that in turn (co-)organises biannual Developmental Conferences and a Develop-
mental Dialogue Group; it also cooperates with the Paolo Freire Centre (PFC 2010), all 
with an emphasis on Vienna. 
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Fig. 4. Developmental curricula in Austria act under the umbrella of the national 
umbrella organisation ‘Mattersburg Circle of Developmental Policy’ and are 
based on regular publication series providing peer reviewed content 
(Fischer and Kolland 2009) 
 
4. Two Curricula for ‘Global Studies’ in Graz 
4.1. Bundle of electives ‘Global Studies’ 
Operating since 2004, the bundle of electives ‘Global Studies’ is an interdisciplinary study 
program at the University of Graz as defined by the ‘Preamble GS’ (2010) which was co-
operatively developed and accepted by the Steering Committee at the initiative's outset. 
GS combines course units from different faculties and departments of the University of 
Graz that address global issues and which are annually selected by GS representatives 
from all university departments. The bundle of electives ‘Global Studies’ is not yet an in-
dependent programme of study, but students enrolled in a wide range of existing curricula 
can take GS courses as electives (a predefined number of electives being required within 
their own curriculum) and receive course credit for them. In addition, students of Global 
Studies are awarded a special certificate when they pass courses amounting to 40 ECTS 
(European Credit Transfer Points).  
Global Studies aims to develop students' understanding of the mechanisms, interde-
pendencies and problems of today's global society. Courses in different relevant disci-
plines give future decision-makers the academic grounding that they need to make in-
formed choices and act in a globally responsible way. The programme sharpens perception 
on global issues, facilitates understanding of different cultures and systems, and strength-
ens competence in intercultural communication by demanding academic achievements in 
each of these six modules: 
 Module 1 >> Globalisation, Development, Sustainability, Gender – An Introduction  
 Module 2 >> World History  
 Module 3 >> World Economics  
 Module 4 >> World Politics and International Law  
 Module 5 >> World Cultures, World Religions and World Ethics  
 Module 6 >> Organisational and Social Skills.  
Vienna University Graz University Salzburg U. Innsbruck U. 
Publications:                               Journal of Developmental Policy 
(JEP), GEP, HSK … 
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At least two semester hours per module have to be passed in each module (Table 1) in 
addition to the compulsory ‘Introduction to Global Studies’ (Kumpfmüller 2010).  
The remaining credit hours are free electives, but they must be part of different modules. 
The internship amounts to a minimum of one month of practical work in a non-university 
organisation focusing on a topic that is relevant to GS. 
Table 1. For the bundle of electives ‘Global Studies’, a minimum number of two 
courses must be completed from each module. The required total 
amounts to 24 semester hours per week (40 ECTS) 
Recommended 
year Type of lectures required Hours per week 
1 introductory lecture Global Studies 2 
1 & 2 2 credits from each of the 6 modules 12 
2 free electives from at least 2 different modules 10 
Total  24 
A so-called ‘Ring Lecture’ (introductory lecture series presented by various speakers) has 
been held annually since 2005. For a statistical analysis of students following this bundle 
of electives, see (Ahamer et al. 2011: 29–33). 
4.2. The initial plan for a ‘Global Studies’ Master's curriculum  
The initial proposal to the university senate (Kumpfmüller 2007: 3–4) produced after in-
tensive and consensus-oriented iterative discussions outlined eight modules in a proposal 
to the curricula commission in order to cover the interdisciplinary scientific breadth of 
‘Global Studies’ in eight modules: 
 Module 1 >> Globalisation, Sustainable Development, Gender – An Introduction 
including the topics of development, globalisation and global change, sustainability and 
globalisation; gender equality; global learning, etc.  
 Module 2 >> World History with the topics: history of cultural realms, colonial his-
tory and European imperialism and colonialism, post- and neo-colonialism, migration, etc.  
 Module 3 >> World Economics: free trade theories, international trade and eco-
nomic institutions, global financial systems and international debt, development econom-
ics and development cooperation, population theories and environmental economics, etc.  
 Module 4 >> World Politics and International Law: theories of international rela-
tions, international politics; critical peace research; international and European law; com-
parative analysis of legislation, etc.  
 Module 5 >> World Cultures, World Religions and World Ethics: Introduction to 
cultural anthropology, language, culture and religion in the globalisation process; cultural 
identity and gender, global citizenship, global ethics, etc.  
 Module 6 >> Organisational Development and Social Skills: Projects in the context 
of global issues (e.g., via the Austrian Development Cooperation); non-governmental or-
ganizations and networks; intervention research, etc.  
 Module 7 >> World Climate, Environment and Technology: climate change, envi-
ronmental problems, technology assessment, communication technologies, sustainable 
development.  
 Module 8 >> Global Learning: international cultural and economic spaces, intercul-
tural communication, human rights, and minorities in the globalisation process.  
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4.3. Final ‘Global Studies’ Master’s curriculum  
The above proposal for eight modules (Chapter 4.2) was shortened by the recently estab-
lished ‘curricula commission master study GS’ (having a varying number of active mem-
bers) and cut down to fewer modules. Initially, for each scientific discipline two obligatory 
introductory courses and two obligatory advanced courses were confirmed as mandatory, 
each out of four modules (representing groups of scientific disciplines); but later the deci-
sion was made that (a) one ‘basic module’ should cover all introductory courses and (b) for 
the advanced level only two out of the remaining five modules are required (Table 2). Finan-
cial shortage might have been the main perceived reason for this curriculum change. 
Table 2. General structure of the final GS master’s curriculum (2010) amounting to 
120 ECTS 
Module name status  ECTS 
Basic module A: Global Studies  compulsory  29 
   
Two modules out of B through F  mandatory choice from B-F  24 
Module B: Law and Politics   12 
Module C: Economics   12 
Module D: History   12 
Module E: Environment, Climate and Technol-
ogy 
 12 
Module F: Culture, Religion, Society and Gender  12 
   
Module G: Practical Experience  Compulsory 18 
   
Module H: Master module (thesis etc.)  Compulsory 37 
   
Free electives  free choice  12 
This curriculum is available online in pdf or html format (GS 2010). As of October 2010, 
the first group of some one hundred students started this curriculum. As an important con-
sequence of the above curriculum changes, the crucial cognitive basis of this interdiscipli-
nary master’s curriculum is to be conveyed in the course of the so-called ‘Basics of Global 
Studies’ (Basics of GS 2011) lecture with 15 ECTS (within basic module A) containing 
input from all disciplines that comprise GS. Because only two modules from B to F have 
to be selected from the ‘advanced’ list of courses, in a ‘pessimistic’ scenario a student 
would pass only one or two weekly semester hours (~4 ECTS) of several of the interdisci-
plinary constituents of ‘Global Studies’. The seven year long planning process of the SC 
GS, however, has always tried to ensure thorough interdisciplinarity across all modules. 
A very important component of the final curriculum is practical experience (module G 
in Table 2) that has to be acquired outside the university, in the sense of a ‘reflective prac-
tice’ (Malone and Wilder 2008). In the spirit of the pedagogy of Freire (1970), the immer-
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sion into the real living situation of deprived people is the objective of this practical exer-
cise including a required academic analysis, ‘inquiry’ and ‘reflection in action’. 
5. Facts and Figures for the GS Master’S Curriculum 
As compared to the facts and figure pertaining to the ‘bundle of electives GS’ presented in 
Ahamer et al. (2011: 23–33), this chapter shows statistics on the GS master curriculum.  
Fig. 5. The central lecture is ‘Basics of GS’. Distribution of the 158 enrolled stu-
dents for the first academic year 2010/11 according to their disciplinary ori-
gin. Only 49 are typical GS master’s students (top row), the others have se-
lected this lecture from their curriculum, possibly to switch curricula later on 
 
Fig. 7 shows that only 31 per cent of the students enrolled in the introductory and key lec-
ture ‘Basics of Global Studies’ are typical master’s students in GS, the others pertained to 
other curricula and selected this core lecture as an elective for their own curriculum, pos-
sibly partly with the goal to start GS when having finished their bachelor's degree. Fig. 8 
identifies the year of entry into studies (at Austrian universities) by using the immatricula-
tion number and shows that most students are in or around their fourth year of studies.  
Ahamer • Multi-Disciplinary Didactics for Curricula 253 
Fig. 6. Years of entry into studies (at Austrian universities) for the students having 
enrolled in the first year of the GS master’s programme in Graz 
 
 
Fig. 9 shows that the marks for the key lecture ‘Basics of GS’ (at left) were composed by 
six components with an almost similar degree of difficulty (at right, symbolized by the 
columns in Fig. 1). Most students reached only around half of the possible points, that is 
the breakeven for a positive mark. Differences between the subsample of GS versus other 
students were significant only in sociology and culture (Fig. 10). The next chapter pro-
vides possible reasons, namely a structured dialogic online procedure that was followed 
mostly only by GS students. 
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Fig. 7. Results for the exams in ‘Basics of Global Studies’, the core lecture of GS 
Graz in 2011 (at left), as composed by the 6 ‘interfaculty’ disciplines  
(at right) 
  
Fig. 8. Comparison of the achievements of students from different disciplines in the 
lecture ‘Basics of Global Studies’ in 2010/11, ordered from best to worst 
total achievement (light grey = on average better in this discipline than 
Global Studies students, bold = worse than Global Studies students on 
average); BA = bachelor, MA = master. Best achievers were philosophy 
students, GS students were only slightly better than the average in all 
disciplines 
 
6. IT may Act as Turbo for Dialogic Learning 
Out of the 8 lecturers teaching the 6 main disciplines taught in ‘Basics of GS’ (see right in 
Fig. 9), only the author made extensive use of information technologies (IT) for learning, 
for example, web-based learning (Ahamer 2011c). The other lecturers only provided 
course notes as slides via email (including additional reading material). Therefore the sta-
tistical material presented may hint at the usefulness of e-learning strategies for multicul-
tural learning. 
Ahamer • Multi-Disciplinary Didactics for Curricula 255 
6.1. Lessons from a guided peer-review process 
Earlier experiences have suggested to use an online discussion forum (part of the WebCT 
learning platform, see Fig. 11) not only for downloading lecture notes but especially for 
writing and mutually reviewing students' standpoints (Fig. 12) which does pose a frame-
work for repeating and improving students’ achievements. According to the lecturer's im-
pressions, the quality of written work has doubled, especially for previously weak stu-
dents. A sizeable number of students comes from outside Austria, for example, from all 
three former conflict parties in former Yugoslavia (however, cordially socializing in Graz) 
or from Muslim Africa, thus representing a true multicultural setting. While most of the 
students already hold a bachelor's degree and are at master's level (see at left in Fig. 10), 
many are still inexperienced in writing differentiated views on intercultural issues evaluat-
ing several viewpoints at a time. A web-based discussion forum enables students  
1. to take enough time to review their peers' work in very detailed manner, word by 
word, and to comment on their classmates’ texts (~10 comments per students on average); 
2. to update their own previously authored texts in the light of the reviews other col-
leagues have received (for didactic reasons this was a double-open review, versus a dou-
ble-blind review); 
3. to receive very specific review comments from their peers (typically from 3–4 col-
leagues) that allow authors to judge the focus and variance of received comments; 
4. to receive specific and strict comments from the lecturer (typically 10–20 com-
ments, length of comments was often equal to the length of the original text, each single 
citation was retrieved and double-checked, often via Google Books); 
5. to iteratively and considerably improve their own texts before final assessment by 
the lecturer which is not at all common in the de facto Austrian university system. 
Fig. 9. The ‘Basics of GS’ platform (at left) and the distribution of achievable points 
for the subject ‘culture’: 20 points can be achieved by answering four 
questions during an overloaded 5h written test (for all 6 subjects) or also 
by beforehand writing a reviewable standpoint (5 p.) and 6 shorter exam-
ples ‘Ex’ (in sum 10 p.) using a web discussion forum. 
 
reviewable  
standpoint 
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Fig. 10. Usage of reviews was enabled for the ‘Basics of GS’ lecture. Students (1) 
deepened their academic competences and (2) grew together as a social 
group by this didactic strategy 
 
In this (guided) review process the communicational characteristic was that the lecturer 
provided strict additional reviews by himself and that marks were announced to be highly 
competitive for this lecture on ‘culture’. Thus, the strikingly high activity of students on 
the web platform (Fig. 13) makes sense: 90–95 per cent of all activities took place after the 
face-to-face lectures in the lecture hall during very intense two months between lectures 
and exam. 
Fig. 11. The frequency of web platform usage is highest after the last lecture in the 
course. In the key GS lecture, 90 per cent of hits and 95 per cent of time 
was registered after the last lecture of the author. This underlines that a 
web platform adds a turbo to learning. 
  
During a total of 2053 sessions of an average duration of 16 minutes, over 31000 hits were 
registered on the WebCT web platform; sessions (16 on a daily average) peaked around 
13:00 to 14:00, mainly in the months of December 2010 to January 2011. While all ‘Ba-
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sics of GS’ face-to-face lectures ended in January (and lectures specifically on culture al-
ready in December), students received the additional assignment from the ‘culture’ lec-
turer for (a) the reviewable standpoint and (b) the six examples ‘Ex’ (Fig. 11) with a dead-
line of January and February, respectively, which created the eminent post-course web 
activity (light brown areas in Fig. 13 and Fig. 16).  
The underlying didactic and pedagogic idea was to use the large dialogic potential of 
the web platform in order to strengthen students’ understanding of standpoints different 
from their own (Ahamer and Jekel 2010). Fig. 14 shows that this target was reached quan-
titatively, both if measured by means of time and hits. Expressed in an aggregated manner, 
over 128 hours were spent in discussion fora (45 per cent of all sessions) while 101 hours 
were spent retrieving and reading files (35 per cent of all sessions) by students (first two 
bars in Fig. 15). The insert in Fig. 15 stresses again the fact that work on the peer-
reviewable ‘standpoints on developmental theories’ has exclusively taken place after the 
last lecture in the lecture hall. The essence of this assignment was to interparadigmatically 
compare opposing approaches, of which ‘neo-colonialism’ and ‘dependency theory’ might 
represent extreme views. 
Fig. 12. Both the measured distribution of web page hits (at left) and of invested 
time (at right) shows that dialogic tools in the platform (posting, review-
ing) were used more frequently than monologic tools (content conveyed 
by lecture notes) 
  
Fig. 13. Tools: more ‘for a’ than ‘files’ or ‘folders’! 
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Fig. 15 shows that discussion fora (dialogic tools) received more hits than downloadable 
files or (monologic tools). 
Fig. 14. Hits to single web pages on the web platform (at left). Insert at right: the 
most important web pages are differentiated into “before” and “after” the 
last course at the lecture hall in order to quantify the “virtual only” stu-
dent activities: the peer-reviewable ”standpoints” were worked on only af-
ter the end of face-to-face courses 
 
 
The single one most hit page was the one leading to the ‘1 page standpoint on diverse de-
velopmental theories’ that had to be reviewed by all students in order to foster interpara-
digmatic understanding (top bar in Fig. 16 and Fig. 17). 
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Fig. 15. Visiting times for single web pages on the web platform. The page for the 
reviewable standpoints on developmental theories was by far the most 
visited of all pages – a clear success for dialogic and discoursive learning 
 
Both Fig. 16 and Fig. 17 show that single web pages regarding dialogic learning were 
used more frequently than for monologic learning. The conclusion is that students prefer a 
communicative structure when studying. Hence, IT-based learning constructed as dialogue 
is far more accepted by learners than mere ‘file download’ – which is an embryonic style 
of e-learning. 
It was already mentioned earlier that the key skill in intercultural learning is the un-
derstanding of views on complex realities that differ from one’s own. The listed items in 
Fig. 16 and Fig. 17 include assignments such as ‘Views of economic development’ and 
‘Modernisation theory versus Dependency theory’ that lie at the heart of conceptual ten-
sions in developmental policy and practice. By receiving and giving reviewer's feedback to 
and from colleagues (and the lecturer) students learn to understand facets of the complex 
field of economic, cultural and institutional development characteristic for ‘global 
change’. It is hence essential that the didactic structure of this course stays in analogy to 
the course’s content, namely using a dialogic emphasis.  
Both Fig. 16 and Fig. 17 show that some of the students’ postings reached a better hit 
number and visiting time than original ‘course notes’ delivered by lecturers. This can be 
understood as: students use more of their own (intermediate) results for learning than 
(some) lecturers' texts! 
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Fig. 16. Cumulative frequency distributions of sessions and total time, of monologi-
cally oriented web activities (folders and files visited) and of dialogically 
oriented web activities (postings read and published, chat pages). Post-
ings were the main means of delivering (dialogic) results while chats were 
not especially encouraged 
 
Fig. 18 shows six parameters applying to all 105 students in a manner sorted according to 
their values. Such a cumulative frequency distribution is able to give aggregated insights 
into basic descriptors of social dynamics among the students. The ‘sessions’ curve shows 
“normal” statistical behaviour, the ‘total time spent on the web platform’ curve suggests 
hypothesizing two clusters of 15 and 55 students (marked by green points) according to 
the amount of time they invested. 
As an orientation, a number of 50 students (equalling the median of all 100 students 
active on the WebCT, or the number of students immatriculated in GS, or the number of 
students spending more than 3 hours on the WebCT) is used for the following aggregate 
assessments:  
 while the most active student completed ~100 sessions, half of them had at least 10 
sessions; 
 while the best web watcher spent 44 hours on the platform, half were there >3 
hours; 
 while the most active visitor visited over 1000 folder pages, half visited >10 folders; 
 while the most active downloader viewed 470 files, half viewed >12 files; 
 while the most active forum member viewed ~1200 posts, half viewed 20 posts; 
 while the most active forum poster published 18 postings, half posted 1 or more. 
A thorough analysis of individual students' performance shows: out of the 45 students 
who attempted the written exam for the entire course on ‘Basics of GS’, three never ac-
cessed the WebCT or did not even register there. The nine students who failed this exam 
are marked with a white point on the ‘total time’ curve of Fig. 18, they all spent less than 
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twelve hours on the web platform. On the other hand, all the 20 students with the highest 
total WebCT presence time passed the exam at their first attempt, which indicates the use-
fulness of IT-based learning.  
This principal result is more striking when singling out only the ‘culture’ performance: 
all (but one) of the 15 students with the highest amount of time spent on the web platform 
were ranked among the best 17 performers in the subject ‘culture’ (Fig. 20 top right). 
When looking for correlations among descriptors for students’ performance (e.g., dis-
played as ordered series in Fig. 19), it becomes evident that diverse subject matters are not 
closely correlated with each other (Fig. 20). A tentative ‘interdisciplinary landscape’ or 
‘sociogram’ of the GS subject matters is displayed in Fig. 21 when using the 1/r² values 
(see table) as distances between the circles. 
Fig. 17. Comparison of students’ performance at the exam for different scientific 
disciplines does not visibly correlate which is typical for interdisciplinary 
curricula 
  
 
Fig. 18. Ordered graphs of points achieved in ‘culture’ (above left) show that half 
of all students were evaluated positive in this discipline. The number of 
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postings published in the same sequence of students suggests an existent 
but not very striking correlation (above right). In general, correlations be-
tween the achievements in ‘culture’ with the achievements in other disci-
plines vary widely, as expectable for interdisciplinary lectures (below) 
 
   
Fig. 19. Above: Correlations between achieved points in the individual disciplinary 
subjects are characterized by the coefficient of determination r². Below: 
Tentative links between the subjects when relying on these correlations 
of the exam results 
r² History Economic  History Economics Environment Sociology Culture 
Economic History 0.05      
Economics 0.33 0.44     
Environment 0.09 0.16 0.16    
Sociology 0.04 0.30 0.17 0.07   
Culture 0.16 0.13 0.13 0.06 0.18  
International Law 0.13 0.16 0.17 0.34 0.01 0.38 
 
 
48h
24h
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In total, the author thinks that the most important lessons from this ‘guided peer re-
view process’ are well-accepted students' opportunities: 
 to receive friendly but strict reviews from both student colleagues and the lecturer 
and to considerably improve text quality on the basis of such a strict review process; 
 to learn from reviews other students have received (this was made use of widely, the 
25 most active students read more than 200 postings!); 
 to create a social web that was based on more than five minutes of accidental con-
versation in the lecture hall or on the corridors. 
Thus, the author thinks that IT is able to strongly contribute to a sound academic so-
cial network between learners based on academic excellence that would not have been 
possible without IT tools such as web platforms. 
A guided review situation favours motivation oriented towards ‘fulfilling external tar-
gets’. 
6.2. Lessons from an unguided peer review process 
Another (unguided) review process was reported earlier in great statistical detail (Ahamer 
2011a, 2011b). As a contrast to the experience above, a more unguided and hence autopoi-
etic social process exhibited rather orientation at ‘what do students believe that their col-
leagues would appreciate’ and rather led to mutual assistance, quite similar to ‘citation 
cartels’ hypothesized by some authors to exist even at later stages of academic careers. 
In such unguided processes, the two following self-organising (autopoietic) social 
mechanisms seem to take place (when differentiating between more ‘pragmatic’ and more 
‘idealistic’ students): 
(1) The guiding motivation for the two subsets (more ‘pragmatic’ and more ‘idealistic’ 
reviewers) for their actions (i.e. what they give) seems to be as displayed in Table 3. 
Table 3. Guiding motivation for the two subsets (‘pragmatic’ and ‘idealistic’)  
reviewers for their actions (what they give)  
Actions pragmatic reviewers idealistic reviewers 
How many reviews do I 
perform? 
 Certainly the more I receive  I don't care how many I re-
ceive 
How mildly will I perform 
my reviews? 
 Certainly the milder my 
received reviews are 
 I don't care how mild my re-
ceived reviews are 
(2) The guiding expectation for the two subsets (more ‘pragmatic’ and more ‘idealistic’ 
reviewers) for their receptions (i.e. what they receive) seems to be as displayed in Table 4: 
Table 4. Guiding expectation for the two subsets (‘pragmatic’ and ‘idealistic’) of 
reviewers for their receptions (what they receive)  
reactions pragmatic reviewers idealistic reviewers 
How many reviews do I 
receive? 
 certainly the more reviews 
I have given 
 I don't know, possibly the 
milder I have been 
How mild will my re-
ceived reviews be? 
 certainly the milder my 
distributed reviews were 
 I don't know, possibly the 
more reviews I have received 
From Table 3 (left) it can be concluded that ‘pragmatic reviewers’ have two potentially 
inciting arguments for higher levels of own activity that both refer to what they have ex-
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perienced themselves so far. Systemically speaking, this constitutes a feedback circle that 
might be coupled back in a proportionate manner (i.e. positive feedback circle). ‘Idealistic 
reviewers’ have no such feedback loop constituted by their pattern of motivation – but 
they appear to be more focused on the ‘real target’. 
This means that individuals inclined to ‘pragmatic behaviour’ might either slip into a 
self-enhancing circle of ever more review activities or else slip into a loop where already 
low activity is still lowered by the mechanism of motivation. Similarly, from Table 3 
(right) it can be concluded that ‘idealistic reviewers’ have a generally lower level of readi-
ness to see or even accept such structural driving factors for their success. Their motiva-
tion grounds elsewhere, most likely in ‘the (ethically sound) quality’ of their contribution.  
The same structure of deliberations, only for expectations of what will happen to them 
is shown in Table 4. The logical structure of the left column allows for a positive feedback 
circle (dynamic), the logical structure of the right column does not (static).  
Table 5. Constituents for the two subsets (‘pragmatic’ and ‘idealistic’) of students: 
what do they depend on?  
 pragmatic reviewers idealistic reviewers 
Logical structure  positive feedback circle 
(dynamic) 
 no positive feedback circle 
(static) 
Source of motivation  exogenous   endogenous 
Table 5 finally suggests a more dynamic structure of the ‘motivation engine’ which could 
explain that ‘non-idealistic but pragmatic’ behaviour is helped by this feedback circle and 
therefore attains higher activity levels as compared to the instructor’s assessment alone. 
An unguided review situation favours motivation oriented towards ‘fulfilling internal 
targets’. 
Another conclusion is repeated from above: In general it becomes clearly visible that 
both functionalities of course design – namely ‘optimizing the pattern of social flow’ and 
‘creating a true picture of the students’ competence’ – do not necessarily always act in the 
same direction; ideally both functionalities should be separated and should complement 
each other. 
7. Conclusions 
Two interdisciplinary and intercultural curricula named ‘Global Studies’ (GS) are cur-
rently implemented at the University of Graz, in the second largest city in Austria. Since 
2004, in over 50 meetings the Steering Committee ‘Global Studies’ as a peer-oriented dia-
logic and discoursive panel has designed their profiles. It was complemented last year by 
a ‘Curricula Commission Global Studies’ defining the details of the master's curriculum. 
1. One ‘bundle of electives Global Studies’ was launched in 2004 and has received 
334 enrolments from students until summer 2010, one third of them from the Department 
of Humanities. A rich interdisciplinary setting is characteristic for the student cohorts 
populating GS and passing at least two credits from each of six modules (1) Globalisation, 
Development, Sustainability, Gender – An Introduction, (2) World History, (3) World 
Economics, (4) World Politics and International Law, (5) World Cultures, World Relig-
ions and World Ethics, (6) Organisational and Social Skills. 
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2. A new ‘Global Studies master's curriculum’ was implemented in autumn 2010 
amounting to a total of 120 ECTS credits. 29 ECTS of courses from an integrative ‘basic 
module’ must be taken. These are complemented by free electives from five modules, out 
of which two must be chosen. Such a curriculum appears presently the best approach to 
promoting the ideals of interdisciplinarity and interculturality given the severe financial 
bottlenecks faced by Austrian universities. 
The spirit and tacit constitution of ‘Global Studies’ at Graz has always been inclusive, 
not exclusive. Strategic decisions were based on a broad consensus of Steering Committee 
members who were dispatched from their departments in order to materialise the views of 
different scientific cultures, thus creating another instance of an ‘intercultural learning 
process’.  
All the above GS-related initiatives have been implemented using the learning platform 
WebCT. 
Experience has shown that this wide variety of web-based approaches is able to cover 
sufficiently well the needed variety of (i) scientific approaches, (ii) didactic procedures 
that synthesise opposing world views and integrate antagonistic understandings and (iii) 
communicational profiles that are materialised in the diversity of students’ scientific cul-
tures. 
The experiences from the first year of the key interdisciplinary lecture ‘Basics of 
Global Studies’ suggests that e-learning facilities represent a ‘turbo’ to student learning, 
especially because of a boost of (web-based) review activities that occur along a guided 
structure implemented by the author. A peer review system combined with a strict review 
by the lecturer proved to be the best system for maintaining high academic quality while 
achieving high density of student-student interaction in this multicultural environment. 
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Local Solutions in a Global Environment: 
Facilitating National Strategies in New Zealand* 
 
Jim Sheffield 
 
 
How should New Zealand respond to the multiple, intertwined and fast-changing 
impacts of globalization? What strategies are available to this small South Pa-
cific country and how may these be facilitated? This empirical research frames 
the facilitation of selected local solutions in a global environment within the 
theoretical perspective of pluralism and communicative action. The facilitation 
of aspects of national policies in the domains of science funding, economic de-
velopment and regional growth is reviewed. Electronic meeting technology was 
employed. The focus question is: ‘Does electronic discourse increase the success 
of local solutions in a global environment?’ 
Keywords: New Zealand, local solutions, global environment, pluralism, com-
municative action, electronic discourse. 
1. A New Zealand Response to Globalization 
Productivity isn't everything, but in the long run, 
it is almost everything. A country's ability to improve 
its standard of living over time depends almost en-
tirely on its ability to raise its output per worker. 
Krugman 1997 
Raising productivity is the core economic challenge for New Zealand over the medium 
term. Small, high-productivity economies rely heavily on international connections –  
the flows of people, capital, trade and ideas between countries around the world (New 
Zealand Government 2009). In the current era of globalization, New Zealand's combined 
lack of any major home market effect, small population and lack of major agglomeration 
effects, and the extreme geographical isolation, breaks the usual link between entrepre-
neurship, innovation and growth (McCann 2009). Domestic policy settings in science 
funding, economic development, and regional planning are critical to making the most of 
international opportunities. A well-funded science sector encourages entrepreneurial and 
innovative activity to be located in New Zealand and facilitates international knowledge 
transfer. Economic development improves competitiveness in global markets, including 
those in the Asia-Pacific region. Regional planning in Auckland, New Zealand's major 
growth area, attracts skilled migrants and reduces the loss of New Zealand-born citizens to 
Australia and other countries (Cheshire 2012) (Fig. 1). 
                                                          
* This article was first published in Journal of Globalization Studies, Vol. 4, Num. 2, 2013, pp. 104–128. 
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Fig. 1. Some aspects of a New Zealand response to globalization 
 
Source: New Zealand Government (2009). 
This article reviews the facilitation of aspects of national policies in the domains of sci-
ence funding, economic development and regional planning (Table 1). Electronic meeting 
technology was employed. The focus question is: ‘Does electronic discourse increase the 
success of local solutions in a global environment?’ The remainder of the article is struc-
tured as follows. Section 2 develops a theoretical framework. Section 3 describes the 
methodology for gathering empirical evidence. Sections 4–6 review the facilitation cases. 
Section 7 discusses the findings in the light of the theoretical framework. Section 8, which 
considers the lessons learned, concludes the article. 
Table 1. Facilitating national strategies in New Zealand 
Science funding 
Sponsor: New Zealand Ministry of Research, Science and Technology. 
Task: Allocation of the US (2012) $2 Billion Public Good Science Fund across all 40 
areas of NZ science. 
Role/process/group: Design of a 5-day group decision process for a 5-year planning 
and budgeting period. Implementation of the process with the national Science and Tech-
nology Expert Panel. 
Goal: Legitimacy in science governance. A national consensus on priorities and trans-
parency in funding. 
Economic development 
Sponsor: New Zealand Trade Development Board. 
Task: To upgrade New Zealand's competitive position in global markets. 
Role/process/group: Design of 70 industry-wide strategic planning interventions con-
ducted with the assistance of Harvard's Michael Porter. Implementation with 1,000+ indus-
try leaders. 
Goal: Improved relationships among industry stakeholders and formation of joint ac-
tion groups 
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Regional planning 
Sponsor: Auckland Regional Council. 
Task: Strategic evaluation of long-term plans for the Auckland region, NZ's main 
growth area. 
Role/process/group: Design of a group decision process to close out a 7-year planning 
cycle. Implementation with representatives of the 7 territorial authorities and the Auckland 
Regional Council. 
Goal: Improved trust and understanding among decision makers. Support for a consen-
sus spatial plan. 
2. Theory Development 
Facilitating national policies required extensive consultation among a large number of 
stakeholders in different organizations. The context was pluralistic – the objectives of so-
cial actors were divergent and power was diffused (Jarzabkowski and Fenton 2006; Denis 
et al. 2007). A modern information and communication technology – electronic meeting 
systems – has been found useful in supporting organizational groups engaged in strategic 
planning activities within an established power structure (Fjermestad and Hiltz 2001; 
Shaw et al. 2003). Yet research on electronic support in the context of pluralism and inter-
organizational meetings suggests that the role of electronic meeting systems is unclear. For 
example, if electronic technology is employed in a meeting sponsored by one organization 
but attended by members of other organizations, whose interpretation of the ends served 
by the electronically-supported meeting should determine success? Who is the client? 
(Ackermann et al. 2005.) What roles and responsibilities will be recognized? (Franco 
2008) Is it sensible to expect powerful stakeholders to use collaborative technologies when 
these introduce unwanted accountability and make the exercise of power more difficult? 
(Schultze and Leidner 2002; Lewis et al. 2007) What type of model should drive the facili-
tation process? (Morton et al. 2003.) By what concept(s) of rationality or validity should 
the facilitator be held accountable for a positive outcome? (Kolfschoten et al. 2007) Inter-
organizational meetings require the surfacing and testing of assumptions from opposing 
perspectives (Mitroff and Linstone 1993). In dialectical terms a pair of opposing perspec-
tives is seen as a Hegelian thesis and antithesis (Millet and Gogan 2006). Ignorance is 
reduced via active engagement with the conflict and confusion that accompany surfacing 
and reconciling opposing (multiple or pluralistic) perspectives, and giving birth to a new, 
more current synthesis. 
Habermas (1984) provides a theory about how claims to pluralistic knowledge should 
best emerge from the communicative process. In Habermas' theory of communicative ac-
tion, an ideal speech situation is defined as one in which all participants are free to ques-
tion any utterance on the basis of its claims to objective truth, rightness for the context, 
and sincerity of the speaker. The speaker must be open to hearing and rationally respond-
ing to the questions that are asked. Power relations, that in other circumstances might al-
low some participants to ignore the perspectives of others, are set aside in favour of genu-
ine dialogue. 
In the theory of communicative action, knowledge is evaluated from three perspec-
tives (Habermas 1984: 100): 
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 Personal perspective (‘why I feel, and would be’). The personal or subjective 
world that is the totality of the experiences to which the speaker or actor has privileged 
access (because it is the speaker or actor that experienced them). Claims to subjective truth 
are evaluated in terms of the sincerity of the speaker or actor. 
 Interpersonal perspective (‘what we say, and should be’). The totality of interper-
sonal relations legitimately regulated by contextual expectations or norms. Claims to in-
terpersonal norms are evaluated in terms of the rightness of the speakers or actors. 
 Technical Perspective (‘how it is, and could be’). The technical world of material 
fact that is the totality of all entities about which objectively true statements are possible, 
or could be brought about by purposeful intervention. Claims to facts and technical exper-
tise are evaluated in terms of objective truth. 
The ideal speech situation provides a standard of excellence for the reflective commu-
nicative action undertaken by two or more stakeholders in order to stabilize mutual under-
standing. Similarly group decision is considered as a collaborative process that seeks 
‘rightness’ in the fit (coherence) between personal values, interpersonal objectives and 
technical decision criteria (Shakun 2003). This requires participants to develop and inte-
grate perspectives from generic roles that Churchman terms system designer (more techni-
cal / task oriented), decision maker (more interpersonal / consensus oriented) and client 
(more subjective / value oriented) (Churchman 1971: 200). Five facilitation principles 
based on pluralism and communicative action are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2. Five facilitation principles based on pluralism and communicative action.  
Adapted from Churchman 1971; Habermas 1984 
Principle 1. Personal commitment 
Express claims to sincerity by free and open disclosure of participants' subjectivity 
(identity, experience and values). 
Ensure that participants give voice to their personal commitments and multiple identi-
ties and that the periods of silence are provided as an aid to ethical self-reflection.  
The procedure for evaluating the evidence should be validated by expressing beliefs 
and aspirations, voices and images (‘story telling’) that are unconstrained by technical is-
sues and unrestrained by the interpersonal context. 
Principle 2. Interpersonal agreement 
Enact claims to rightness via discussion among all those who are entitled to be repre-
sented.  
Ensure that the discussion addresses the role-based needs of stakeholders.  
The procedure for evaluating the evidence should be validated by full participation  
in a debate conducted under the norms of established legitimate interpersonal relationships. 
Principle 3. Technical excellence 
Present claims to objective truth via research evidence.  
Ensure that the findings by technical experts are examined critically and the findings 
documented.  
The procedure for evaluating the evidence should be validated by a willingness to 
adopt a cognitive, objectivating attitude towards the facts. Listen to the evidence, look at 
the facts – avoid partisan delusions. 
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Principle 4. Coherence 
Assuming that claims for valid personal, interpersonal and technical knowledge have 
been surfaced, ensure that they are coherent. An apparent contradiction (thesis and antithe-
sis) should serve as a precursor to a Hegelian synthesis. Oh my God, I was wrong! We were 
all wrong!  
The procedure for evaluating coherence should be validated by a willingness to probe 
the evidence from all three perspectives, to identify strengths and weaknesses in the evi-
dence, and to identify tradeoffs. 
Principle 5. Overall Success  
Success is conceptualized in Churchmanian terms as a meeting of the minds about in-
tertwined relational and task issues that creates the capability of choosing the right means 
for one's desired ends.  
This requires participants to develop and integrate perspectives from generic roles that 
Churchman terms system designer (more technical / task oriented), decision maker (more 
interpersonal / consensus oriented) and client (more subjective / value oriented). 
More specifically, success is indicated by insight leading to a consensus model that 
provides decision makers with a rationale for action. 
Integration of the Habermasian perspectives on knowledge is an exercise in sense-making 
(Weick 1979). Themes are detected both prospectively and retrospectively and emerge 
from communicative acts in a somewhat unpredictable manner. Nevertheless, it is com-
mon for discourse on intentions to proceed from the personal to the technical, followed by 
discourse on outcomes that proceed from the technical to the personal (Shakun 2003). 
Each pair of discourses (intention and outcome) in the same knowledge perspective devel-
ops mutual understanding via one of the principles in Table 2 and evaluates rationality via 
the relevant Habermasian knowledge claim (Sheffield 2005). The standard of excellence 
for communicative action can be stated as follows: personal commitment (validated by 
sincerity) to an interpersonal consensus (validated by rightness) for technical excellence 
(validated by objective truth). Each aspect of excellence is associated with Principle 1, 2 
or 3, and the collective value of all three principles is evaluated in terms of Principle 4 and 
Principle 5 (Table 2). In the current research pluralism and electronic discourse are evalu-
ated via qualitative measures of the impact on overall success of the facilitation principles 
and associated framework (Fig. 2). 
Pluralism is a notable feature not only of communicative action but of research in ar-
eas as diverse as neuroscience (Lehrer 2009), knowledge management (Sheffield and Guo 
2007a, 2007b; Sheffield 2008b), organizational sense-making (Weick 1979; Snowden and 
Boone 2007) and systemic development (Sheffield 2008a, 2009a; Midgley and Pinzón 
2011). Recent advances in neuroscience ground pluralism in the biology of decision be-
haviour (Lehrer 2009; Sheffield 2012). Various scanning devices reveal that the brain is an 
argument between neural regions dealing with emotion, morality and reason. Seen through 
the perspective of neuroscience the standard of excellence in group decision making be-
comes the pursuit of success through emotional commitment to a moral agreement for rea-
soned excellence.  
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Fig. 2. A framework for facilitating national strategies in New Zealand based  
on pluralism and communicative action (Habermas 1984). Adapted from 
Sheffield (2004, 2009b) 
 
Pluralism can be viewed as a consequence of intertwined relationship and task issues, and 
intertwined divergent and convergent thinking. The electronic discourse and supporting 
technology employed in the current research supported pluralism via two key attributes. 
Firstly, the technology provided a degree of anonymity that reduced the anxiety about sur-
facing opposing perspectives. This reduced participants' conflict about personal (emo-
tional) commitments and interpersonal (moral) issues. Secondly, the technology reduced 
confusion by providing automatic recording of all electronic discourse (‘group memory’). 
This enhanced participants' technical (reasoning) capabilities. Together these attributes 
allowed procedures for idea generation (divergent thinking) to be separated in time from 
procedures for information analysis (convergent thinking). This in turn enabled a separate 
focus on interlocked issues about relationships (trust) and cognition (understanding). In the 
current research all of these concepts are included in the evaluation of satisfaction with 
electronic discourse (Fig. 3). 
Fig. 3. Evaluation of participant's satisfaction with electronic discourse 
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3. Methodology 
A multiple case study approach was adopted. The unit of analysis was a meeting (or series 
of meetings) facilitated by a leader in the domain of either science funding, economic de-
velopment or regional planning. The facilitator was not part of the research team. The re-
search team consisted of two academics and two assistants. The role of the research team 
was primarily one of data gathering and analysis. The data gathering techniques that were 
used included direct observation, interviews with the facilitator and his staff, interviews 
with meeting participants, analysis of meeting reports and computer files, and a question-
naire that was administered to participants at the end of their meeting. 
All meetings were conducted in an electronic meeting facility at the University of 
Auckland. This facility, called the Decision Support Centre (DSC), consists of a large 
room containing 20 computers set out on an elongated table. In addition, the DSC contains 
a set of four large, moveable whiteboards for more traditional methods of recording the 
group's activities. The purpose of the computer facilities is to run Ventana Corporation's 
GroupSystems, a text-based electronic meeting support system (Sheffield and Gallupe 
1994; Fjermestad and Hiltz 2001; Ackermann et al. 2005). GroupSystems supports proc-
esses that include the anonymous and simultaneous individual generation of ideas and the 
prioritization and brief discussion of key findings (Van de Ven and Delbecq 1971). 
GroupSystems also supports the anonymous and simultaneous individual allocation of 
budget amounts and the amalgamation and analysis of a group budget (Fig. 4). In the fol-
lowing three sections the facilitation cases are reviewed. 
Fig. 4. Electronic meeting technology 
 
Source: Sheffield 1993.  
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4. Facilitating Science Funding 
The clashing point of two subjects, two disci-
plines, two cultures of two galaxies, so far as that goes 
ought to produce creative chances.  
(Snow 1959: 16) 
There was such a huge diversity of people on the 
panel, from ‘pure research’ oriented scientists to hard-
headed business people, that significant political dif-
ferences were inevitable. ‘(Electronic discourse) put 
the politics in a black box, to be dealt with later’.  
(Participant in a science funding meeting) 
Bednarek (2011) analyses the strategizing process in New Zealand's science sector. She 
found that the context was pluralistic – the objectives of social actors were divergent and 
power was diffused. In this context institutions found legitimacy to be a powerful determi-
nant of success. Legitimacy was found to comprise aspects which included the cognitive, 
normative/moral/regulative and socio-political. Organizations in New Zealand's science 
sector were characterized by multiple embedded tensions and complex diffused power 
structures. The author's analysis demonstrated both the creative potential and challenges in 
strategizing for legitimacy amidst pluralism. 
The facilitation of aspects of science funding starts with the theoretical perspective 
that objective facts, societal norms, and personal values are intertwined. Objectivism, so-
cial constructionism and subjectivism are viewed as emergent perspectives in a broader 
and more critical discourse. The chief scientist of New Zealand, Sir Peter Gluckman, em-
phasizes that science is no longer linear, authoritative and definitive, provided only by a 
domain-specific expert. Rather science is increasingly characterized by complexity, where 
multiple perspectives on knowledge are required to address the asymmetric payoffs asso-
ciated with various policy options (Gluckman 2011).  
The chief executive of New Zealand's Ministry of Research, Science and Technology 
(MORST) and staff spent four days in the Decision Support Centre at the University of 
Auckland (Fig. 4) with the panel appointed to allocate the Public Good Science Fund. The 
panel distributed US(2012)$ 2 billion across all 40 areas of New Zealand science. This is 
by far the largest contestable fund in New Zealand and funding decisions directly or indi-
rectly impact most of the New Zealand economy. The technical (cognitive) issues were 
complex – each of the twenty panel members had received approximately 1,000 pages of 
briefing papers. A group memory device would clearly be required to support deliberation. 
The personal and interpersonal (socio-political) issues were perhaps more difficult to ig-
nore – many of the panel were scientists, and nobody wanted reductions in areas dear to 
them. The decision process was designed to reduce politics about divergent objectives to a 
manageable level, so that attention could be directed to the more technical, task-oriented 
aspects of the decision process. 
One member of the panel was the chief executive of the New Zealand Trade Devel-
opment Board, Rick Christie. He reported that electronic discourse ‘tends to be fairer – 
more objective – it draws on a different range of skills. But there's no question of not being 
heard – which can be a problem in meetings where there's just verbal interaction… If you 
are seeking ideas on something not identified with the contributor, then it's a great level-
ler…’ (Sheffield 1993) Another member of the panel was John Butcher, director of the 
Sheffield • Local Solutions in a Global Environment 277 
Forest Research Institute's Wood Technology Division. He reported that there was such a 
huge diversity of people on the panel, from ‘pure research’ oriented scientists to hard-
headed business people, that significant political differences were inevitable, and that 
‘(electronic discourse) put the politics in a black box, to be dealt with later’ (Ibid.). 
Quantitative evidence on the efficiency and effectiveness of facilitating science fund-
ing was obtained via a survey instrument (see Appendix). The instrument was adminis-
tered to all participants at the end of the final day of the electronically-supported meetings. 
Participants' satisfaction with electronic discourse averaged 5.9 on a 7 point scale (1 = low 
satisfaction, 7 = high satisfaction). Participants were satisfied with the focus on personal 
and interpersonal knowledge and the management of relationship issues – absence of per-
ceived conflict (6.1) and consensus for cooperative action (6.0) received the highest rat-
ings. Participants were also satisfied with the focus on technical knowledge – ratings for 
participation (5.9) and information exchange (5.8) were also high (Fig. 5). 
Fig. 5. Science funding. Participants' satisfaction with electronic discourse averaged 
5.9 (1 = Low satisfaction; 7 = High satisfaction) 
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5. Facilitating Economic Development 
Sheffield and Gallupe (1994, 1995) describe an application of electronic meeting technol-
ogy to a series of economic policy-making meetings sponsored by the New Zealand Trade 
Development Board. The meetings were part of a national study aiming to upgrade New 
Zealand's competitive position in global markets. They were held in Auckland, the main 
economic region of New Zealand, and were branded ‘Advantage Auckland’. The aim of 
the research was to determine if electronic meeting technology could support an economic 
development process where participants came from a variety of backgrounds (e.g., busi-
ness competitors, different ethnic groups) and where meeting urgency and efficiency were 
of prime importance.  
The national study was implemented with the assistance of Harvard's Michael Porter 
and was framed by his book The Competitive Advantage of Nations (Porter 1990). It 
started with the application of Porter's Diamond Model of industry-based competitiveness 
to analyze the New Zealand economy and to develop recommendations for improvement. 
Case studies were completed on 20 economic sectors which in total comprised 85 per cent 
of New Zealand's exports. The results were published in an influential book entitled Up-
grading New Zealand's Competitive Advantage (Crocombe et al. 1991). It was intended to 
serve as a basis for positive action by individuals, companies, unions, industry groups, and 
government. It sought to explain why New Zealand needed: 
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 a new, more comprehensive economic framework; 
 a fundamental re-engineering of attitudes, strategies and institutions; 
 systematic upgrading of sources of competitive advantage. 
At the time of the study, however, the New Zealand economy was in recession. Most 
businesses were dependent on the shrinking local market and as a consequence faced se-
vere competition on price and high levels of business failure. Growth in export earnings 
became the primary goal of government economic policy. Cooperative efforts to upgrade 
competitive advantage were urgently required – yet were expected to be difficult to ar-
range. 
The Advantage Auckland meetings had four key objectives: 
1. to involve a large number of business leaders with a variety of backgrounds in 
sector and enterprise planning; 
2. to assist those who were business competitors to move beyond price comple-
tion in local markets and seek opportunities for joint action to upgrade indus-
try competitiveness in world markets; 
3. to develop business opportunities for ethnic groups such as Maori who were 
suffering from high rates of unemployment; 
4. to develop a collaborative action plan containing five initiatives that the meet-
ing participants were committed to implement. 
The final design of the meetings reflected the assumptions of the research team and 
facilitator: 
 that some participants would require ‘unfreezing’ from their initial viewpoints 
(Lewin 1947; Schein 1993); 
 that anonymous brainstorming on carefully selected topics would build opportuni-
ties for collaborative action although brief oral discussions would be required for agree-
ment on key ideas; 
 that building commitment to implement the action plans was primarily a social 
process that could best be supported in a rich communication medium (Daft and Lengel 
1986; Sheffield 1995a).  
There were five stages in each meeting. The purpose was to obtain working agreement 
on: meeting objectives, industry competitive advantages and disadvantages, actions to en-
hance competitive advantage, detailed action plans, and commitment to implementation. 
Earlier stages featured anonymous brainstorming within a strong organizing structure. In 
the last two stages, structure was not imposed – it emerged largely from the direct face-to-
face interaction of the participants. In these stages the facilitator served primarily as coach 
and the electronic support served primarily as a memory aid. The design and evaluation of 
meeting discourse reflected elements of the task (Porter's Diamond Model) and four rec-
ommendations for ‘unfreezing’ (Lewin 1947): 
1) participants feel psychologically safe; 
2) participants step outside existing cultural norms; 
3) participants (especially the leaders) learn something new; 
4) a formal change process is implemented. 
A series of 12 meetings were attended by 250 business leaders with a variety of back-
grounds (Sheffield and Gallupe 1994). The primary result for each participant from their 
meeting was a 50- to 80-page bound transcript. Quantitative evidence about meeting effec-
Sheffield • Local Solutions in a Global Environment 279 
tiveness and participant satisfaction was obtained via a survey instrument administered at 
the end of each meeting. The results of the questionnaire (see Appendix) indicated that 
participants felt that the meetings were both very effective and efficient. Answers to ques-
tionnaire item 1 indicated that participants felt that if the meetings were held using con-
ventional meeting support, each would have taken three times as long. Average effective-
ness (measured via the average of items 3b-24) was 6.1 (1 = Low satisfaction; 7 = High 
satisfaction). Participants felt that the way the session was run by the facilitator was excel-
lent (6.3) and the technology was very easy and fun to use (6.3).  
Participants' satisfaction with electronic discourse was measured via four measures 
that are numbered so as to match the four recommendations for unfreezing: 
1) absence of perceived conflict; 
2) participation; 
3) information exchange; 
4) consensus for cooperative action. 
As demonstrated in Fig. 6, these measures of the meeting process are conceptually re-
lated to procedure (either divergent or convergent) and focus (either relationship or task). 
For the 12 Advantage Auckland meetings, the average of these four measures was 6.1 (1 = 
Low satisfaction; 7 = High satisfaction) (Fig. 6).  
Fig. 6. Economic development. Participants' satisfaction with electronic discourse 
averaged 6.1 (1 = Low satisfaction; 7 = High satisfaction) 
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Source: Sheffield and Gallupe (1994, 1995).  
The follow-up study two years after the meetings revealed that the success of the ac-
tion plans varied considerably. Some were discontinued within months. Others such as the 
Marine Exporters Group (Marex) remain in existence and have become central to their 
industries. The most successful action plans were those in industries where previous meet-
ings had been marked by dysfunctional conflict. Individuals in these meetings collectively 
possessed resources which, when shared and focused in the absence of perceived conflict, 
were sufficient to support successful initiatives. Subsequently, further 58 meetings were 
held in Auckland that were attended by approximately 1,000 business leaders. The Advan-
tage Auckland meetings led directly to the establishment of a group support facility at Vic-
toria University in the capital city of Wellington. The Wellington facility has supported 
many campaigns, most of which are sponsored by national government, some with the 
goal of upgrading New Zealand's competitive position in global markets. 
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6. Facilitating Regional Planning 
6.1. Introduction 
At the time of this research study, the governance of the Auckland region was character-
ized by divergent objectives (politics) and diffuse power structures (decentralized govern-
ance) (Healey 1997). Planners from seven territorial authorities met on occasion with the 
planning team from the regional council to develop comprehensive urban growth plans. 
They negotiated a shared meaning about facts (attributes of Auckland), norms (mutual 
expectations), and personal commitments (to one's own visions – and how they should be 
funded). Comprehensive scenarios for rival strategies were iteratively developed and 
evaluated throughout lengthy planning cycles. The process was complex and politics, con-
fusion, and conflict were accepted as the norm.  
Political differences in the Auckland region had been exacerbated by a combination of 
limited resources and population growth from internal and external migration. The politics 
around transportation were particularly difficult. Trip times were increasing and transpor-
tation costs, which included lost productivity, were increasing. While transportation mod-
elling had been extensively used, issues of governance, funding, and collaborative plan-
ning remained. In the absence of a robust and responsive governance structure, delibera-
tions about managing population growth were marked by political differences (Royal 
Commission on Auckland Governance 2007; New Zealand Council for Infrastructure De-
velopment 2008).  
Confusion arose from the limited role of a single decision maker and the complexity 
of the substantive factual issues. For example, multiple organizations were involved in 
transportation governance – their roles were specialized and included control, participa-
tion, planning, funding, and operation/management. While each organization managed 
part of the transport system, none was responsible for the system as a whole. Region-wide 
or comprehensive urban planning necessitated a critical evaluation of conflicting claims 
about intertwined criteria related to transportation, housing, workplaces, amenities, etc., by 
individuals primarily situated within organizations with divergent objectives. To a greater 
or lesser extent, all social actors suffered from confusion.  
Conflict arose from the complexity of the power relationships among decision makers. 
Local Government legislation conferred powers on the regional council to plan for the re-
gion ‘in consultation with’ territorial authorities. Each authority maintained a planning 
office responsible to its own council. Each was empowered to serve its own constituency 
and expected the comprehensive urban plan to serve its own interest. To a greater or lesser 
extent, all social actors were embroiled in power conflicts. 
In Table 2 overall success required participants to develop and integrate perspectives 
from generic roles that Churchman terms system designer (more technical / task oriented), 
decision maker (more interpersonal / consensus oriented) and client (more subjective / 
value oriented). In the regional planning meeting, each participant was primarily a de-
signer of an urban area for which the elected council was the decision maker, and those 
who lived in the area were clients (Churchman 1971: 200).  
The current research explores the practical value of electronic discourse in regional 
governance and comprehensive urban planning (see Tables 1 and 2, Fig. 2). Because of the 
complexity of the issues, and the importance of power relations, and the emergent nature 
of their interactions, and the historical context a non-positivist method of inquiry was 
adopted. The aim was to describe the general nature of the phenomena observed and to 
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interpret actions, events, and consequences. The evolution of quality measures (validity 
claims) during the pre-meeting, meeting, and post-meeting phases of decision making was 
observed. Data was gathered before, during, and after an electronically-supported meeting.  
The purpose of the facilitated electronically-supported meeting was the strategic 
evaluation of a comprehensive 30-year plan for the Auckland region. This plan, known as 
the Auckland Strategic Planning Model, had been constructed over a seven-year period. 
The plan described two strategies for an increase in population from 1 to 1.5 million. Con-
solidation drove strategy one. More controls, particularly environmental controls, would 
be imposed to limit the spread of population into rural areas. The result would be higher 
population density and increased use of passenger transportation (buses, light rail). Expan-
sion drove strategy two. Planning controls would be relaxed, allowing the spread of popu-
lation into rural areas. The result would be lower population density and increased use of 
private transport (cars, freeways) (Sheffield 2009b). 
In summary regional planning in Auckland, New Zealand was subject to political dif-
ferences, confusion, and conflict. Regional planning was informed not by a search for a 
purely technical solution but by communication within a diffuse power structure about 
divergent objectives. Interorganizational planning meetings were the exercise of technical 
skills on behalf of constituencies with a history of conflict, confusion, and the exercise of 
power. An open dialogue across planning organizations was required to resolve contradic-
tions among competing perspectives. Facilitating such a dialogue presents conceptual and 
practical difficulties that motivated the research reviewed below. 
6.2. Before the meeting 
The evidence gathered in the pre-meeting phase revealed that the 16 participants in the 
electronically supported regional planning meeting were there to represent seven territorial 
authorities (four cities and three districts) and the Auckland Regional Council (ARC). 
Each was a professional planner responsible for advising his/her own (elected) council. 
Each territorial authority constituted one part of the whole of the Auckland region.  
The issues associated with embedding ‘one part’ of an urban region in ‘the whole’ were 
complex. The chief planner for the ARC advised that most participants had been involved 
in prior consultations marked to some degree by politics, confusion, and conflict. Partici-
pants recognized the difficulties in achieving the goals of their respective councils and 
engaging in consultations about comprehensive region-wide plans with planners from 
other councils. Perceptions of costs and benefits varied with the allegiance of the partici-
pant and the history of his or her interactions. As the day of the focal electronically-
supported meeting approached, it became apparent that considerable difficulties were be-
ing experienced by ARC planners, and that these were directly related to unresolved tech-
nical, interpersonal and personal issues. 
Technical perspective. Technical difficulties were encountered in discovering an ana-
lytically sound method of combining knowledge from the acknowledged experts. Urban 
planning is a pluralistic area that Banville and Landry (1989) would describe as ‘lacking 
conceptual integration’. For example, traffic engineers focused on access and transporta-
tion and developed estimates of trip times under each strategy. Biologists studied coastal 
water quality and developed estimates of pollutants in parts per million. Financial analysts 
focusing on economic values developed quantitative estimates of costs. Other planning 
consultants developed qualitative assessments of amenity, landscape values and housing 
choice. Scientific methods were applied by the experts who developed submodels in sub-
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disciplines embedded within urban planning. Yet, measures such as trip times, pollutants 
and implementation costs were, by themselves, conceptually unrelated and could not rig-
orously be compared. Claims to objective truth were diminished by the lack of an analyti-
cally sound method of combining knowledge from different subspecialties. 
Interpersonal perspective. The traditional urban planning triple-bottom-line categories 
of economic, social and environmental concerns appeared to be interlinked in a way that 
made the separate evaluation of any one category or subcategory impossible. It became 
clear that there were complex, dynamic and recursive (‘chicken and egg’) or self-
referential (Müller et al. 2005) interdependencies among stakeholder's beliefs, potentially 
right strategies and available objective facts. These emergent properties of regional plan-
ning could only be resolved by discourse. 
Personal perspective. The third set of problems was associated with personal com-
mitments. Planners from one major territorial authority (a city of 300,000) were reluctant 
to attend because they were committed to a city plan based on presuppositions that dif-
fered from those of the regional council.  
Summary. Analysis from the perspective of pluralism and communicative action (Ta-
ble 2, Fig. 2) provides qualitative evidence suggesting that the observed levels of guaran-
tors (objective truth, rightness and sincerity) immediately before the focal electronically-
supported meeting were low. 
6.3. During the meeting 
To evaluate rival strategies for the Auckland region, the facilitator of the focal electroni-
cally-supported meeting chose to apply the five facilitation principles (Table 2) and 
framework (Fig. 2). The first part of the meeting focused on the expression of concerns 
and issues motivating each stakeholder. The last part of the meeting focused on expres-
sions of degrees of commitment to action, for and against, rival strategies. More than half 
of the agenda items were devoted to electronically-supported discourse about a decision 
matrix. Two strategies (columns) were evaluated against five classes of criteria (rows) – 
cost, amenity and landscape, housing choice, access and transportation, and water quality. 
Each row of the decision matrix was the subject of a 50-minute session that included the 
anonymous individual generation of ideas and the prioritization and brief discussion of key 
findings (Sheffield 2004). This 50-minute session included the private ordering by each 
participant of his or her preference for each strategy (Dias and Climaco 2005). In the fol-
lowing subsections evidence is presented about participant satisfaction with electronic dis-
course and claims to emergent personal, interpersonal and technical knowledge. 
Participant satisfaction with electronic discourse. Participants' satisfaction with elec-
tronic discourse averaged 6.0 on a 7 point scale (1 = low satisfaction; 7 = high satisfaction) 
(Fig. 7). Participants (some of whom were initially unwilling to attend the meeting) were 
particularly satisfied with participation (6.2) and the management of relationship issues – 
absence of perceived conflict (6.1) and consensus for cooperative action (6.1) also re-
ceived high ratings. The relatively lower rating for information exchange (5.5) reflects 
most participants' familiarity with the issues. Unstructured comments were collected 
anonymously from participants by means of the GroupSystems software. The responses 
were overwhelmingly positive. Participants remarked that the meeting generated intense 
participation, goodwill and momentum. Many people expressed surprise that the technol-
ogy existed and stated that the meeting outcomes would not have been possible without 
electronic support. 
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Fig. 7. Regional planning. Participants' satisfaction with electronic discourse  
averaged 6.0 (1 = Low satisfaction; 7 = High satisfaction) 
Regional planning Procedure 
Focus Divergent Convergent 
Personal and 
interpersonal knowledge 
Relationship issues 
Reduce conflict 
Increase trust 
1. Absence of 
perceived 
conflict 
6.1 
4. Consensus for 
cooperative 
action 
6.1 
Technical knowledge 
Task issues 
Reduce confusion 
Increase understanding 
2. Participation 
6.2 
3. Information 
exchange 
5.5 
Source: Sheffield (2004, 2009b). 
Evaluation of claims to objective truth. Through the use of the electronic meetings tech-
nology participants produced ten pages of text on each of the five criteria (Sheffield 2004). 
This text or ‘frozen discourse’ includes key issues that were prioritized via a weighted vot-
ing procedure (Van de Ven and Delbecq 1971). Participants cast a total of 240 votes for 
each criterion. The key issues were expressed in a manner that was exploratory rather 
than evaluative. For example, the issue of the extent to which population density must in-
crease to make public transportation sufficiently viable is central to the choice between 
strategy one (consolidation) and strategy two (expansion). Yet, at the end of a seven-year 
planning exercise that included extensive traffic modeling, the issue was raised as a ques-
tion rather than as the evaluation of a factual proposition supported by expert analysis. 
This supports the conclusion that under the norms of a cognitive, objectivating attitude 
towards the facts, the ‘truth’ was that neither strategy was superior. 
Evaluation of claims to rightness. At the end of the discourse on a criterion, each par-
ticipant privately recorded how well each strategy performed against the five criteria in 
Table 1. This enabled participants to interpret technical findings from the perspective of 
their own organization's norms and values. Each of the 16 participants anonymously rated 
the two strategies on each of the 5 criterion. The aggregated ratings for each strategy and 
criterion were made accessible to each participant. On one criterion (housing choice), 
strategy one and strategy two were rated equally. On the remaining four criteria (cost, 
amenity and landscape, access and transportation, and water quality) strategy one per-
formed distinctly better than strategy two. The strategies and criteria had been developed 
through a consultative process over a seven-year period. This supports the conclusion that 
under the norms of established legitimate interpersonal relationships, strategy one is more 
‘right’ than strategy two. 
Evaluation of claims to sincerity. Electronic meeting technology supported sharing 
personal visions prompted by the question ‘What is it like to live in Auckland under strate-
gies 1 and 2?’ From the perspective of Churchman's inquiring system, participants were 
asked to drop their usual role of designer and adopt the role of client (Churchman 1971: 
200). The goal was disclosure of speaker's subjectivity, unconstrained by the (technical) 
structure of the model and unrestrained by the interpersonal context. The strategy was to 
get each individual to: (a) write a personalized account of what it would be like to live in 
Auckland 30 years hence under each of strategies 1 and 2; (b) read the accounts of others 
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to identify the most valuable visions. The procedure was a 60-minute silent envisioning 
exercise in which each account was identified only by a code. Anonymity was almost 
complete. The most valued visions of what it would be like to live in Auckland 30 years 
hence showed intense personal support for strategy one, and a willingness to work against 
strategy two. This supports the conclusion that under the norms of disclosure of speakers' 
subjectivity, 14 of the 16 participants would, in all sincerity, only have supported strategy 
one.  
Summary. The positive results obtained from the meeting are in strong contrast to the 
confusion and conflict that existed at the end of the pre-meeting phase. While some par-
ticipants had been reluctant to attend the focal meeting, and expressed negative views at 
the beginning of the meeting, all participants provided positive evaluations at the end of 
the meeting. The functionality of the electronic meeting technology was supportive of an 
overall positive result. Participation by all participants was intense. By the end of the 
meeting, electronic discourse produced 80 pages of text. Intense participation in electronic 
discourse resulted in extensive documentation of claims to objective truth, rightness, and 
sincerity. The data gathered during the focal meeting support the claim that electronic dis-
course had successfully reduced conflict and confusion. It is not clear, however, that the 
decision outcomes integrated the technical, interpersonal, and personal perspectives into a 
consensus model that provided a rationale for action. 
6.4. After the meeting 
We have yet to consider the degree of coherence among the three perspectives. Partici-
pants found no difference between the strategies on the basis of technical knowledge. 
Moderate claims in favour of strategy one were made based on interpersonal knowledge. 
Strong claims in favour of strategy one were made based on personal knowledge. 
The degree of coherence among the decision outcomes at different levels was poor. 
There was a major discrepancy in preferences at various stages of the decision process. 
The 80-page report generated by electronic meeting technology (from which the findings 
were extracted) was circulated to all participants immediately after the meeting. The intro-
ductory section of the report highlighted the fact that the participants were strongly sup-
portive of a strategy that lacked factual support. The report became subject to intense 
scrutiny. Regional planners repeatedly met among themselves about the report and con-
sulted other meeting participants. Support grew for the interpretation that the strategic op-
tions were not extreme enough. In Hegelian terms, the dialectical logic (synthesis) of this 
interpretation was initially lost on the regional planners because they were so firmly wed-
ded to their decision framework (thesis) that they experienced profound difficulty in rec-
ognizing that the framework was flawed (antithesis). An abbreviated planning round was 
subsequently undertaken with more extreme versions of strategies one and two (based on a 
hundred percent increase in population). Support that integrated the technical, interper-
sonal and personal levels of the facilitation framework was then found for strategy one. 
6.5. Summary of findings 
The results showed that the pre-meeting phase was fraught with technical, interpersonal 
and personal problems. Both the observations during the meeting and the satisfaction re-
ported by participants (Fig. 7) demonstrated that the facilitated electronically-supported 
meeting had increased participant's trust and understanding. During the meeting partici-
pants found no difference between the strategies on the basis of technical knowledge,  
a moderate preference for scenario one on the basis of interpersonal knowledge, and a strong 
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preference for scenario one on the basis of personal knowledge. Reflection after the meet-
ing produced sudden insights that dissolved the perceived lack of coherence. The final 
analysis integrated technical, interpersonal, and personal perspectives into a consensus 
model that provided a rationale for action. Empirical evidence was therefore found for the 
importance of the facilitation framework (Fig. 2) and all five principles (Table 2). 
7. Discussion 
The meeting made it easy to lay your thoughts out 
without putting your neck on the line. 
(Participant in an economic development meeting) 
The current research described local solutions implemented as part of New Zealand  
response to impacts of globalization. Inter-organizational meetings were conducted in the 
domains of science funding, economic development and regional planning. The impor-
tance of pluralism and electronic discourse to the successful facilitation of these meetings 
was evaluated via quantitative and qualitative measures. Evidence from the quantitative 
measures indicated that participants found the meetings very efficient and effective and 
were very satisfied with electronic discourse. Averages across all three cases are reported 
in Fig. 8. Evidence from the qualitative measures indicated that the facilitation principles 
(Table 2) and framework (Fig. 2) were closely associated with overall success. These find-
ings are briefly discussed. 
Fig. 8. All three cases. Participants' satisfaction with electronic discourse averaged 
6.0 (1 = Low satisfaction; 7 = High satisfaction) 
All three cases Procedure 
Focus Divergent Convergent 
Personal and 
interpersonal knowledge 
Relationship issues 
Reduce conflict 
Increase trust 
1. Absence of 
perceived 
conflict 
6.2 
4. Consensus for 
cooperative 
action 
6.1 
Technical knowledge 
Task issues 
Reduce confusion 
Increase understanding 
2. Participation 
6.0 
3. Information 
exchange 
5.7 
The strategies implemented were developed in inter-organizational meetings attended by 
a large number of stakeholders with divergent objectives. Since each participant was very 
busy meeting the demands of their own organization it was imperative that the inter-
organizational meetings were efficient and effective. In traditional inter-organizational 
meetings, even when participants desire to work in a relatively democratic way, the lim-
ited airtime creates conflict. In a one-hour meeting of 15 people, each must compete to get 
more than four minutes of airtime. Quite literally it is the sender not the message that is 
visible. Critical analysis invites interpersonal conflict. But in an electronic meeting all par-
ticipants can input and read information at the same time (Sheffield 1995b). 
As everyone can ‘talk’ at once and still be heard, the work was completed two to three 
times faster. Because it was difficult to identify who has proposed a particular idea, rank 
and personality differences among participants were less pronounced. Advocacy, coali-
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tions and infighting were less necessary. According to participants, facilitated electroni-
cally-supported meetings provided an efficient and effective method of generating in-
formed consensus for action (Fig. 8). 
The quantitative evidence indicated that participants were particularly satisfied with 
the focus on personal and interpersonal knowledge and the management of relationship 
issues – across all three cases absence of perceived conflict (6.2) and consensus for coop-
erative action (6.1) received the highest ratings. Participants were also satisfied with the 
focus on technical knowledge – ratings for participation (6.0) and information exchange 
(5.7) were also high. This suggests that the anonymity provided by electronic meeting 
technology was perceived as more important than the raw power associated with the si-
multaneous use of keyboards. This was particularly apparent in the economic development 
meetings. 
In the 12 Advantage Auckland economic development meetings the absence of per-
ceived conflict (6.4) and consensus for cooperative action (6.2) received the highest rat-
ings. The electronically supported meetings were held when the economy was in reces-
sion. Because the level of pain was high and some participants were business competitors, 
the potential for conflict was high. In many industry sectors diminished disposable income 
and deregulation had led to oversupply, competition on price, heavy discounting, and per-
sistent infighting. Participants indicated that the meeting created a dialogue, and the ex-
change of valuable information fostered openness and trust. Interviews conducted one to 
two years afterwards as part of a follow-up study (Sheffield and Gallupe 1995) confirmed 
that the meetings had been a catalyst for industry wide change. Participants commented 
that the anonymous and simultaneous use of the keyboards aided creativity and allowed 
everybody's comments to be treated fairly. 
‘Our ideas were stimulated, shared and focused’. 
‘Domination by individuals whose solutions were not of great quality had often de-
stroyed meetings in the past. Anonymity was essential to get rid of personality clashes. 
The (electronically-supported) meeting was memorable for the variety of participants, its 
quietness and structure – nobody dominated. It delivered an action plan that was solid 
enough to cope with the infighting’. 
‘Before the meeting a lot of us didn't believe in talking to the opposition. There's  
a lot more talking together, pulling together now’. 
‘The meeting was definitely the catalyst. Absolutely! Why? Because the computer 
medium allowed people to feel that their contributions were being treated fairly’. 
‘The meeting made it easy to lay your thoughts out without putting your neck on the 
line’. 
Empirical support was found for the facilitation framework and all five principles 
(Table 2, Fig. 2). This suggests that, in facilitating local solutions in a global environment, 
the benefits of electronic discourse are three-fold:  
Technical perspective. Electronic discourse provided support for the development and 
documentation of validity claims about objective truth, rightness and sincerity, and the 
degree of coherence among them. 
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Interpersonal perspective. Electronic discourse provided support for discourse that in-
terweaves evidence (experience and reflection, decision and action, theory and practice, 
individual feeling and objective fact) from multiple, intertwined, conflicting yet mutually 
supportive evaluative frames. 
Personal perspective. Electronic discourse provided support for the ‘psychological 
safety’ and ‘trust’ needed for direct and unreserved expressions of multiple, conflicting 
individual perspectives. 
In totality, the empirical evidence enables the focus question ‘Does electronic dis-
course increase the success of local solutions in a global environment?’ to be answered in 
the affirmative. 
8. Conclusion 
Several lessons have been learnt. Firstly, facilitating local solutions in a global environ-
ment was a pluralistic endeavour – the objectives of social actors were divergent and 
power was diffused. Often the goal was a legitimate consensus among diverse stake-
holders so that scarce resources could be combined / leveraged for national advantage. 
Secondly, the theoretical perspective of communicative action was useful in separating out 
intertwined but quite different types of knowledge. The standard of excellence in commu-
nicative action can be stated as follows: personal commitment (validated by sincerity) to 
an interpersonal consensus (validated by rightness) for technical excellence (validated 
by objective truth). Thirdly, individual and institutional knowledge was inherently medi-
ated and situated, provisional and pragmatic, aspirational and contested. In an environ-
ment of diffuse power relationships, inter-organizational meetings were essential in 
gaining legitimacy. Fourthly, electronic meeting technology has a raw power that leads 
to efficient and effective inter-organizational meetings. Excellent performance was ob-
served in the application of electronic meeting technology in science funding, economic 
development, and regional planning meetings. Fifthly, the findings reported in the cur-
rent research suggested that the facilitation principles and framework developed in this 
article may be routinely applied in various other domains. Seen from a Hegelian per-
spective, the power of pluralism and communicative action lies not in achievement of 
enlightenment, but in appreciation of the nature of three types of ignorance and the prac-
tical consequences of belief.  
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Appendix 
Session Evaluation Questionnaire* 
Decision Support Centre session for _____________ (group) on __________ (date)  
*Efficiency (Q1-2), effectiveness (Q3a-5), facilitator (Q6-7), technology (Q8-11), reduced 
barriers to communication (Q12-14), participation (Q15-17), information exchange (Q18-21), 
meeting outcomes (Q22-24). 
Directions: Your opinions are important to us! Please take the time to answer the questions 
on the front of this sheet. We will use your responses to this questionnaire to upgrade future 
workshops in the Decision Support Centre. Thank you! Jim Sheffield, Research Director, Deci-
sion Support Centre. 
1. You spent _____ hours in the Decision Support Centre to achieve this result. How many 
hours would you expect to spend to achieve the same result by conventional means? _____ 
hours 
2. Using conventional means the process would most likely have spread over ______ days 
3a. In the next three months I expect to use/study the report of this session for a total of 
______hours 
 
For questions 3b through 24 indicate your level of agreement with the statement using the 
following scheme: 
            (1)            (2)           (3)             (4)              (5)                 (6)               (7) 
       Strongly    Mostly   Somewhat   Neutral     Somewhat      Mostly        Strongly 
      Disagree   Disagree   Disagree                         Agree          Agree          Agree 
 
All questions are answered by circling a number. There are no right or wrong answers. 
3b. Overall, I thought the workshop was excellent: 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
4. I enjoyed being a member of this group: 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
5. The report containing all contributions  
to this session will be highly valuable:  1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
6. The way the session was run by the facilitator  
was excellent:  1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
7.  The facilitator's use of the whiteboards  
was highly effective: 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
8.  The computer facilities were easy to use:  1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
9. The computer facilities were highly effective: 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
10. Typing enabled me to focus and refine  
my ideas before going public:  1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
11. The Decision Support Centre technology  
is fun to use:         1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
12. Internal politics were largely absent from  
today's meeting:    1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
13. The rank of participants did not inhibit  
the free flow of ideas:  1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
14. The personality of participants did  
not inhibit the free flow of ideas:  1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
15. I felt actively involved throughout the session:  1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
16. All group members participated equally:  1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
17. Participants, both as individuals and  
as a group, were creative:  1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
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18. I was willing to give valuable  
information to others in the group:  1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
19. I was able to give valuable information  
to others in the group:  1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
20. I received valuable ideas from others  
on issues of significance to me:  1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
21. I received support from others  
on issues of significance to me: 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
22. The issues surfaced during the  
brainstorming are important: 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
22b. I strongly recommend that this and similar groups  
use the Decision Support Centre for future planning tasks: 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
23. The summary of key issues developed  
on the whiteboards is important: 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
24. Participants, both as individuals and  
as a group, were productive:  1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Quotable comment. Please quote me  
on the following comment: 
 
Please use the back of the sheet for further comments. 
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Evolutionary Globalistics 
 
Ilya V. Ilyin and Arkadi D. Ursul 
 
 
The analysis of global processes (including globalization and global problems) 
with relation to evolutionary aspects seems an important step towards under-
standing their essence and full subject matter as well as revealing their inter-
connection and interaction with other global processes. We consider the possible 
development of Evolutionary Globalistics (one of the fields of Global Studies in 
all their aspects) as a new stage of formation of global knowledge. It is most 
probable that, at the first stage of its development, Evolutionary Globalistics will 
evolve as one of the branches of Globalistics alongside with other fields of Glob-
al Studies. However, as the necessity of using the evolutionary approach in 
Global Studies is recognized, this sphere will be filled with ideas of development 
and it is quite probable that a new, evolutionary stage of global knowledge will 
start.  
Keywords: Global Studies, evolutionary processes, evolutionism, global prob-
lems, Globalistics, Evolutionary Globalistics. 
Several years ago the authors of the present article introduced a new notion of ‘Evolu-
tionary Globalistics’ into the object field of Global Studies. 
Any global crisis, including the natural one, represents a dangerous decrease in the 
stability of a certain global process or in the self-preservation of a system under the influ-
ence of external and internal negative factors and conditions, which can undermine the 
process or destabilize the system and lead to the global catastrophe. The issues of crises 
are extensively discussed in terms of the global economic crisis and also in a wider, uni-
versal and evolutionary sense. Moreover, a new field of knowledge, devoted to the analy-
sis of different kinds of global catastrophes and possible threats to the humanity, is cur-
rently developed. Also the scholars analyze global catastrophes of cosmic, planetary and 
anthropogenic nature and their possible combinations as well as assess their influence on 
the future existence of the humanity on Earth. Basing on certain data derived from natural 
history sciences, some scholars suggest that the humankind may soon get extinct due to 
the effects of evolutionary processes. 
Global problems represent a concentration of negative consequences of the preceding 
phases of world development and the exacerbation of contradictions that can lead to global 
crisis and catastrophic consequences. In order to overcome the crisis caused by global 
problems and negative processes on a global scale, the humanity should undertake some 
well-coordinated actions. The destructive and regressive nature of the consequences of 
increasing global problems determines the necessity to overcome them in order to pass to 
the progressive positive trend of global development (or, as was defined about twenty 
years ago, to the pathway of sustainable development as a new type of development pre-
serving both civilization and biosphere). However, in order to move on to the sustainable 
Globalistics and Globalization Studies 294 
development, the humanity needs to create a new type of governance, namely, the global 
governance which will control the shift to this type of socio-natural development.  
That is why within the evolutionary framework one can also analyze the changes from 
negative to positive assessment of global issues and their consequences. Global problems are 
just another form of global development and they call for a reverse in their further develop-
ment in order to be overcome. One can clearly note the interaction of progressive and regres-
sive processes and trends of the world development in globalization and global problems as 
the forms of global development. We believe that the identification of such evolutionary 
trends both in global political processes and in other fields of globalization will be one of the 
objectives of a new field of studies, namely, of Political Globalistics. Its ultimate goal will be 
to provide recommendations on the effective steps to reduce the negative (regressive) conse-
quences of global processes and to increase their positive (progressive) impact. 
Despite the fact that the majority of scientists regard globalization as a positive 
(axiologically) process of creation of an integral world resulting from the human activity, 
this phenomenon in the context of chaotic development of the modern world is character-
ized by intensified negative consequences. It is connected with the chaotic development of 
globalization and other global processes which should be managed in an anticipatory man-
ner on a global scale. However, political globalization appears to lag behind many other 
globalization processes, such as economic globalization and informatization. The political 
aspect of globalization and other global processes becomes evident when some efforts are 
made to solve global problems. This encourages corresponding political transformations 
on a global scale which are supposed to lead to the intensification of progressive and inno-
vative processes in the future. 
The analysis of global processes (including globalization and global problems) with 
relation to evolutionary aspects seems an important step towards understanding their es-
sence and full subject matter as well as revealing their interconnection and interaction with 
other global processes. The evolutionary analysis of global processes provides a more ef-
fective way of using these processes in the formation of global activity and especially 
global governance. 
If we proceed from the above-made assumption that Globalistics is the field of knowl-
edge that studies global processes and systems, it becomes possible to get a different per-
spective of the field of studies of Globalistics and even of global knowledge in general. 
Although Globalistics has never ignored the problem of development, and the evolutionary 
aspect in some way is expressed even in the definition of this scientific field, the ‘proces-
sual and evolutionary’ factors have not yet been given a proper position within Global 
Studies. Globalistics could hardly appear in its ‘evolutionary version’ from the very be-
ginning, as at the primary stage of its formation the object of studies is defined and de-
scribed and then there starts a systemization process. At the further stages of development, 
the methods of study and approaches corresponding to the object of study are formed. This 
is the formation process of almost every branch of science and Globalistics is hardly an 
exception. We can take not only Biology and Geology as an example, but Economics as 
well, as the theoretical part of these disciplines has been developing for several centuries 
but only in the last thirty years Evolutionary Economics appeared as a field of science. It 
was in fact the same period when the formation of Globalistics started. 
The evolutionary basis provides an opportunity to predict the formation of new 
branches of Global Studies, practical global activity and especially global education. So 
far, Globalistics has started the formation of its research area both in theoretical and prac-
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tical (including educational) aspects. The area of study of Globalistics includes not only 
globalization and global problems but also some broader categories of global processes 
and systems in their evolution (better to say, in the co-evolution) and this makes a signifi-
cant change in the theoretical and cognitive perspectives of Global Studies. Within the 
development of Globalistics, the evolutionary stage of creation of global knowledge has 
followed the initial period of its accumulation and description. The process of creation of 
global knowledge at this stage develops inter alia according to the suggested theoretical 
model of Evolutionary Globalistics.  
We consider the possible development of Evolutionary Globalistics as a new stage of 
formation of global knowledge. It is quite probable that at the first stage of its development 
Evolutionary Globalistics will evolve as one of the branches of Globalistics alongside with 
other fields of Global Studies. However, as the necessity of using the evolutionary approach 
in Global Studies is recognized, this sphere will be filled with ideas of development and it is 
quite probable that a new, evolutionary stage of global knowledge will start. 
Here we offer not only a processual and systematic but also an evolutionary, or, to put 
it better, a global evolutionary approach which allows a more adequate definition of the 
place of Globalistics (and global processes and systems it studies) in contemporary science 
and in the general scientific worldview in the era of globalization. The simultaneous usage 
of both processual and evolutionary concepts expands the perspectives of the global 
knowledge development, giving an opportunity to more actively involve Globalistics into 
the processes of inter- and trans-disciplinary synthesis as well as to form an integral scien-
tific knowledge of the planetary scale. 
A clearer definition of the subject field of Globalistics will provide an effective proc-
ess of formation of different areas of practical activity. The understanding of the place and 
role of certain global phenomena in the evolutionary process will enable the scientific 
community to take more effective steps in practical activity focused on the survival of the 
civilization and the preservation of biosphere which is the natural basis of existence. The 
evolutionary approach in Globalistics is especially relevant for global education which is 
responsible for the formation of advanced consciousness of the planetary scale, aimed at 
achieving noospheric and humanitarian goals. 
It is important to analyze the development of global education and corresponding sys-
tems of training and upbringing with respect to facilitating the attempts to find solution for 
global issues and provide the world community's survival. If Globalistics and global 
knowledge in general are considered as one of the leading scientific fields of the twenty-
first century, the global education, currently being formed, may become a catalyst acceler-
ating the transition of the educational process to a brand new level, corresponding to the 
planetary noospheric future of the humanity. The application of integrative general scien-
tific methods and approaches stimulates the emergence of new fields of Global Studies. 
Thus, the implementation of the suggested evolutionary and universal evolutionary ap-
proaches to Global Studies allows destinduishing such new areas of research as Paleoglob-
alistics, Cosmoglobalistics, Futuroglobalistics and some others. The branch of Globalistics 
studying mainly natural and socionatural global processes that occurred in the past can be 
called Paleoglobalistics. Contemporary global processes are studied in a trans-disciplinary 
field of scientific research which is traditionally referred to as Globalistics proper (Modern 
Globalistics) or Neoglobalistics. And finally, the field of Global Studies that concentrates 
on understanding and forecasting the future of global processes and systems can be called 
Futuroglobalistics. Globalistics unite the three temporal fields of Global Studies men-
tioned above and sets a trend of their analysis within evolutionary approach. 
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The integration of neoglobalistic, futuroglobalistic and paleoglobalistic areas of Glob-
al Studies is one of the most important aims of Globalistics as a world-view and as a field 
of science and education. This, however, requires their development as separate branches 
of Globalistics.  
Evolutionary Globalistics unites two world outlooks and methodological approaches: 
evolutionism and globalism. Globalism here is considered in its broad meaning as a world-
view that analyzes the world from the point of general development concepts and regards 
it as directed changes in the essence of processes and systems (progress, regress and other 
forms and directions of development). Having no opportunity to dwell here upon the gen-
eral development theory and history of evolutionism, we would like to draw the readers' 
attention to the existence of more accurate definitions of evolutionism. Evolutionism 
(Fig. 1) in the modern sense is a concept (and a methodological approach) which analyzes 
the processes under consideration not only from the point of their dynamics, transforma-
tions, changes, but also takes into account their development and evolution. This is a 
broader interpretation of evolutionism, which regards development not simply as gradual 
quantitative changes.  
Fig. 1. Evolutionism 
 
Evolutionism (Fig. 1) is a type of world perception that analyzes everything in terms of the 
following interpretation of development: 1) as directed changes in the essence of processes 
and systems; 2) as progressive quantitative and qualitative directed transformations of tan-
gible objects; and 3) as gradual and reversible quantitative changes of objects without 
qualitative leaps. 
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Globalism as a global variant of systematic approach is a world perception focused on 
the recognition of the world as a planetary entity and of the humanity as a united global 
community in which global characteristics prevail and the involvement into the universal 
problems and processes in widely realized.  
Development in its broad sense is defined as processes or tangible objects that demon-
strate directed and, as a rule, irreversible changes of their content or structure. The fact that 
processes can either evolve in a progressive way, when a process (system) becomes more 
complex, or regress towards simplicity, degradation and decay, demonstrates the afore-
mentioned directionality of development. In simplified form, the possible evolutionary 
trends (directions) of evolutionary processes look as follows: 
Regress   ←   Global Processes and Systems  →   Progress  
There exist other forms of development which are combinations of the ones men-
tioned above: neutral, wave, cyclic, and circular development, etc. However, all these 
forms are certain combinations of progressive and regressive trends.  
In a broader sense, the concepts of development and evolution are practically equiva-
lent. Evolution in this interpretation involves quantitative and qualitative spasmodic 
changes, as well as the interconnection between progressive, regressive, cyclical and other 
types and forms of development existing in nature. We mainly use the wider understand-
ing of evolution as a synonym to the concept of development. 
The correlation between historical and evolutionary approaches in Globalistics is one 
of important problems in this context. If the evolutionary approach coincided with the his-
torical one, Charles Darwin would have no necessity to create his special Evolutionary 
Biology and many other fields of science would not have formed their evolutionary 
branches. The historical approach in Globalistics in the form of Historical Globalistics 
appeared prior to the evolutionary one. The historical approach consists in time ordering of 
facts and events relating mainly to social sphere, that is it deals with social dynamics in a 
temporal aspect. 
In contrast to the historical approach, the evolutionary method of analysis of processes 
and phenomena does not consider all the temporal dimensions, but only the most impor-
tant ones, often the qualitative transformations, and estimates directions of such changes, 
identifying whether they should be considered as increasing complexity or simplification, 
progress or regress. Evolutionary method also differs from the logical one, which is also 
contrasted with the historical approach.  
Another peculiarity of the historical approach is connected with the fact, that history, 
which is supposed to be based on facts, cannot adequately analyze the future, where no 
facts exist so far. That is why the historical approach is based on the analysis of the past 
and only partly of the present, which, by the end of the analytical process, becomes the 
past. Therefore, history is associated with the science about the past, where some devel-
opment processes can be singled out. However, the temporal aspect and special attention 
given to the past prevail in the historical approach.  
Development processes could be to a certain extend detected in the past, however, the 
evolutionary processes do not coincide with the chronological order of events not least 
because they are not the phenomena of linear timing nature, which is required within the 
historical approach. The historical approach registers only sequences of facts and events 
and is not defined by the objective logic of development of the subject under scrutiny, 
which, in turn is analyzed within the evolutionary approach.  
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In the course of time historians try to link their science to a certain perception within 
the evolutionary approach. First, they used to identify the historical process with progress 
considering all the regressive changes accidental or deviating from the main trend of social 
dynamics. Later, the ideas of circulation and cyclical development, often observed in na-
ture, became popular. After that, the idea of the end of history emerged, and not only alle-
gorically (e.g., the way it was expressed by Francis Fukuyama). The historical approach 
turns out to depend on the evolutionary understanding of history, which provides addi-
tional arguments in favor of the difference between the two approaches under discussion. 
That is why Historical Globalistics is not the same as Evolutionary Globalistics, whereas 
the historical approach in Globalistics cannot be identified with the evolutionary one in the 
same branch of studies (Fig. 2). 
Evolutionary Globalistics is an interdisciplinary conceptual approach to the analysis of 
global processes and systems in evolutionary aspect and, above all, on the basis of global 
evolutionism. Evolutionary Globalistics unites all the temporal aspects of Globalistics and, 
moreover, directs the analysis towards the sphere of global processes and systems in a uni-
fied evolutionary aspect, that is in the interconnection of the past, present, and future. 
Fig. 2. Historical and Evolutionary Globalistics 
 
Thus, Historical Globalistics is rather a description and, to a certain extent, a tempo-
rally ordered reflection of the world dynamics of human existence whereas Evolutionary 
Globalistics is the study of evolution and coevolution of global processes and their sys-
tematical synergetic phenomenon – global development.  
The above-mentioned general scientific approaches and methods (such as global mod-
eling, systematic, historical, ecological, socionatural, evolutionary, coevolutionary, syner-
getic, informational and other) significantly facilitate the global integrating development 
of science. 
In general, there is no method or approach implemented solely in Globalistics. Some 
of the aforementioned methods have just been formed. Even globalism as a global variant 
of systematic approach is a world perception focused on the recognition of the world as a 
planetary whole and of the humanity as a united global community, in which global char-
acteristics prevail and the involvement into the universal problems and processes in widely 
implemented.  
At the early stages of development of Globalistics, the systemic approach and global 
modeling used to play an important part. Later, the development of Complexity Studies 
approach began which provided the basis of implementation of the evolutionary approach 
in Globalistics. Complexity Studies are a branch of science studying cooperative processes 
Ilyin and Ursul • Evolutionary Globalistics 299 
and self-organizing (or self-disorganizing) systems in non-linear and unbalanced environ-
ment. These are the types of environment in which global processes take place on the 
global scale.  
Self-organization as a rising complexity of the evolving global system or process, the 
increase of its informational content (the growing diversity of its elements, connections, 
and relations etc.) is of special interest for Globalistics. Self-disorganization, also studied 
within Complexity Studies, can be considered a regressive path of development, whereas 
self-organization can to a certain extent be identified with a progressive branch of evolu-
tion, as this process includes increasing complexity and organization of evolving global 
processes and systems.  
We regard Globalistics as the most important component of the forming system of in-
tegral general scientific knowledge that defines the modern scientific world-view of the 
universal or global evolutionism. The integral general scientific knowledge is formed via 
trans-disciplinary synthesis of integrative processes in science. This system consists of 
forms of knowledge with most general research areas and is used in many (someday, 
probably, in all) fields of knowledge. 
Evolutionary Globalistics will be formed as a trans-disciplinary conceptual approach 
to the analysis of global processes and systems from the evolutionary point and, above all, 
will be based on the results obtained in global (universal) evolutionism. The ideas on de-
velopment came into Globalistics in different ways including the process of integration of 
the evolutionary concepts from the disciplines involved into Globalistics. However, global 
evolutionism can be considered the most important in this respect, as it penetrates more 
and more scientific disciplines and research spheres including Global Studies. Global evo-
lutionism represents the basis of modern scientific world-view and a form of global (uni-
versal) evolution, in which self-organization of material systems is the main permanent 
process in the observable Universe. Global evolution is a continuous self-organization 
process in the material systems first in inanimate nature, then in the living matter and soci-
ety, and after that – in the socionatural form (see Table 1). It is quite obvious that the evo-
lutionary approach has penetrated Global Studies in different forms; however, it happens 
less intensively and effectively than the general scientific principles and approaches, al-
ready discovered in global evolutionism, are applied.  
Table 1. Global Evolution 
Evolutionary Levels 
Non-organic Nature Organic Nature Community 
Submicroparticle Biological macromoleclular Individual 
Microparticle Cellar Family 
Nuclear Microorganic Collective 
Atomic Organs and tissues Big social groups (classes, 
nations) 
Moleclular Organism itself State (Civil society) 
Macrolevel Population Regional state systems 
Mega-level (planets, star-
planetary systems, galaxies) 
Biocenosis Humanity itself 
Meta-level (Metagalaxy) Biosphere Noosphere 
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Economic Globalization:  
The Five Basic Globalization Types 
 
Bruno G. Ruettimann 
 
 
Current economic theory gives no sufficient practical models to explain the re-
cent economic development with respect to globalization. In fact, the economic 
globalization is not always the same globalization, which is recognized through 
the different manifestations of this phenomenon. Based on the four basic busi-
ness typologies (commodities, standards, specialties, and convenience goods) 
a new model defines five fundamental types of economic globalization (1a, 1b, 
1c, 2, and 3). Globalization Type 1 and subtypes are related to physical material 
interchange, Type 2 is related to financial participations and Type 3 – to the hu-
man factor. This distinction is necessary because each type has its own rational 
and performs differently from a globalization viewpoint. These basic globaliza-
tion types help to model the triggering mechanism of their evolution and allow us 
to understand the competitive constellation and strategic moves of companies as 
well as the different latent potential for unemployment. The Basic Globalization 
Types distinguished by the author allows a vivid explanation of the characteris-
tics of economic globalization when teaching. 
Keywords: business types, globalization types, foreign trade theory. 
Introduction  
On the one hand, economic globalization is often viewed as an obscure process that appar-
ently yields more profit for the companies, while increasing unemployment for the work-
ing classes. On the other hand, globalization is hardly controllable, since it is not only a 
process but rather a phenotypical manifestation within the causal systemic world of econ-
omy and politico-social behavior. But how can economic globalization be modelled? 
Many books have been written on globalization but none of them presents its integral the-
ory. Basic concepts still go mainly back to foreign trade theory with Ricardian compara-
tive cost advantages and Pareto optimality as well as Heckscher-Ohlin. The gravity model 
of Isard shows the geographic view on trade but finally did not encounter the merited suc-
cess. A new view has been developed by Krugman in his New Economic Geography. Dif-
ferent business and globalization patterns are observable in different industries. On the one 
hand, we have the extraction of raw materials in particular geographic regions of the sub-
tropics, or primary aluminium production in distant but low energy cost regions, and, on 
the other hand, semi-fabricated products manufactured near extensively industrialized re-
gions. Cars produced in highly automated factories in urban area and exported worldwide, 
fast-food chains or franchised fashion stores covering the globe to conquest market share – 
different concepts, but the same target: the world market. Why do so many different con-
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cepts exist? What are the rules governing the economic structure and the competitive sys-
tem? Is it possible to give a structure to globalization in order to be modelled? 
The Determinants for Globalization Type  
Going beyond the usual phenomenological description of globalization, let us analyze the 
intrinsic logic of worldwide competition and the structure of the economic system. Our 
business system is mainly composed of: 
– the transaction object, that is, a product or a service; 
– the supply and demand structure, with the related transaction scheme; 
– the operating configuration of supply (Rüttimann 2007). 
The product is characterized by its attributes, for example, heavy or bulky, complex or 
precious, perishable or durable, and its customization degree, all these determining the 
transportability of the product. The transaction scheme describes how supply and demand 
interact determining the localization degree of the product. The market structures given by 
the number of market actors and relative concentration curves of supply and demand de-
termine the competitive nature of the business. The operating configuration refers to how 
products are produced, at one extreme they are produced centrally within a single plant 
configuration and then distributed worldwide, or production facilities are spread around 
different geographic regions within a multi-plant configuration and products are sold lo-
cally. This leads to the induction scheme of Fig. 1 to classify first the business type and 
finally the globalization type. Indeed, as we will see, globalization is not always the same.  
Fig. 1. Framework of globalization types determinants 
 
As we can see in Fig. 1, it is evident that the typology of globalization is largely deter-
mined by the product characteristics. The backward determinants which influence product 
characteristics, market structure and determine the business classification, and finally the 
operating configuration, are: 
– value of the product; 
– transport cost and related range of distribution; 
– production factors in terms of cost drivers; 
– demand profile; 
– supply structure (Rüttimann 2007).  
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The Four Basic Business Typologies  
These main determinants characterize each business type within industrial system. Certain 
combinations of these determinants reveal clear patterns for each business type. Fig. 2 
shows different businesses within the matrix of product-characteristics and market-
structure which are the main drivers for business type classification (Rüttimann 2007). The 
representation of product-characteristics (differentiated or not) as one axis, and market-
structure (oligopolistic or fragmented) as another axis within a matrix, leads finally to the 
following landscape of basic business types: 
– commodities; 
– specialties; 
– standards; 
– convenience. 
Fig. 2. Selected businesses within the product-characteristic / market-structure 
matrix 
 
Fig. 3. Basic classification of business types 
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Fig. 3 presents a clear, systematic and structured view with which to classify roughly the 
businesses in types. It goes without saying that mixed types may exist. The ‘commodity type 
of business’ (e.g., primary aluminium or wheat) comprises all kinds of goods listed on effi-
cient market places, such as commodities exchanges with world market prices. The ‘spe-
cialty type of business’ (e.g., electronics or automobile) embraces those durables and con-
sumables, goods with a distinctive brand thus creating imperfect competition. The ‘stan-
dards type of business’ (e.g., cement or extrusions) covers the intermediate or semi-
finished products with a rather polypolistic supply structure. The ‘convenience type of 
business’ (e.g., hotels or clothing) embraces most products of our life sold in retail stores 
or offered as services in a very fragmented market to reach the final demand, representing 
from the supply side an imperfect or monopolistic competition.  
The Five Economic Globalization Types 
Having classified the business, the question is how globalization is influenced by each 
business type, or rather how globalization of the business evolves in each business type 
and according to which pattern. Analyzing the business types, it appears that the operating 
configuration determined by business is a major determinant for the globalization type. 
The intrinsic logic reveals two main types: 
Type 1 – material (or physical) globalization for commodities and specialties; 
Type 2 – immaterial (or financial) globalization for standards and convenience. 
The difference between these types is substantial. Products of businesses following Type 1 
globalization could be produced finally within a single plant operating configuration and 
shipped physically worldwide whereas products of businesses following a Type 2 globaliza-
tion are produced locally for the local market. MNC (Multi National Corporations) will have 
in this case a network of local companies by FDI (Foreign Direct Investments) and the busi-
ness idea is to exploit the know-how in doing business. In this fragmented markets they have 
to buy or set-up new enterprises to increase market share. But for Type 1 globalization we 
have to distinguish between commodities and specialties (Fig. 4).  
Fig. 4. The natural types of globalization 
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Let us call Type 1a the ‘globalization of commodities’; through the listing on efficient 
market places such as commodity exchanges, this represents the pure example of business 
globalization. This type of globalization is inevitable because its effects are spreading all 
over the world. For the Type 1b ‘globalization of specialties’ the products characteristics 
are unique and therefore – to some extent – the price can be fixed by the supplier taking 
into account the value for the customer. This is due to the possibility of product differen-
tiation within the competitive system. For the second type of globalization the distinction 
into subtypes is not necessary. Indeed, in markets not accompanied by material (physical) 
flows of products over a certain distance they, according to Chamberlin and Robinson, 
represent a local monopoly governed by imperfect competition. Therefore, we need to 
have no distinction of globalization patterns between standards and convenience type of 
products. The localization of the business leads to a globalization pattern with a market 
share adding strategy by FDI in order to grow in businesses of such types. 
Fig. 5. The globalization type matrix 
 
Are there any drivers able to upset this apparently stable situation? Yes, there is one. If the 
difference in price (intended as absolute cost advantage, according to Adam Smith) for the 
same goods in different economies exceeds a certain threshold, exports can temporarily 
become possible also for products following Type-2 globalisation. We may call this ‘eco-
nomic arbitrage’. In these cases we can observe also a material flow of products within the 
Type-2 globalisation characterized businesses; let us call the Type-1c ‘opportunistic or 
low-cost globalization’. Typical are the exports of low-cost countries such as China. Fur-
thermore, if a price difference between the salaries of white collar jobs also exists in dif-
ferent economies – and the skills are equivalent – then, thanks to today's efficient tele-
communication infrastructure, it is also possible that enterprise functions as R&D, call 
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centres or accounting are outsourced to low-cost countries such as India; let us call the 
third type ‘globalization of human factor or service’. Fig. 5 shows all types of globaliza-
tion within a matrix allowing us to identify them roughly and with that the possible evolu-
tion or competitive issues to face within a certain business (Rüttimann 2007).   
Does any evidence exist for this business and globalization type classification? The 
structure of exported goods for the year 2004 is shown in Fig. 6. The business type sym-
bols have been added to each product group in order to show the pertinent classification 
according to the business type matrix as well as the corresponding type of globalization. 
We see that the majority of the product groups belong to the commodities and specialties. 
The graph shows also a statistical significant difference between the typical type 1 global-
ization business types of commodities and specialties compared to the type 2 globalization 
businesses of standards and convenience. The reason why the type 2 globalization busi-
nesses show some trade activity is mainly attributable to the opportunistic low-price glob-
alization type 1c. We have to keep in mind that this classification is a rough but useful 
model, based on economic considerations, giving practical guidelines to structure the eco-
nomic globalization phenomenon and is far from being a mathematically exact model ac-
cording to physical laws. 
Fig. 6. Goods export and relative business types 
 
The Intrinsic Rational of Each Globalization Type 
Indeed, these different globalization types also follow different economic laws. Type 1a, 
that is globalization of commodities, is characterized by global price building in efficient 
dedicated market places, and they are mainly characterized by unidirectional material 
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flows from countries of origin to the industrialized countries of transformation (Fig. 7). 
The preference for a raw material compared to another depends from the ‘latent value’ of a 
specific resource compared to another substitute resource. This also takes into considera-
tion the ecological impact or the end-of-cycle aspects. The latent value expresses the value 
for the customer; it explains why a more expensive resource – like aluminium versus 
steel – is chosen.  
Fig. 7. The foreign trade from the country of origin to the country of destination 
 
Globalization Type 1b is characterized by bi-directional flows of the same products be-
tween different economies (Fig. 8). Similar but differentiated products are produced by 
different competitors in different countries. The preference for one product compared to 
another depends on the ‘cost-benefit’ perception of the customer which can be translated 
to the ‘competitiveness factor’ of differentiated products of a producer. This competitive-
ness factor describes a comparative competitive advantage allowing us to model the be-
havior of economic actors for differentiated products. The higher the competitiveness fac-
tor is, the higher the market share of the producer. This can be seen as the modern inter-
pretation of the Heckscher-Ohlin factors proportion theory. 
Fig. 8. Bi-directional flows of the same products between different economies 
 
Type 2 globalization products depend on the ‘intrinsic market fragmentation’ of the busi-
ness (Fig. 9).  
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Fig. 9. 
 
This market fragmentation is given by the characteristic of the product and the related 
transaction mechanism as well as its transportation cost. The fragmentation is determined 
as follows: 
For simplicity, let us assume that all the companies are the same size in the market; 
due to the fragmentation of the market, this approximation is valid for most companies in 
the market. The higher the demand is, the more supplying companies a fragmented market 
requires. The market share in a fragmented market is fairly irrelevant. The demand is uni-
formly fragmented in the market and therefore the supply, due to the characteristics of the 
product, is also uniformly fragmented. The market structure is the driving element within 
this simplified analytical view. The reason for entering this market, besides the desire to 
exert control, is to increase one's own added value within the value chain. This reasoning 
is especially valid for the intermediate products (standards). The reasoning for conven-
ience such as services (hotels) or fast-food is similar, but through the differentiation of the 
product and the end customers' behaviour, the causal relation has to be reconsidered, tak-
ing into account the comparative characteristics of the product or service offered. Indeed, 
combined with the fragmentation of the final demand, Type 2 fragmentation is an indicator 
for the necessary polypolistic offer structure to reach the next transformation stage of the 
value add chain or to be distributed to the final customer.  
Type 1c is based on the price differential of the same product with low differentiation 
properties between two economies. Type 1c globalization is an example par excellence to 
explain the classic foreign trade theory based on absolute cost advantages. It is interesting 
to note that propensity of Type 1c globalization is based not on volume and growth but 
first on price difference and secondly, on capacity utilization. The absolute cost advantage 
is the most evident driving factor for the Type 1c globalization. We may call the resulting 
driver the ‘propensity for globalization’ (Fig. 10).  
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Fig. 10. 
 
The higher the difference is, the higher the material flows of these products from countries 
of emerging economies to countries of advanced economies, although – from the intrinsic 
nature of the business – it would follow the Type 2 globalization.  
Type 3 globalization is modelled by the ‘comparative skill of labor’, that is the level 
of skills available and the respective cost as well as the cost to transfer the service in ques-
tion to the economy with lower cost (Fig. 11).  
Fig. 11. 
 
The theory of factor allocation, in this particular case labor, follows the same theory valid 
for economic goods. But let us enlarge on the concept and analyze the comparative skills 
of labor as well. In this context labor is intended to be rather as white collars. Type 3 glob-
alization deals with the supporting function within a company. The main driver for the 
transfer of service functions to low-cost countries is the cost of salaries including the so-
cial contributions for white collar workers. Changes in considerations, according to ex-
periences made, can even overweight the labor cost advantage and lead to outsourcing 
being reconsidered. This type of globalization is increasing not only for the supporting 
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functions but also for every service based on human skills where the service can be sup-
ported by the new telecommunication possibilities. 
Each business follows its own globalization type. Nevertheless, there are also the 
mixed types. Especially Type 2 globalization is also observable in superposition to 1a and 
1b globalization from MNE to increase market share. These imperialistic expansion strate-
gies are often denounced due to the latent fear of unemployment. But the natural types of 
globalization (e.g., 1a, 1b, 2) are not responsible for the negative social consequences such as 
unemployment; the socio-political consequences are mainly caused by Types 1c and 3. But 
this is another story. The phenomenological modelling of economic globalization pre-
sented here is further accompanied by a common denominator for the intrinsic reason of 
macroeconomic globalization evolution. The rationale behind this will lead to the Central 
Theorem of Globalization (Rüttimann 2007).  
The Aluminium Industry 
Big structural changes are occurring in the aluminium industry (Pawlek 2007). These 
changes have been analyzed extensively (Rüttimann 2008b), and the results were pre-
sented during the closing keynote speech at the Aluminium 2008 World Trade Fair and 
Conference in Essen. The globalization types presented here help us to understand the on-
going fundamental changes in the global industry logic. Let us try to put the aluminium 
technologies into the business type matrix and then derive the pertinent globalization type. 
Bauxite mining belongs to the ore extracting operation often performed by big vertically 
integrated aluminium companies or multinational mining groups, characterized by a clear 
oligopolistic market structure. Per definition, the differentiation aspect of a commodity is 
not existent, may be with the exception of the ore content. The same is valid for the cal-
cined alumina. The outcome of the smelting process is primary aluminium, traded as in-
gots on commodity exchanges mainly in the quality 99.7 per cent. Also for primary alu-
minium we have the same oligopolistic structure composed of MNС with some independ-
ent SME (Small Medium Enterprises) as exceptions. We can classify all these goods as 
belonging to the commodity type of business, goods flowing from their natural origin to 
the big conversion centers and where low cost operations are essential (Fig. 12). The world 
of semi-fabricated products is mainly composed of the technologies rolling, extrusion, 
castings, forgings, and thin foil rolling. Although these plants often belong to MNС, the 
operating configuration has a fragmented structure in order to be near to their customers; 
MNE try to serve a wider geographical extension by setting-up a network of plants (e.g. 
SAPA, Hydro Aluminium, Novelis). The reasons of the fragmentation originate from  
the cumbrous shape of the products but also the need to interact with customers resulting 
therefore in a more regional-oriented business, but also the availability of technology and 
the nonsense of long transportation distances for non-differentiated products. The frag-
mentation of the business favors the concomitance of SME mainly in the extrusions, cast-
ings and forging technologies. For example, in extrusions the SME make up 50 per cent of 
the plants (Conserva 2007). All these technologies can be classified as belonging to the 
standards type business. These are intermediate goods with a low differentiation degree of 
the product. We can even classify the transaction object rather to be a service than only  
a physical product. Indeed, the customer asks primarily three questions: Can you manufac-
ture this product? When can you supply it? How much does it cost? Thus, the extrusion 
companies are not supplying a product but performing a service by putting their produc-
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tion capacities to the service of their customers and trying to give the shortest delivery 
time, accurate punctuality and specification-conform quality (Rüttimann 2002). Some-
times in the aluminium industry we can observe the downstream integration in the value-
added chain right to ready-to-be-assembled components or systems for the building indus-
try. These products have already a quite advanced differentiation degree for the solution 
proposed. On the other hand, the concentration degree from the supply point of view may 
vary. Nevertheless, we can classify it as belonging to in-between of specialties type of 
business and convenience.  
Fig. 12. The aluminium technologies within the Business Typology Matrix 
 
The products (or technologies) of the aluminium industry belong mostly to the commodi-
ties and standards type of business (Fig. 12); this seems to be reasonable due to the fact 
that the transaction type is rather a B2B than a B2C.  
The aluminium industry has been mainly composed of fully vertically integrated con-
cerns covering the bauxite extracting, alumina refinery, primary aluminium smelting, dif-
ferent semis production technologies, and sometimes through to the manufacturing of 
components for the automotive, aerospace or electrotechnical industries (Fig. 13). Interest-
ing is to see the apparently neat cut between the upstream operations (bauxite, alumina  
and primary) from the so-called downstream technologies (rolling, extrusions, castings, and 
forgings). Indeed, the basic aluminium production supplies the common basic raw material 
to all the other aluminium semis operations. Fig. 13 shows the relative business typology 
as well as the related globalization type on each level of the value-added chain. It clearly 
shows the co-existence of different globalization typologies within the aluminium indus-
try. Therefore, we cannot simply say that we can observe a general globalization tendency 
in the aluminium industry but we can also assert it will perform differently along the 
added-value chain according to the different industry logics with different effects on  
the competitive system as well as the social system of employment. 
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Fig. 13. The value-add chain of the aluminium industry 
 
In addition to the predominant globalization type of each value added stage, secondary 
globalization types may overlap. In fact, globalization Type 2 will mainly face additional 
competition in the form of opportunistic low-price globalization Type 1c. This has been 
especially the case of North American extrusion imports from China during the last years 
(Rüttimann 2008a). Further, in case of MNС, markets with natural physical globalization 
Types 1a and 1b will also be overlapped by the financial globalization Type 2 with the 
logic of adding market shares for global growth. This shows that the present disintegration 
of integrated aluminium companies is also related to the difference in the basic globaliza-
tion types with different industry logics. Indeed, for globalization Type 1 the CSF (Critical 
Success Factor) is cost, the price being determined by LME (London Metal Exchange), 
whereas for globalization Type 2 the CSF is mainly a service. Moreover, despite the fact 
that the semis operation such as extrusion or rolling have the same globalization type, we 
find that between the different semis operations there are no relevant synergies observable 
from management point of view (Rüttimann 2008b) (except for contingent situations). 
This is underlined by the fact that the alloys are often quite different even with separate 
recycling loops, and the products out of different technologies are only partly, if ever, sub-
stitutable needing different conceptual engineering design. The reason for backward inte-
gration is more related historically as well as to have direct access to the aluminium metal, 
securing the supply side.  
 
References 
Conserva, M. 2007. Global Market Trends of Aluminium and Aluminium Products. Proceed-
ings of the 6th World Congress Aluminium Two Thousand. March 13–17. Florence: Interall 
publications. 
Holding,
Services
Bauxit mining,
Alumina production
Primary smelter , Casting
Rolling, Extruding,
Die casting, Forging,...
Components ,
Finished products
Recycling
U
sa
ge
Remelters ,
Foundry
Scrap,
waste
Type Ia
Type Ia
Type II
Type II
-
Type Ib
Type II
Type III
U
sa
ge
Globalistics and Globalization Studies 312 
Pawlek, R. 2007. The Rio Tinto Alcan Deal – Marking the Dawn of a New Era for Metals. 
ALUMINIUM 9/, Giesel Verlag. 
Rüttimann, B. 2002. Strategy and Tactics in the Aluminium Semi-Finished Products Industry. 
ALUMINIUM 78 (2002) 1/2 and 4. 
Rüttimann, B. 2007. Modeling Economic Globalization. A Post-Neoclassic View on Foreign 
Trade and Competition. Münster: Verlagshaus Monsenstein und Vannerdat. 
Rüttimann, B. 2008a. The Globalization Trap of the Aluminum Extrusion Industry. Paper pre-
sented at the 9th International Extrusion Technology Congress ET08, May 13–16. Orlando, 
Florida, USA. 
Rüttimann, B. 2008b. Which Globalisation for the Aluminium Industry? ALUMINIUM, Part 
1 in 1-2/2008 and Part 2 in 3/2008, Giesel Verlag.  
  
Globalistics and Globalization Studies 2014 313–320 
 
 
Interdisciplinary Methodology:  
A Graduate-Level Course in Global Studies 
 
Patrick Manning 
 
 
By definition, Global Studies is global in scope; at best this field of study is in-
terdisciplinary as well. Individual programs at various institutions have made 
great strides in crossing disciplinary lines in their educational programs. Never-
theless, while university public relations releases speak confidently of the inter-
disciplinary, transdisciplinary, and cross-disciplinary advances in many scien-
tific fields, the overwhelming majority of instruction remains constrained within 
disciplinary limits. This brief essay describes one effort, central to a collabora-
tive effort in Global Studies, that has succeeded in bringing together advanced 
graduate students from many fields and enabling them to share the experience of 
exploring the character and interplay of several disciplines. The purpose of this 
work, at the level of individual students, is to strengthen their skills in learning 
basic competence in fields other than their own core discipline. At the level of 
the Global Studies program, the purpose is to develop a framework and a lan-
guage for discussing multiple disciplines at once, and for using that language to 
sustain a broadly interdisciplinary discourse. 
Keywords: Global Studies, World History, course objectives, Schedule and 
Readings. 
Global Studies and World History at the University of Pittsburgh 
At the University of Pittsburgh, a developing program of graduate study links Global Stud-
ies and World History. The alliance of the centers – the Global Studies Center and the 
World History Center – brings a historical dimension to global studies, and an interdisci-
plinary dimension to world history.1 Global Studies, with focus on the themes of global 
health, security, society, economy, awards graduate certificates based on an 18-credit 
course of study. The World History Center emphasizes research, graduate and under-
graduate study, and awards a History PhD with thematic concentration in world history. 
The two centers collaborate in global educational outreach to the community and to sec-
ondary schools. 
The course in Interdisciplinary Methodology was taught in 2009 and 2012 and is 
scheduled to be taught again in 2015. It has enabled the university to create a space where 
                                                          
1 The Global Studies Center (http://www.ucis.pitt.edu/global), directed by Prof. Nancy Condee, is housed in the Uni-
versity Center of International Studies (UCIS) at the University of Pittsburgh and is supported by Title VI funding 
from the U.S. Department of Education. The World History Center (http://www.worldhistory.pitt.edu), directed by 
Prof. Patrick Manning, is housed in the Department of History. The Global Studies Center and the World History 
Center have a joint membership in the international Global Studies Consortium. 
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cross-disciplinary analysis is formally recognized, encouraged, and developed. The course 
has strengthened each of the centers, their relationship, and has expanded interdisciplinary 
discourse in other parts of the university. 
Purpose and Objectives of the Course 
This is a course in interdisciplinary theory and methods for graduate students who have 
achieved substantial strength in an academic discipline – in the social sciences, humanities 
and arts, natural sciences, or information sciences – and who wish to develop strength in an 
additional discipline and in the interplay of disciplines. Each student reads to prepare col-
laborative presentations describing key aspects of two disciplines, develops statements on 
the frameworks, assumptions, links, parallels, and contradictions of various theories, and 
prepares a major paper on a previously unfamiliar methodology. Each discipline is discussed 
at an introductory level, but the exercise of comparing and connecting disciplines requires 
advanced conceptualization. The course works in association with a practical research pro-
ject to develop a world-historical dataset containing systematic, worldwide data on selected 
variables and topics.2 
The general objective of this interdisciplinary graduate course is to encourage  
the development of a multidisciplinary academic discourse at the University of Pittsburgh, 
particularly emphasizing global perspectives, in which interested graduate students and 
faculty members participate, under the aegis of the Global Studies Center and the World 
History Center. The specific course objectives are: 
 to introduce students to a wide range of disciplines, theories, and methods. Discus-
sion is to include the framework, data, method, and analysis for each discipline; 
 to enable individual students to develop substantial strength in a new discipline and 
method of their choice; 
 to compare and contrast the various disciplines, seeking out links and parallels 
among them; 
 to develop a common language for cross-disciplinary discourse, encompassing mul-
tiple disciplines; 
 to contribute to creation of a global historical dataset reflecting many of these disci-
plines: such a dataset is developing through the Collaborative for Historical Information 
and Analysis (CHIA). 
At the end of the course, students should: 
 have gained literacy in disciplines in the humanities and arts, social sciences, natural 
sciences, and information sciences. By ‘literacy’ is meant: 
– familiarity with elements of the scope (subject matter, variables and frameworks), 
method (types of analysis), and theory of multiple disciplines; 
– familiarity with the range of subfields in each discipline, especially the distinctions 
among small-scale and large-scale (or micro and macro) dimensions of the discipline; 
– familiarity with categories of empirical study in the same disciplines; 
– familiarity with the similarities, links, complementarities, and contradictions of var-
ious disciplines and their theories. 
                                                          
2 Collaborative for Historical Information and Analysis (CHIA, http://www.chia.pitt.edu), sponsored by the World 
History Center. 
Manning • Interdisciplinary Methodology 315 
 Have developed particular strength in one new methodology;  
 have developed a language for cross-disciplinary discussion and analysis;  
 have gained experience in the combination of data from different disciplines to con-
struct a global picture of aspects of human society. 
Instructor and Background 
I have been the instructor each time the course has been given. I have long been a practi-
tioner of cross-disciplinary study and sought out the opportunity to teach this course. I am 
now principally a world historian but was trained as an economic historian of Africa with 
a Master's degree in Economics and with an undergraduate degree in Chemistry.3 My 
graduate study in African history included cross-disciplinary course work and a conclud-
ing seminar, taught by Jan Vansina, in which students worked on archaeology, historical 
linguistics, economics, politics, social anthropology. Since receiving my degree, I have 
conducted additional study and practice in demography, historical studies of language, 
information science, and multimedia production. This provided a basis for leading a course 
in which students could address multiple disciplines at varying levels of depth, and could 
share the experience and exchange their understanding not only of specific disciplines but 
of cross-disciplinary analysis more broadly. In my opinion, the qualification to be instruc-
tor of such an interdisciplinary course is not mastery of the various disciplines but a will-
ingness, based on past experience, to take on new disciplines and gain a substantial if basic 
acquaintance with each new field. 
Students by Discipline 
2015 – the course will now be required for graduate students in World History; other 
students are expected from a broad range of disciplines. 
2012 – students were based in Communications, Economics, Information Science (4), 
Linguistics, Political Science, Public Health, Slavic Language & Literature, Sociology (2), 
Statistics, and Theatre. 
2009 – students were based in East Asian Studies, Education, English (4 total, in cin-
ema, rhetoric, composition, and literature), and History (7 total in various regional fields). 
Initial Presentations and Discussions 
During the first two weeks of the course, the instructor gives initial presentations provid-
ing background to disciplinary and interdisciplinary study and also to model the presenta-
tions that student groups are to give later in the semester. The initial presentation reviews 
epistemological dynamics – the interplay of disciplines, frameworks, theories, evidence, 
analysis, and verification. The second presentation addresses philosophical maps of the 
disciplines, distinguishing the succeeding analytical approaches of positivism, modernism, 
postmodernism and realism – and asking whether the present generation will be able to 
sustain multiple philosophies of analysis. In the 2009 version of the course, I continued in 
week three to give a presentation on quantitative social science and led students in an ex-
ercise on locating and reading articles in major scientific journals: Nature, Science, and 
PNAS (Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences).  
                                                          
3 Patrick Manning, Andrew W. Mellon Professor of World History (http://www.manning.pitt.edu).  
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Also in the first two weeks of the course, students debate and select the disciplines 
they wish to explore, the order in which they will discuss the disciplines, and the member-
ship of the teams to explore each discipline. In the third week, students identify the topic 
for their major paper and submit an abstract for the paper: the abstracts are posted and 
shared among all in the class. 
The Disciplines We Explored 
Disciplines explored in 2012, in their order of discussion: Economics; Political Sci-
ence; Sociology; Anthropology; Linguistics; History; Visual arts; Literature; Psychology; 
Environment; Social evolution and systems. 
Disciplines explored in 2009, in their order of discussion: Literary Theory; Religious 
Studies; Literacy; Ecology; Linguistics; Theories of Pedagogy; Sociology; Cultural An-
thropology; Oral History; Gender Studies. 
Student Assignments 
In general students are to explore the disciplines, present two disciplines to their col-
leagues, develop strength in one new discipline, and share in an expanding, transdiscipli-
nary discourse. 
(1) Each week, students are responsible for completing the assigned reading, exploring 
optional readings, and gaining familiarity with the elements of the discipline under study 
in that week.  
(2) Each week, two or three students select, assign, and lead discussion on readings 
conveying the nature of the method assigned for that week and the significance of its re-
sults. (Students select their assignments at the start of the semester.) 
(3) Students prepare to join actively in each week's cumulative discussion by scruti-
nizing the epistemology apparent in each method and by working to develop a language 
for cross-disciplinary discussion. 
(4) Each student selects a method to learn in depth and submit, at the end of the se-
mester, a substantial paper articulating that method and discussing an application. The pa-
per is posted and discussed.  
For each week, the instructor selects one or two concise ‘core readings’ that provide 
an introduction to the discipline under study. In the eight meetings from Week 3 through 
Week 11, groups of three students present on their selected discipline or disciplines. In 
addition to the core reading assigned by the instructor, the presenters select and assign 
readings of no more than 150 pages, and distribute them via an online resource at least 
seven days in advance of their discussion. Student discussion leaders are to lead discus-
sions during the 100 minutes of discussion in which they present, rather than lecture. 
That is, the instructor assesses the discussion leaders according to the breadth and depth 
of the discussion during the time allocated to them, rather than simply the skill of their 
lecture. 
Topics for possible discussion of a methodology include: subject matter of the disci-
pline, the objectives of analysis, the materials of study and empirical evidence, the meth-
ods of analysis, and the contending or succeeding theories in each field. In addition, stu-
dents are encouraged to identify the main journals and standard works in each field, the 
principal practical and theoretical debates, the evolution of the field, the outstanding ac-
complishments of the field, and the links of each field to other fields. 
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Examples from Presentations and Discussions 
One recurring result in student presentations on disciplines was that they addressed a sig-
nificant amount of their time to tracing the history of each field. For fields such as political 
science and sociology, but also for psychology and ecology, students found it fascinating 
to see how the methods, theories, and debates in each field changed over time. Another 
recurring point was that students found models of scientific method in the standard materi-
als of several disciplines, and sought to identify the variations on a common model. The 
notion of equilibrium was remarkably widespread, appearing not only in Economics but 
also in Ecology. Equally striking, however, was the immense amount of variety in each 
discipline, so that none of them could be characterized by a single theory or analytical fo-
cus. The diversity of disciplinary analysis reflects especially the range of scales from mi-
cro to macro within each field: Microeconomics and Macroeconomics have quite different 
theories, and much the same can be said for Psychology, Ecology, and Linguistics. While 
certain subfields gain prominence and cross-disciplinary reputations – behavioral econom-
ics has been one such in recent years – other fields within the same discipline may con-
tinue productively along quite different lines.  
Despite the importance of recurring themes in discussing the various disciplines, each 
discipline and each presentation brought attention to particular issues of interest. In politi-
cal science, discussion centered on the debate over ‘perestroika’, the argument by a some-
what dissident group of scholars that quantitative studies, dominantly electoral, had led to 
neglect of important qualitative issues in politics. In Sociology, the discussion focused on 
the distinctive analysis of Bayesian statistics. 
For linguistics, the presentation focused especially on the issue of metaphor, begin-
ning with the simple matter of social valuations placed on the terms ‘up’ and ‘down’, and 
showing some of the many other concepts that are conveyed through metaphor. The pres-
entation of visual arts and literature posed very basic questions about the origins and na-
ture of creativity, expression, interpretation – it presented art and science first as contradic-
tory, then as unified. For ecology, the presenters used organizational charts to show the 
tiny place of this field within environmental science and within the academy more 
broadly; they also focused on non-equilibrium studies of ecology. The concluding presen-
tation on systems and social evolution traced social evolution through six disciplines, em-
phasizing the tension between conflict and cooperation. 
Some Results of the Course 
Each student was to write a paper of no more than 25 pages in length, presenting a critical 
exploration and defense of a methodology likely to be of importance to his or her future 
research. The first two pages of each paper are to be a summary of the entire paper aimed 
at facilitating discussion among students in the course. The methodology could be that of a 
single discipline or sub-discipline, or a combination of techniques from different disci-
plines. The papers must reflect substantial reading and reflection, and must convey the 
logic and the relevance of the problem to significant research issues. This is not a research 
paper, but an articulation and defense of a methodology that could readily be applied to 
research. Titles of the 2012 papers are shown in Appendix 3: none were publishable, yet it 
may be that they reflect the opening of new and broader thinking by the authors. 
In addition to the readings listed in the Course Schedule, students had the opportunity 
to develop more extensive bibliographies for disciplines of interest to them. These might 
include: condensed statements of scope, theory, and method; introductory textbooks; ad-
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vanced handbooks; scholarly journals; outstanding recent works (articles or books); and 
studies including or applicable to historical data. 
One concrete result of the course was the publication of a paper co-authored by the in-
structor and a student. As promised to students at the beginning of the course, I was able to 
select one of the strongest students to work with me as a research assistant on an aspect of 
the CHIA project for building a world-historical archive. I selected Sanjana Ravi, a public 
health student who had strong skills in articulating analytical frameworks and dynamics. 
In the fall of 2012 we worked together in defining the completing an article that used a 
systems approach to encompass the study of human populations from the multiple disci-
plinary perspectives of Demography, Economics, Political science, and Sociology. The 
reason for this effort to link disciplines was that the construction of a world-historical ar-
chive would require combining the strengths of all these disciplines in order to make esti-
mations to begin filling in the large amount of missing data.4 
As usual in education, the students pass through in one or several years, and only the 
teachers remain in place. Yet somehow the ethos of a curriculum makes itself felt, perhaps 
simply because of the repeated work of the teacher but more likely because of interactions 
of students with each other in the classroom and beyond it. Even the institution may adjust 
to developing lines of inquiry within its walls. So I think there is hope that collaborative 
instruction and learning of interdisciplinary methods may gradually become a part of uni-
versity life. 
Appendix 1. Course Schedule and Readings (revised, April 2012) 
Week 1 (January 9). Introduction: Epistemological dynamics [Manning]. 
Reading: King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry, pp. I–xi, 1–33. 
(January 16) – No class: Martin Luther King, Jr. Holiday. 
Week 2 (January 23). Philosophy: Positivism, Post-modernism & Realism; causation and 
feedback.  
Presenter: Patrick Manning. 
Reading: King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry, pp. 34–114. 
Wilson, E. O., Consilience (New York: Knopf, 1998), chapters 1 and 2. 
Campbell, Donald T., Methodology and Epistemology for Social Sciences, vii–xix. 
Thompson, Willie, Postmodernism and History, 6–26, 56–73. 
McNeill, William H., ‘Passing Strange’, History and Theory (2001). 
Week 3 (January 30). Social Science 1. Economics. 
Presenters: Helga Cabellero-Benitez, John Christie-Searles, Sanjana Ravi. 
Reading: King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry, pp. 115–230. 
Wikipedia, ‘Economics’, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economics 
Humphries, Jane. ‘Rational Economic Families? Economics, the Family, and the Econ-
omy’. In Joanne Cook, Jennifer Roberts, and Georgina Waylen (eds.), Towards a Gendered 
Political Economy.  London: MacMillan Press, 2000. 
Week 4 (February 6). Social Science 2. Political Science. 
Presenters: James Osborne, Sharon Quinsaat, Qi Zhang 
Reading: Schramm, S. F., Caterino, B. (eds.) Making Political Science Matter: Debating 
Knowledge, Research, and Method (New York: New York University Press, 2006). 
Week 5 (February 13). Social Science 3. Sociology. 
                                                          
4 Patrick Manning and Sanjana Ravi, ‘Cross-Disciplinary Theory in Construction of a World-Historical Archive’, 
Journal of World-Historical Information 1 (2013): 15–39. doi: 10.5195/jwhi.2013.3. 
Manning • Interdisciplinary Methodology 319 
Presenters: Jeremy Burton, Jinyuan Liu, James Osborne 
Reading: Smith, Philip (ed). The New American Cultural Sociology (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1998). 
Alford, Robert. The Craft of Inquiry. Theories, Methods, Evidence (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1998). 
Week 6 (February 20). Social Science 4. Anthropology. 
Presenters: Sarah Bishop, Lauren Collister, Beach Gray. 
Reading: Barth, Fredrik, et al., One Discipline, Four Ways: British, German, French and 
American Anthropology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
Week 7 (February 27). Humanities and Arts 1. Linguistics. 
Presenters: Ryan Champagne, Courtney Lauder, Peter Wood. 
Reading: Wikipedia, ‘Linguistics’, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistics. 
(March 5) – Spring Break. 
Week 8 (March 12). Humanities and Arts 2; Social Science 5. History. 
Presenters: Sharon Quinsaat, Ya-Wen Yu, Qi Zhang. 
Reading: Manning, Patrick, Navigating World History (New York: Palgrave, 2003),  
313–323. 
Week 9 (March 19). Humanities and Arts 3. Literature and Visual Arts. 
Presenters: Ryan Champagne, John Christie-Searles, Sanjaya Ravi. 
Reading: Castle, Gregory. The Blackwell Guide to Literary Theory (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2007). 
Smith, Terry, What Is Contemporary Art? (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009). 
Week 10 (March 26). Natural Sciences 1; Social Science 6. Psychology. 
Presenters: Jinyuan Liu, Peter Wood, Jungwon Yeo. 
Reading: Wikipedia, ‘Psychology’, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Psychology. 
Week 11 (April 2). Natural Sciences 2. Environmental Studies. 
Presenters: Beach Gray, Jeremy Burton, Sarah Bishop. 
Reading: Scoones, I. ‘New Ecology and the Social Sciences: What Prospects for a Fruitful 
Engagement?’ Annual Review of Anthropology, 28 (1999) pp. 479–507. 
Week 12 (April 9). Combining Disciplines 1. Social Evolution and Systems. 
Presenters: Helga Caballero-Benitez, Sanjana Ravi, Lauren Collister. 
Reading: Bentley, Jerry (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of World History (2011). 
Carneiro, Robert L. ‘Stellar Evolution and Social Evolution: A Study in Parallel Proc-
esses’, Social Evolution & History 4 (2005). 
Week 14 (April 16). Presentations 1.  
Presentation of main papers (first half).  
Reading: paper summaries circulated by authors. 
Week 15 (April 23?). Presentations 2. 
Presentation of main papers (second half). 
Reading: paper summaries circulated by authors. 
Appendix 2. Titles of Methodological Papers, April 2012 
1. ‘A Methodology of Experience: A Defense of Oral History within the Field of Com-
munication’. 
2. ‘Choosing wisely: Behavioral economics and information overload’. 
3. ‘Behavioral Economics: the bounded rationality and prospect theories as critiques of 
the rationality paradigm’. 
4. ‘What Does This Word Mean? Reframing Disciplines in Interdisciplinary Communi-
cation’. 
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5. ‘Tanzanian Benedictine Monasticism:  Modernization through Primary Education’. 
6. ‘Measuring Advertisement Reaction’. 
7. ‘Seeing Is More Than Believing: Visual Ways of Knowing’. 
8. ‘In Defense of Qualitative Case Studies and their Utilization in Indigenous Politics’. 
9. ‘Using Comparative Method in Explaining the Role of National Context in Home-
land-Oriented Migrant Mobilization’. 
10. ‘The Patient's Dilemma: A Methodology for Infectious Disease Investigation’. 
11. ‘A Cognitive Turn Toward Performance Scholarship’. 
12. ‘Post-Colonialism: Toward an Interdisciplinary Approach of Cultural Politics and 
Postmodernist Historiography’.  
13. ‘The mathematicization of sociology and Political Science: a new institutionalism 
comparison’.    
Appendix 3. Comments from Students, June 2013 
Here are comments from three students in the course, written a year after the course ended. 
They suggest that the course did indeed make some progress in enabling students to address 
cross-disciplinary issues in a more confident fashion. 
•  ‘The course allowed me to see the connectivity between the social sciences; moreover, I 
was able to see familiar skills sets, familiar literature, and familiar diction applied to different 
social sciences in different ways.’  
•  ‘We all spoke different languages, and this course introduced me to some tools that help 
bridge that language gap between our disciplines. … 
I had already been an Open Access advocate in my own scholarly work, but in the class 
I heard about how others had similar issues surrounding access to data and research and no one 
knew how to fix them. ... I decided that I wanted to devote my efforts to helping to remedy that 
problem and turned my career path in a new and exciting direction:  Open Access policy.’ 
• ‘When I read a research paper, for example, I now pay closer attention to the assump-
tions underlying the authors' hypotheses and chosen methods. As someone who works in 
a multidisciplinary profession, I find these skills to be invaluable.’  
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Beyond Global Studies. An Introductory Lecture 
into a Big History Course* 
 
Leonid E. Grinin, Andrey V. Korotayev, and David Baker 
 
 
Global studies can be made not only with respect to the humans who inhabit the 
Earth, they can well be done with respect to biological and abiotic systems of 
our planet. Such an approach opens wide horizons for the modern university 
education as it helps to form a global view of various processes. However, we 
can also ask ourselves whether the limits of our studies can be moved further. 
Would not it be useful for the students to understand the evolution of our planet 
within the context of the evolution of our Universe? The need to see this process 
of development holistically, in its origins and growing complexity, is fundamental 
to what drives not only science but the human imagination. This shared vision of 
the grand narrative is one of the most effective ways to conceptualize and inte-
grate our growing knowledge of the Universe, society, and human thought. Note 
that the respective discipline already exists and it has been developing quite suc-
cessfully for more than three decades; it is denotes as Big History. 
Keywords: Big History, Universe, evolution, complexity, grand narrative. 
What is Big History? 
Big History has been developing very fast indeed. We are currently observing a ‘Cambrian 
explosion’ in terms of its popularity and diffusion. Big History courses are taught in the 
schools and universities of several dozen countries, including Australia, Great Britain, 
China, Germany India, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, the USA, Russia and many more. 
The International Big History Association (IBHA) is gaining momentum in its projects 
and membership. Conferences are beginning to be held regularly. Hundreds of researchers 
are involved in studying and teaching Big History. What is Big History? And why is it 
becoming so popular? According to the working definition of the International Big History 
Association, ‘Big History seeks to understand the integrated history of the Cosmos, Earth, 
Life and Humanity, using the best available empirical evidence and scholarly methods’ 
(Grinin et al. 2014a: 5). So, Big History brings together constantly updated information 
from the scientific disciplines and merges it with the contemplative realms of philosophy 
and the humanities. It also provides a connection between the past, present, and future. Big 
History is a colossal and extremely heterogeneous field of research encompassing all the 
forms of existence and all timescales.  
                                                          
* The text of this lecture has been prepared on the basis of our introduction to the edited volume Teaching & Research-
ing Big History: Exploring a New Scholarly Field (Grinin et al. 2014b). For more information on Big History see, 
e.g., Grinin et al. 2011, 2014b; Grinin, Korotayev, Rodrigue 2011; Grinin, Korotayev 2013; Grinin, Ilyin, and Koro-
tayev 2012. 
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Scientific specialization and the immense amounts of information contained in the 
various ‘compartments’ of academia can hinder our capacity for inclusiveness, but, para-
doxically, it also amplifies the need for it. Many scientists would like a more integrated 
vision that sees beyond their meticulous and complicated fields of specialization. One can 
see the growth of such interest in the framework of individual disciplines, as well as in 
interdisciplinary research. Moreover, without using ‘mega-paradigms’ like Big History, 
scientists working in different fields may run the risk of losing sight of how each other's 
tireless work connects and contributes to their own. 
Yet while interdisciplinarity is not a new idea, many disciplines can run the disap-
pointing tendency of only paying lip-service to it. This is not possible in Big History. In a 
discipline that starts by weaving together all the disciplines into a single narrative, inter-
disciplinary work is not only possible, it is essential. A unification of the disciplines, a 
deep symbiosis of academic cells, will open up research areas that are vital to the devel-
opment of the twenty-first century thought and culture. As has been mentioned on a num-
ber of occasions, the rapidly globalizing world needs global knowledge that explains a uni-
fied global system (see Grinin, Carneiro, Korotayev, and Spier 2011; Grinin and Korotayev 
2009). Indeed, globalization itself becomes a vehicle for Big History. The very existence 
of the International Big History Association is proof of that. 
Origins of Big History 
Big History ideas did not appear out of nowhere. They have deep roots in human spiritual-
ity, philosophy, and science. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries there was an explo-
sive growth of scientific knowledge accompanied by a deep differentiation of disciplines. 
This made borders between scholars and scientists much more rigid, while research spe-
cialization grew by an order of magnitude. As Erwin Schrödinger justly noted: ‘[I]t has 
become next to impossible for a single mind fully to command more than a small special-
ized portion of it’. However, he continued, there is ‘no other escape from this dilemma 
(lest our true aim be lost forever) than that some of us should venture to embark on a syn-
thesis of facts and theories’ (Schrödinger 1944: 1). As disintegration peaked in the twenti-
eth century, such undertakings were not mentioned as often as they ought to have been. 
When an interdisciplinary synthesis was mentioned at all, it was seen as a lofty goal, the 
barest whisper of a dream, rather than an approachable reality. 
A very different picture appears if we look further back in the history of human 
thought. From the very moment of their emergence, grand unified theories of existence 
tended to become global. Even the Abrahamic theological tradition, that was dominant in the 
western half of the Afroeurasian world-system in the Late Ancient and Medieval periods, 
contains a sort of proto-Big History. It presents a unified vision of the Universe’s origin, de-
velopment, and future. In that grand narrative, the Universe has a single point of creation and 
it develops according to a divine plan. Similarly, classical Indian religious philosophy 
loosely resembles the principle of the unity of the world through the idea of reincarnation, 
in a Hindu approximation of the First Law of Thermodynamics. Even the delusions of as-
trologers and alchemists contained the idea of universal interconnectedness (stars and 
planets affect human fates; everything can be transformed into everything else). This is 
only a fragment of the pre-modern ideas that contained an element of Big History think-
ing. Many interesting insights on the properties of the Universe can be found in pre-
scientific worldviews generated by various human civilizations.  
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Ancient philosophy even aspired to find the single principle cause for everything that 
exists1. This was done in a very insightful way in the works of the ancient Greeks, who 
were especially interested in the origins and nature of the Universe. Note that, even while 
Greek (and, more generally, classical) philosophy concentrated on ethical or aesthetic issues, 
it was still dominated by the idea of the single law of Logos that governed the whole Uni-
verse, with many different interpretations of it provided by various thinkers. This was rein-
forced by the concept of a ‘cosmic circulation’ that also influenced human society. Medieval 
philosophy inherited the Greek tradition ‘to comprehend the universe on the basis of ar-
chetypical principles … as well as the inclination to detect clarifying universals in the 
chaos of the life’ (Tarnas 1991). 
The Beginning of Modern History of Big History 
The transition from the geocentric (Ptolemaic) to the heliocentric (Copernican) perspective 
took many decades notwithstanding all the brilliant conjectures of Giordano Bruno (1548–
1600). Discoveries by Johannes Kepler (1571–1630), Galileo Galelei (1564–1642), and 
Isaac Newton (1643–1727) produced a majestic vision of the Universe.  For the first time 
in history, a more advanced form of Big History thinking was produced – not by the 
speculations of philosophers or theologians but on the basis of corroborated facts and 
mathematically formulated laws of Nature. ‘Mechanicism’ became the dominant paradigm 
in western scientific thought (including the social sciences). Thus the formation of a uni-
fied scientific worldview was consolidated. ‘Natural philosophy’, the precursor term for sci-
ence, investigated everything from the highly cosmological to the deeply sociological and con-
tinued to preserve its dominant position in the eighteenth century: the age of the Enlightenment 
(see Barg 1987; Grinin 2012 for more details).  
However, new ideas stressing historical variability soon emerged. Those ideas and discov-
eries led to a crisis of the dominant scientific paradigm. In geology, Georges-Louis Leclerc, 
Comte de Buffon, systematized all the known empirical data and analyzed a number of im-
portant theoretical issues of the development of the Earth and its surface. He also produced a 
few insights that turned out to be important for the development of the theory of biological 
evolution. The hypothesis of the emergence of the Solar System from a gas nebula was 
first spelled out by philosopher Immanuel Kant and later by mathematician and astrono-
mer Pierre-Simon Laplace in one of the notes to his multivolume Mécanique Céleste 
(1799–1825). 
Some of the philosophical roots of evolutionary ideas are very old indeed, and scientifi-
cally based evolutionary ideas first emerged in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. But 
the idea of universal evolution only became really influential in the nineteenth century. The 
first major evolutionary theory in biology was produced by Jean-Baptiste Lamarck (1744–
1829), who advocated change via acquired traits. Another no less evolutionary theory was 
formulated in geology by Charles Lyell (1797–1875) who, in his Principles of Geology 
(1830–1833), refuted the theory of catastrophism.  
It is no coincidence that the first narratives beginning to resemble modern big histories 
first emerged around this time. The first real concerted and conscious attempt to unify the 
story of the physical processes of the universe to the dynamics of human society was made 
                                                          
1 In particular, in the classical Indian Philosophy one finds the belief in the ‘eternal moral order’ of the Universe as 
well as ideas of the collossality of the world space and time, infinity of the Universe comprising millions of such 
worlds as our Earth (see, e.g., Chatterjee, Datta 1954).   
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by Alexander von Humboldt (1769–1859), a Prussian natural philosopher, who set out to 
write Kosmos (1845–1859), but died before he could complete it. Also, Robert Chambers 
anonymously published the Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation in 1844. His book 
began with the inception of the Universe in a fiery mist and ended with a history of hu-
manity.  
In the second half of the nineteenth century, the concept of evolution by natural selec-
tion as pioneered by Charles Darwin (1859) and Alfred Russel Wallace (1858) merged 
with the idea of social progress espoused by Herbert Spencer (1857, 1862, 1896) and be-
came a major influence on western thought. The idea of evolution/progress as a transition 
from less to more complex systems dramatically transformed the human worldview (note: 
although Spencer paid more attention to biological and social evolution, he treated evolu-
tion as a universal process taking place at all possible levels – from microorganisms to 
galaxies). It became known that stars and planets, including the Sun and the Earth, are ob-
jects that have their origin, history, and end. There was a great deal of indication that revo-
lutionary changes in astronomy were forthcoming. 
Two discoveries produced the most important contribution to the emergence of Big 
History. First, the interpretation of the redshift by Edwin Hubble in the 1920s demon-
strated that the Universe is not static and eternal, but is in a general state of expansion, as 
if it began with a primordial ‘explosion’. By the 1940s, interacting teams of physicists and 
astronomers from around the world speculated on the existence of left-over radiation from 
this event – cosmic microwave background radiation. This radiation was detected in 1964 
by Arno Penzias and Robert Wilson and provides the most convincing observational evi-
dence for the explosive beginning of our Universe, which in the late 1940s George Ga-
mow and Fred Hoyle called the ‘Big Bang’. The simple epithet became useful for the the-
ory's supporters. Moreover, the emergence of historical evidence for a point of origin of 
the Universe established a sense of chronology and transformed astrophysics into a his-
torical science. The door firmly swung open for scholars of all shades to produce a univer-
sal history, called, to use our own simple epithet, ‘Big History’.  
Cambrian-Style Explosion of Big History 
By the last decades of the twentieth century, it became clear that the natural sciences con-
tained a clear narrative from the Big Bang to modern day and this unity began to find ex-
pression in an increasing number of written works. For the first time it was actually possi-
ble for the mainstream to grasp the entire chronology.2 This began the process of thinking 
about both natural and human history as part of the unified whole. In 1980, astrophysicist 
Eric Jantsch wrote The Self-Organizing Universe (Jantsch 1980), now sadly out of print, 
which tied together all universal entities into a collection of processes. It constitutes the 
first modern unifying Big History. Jantsch did a credible job of examining human history 
as an extension of cosmic evolution and as just one of many structures operating beyond 
thermodynamic equilibrium. Jantsch's work constitutes the first attempt to find a common 
strand or dynamic that streamlines, unites, and underwrites the entire grand narrative. It is 
thus possible to explore history from the Big Bang to modern day without being weighed 
down by the scale of the chronology. 
Around the same time American-based astrophysicists, geologists, and biologists such 
as Preston Cloud, Siegfried Kutter, George Field, and Eric Chaisson began writing and 
                                                          
2 A phenomenon best discussed in David Christian (2009). 
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teaching courses about the cosmic story. Then at the end of the 1980s history and psychol-
ogy professors like David Christian in Sydney, John Mears in Dallas, and Akop Naza-
retyan in Moscow3 began to craft grand narratives that incorporated the human story more 
seamlessly into a larger universal narrative. Fred Spier did the same at Amsterdam and 
Eindhoven. From here, a Cambrian-style explosion of courses and works has occurred.4 
Eric Chaisson's Cosmic Evolution (2001) defines the unifying theme of Big History as 
the rise of complexity, which, he argues, occurs when energy flows through matter be-
come increasingly dense. Chaisson even proposed a way of objectively measuring this 
trend. Free energy rate density is the energy per second that flows through an amount of 
mass. In this way Chaisson empirically established that complexity has been rising in the 
Universe for 13.8 billion years. The theme of rising complexity was incorporated into 
David Christian's Maps of Time (2005) which further employed it in the human tale. Fred 
Spier, most recently in his book, Big History and the Future of Humanity (2010), has em-
phasized the Goldilocks principle, and how the rise of complexity occurs when conditions 
like temperature, pressure, and radiation are ‘just right’ for the rise of complexity to occur. 
Spier asserts that the rise of complexity combined with energy flows and the Goldilocks 
principle form the beginnings of an overarching theory of Big History.  
The unique approach of Big History, the interdisciplinary genre of history that deals 
with the grand narrative of 13.8 billion years, has opened up a vast amount of research 
agendas. Or, to engage an evolutionary metaphor, it has triggered a scholarly speciation 
event where hundreds of new niches have opened up waiting to be filled. The ecological 
terrain is vast and the numbers that currently populate it are few. The research comes in a 
variety of forms. We big historians must collaborate very closely to pursue this vibrant 
new field.  
Big History and Evolutionary Megaparadigm  
Big History has much in common with the interdisciplinary evolutionary research, and this 
is not a coincidence that the Russian version of Big History is called Universal History or 
Universal Evolutionism. 
We need epistemological key terms in order to understand change in nature and soci-
ety in its entirety. There are not that many scientific notions that could play the role of 
such key terms. We think that evolution is one of them.  
One of the clearest manifestations of the universal evolutionary approach is just Big 
History that considers the process of evolution as a continuous and integral process – from 
the Big Bang all the way down to the current state of human affairs and beyond.  
Big History provides unique opportunities to consider the development of the Uni-
verse as a single process. However, one should note that the Big History studies tend to 
pay little attention to such an important aspect as the unity of principles, laws, and mecha-
nisms of evolution at all its levels. We believe that combining the Big History potential 
with evolutionary approaches can open wider horizons in this respect (see Grinin et al. 
2011). Indeed, common traits in development, functioning, and interaction can be found in 
                                                          
3 For more detail on the Russian Big History tradition see Nazaretyan 2011.  
4 For recent survey of size and of the field see Rodrigue, Stasko 2009; and the canon of seminal works includes but is 
not confined to Fred Spier's The Structure of Big History: From the Big Bang until Today (1996), David Christian's 
Maps of Time: An Introduction to Big History (2004), Eric Chaisson's Epic of Evolution: Seven Ages of the Cosmos 
(2006), Cynthia Stokes Brown's Big History: From the Big Bang to the Present (2007), and Evolution, a Big History 
Perspective (Grinin, Korotayev, Rodrigue 2011). 
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apparently quite different processes and phenomena of Big History. In this respect the uni-
versality of evolution is expressed in those real similarities that are detected in many mani-
festations at all its levels. The comparison between different types of macroevolution ap-
pears to be essential for the search for such similarities. We also believe that there are sev-
eral important aspects to such an approach.  
First of all, there are established fundamental notions such as ‘matter’, ‘energy’, ‘en-
tropy’, ‘complexity’, ‘information’, ‘space’, and ‘time’, that provide a general framework 
for comparisons.  
In the second place, matter has some very general properties, which were perhaps al-
ready predetermined during the initial super dense phase of the universe. During the sub-
sequent phases of universal evolution, matter acquires very specific forms, while new 
properties emerged at every new stage of the universal evolution.  
In the third place, a few general system-dependent structural properties of matter5 ap-
pear to determine similarities between different types of macroevolution. Ashby (1958) 
noticed that while the range of systems is enormously wide, most systems consist of 
physical parts: atoms, stars, switches, springs, bones, neurons, muscles, gases, etc. (see 
also Hall and Fagen 1956). In many cases we are dealing with very complex systems that 
are found in many places (Haken 2005: 16). The emergence of forms of greater complex-
ity results from the transition from one evolutionary level to another. The general princi-
ples related to the functioning and development of such objects can be described by gen-
eral system theory. The concepts of self-organization and transition from equilibrium to a 
non-equilibrium state are also relevant in this respect. In addition, both biotic and abiotic 
systems show complex interactions with their environment that can be described in terms 
of general principles.  
In the fourth place, mega-evolutionary trajectories can be considered as components of 
a single process, and their different phases can be regarded as different types of macroevolu-
tion that could be similar in terms of their main trends and directions as well as particular 
mechanisms. This will be discussed in more detail below.  
In the fifth place, we can speak about common vectors of megaevolution as well as 
common causes and conditions during the transition from one level of organization to an-
other. There is a number of very important categories that are relevant for the analysis of 
all phases of megaevolution, most notably self-organization, stable and chaotic states, 
phase transition, bifurcation, etc.  
It appears to be also possible to speak about some other points confirming the unity of 
many principles of the organization and functioning of our world at all the levels and in 
rather various aspects. Hence, the integration of such paradigms as Big History and 
megaevolutionary comparative studies allow researchers and students to view a colossal 
panorama of our Universe at various levels and in very different aspects. 
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Section 2. GLOBAL STUDIES CURRICULA AND 
SYLLABI AROUND THE WORLD 
 
Part 1. 
UNIVERSITIES WITH GLOBAL STUDIES  
EDUCATION AT BACHELOR’S LEVEL  
Arizona State University, USA 
 
1. Name of university Arizona State University 
2. Year of foundation 1885 
3. Name of faculty where Globalistics is studied School of Politics and  
 Global Studies 
4. Name of program and year of beginning Global Studies (2005) 
5. Number of students No information 
6. Levels of study (undergraduate, postgraduate, PhD) The school offers undergraduate
 Degrees (BA, BS) in Global 
 Studies. 
7. Languages of study English 
8. Short description of program 
Undergraduate program in Global Studies normally takes eight semesters to complete. 
During this period students are supposed to study the causes and consequences of problems 
that cross national boundaries, and the governance of these problems in social, cultural, and 
economic contexts. Each student addresses real world problems and their solutions in the con-
text of the New American University. This mission is enabled by an internationally recognized 
faculty from a wide variety of disciplines in the social sciences, humanities and law with exten-
sive global experience. 
9. Full description of program 
Undergraduate program in Global Studies employs diverse theoretical and disciplinary 
perspectives in the study of global processes, institutions and problems across global, national, 
regional and local scales. It includes compulsory courses and elective ones as well. 
Compulsory, or fundamental, courses are:  
– Access to the World;  
– College Mathematics;  
– Cultural Diversity in the USA;  
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– Global Awareness;  
– Historical Awareness;  
– Humanities, Fine Arts and Design;  
– Internship;  
– Natural Science;  
– Professional Global Career Development;  
– Political Statistics;  
– Research Methods;  
– Second Language;  
– Social and Behavioral Sciences;  
– Social Statistics;  
– Thinking Globally: The Individual and Authority. 
Elective courses are divided into five blocks which represent the areas the current students 
focus on: Cultural Perspectives and Place, Economic Development, Global Governance, Urban 
Systems and Environment, Violence and Conflict. 
These courses are: 
1) Cultural Perspectives and Place track: 
– Global History since 1500;  
– Religion and Globalization;  
– Introduction to Southeast Asia;  
– Global Trends;  
– Place making in a Globalizing World;  
– China in Transition; 
– Yoruba in the African Diaspora;  
– Islam and World Affairs;  
– Islam & Islamic Societies in Africa;  
– Cultural Aspects of Globalization;  
– Religions of India; 
– Globalization and China;  
– Gender, Culture and Development. 
2) Economic Development track: 
– Economic Development in Historical Perspective;  
– Economic Development in Transitional Societies;  
– Global Markets;  
– Policies for Economic Development;  
– Principles of Economic Development;  
– Global Trade in Real Time;  
– Capstone: Understanding China. 
3) Global Governance track: 
– Mechanisms of Governance;  
– International Institutions and Global Governance;  
– Alien Rule and Discontent;  
– Diplomacy and Foreign Service;  
– International Institutions;  
– Working International Organizations;  
– Contemporary Global Trends;  
– World Society;  
– Religion and Global Politics;  
– Different Voices within Contemporary Islamic Discourse;  
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– Race, Ethnicity, and Politics;  
– International Women;  
– Comparative Empires;  
– The Use of Covert Action: The U.S. Experience;  
– Capstone: Global Civil Society and Global Studies;  
– Capstone: Collective Action & Global Public Goods. 
4) Urban Systems & Environment track: 
– Global Urban Systems;  
– Urbanization in China;  
– Globalization and the Environment: Problems and Solutions;  
– Introduction to Environmental Issues;  
– Global Environmental Conflict;  
– Gender Globalization and Sustainability;  
– International Development and Sustainability;  
– Natural Catastrophe & Urban Response;  
Capstone: Coping with Climate Change. 
5) Violence & Conflict track: 
– Humanitarian Crisis and International Intervention;  
– Globalization, Colonialism, and Religion;  
– Intro to Humanitarian & Disaster Relief Work;  
– Violence/Conflict/Human Right;  
– Working/Humanity Organizations;  
– Religion;  
– Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict;  
– Facing the Past: Truth, Memory, Denial after Atrocities;  
– Politics of Global Justice;  
– Media & Politics: Conflict and Terrorism SE Asia;  
– National and Ethnic Conflict. 
The course of study is intellectually demanding and stimulating, ensuring students to grad-
uate with defined skills necessary for careers in globally oriented corporations, government 
agencies, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations, and for admission 
for leading graduate and professional schools. 
10. International agreements   No information 
11. Contacts (university, faculty, chairs) 
School of Politics and Global Studies 
Coor Hall, 6th Floor 
975 Myrtle Avenue 
Temple, AZ 85287-3902 
Phone: 480-965-8563 
Fax: 480-965-39-29 
E-mail:spgs@asu.edu  
Homepage:http://pgs.clas.asu.edu/ 
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University of Minnesota, USA 
 
1. Name of university University of Minnesota  
2. Year of foundation 1851 
3. Name of faculty where Globalistics is studied College of Liberal Arts (Insti- 
 tute for Global Studies) 
4. Name of program and year of beginning Global Studies 
5. Number of students No information 
6. Levels of study (undergraduate, postgraduate, PhD) Undergraduate 
7. Languages of study English 
8. Short description of program 
This program allows students to combine thematic and regional courses with the major’s 
core theoretical courses, experiential opportunities and language study. The degree encourages 
the development of strong analytical skills, writing skills, and the ability to approach issues 
from multiple viewpoints. By combining coursework, language study, and experiential oppor-
tunities such as study abroad and internships, the major is ideally suited for students wishing to 
work in public, private, and non-profit organizations dealing with global and cross-cultural 
issues. 
9. Full description 
All courses taught in Global Studies are:  
– twentieth-century Europe from the End of World War II to the End of the Millennium; 
– twentieth-century India;  
– Advanced Topics in South Asian Studies;  
– Altering States: after Communism;  
– Cold War: 1945–91;  
– Crime and Human Rights;  
– Culture and Society of India;  
– Cultural Anthropology;  
– Debating ‘Development’: Contested Visions;  
– Directed Studies;  
– Directed Research;  
– Environment & Empire;  
– Environment and Development in the Third World;  
– Europe: a Geographic Perspective;  
– Europe and its Margins;  
– Food, Culture and Society;  
– Foreign Language;  
– Freshman Seminar;  
– From Printing Press to Internet: Media, Communications and History;  
– Fund and World Trade Organization;  
– Gender and the Family in the Islamic World;  
– Geography of Global Cities;  
– Global Institutions of Power: World Bank, International Monetary;  
– Globalization: Issues and Challenges;  
– Globalization and Social Justice;  
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– Global Studies;  
– Globalize This! Understanding Globalization through Sociology;  
– Honors Course: Supervised Research Paper;  
– Honors: Global Studies Practicum;  
– Honors: Senior Seminar in Global Studies;  
– History of Capitalism: Development since 1500;  
– Human Rights Advocacy;  
– Human Rights Internship;  
– International Human Rights Law;  
– Islam and the West;  
– Knowledge, Power and the Politics of Representation in Global Studies;  
– Life for Sale: Global Debates on Environment, Science, and Society;  
– Living in the Global;  
– Major Project Seminar;  
– News Coverage of International Events;  
– Other Worlds: Globalization and Culture;  
– Population in an Interacting World;  
– Race, Class and the Politics of Nature;  
– Senior Seminar in Global Studies;  
– Society and the Environment: a Growing Conflict;  
– Sociology of International Law;  
– Sustainable People, Sustainable Planet;  
– Theoretical Approaches to Global Studies;  
– Topics: Freshman Seminar;  
– Topics in African Area Studies;  
– Topics in Global Studies;  
– Topics in East Asian Studies;  
– Topics in European Studies;  
– Topics in Latin American Studies;  
– Topics in Middle Eastern Studies;  
– Topics in Russian Area Studies;  
– Topics in South Asian Studies. 
10. International agreements  No information 
11. Contacts (university, faculty, chairs) 
Institute for Global Studies 
214 Social Sciences 
267 19th Ave S 
Minneapolis, MN 55455 
Phone: (612) 624-9007 
Fax: (612) 626-2242 
E-mail:igs@umn.edu 
Homepage:http://igs.cla.umn.edu 
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Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada 
 
1. Name of university Wilfrid Laurier University 
2. Year of foundation Its predecessors are Evangelical Lutheran Seminary of Canada  
(1911), Waterloo College of Arts (1925), and Waterloo  
Lutheran University (1960). From the year of 1973 it has  
been named as Wilfrid Laurier University. 
3. Name of faculty where Globalistics is studied Faculty of Arts, Global Studies 
Department 
4. Name of program and year of beginning  Global Studies 
5. Number of students    No information 
6. Levels of study (undergraduate, postgraduate, PhD) Undergraduate (BA) 
7. Languages of study    English 
8. Short description of program 
Global Studies is a multidisciplinary department concerned with the study of global socie-
ties, issues and events that shape today's world. The department offers a BA in a single or 
combined honors program in four years. We cultivate an environment that fosters high academ-
ic achievement, while also preparing students for a range of professional careers after gradua-
tion. Students are expected to work through three areas of inquiry: ‘comparative development’, 
‘peace and conflict’, and ‘globalization and cultures’. In so doing, they are required to progres-
sively develop their knowledge, proceeding from general concepts and issues into more specif-
ic and advanced theories, as well as research methodologies. They are also required to apply a 
multidisciplinary range of conceptual and analytical tools to think in critical, ethical and inno-
vative ways. Finally, students are also required to develop a degree of second language compe-
tency and may choose to complete an experiential component in their program of study by par-
ticipating in a volunteer placement nationally or abroad. 
9. Full description 
Typical courses that serve as description of the program are: 
– Contemporary Global Conflicts and the Search for Peace;  
– Contemporary Western Societies: Globalization and Cultures;  
– Civil Society, Social Movements and Globalization;  
– City Worlds;  
– Dialogue and Critique in an Age of Terror;  
– Directed Studies;  
– Disarming Conflicts;  
– Disasters and Development;  
– Ecological Citizenship;  
– Ethnical Encounters;  
– Field Course in Global Studies;  
– Global Humanitarianism: the Paradoxes of Giving;  
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– Global Migrations, Refugees and Diasporas;  
– Global Studies: a Case Study;  
– Global Studies Fieldwork;  
– Global Justice;  
– Global Studies in Practice;  
– Globalization and Cultures: the Cosmopolitan Village;  
– Introduction to Global Studies;  
– Islam Culture and Society;  
– Methods in Global Studies;  
– Narratives of/about Violence;  
– Nature, Culture and Development;  
– Neoliberalism and its Critics;  
– Peace Building in the Shadow of War;  
– Peace and Conflict Transformation: an Introduction;  
– Post-Field Placement;  
– Practices of Development;  
– Seminar in Global Studies;  
– Senior Field Course in Global Studies;  
– Special Topics in Global Studies;  
– The Individualized World;  
– Theories in Global Studies;  
– Theories of Development;  
– Tourism and the Globe;  
– War and Conflict: an Introduction. 
10. International agreements 
Wilfrid Laurier University is a current member of the Global Studies Consortium. 
11. Contacts (university, faculty, chairs) 
Global Studies Department 
Faculty of Arts 
Wilfrid Laurier University 
5-120 Alvin Woods Building 
75 University Ave. W. 
Waterloo, ON, N2L 3C5 
Phone: 519-884-0710 x.3968 
Fax: 519-884-8854 
Homepage:http://www.wlu.ca/homepage.php?grp_id=148 
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Part 2. 
UNIVERSITIES WITH GLOBAL STUDIES EDUCATION  
AT MASTER’S AND/OR PHD LEVELS 
Erasmus Mundus Global Studies Consortium 
1. Name of university   Erasmus Mundus Global Studies Consor- 
tium comprises five leading European 
Universities: University of Leipzig, Lon- 
don School of Economics and Political 
Science, Roskilde University, University 
of Vienna, University of Wroclaw. 
2. Year of foundation   2005 
3. Name of faculty where Globalistics is studied Global Studies disciplines are offered on  
the departments of the current consortium's 
members. 
4. Name of program and year of beginning Global Studies – A European Perspective  
(2005) 
5. Number of students   71 
6. Levels of study (undergraduate, postgraduate, PhD)  Postgraduate (MA) 
7. Languages of study   English, German 
8. Short description of program 
It is a two-year program at two different European universities, at each for one academic 
year. Students can specialize in particular areas of globalization research: 
1) at the University of Leipzig on comparative analysis of global entanglements both 
historically and for the present times, focusing on Eastern Europe, Western Europe, East 
Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, Northern Africa and the Middle East, Latin America and Northern 
America; 
2) at the London School of Economics on the economic and social history and analysis of 
economic globalization since around 1400; 
3) at the Roskilde University on development studies, global political economy and global 
governance, political culture and civil society; 
4) at the University of Vienna study of international organizations, global history from the 
year 1500 onwards, as well as area-related analysis of East Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, Central 
Europe and Latin America; 
5) at the University of Wroclaw on the analysis of transformation processes in Central and 
Eastern Europe, security issues, regional cooperation, communications and the media. 
All modules comprise history, cultural, area studies, social or political based approaches 
upon historical and contemporary patterns of globalization and different societal responses, 
towards these processes. 
9. Full description 
Each student needs to complete 11 modules. Scientific disciplines are offered at more than 
five universities. 
Disciplines offered in Leipzig are:  
– Global History, International Studies;  
– Methods for the Study of Globalization;  
– Regions in Globalization;  
– Global Studies Colloquium and Summer School;  
– Academic Writing and Research Skills;  
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– World Orders and Cultural Transfers under the Global Condition. 
Disciplines offered in London are:  
– Economic Change in Global History: Approaches and Analysis;  
– The Development and Integration of the World Economy in the 19th and 20th centuries;  
– Pre-Modern Paths of Growth: East and West Compared, c. 1000–1800; 
– Regions in the Global Economic History;  
– Essay (6,000 words) in Global History;  
– Winter and Summer School;  
– Thesis Discussion, Research Design and Quantitative Methods in Economic History. 
Disciplines offered in Roskilde are:  
– Global Politics, Global Governance, Regionalization and State Sovereignty;  
– Methodological Workshop ‘How to Write a Project’;  
– Global Political Economy + Project;  
– Summer School;  
– Winter School;  
– Global Governance – Europeanization & Globalization;  
– Globalization, Political Culture, Civil Society & Social Movements;  
– Methodological Workshop ‘Comparative Methodology’;  
– Thesis Seminar; International Presentations Colloquium. 
Disciplines offered in Vienna are: 
– Introduction to Global History;  
– Theories of Global History;  
– Methods of Global History;  
– Global History by World Regions;  
– Thematic Aspects of Global History;  
– Winter and Summer School;  
– Theories of Global Study – with emphasis on areas;  
– Methods of Global History – with emphasis on areas;  
– Global History by Regions – specialize in one region;  
– Thematic Aspects of Global History – specialize on one aspect;  
– Research Colloquium. 
Disciplines offered in Wroclaw are: 
– Aspects of Globalization & Regionalization;  
– International Relations;  
– Economic Systems & Political Economy;  
– Transformation Economics, Security & IR;  
– Society & Politics;  
– Research seminar, winter and summer school;  
– Globalization: Selected Issues;  
– Systems in Transition; International Cooperation and Security;  
– Societies in Transition;  
– Research Colloquium. 
Scientific disciplines offered at Non-European partner universities: 
1) Dalhousie: Development/Philosophy of Social Sciences; Environment and Develop-
ment; Comparative Theory; 
2) Macquarie: Globalization and Sustainable Development; The International System; 
Globalization and the North-South Relationship; 
3) Fudan: Modernity in Asia and Europe Compared; Modern Chinese History; Interna-
tional Relations from a Chinese Perspective; 
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4) JNU: Levels of Regional Development in India; Government and Politics in India; 
Social Geography; 
5) UCSB: Global Culture and Religion; Political Economy, Sustainable Development 
and the Environment; Contemporary Globalization; 
6) Stellenbosch: Conflict in Africa; Global Political Economy ; Negotiating Transition; 
7) Addis Ababa: Peace and Security in Africa; Human Rights and Development; New 
Regionalism in Africa. 
The continuous quality of the program is assured through a constant evaluation process by 
its students, and alumni, the teaching and administrative personnel, as well as by external re-
view. 
10. International agreements 
The European Master in Global Studies is maintaining a partnership with the following six 
leading non-European universities: Dalhousie University (Canada), Fudan University (China), 
Jawaharlal Nehru University (India), Macquarie University (Australia), University of Califor-
nia at Santa Barbara (USA), and University of Stellenbosch (South Africa). 
11. Contacts (university, faculty, chairs) 
Global and European Studies Institute 
Faculty of Social Science and Philosophy 
University of Leipzig 
Emil-Fuchs-Strasse 1 
04105 Leipzig 
Germany 
Phone: +49 341-97-302-30 
Fax: +49341-96-052-61 
E-mail: gesi@uni-leipzig.de 
Homepage: http://www.uni-leipzig.de/~gesi/index.php?id=57/ 
Global Studies Curricula and Syllabi 339
Hanyang University, South Korea 
 
1. Name of university Hanyang University 
2. Year of foundation 1939  
3. Name of faculty where Globalistics is studied Research Institute of Comparative  
 History and Culture 
4. Name of program and year of beginning Transnational Humanities (2009) 
5. Number of students 31 
6. Levels of study (undergraduate, postgraduate, PhD) Postgraduate (MA) 
7. Languages of study No information 
8. Short description of program 
The main aim of a program is to train capable transnational intellects by providing a cur-
riculum that crosses the boundaries of nation-states and academic disciplines. 
This is the only graduate program in Korea which employs the transnational paradigm, 
opens up humanistic inquiry and develops free and progressive minds. In addition to the 
Transnational Humanities curriculum, other learning opportunities and support measures are 
provided, including the Transnational Humanities Lecture Series, the Flying University of 
Transnational Humanities (a summer school), cross-registration programs with leading univer-
sities worldwide, internships in international organizations, and scholarships for all students. 
9. Full description 
The postgraduate program in Transnational Humanities entails a flexible process of dis-
covery created together by teachers and students. 
Courses in Transnational Humanities are divided into three categories: Introductory, Fo-
cus, and Seminar and Text Reading. 
Introductory courses are:  
– Introduction to Transnational Humanities; 
– Globalization: Theory and History; 
– Transnational History: Theory and Methodology; 
– Translation and Comparison; 
Media and Narrative in Transnational Perspectives. 
Focus courses are:  
– Transnational Cultural Studies; 
– Nationalism and Transnationalism; 
– Migration and Diaspora; 
– Citizenship and Identity Politics in Global Age; 
– Social Ethnics in Multicultural Society; 
– Border and Area Studies; 
– Archaeology of knowledge 1: History, Literature and Society; 
– Archaeology of knowledge 2: Science, Technology & Medicine. 
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Seminar and Text Reading section includes ‘Seminar: Issues in Transnational Humanities 
1, 2’ and ‘Multilingual Text Reading 1, 2’. 
10. International agreements 
The Research Institute of Comparative History and Culture is the only member of the 
Global Studies Consortium in South Korea. Also it is in a collaborative network with Asia New 
Humanities Net and International Conference of Labour and Social History. 
11. Contacts (university, faculty, chairs) 
Research Institute of Comparative History and Culture 
Hanyang University, Seoul, South Korea 
Phone: +82-2-2220-4624 
Fax: +82-2-2298-0542 
E-mail: shongshrong@gmail.com 
Homepage: http://rich.ac 
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Hitotsubashi University, Japan 
 
1. Name of university Hitotsubashi University  
2. Year of foundation 1920 
3. Name of faculty where Globalistics is studied  Institute for the Study of Global  
Issues 
4. Name of program and year of beginning Global Issues Course (1996) 
5. Number of students No information 
6. Levels of study (undergraduate, postgraduate, PhD) Postgraduate (MA), PhD 
7. Languages of study English, Japanese 
8. Short description of program 
The Global Issues Course aims to equip students with both research and professional skills. 
Its curriculum therefore includes core theoretical and practical courses. The former are required to 
gain a theoretical understanding of modern global problems and processes, while the latter are 
designed to teach useful methods for conducting specific analyses and looking for possible solu-
tions. Students can enroll in both kinds of courses according to their research interests and needs. 
The Global Issues Course is unique and has its features. First of all, the course turns con-
ventional postgraduate sociological education on its head by first identifying concrete issues of 
concern and then trying to unravel the often intricate contexts in which they occur. In order to 
do that, students construct analytical frameworks and look into existing bodies of sociological 
knowledge and research methodology such as they find necessary. Secondly, during their stud-
ies, students are expected to not only theorize about the social problems they are investigating, 
but also to formulate practical solutions for them. Moreover, it is taken into account that many 
of the biggest social problems of our age are occurring in Asia, the Middle East, Africa and 
Latin America. That is why the Institute provides an opportunity for students to free them-
selves from traditional Euro-centric ways of thinking to a necessary degree and be more recep-
tive to the peculiarities of local contexts in their research. 
To conclude, the program follows three basic principles: an issue-focused methodology, 
solution-oriented investigation, a de-Eurocentric approach. 
9. Full description 
The courses offered by the faculty are divided into different blocks: Anthropology, Eco-
nomics, Psychiatry, Political Science, Sociology, Geography, Environmental Science, Televi-
sion Production, Media Studies, and Astronomy. 
10. International agreements 
Institute for the Study of Global Issues is a founding member of the Global Studies Con-
sortium, an international network of graduate teaching programs on global studies. 
11. Contacts (university, faculty, chairs) 
Institute for the Study of Global Issues 
Graduate School of Social Science, Hitotsubashi University 
2-1 Naka Kinitachi, Tokyo 186-8601, Japan 
Phone: +81-42-580-9098, E-mail: KOBAYASHI.Miyuki@r.hit-u.ac.jp 
Homepage: http://isgi.soc.hit-u.ac.jp/ 
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University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA 
 
1. Name of university University of Illinois at Urbana 
 Champaign  
2. Year of foundation 1867 
3. Name of faculty where Globalistics is studied College of Liberal Arts & Sciences, 
 Center for Global Studies 
4. Name of program and year of beginning  Global Studies (International Studies) 
5. Number of students No information 
6. Levels of study (undergraduate, postgraduate, PhD) Postgraduate (MA) 
7. Languages of study English 
8. Short description of program 
Global Studies is an interdisciplinary program of study that provides a strong foundation in 
the analysis of contemporary global issues through coursework, research and experiences in the 
field. The Global Studies program of study was developed in response to the growing demand for 
knowledge, skills, and values to successfully navigate concerns at international and global levels. 
9. Full description 
Program courses include required core courses, as well as topics-based seminars and semi-
nars abroad offered by the Global Studies faculty and faculty from other departments on campus. 
These courses are:  
– Introduction to Global Studies;  
– Undergraduate Open Seminar;  
– Field Work Preparation;  
– Foundations to Global Studies Research;  
– Governance, Development;  
– Global Studies Foundation Seminar;  
– Global Studies Seminar Abroad;  
– International Diplomacy and Negotiation;  
– Research Methods 1;  
– Research Methods 2;  
– Special Topics;  
– Geography of International Conflicts;  
– Natural Disasters;  
– Energy Systems;  
– Resource Conflicts;  
– War, Military Institutions, and Society since 1815;  
– Math Issues in National Security;  
– Nuclear Weapons & Arms Control;  
– Introduction to International Security;  
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– Art, Propaganda, and War;  
– Comparative Political Economy;  
– Ethnic Conflict;  
– The Ethnics of War and Peace;  
– Women in Muslim Societies;  
– Energy & Security;  
– Writing on Technology & Security;  
– Military & Civilian Uses of Nuclear Energy;  
– Seminar on Security. 
10. International agreements  No information 
11. Contacts (university, faculty, chairs) 
College of Liberal Arts & Sciences – Global Studies 
International and Global Studies 
703 S. Wright Street, 3rd Floor 
Champaign, IL 61820 
Phone: (217) 333-0178 
Fax: (217) 265-7555 
E-mail: globalstudies@illinois.edu 
Homepage: http://www.globalstudies.illinois.edu/ 
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Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey, USA 
 
1. Name of university     Rutgers, The State University of 
New Jersey 
2. Year of foundation    1766  
3. Name of faculty where Globalistics is studied Division of Global Affairs 
4. Name of program and year of beginning  Global Affairs (MA),  
Global Affairs (PhD) 
5. Number of students    90 
6. Levels of study (undergraduate, postgraduate, PhD)  Postgraduate (MA), PhD 
7. Languages of study    English 
8. Short description of program  
The Master's degree, with a more practical emphasis, prepares students to work in the pub-
lic and private international sectors, as well as in non-governmental organizations, think-tanks, 
foundations, and media companies focusing on global issues. 
The Ph.D., more academically oriented, is geared towards preparing future scholars eager 
to adopt and cultivate a planetary perspective on global issues from an interdisciplinary and 
multicultural standpoint. The Ph.D. in Global Affairs can also be an excellent track for policy 
jobs at the global level requiring advanced expertise. 
9. Full description of program 
Rutgers University in Newark is the only institution in the United States to offer both Mas-
ter of Science and Doctoral degrees in Global Affairs. The main goal of the graduate Division 
of Global Affairs (DGA) is to provide intellectual and practical training in core areas, particu-
larly in the fields of security, ethics, development and the environment. The program offers its 
ethnically and internationally diverse student population an interdisciplinary and multicultural 
perspective on global issues. 
Cutting across academic fields, DGA brings together faculty from Arts and Sciences (po-
litical science, history, sociology, economics, anthropology and others), the School of Law 
(international law, international organizations, human rights law, comparative jurisprudence), 
the Business School (global political economy, international business and others), the School 
of Criminal Justice, the School of Nursing (in particular global health) and the School of Public 
Affairs and Administration. The program draws on the expertise of both academics and practi-
tioners with a curriculum built around four concentrations: Global Governance, Global Busi-
ness and Economics, Conflict and Human Rights, and Human and Environmental Security. 
10. International agreements 
The program takes part in the Global Studies Consortium, Federation of Balkan American 
Association, FRANCE24 Blok, and Centers for Global Advancement and International Affairs. 
11. Contacts (university, faculty, chairs) 
Division of Global Affairs 
Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey 
177 University Avenue, Room 220A, Conklin Hall, Newark, NJ 07102 
Phone: (973) 353-5585 Homepage: http://dga.rutgers.edu/ 
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University of Pittsburgh, USA 
 
1. Name of university University of Pittsburgh 
2. Year of foundation 1787 
3. Name of faculty where Globalistics is studied Global Studies Center,  
 World History Center 
4. Name of program and year of beginning Global Studies, World History 
 (2012–2013) 
5. Number of students 73 
6. Levels of study (undergraduate, postgraduate, PhD) Postgraduate, PhD 
7. Languages of study English 
8. Short description of program 
Through the graduate and PhD programs, students develop an awareness of major currents 
of global change and the issues it raises, the capacity for effective communication across cul-
tural and linguistic boundaries, and personal adaptability to diverse cultures. 
Programs also encourage students to take advantage of the many international learning op-
portunities available at the University of Pittsburgh. Students are encouraged to enroll in a 
study or service abroad program or participate in an international internship. 
9. Full description 
Global Studies students choose one of the six concentrations – Sustainable Development; 
Global Economy and Global Governance; Changing Identities in a Global World; Communi-
cation, Technology, and Society; Conflict and Conflict Resolution; Global health – and unite it 
with the study of a particular region and a language of that region. 
The courses are offered by various departments and schools across the University. Some 
examples of core courses in Global Studies are listed below: 
1) Sustainable Development concentration: 
– Anthropology of Food;  
– Biocultural Anthropology;  
– Ecology;  
– Geology;  
– Geotechnical Analysis;  
– Global Environmental Politics etc. 
2) Global Economy and Global Governance concentration: 
– Environmental Economics;  
– Economics for Public Affairs;  
– Intermediate Macroeconomics;  
– Intermediate Microeconomics;  
– International Finance;  
– International Marketing etc. 
3) Changing Identities in a Global World concentration: 
– Anthropology of Education;  
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– Cultural Sociology;  
– Marriage;  
– Nationalism;  
– Religion in Early America;  
– Social Movements etc. 
4) Communication, Technology, and Society concentration: 
– Advanced Sociolinguistics;  
– Cross-cultural Communication;  
– Introduction to World Art;  
– Languages of the World;  
– Language, Gender and Society;  
– World Literature in English;  
5) Conflict and Conflict Resolution concentration: 
– American Foreign Policy;  
– Conflict and War Theory;  
– International Organized Crime;  
– Peace Movements & Peace Education;  
– Principles Homeland Security;  
– Terrorism etc. 
6) Global Health concentration: 
– Biopsychology of Health Disparities;  
– Epidemiology Infectious Diseases;  
– Gender and Development;  
– Introduction to Population Problems;  
– Theories of Health Behavior & Health Education. 
10. International agreements 
The World History Center maintains close relations with the Network of Global and World 
History Organizations (NOGWHISTO) and its affiliates, including the World History Associa-
tion, the Asian Association of World Historians, the African Network in Global History, and 
the European Network in Universal and Global History. 
The World History Center and the Global Studies Center both hold a joint membership in 
the Global Studies Consortium. 
11. Contacts (university, faculty, chairs) 
Global Studies Center 
University of Pittsburgh 
University Center for International Studies 
4100 Wesley W. Posvar Hall 
230 South Bouquet Street 
Pittsburgh, PA 15260 
Phone: (412) 648-5085 
Fax: (412) 624-4672 
E-mail: global@pitt.edu 
Homepage: http://www.ucis.pitt.edu/global/ 
World History Center 
University of Pittsburgh, Department of History 
3900 Wesley W. Posvar Hall 
230 South Bouquet Street 
Pittsburgh, PA 15260 
Phone: (412) 624-3073, Fax: (412) 648-9074 E-mail: worldhis@pitt.edu  
Homepage: http://www.worldhistory.pitt.edu/ 
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Sophia University, Japan 
 
1. Name of university Sophia University 
2. Year of foundation 1913 
3. Name of faculty where Globalistics is studied The Graduate School of Global Studies 
4. Name of program and year of beginning Global Studies (2006) 
5. Number of students 59 
6. Levels of study (undergraduate, postgraduate, PhD) Postgraduate (MA, PhD) 
7. Languages of study English, Japanese 
8. Short description of program 
The MA in Global Studies examines world systems, transnational processes, and global-
local interactions from perspectives of anthropology, history, political science, religious studies 
and sociology. Students take two Foundational Courses to acquire theoretical concepts and 
methodological approaches for the study of global phenomena. A range of thematic Elective 
Courses enables students to explore global issues and phenomena from an area-based perspec-
tive that draws on concrete cases in Japan, China, and the rest of Asia. Students proficient in 
Japanese may also choose from a selection of area studies and international relations courses 
taught in Japanese that focus on Southeast Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. Study of 
Japanese and other languages relevant for a student's research and future career is strongly en-
couraged. 
The PhD in Global Studies is designed for the advanced study of specific areas or locales 
in the context of global processes and transnational connections. While the questions and lines 
of inquiry in global studies are interdisciplinary, research and writing agendas emphasize 
methods and concepts from the disciplines of history, political science, and sociology. The 
degree prepares candidates for academic positions in area, international, and global studies 
programs, or for research positions in foundations, NGOs, and companies that need advanced 
analyses of countries and regions in global contexts. 
The doctoral course, which requires a three-year residency, focuses on the writing of a dis-
sertation. While no course work is required, candidates participate in workshops and other pro-
gram activities and may, in consultation with their dissertation supervisor, attend courses. Can-
didates first pass several qualifying exams and then, upon successful defense of a dissertation 
prospectus, proceed on to dissertation research and writing. To ensure close guidance of the 
dissertation, only a few candidates are admitted each year. 
9. Full description 
Academic disciplines in curriculum represent three areas of study: social science (55 per 
cent), humanities (30 per cent), and business studies (15 per cent). MA in Global Studies con-
sists of 37 courses. About a half is cross-listed courses from other graduate programs that con-
ducted in Japanese but readings are mostly or entirely in English. 
The Global Studies courses are:  
– Comparative Politics;  
– Conflicts and Security;  
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– Diplomatic History;  
– Global Culture;  
– Global History;  
– Global Issues;  
– Global Politics;  
– Globalization and Institutional Change;  
– Globalization and Migration;  
– Globalization and Nation States;  
– Globalization and Society;  
– Globalization and Popular Religion;  
– Graduation Project;  
– Introduction to Global Studies 1;  
– Introduction to Global Studies 2;  
– Master's Thesis;  
– Research Guidance;  
– Thesis Guidance;  
– Thesis Seminar. 
The school seeks to train scholars and specialists capable of working effectively in aca-
demia, research and other institutions that tackle global issues. 
10. International agreements 
The Graduate School of Global Studies is a current member of the Global Studies Consor-
tium. 
11. Contacts (university, faculty, chairs) 
Graduate Program in Global Studies 
Sophia University 
7-1 Kioi-cho, Chiyoda-Ku 
Tokyo 102-8554, Japan 
E-mail: d-wank@sophia.ac.jp 
Homepage: http://grad.fla.sophia.ac.jp/ 
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Berlin Graduate School  
for Transnational Studies, Germany 
 
1. Name of university Berlin Graduate School for Transna- 
 tional Studies is a cooperative project  
 of three outstanding scientific institutes  
 and institutions: Free University of Ber- 
 lin, Hertie School of Governance, and  
 Social Science Research Center Berlin. 
2. Year of foundation 2008 
3. Name of faculty where Globalistics is studied Berlin Graduate School  
 for Transnational Studies  
4. Name of program and year of beginning The PhD program at BTS 
5. Number of students 81 
6. Levels of study (undergraduate, postgraduate, PhD)  PhD 
7. Languages of study English 
8. Short description of program 
The program is strategically placed at the intersection of political science, economics, his-
tory, law and sociology, where the most exciting changes and debates in an area of globaliza-
tion and fragmentation take place. 
The PhD program consists of three years of study, starting in September of each year. The 
bulk of the workload for candidates will take the form of independent thesis research. Apart 
from this, all candidates are required to successfully complete content-oriented survey courses, 
colloquia on research methods, and multidisciplinary skills workshops. Candidates will also be 
required to present the results of their research regularly at research colloquia and at academic 
conferences. 
9. Full description 
The course takes 3 years to complete.  
The courses and other academic opportunities offered at BTS are:  
– Colloquium: Research Design;  
– Colloquium: Research in Progress;  
– Colloquium: Research Results;  
– Independent Research on Dissertation Project;  
Methods on Qualitative or Quantitative Research;  
– Survey Course on Transnational Studies;  
– Transferable Skills: English Academic Writing plus Another Transferable Skills Work-
shop;  
– Transferable Skills: Two Different Workshops;  
– Teaching Assistance or Cooperation with a Third Party Funded Project at One of the 
Partnering Institutions. 
Workshops cover methods on quantitative and qualitative research, as well as transferable 
skills. BTS always provides its PhD candidates with the opportunity to indicate further ideas 
for workshops they would be interested in and plans are made accordingly.  
Regular workshops include:  
– Discourse Analysis;  
– English Academic Writing;  
– Interview Techniques;  
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– Qualitative Comparative Analysis;  
University Didactics etc. 
10. International agreements 
Berlin Graduate School for Transnational Studies is currently a member of the Global 
Studies Consortium. Also it hosts an annual PhD workshop in cooperation with Hebrew Uni-
versity of Jerusalem and the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt. 
11. Contacts (university, faculty, chairs) 
Berlin Graduate School for transnational Studies 
Free University of Berlin 
Ihnestr. 26 
14195 Berlin 
Germany 
Phone: +49 (0) 30-838-57-052 
Fax: +49 (0) 30-838-57-096 
E-mail: info@transnationalstudies.eu 
Homepage: http://www.transnationalstudies.eu 
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Part 3 
UNIVERSITIES WITH GLOBAL STUDIES EDUCATION  
AT BACHELOR’S, MASTER’S AND/OR PHD LEVELS 
 
Aarhus University, Denmark 
 
1. Name of university   Aarhus University 
2. Year of foundation   1928 
3. Name of faculty where Globalistics is studied Department of Political Science  
and Government 
4. Name of program and year of beginning Political Science, Social Science 
5. Number of students   No information 
6. Levels of study (undergraduate, postgraduate, PhD) 
The department has the overall responsibility for the Bachelor's and Master's degree 
(cand.scient.pol.) programs in Political Science, the Master's degree (cand.soc.) programs in 
Social Science, and the subsidiary subject programs in Social Science. The department also 
contributes to the Flexible Master of Public Governance (FMOL). 
7. Languages of study   English, Danish  
8. Short description of program 
The program includes two semesters of full time course work, one term in which students 
carry through a project or international internship or follow elective courses, and a final thesis 
written under supervision in the fourth semester. 
The core courses are modern global history, global society, international political economy, 
global justice, international relations and organizations, and international project management. 
9. Full description of program 
The first year of the MA program consists of six core classes, taught over the first two se-
mesters. The first semester comprises Modern Global History, International Political Economy 
and Global Society, which provide the foundation for the second semester classes on Global 
Justice, International Relations and Organizations, and Project Management. 
In the second year, the students are provided with several options. They can choose to put 
into practice the skills and knowledge they acquired in the first year by finding an internship or 
they can continue with their academic track and write a self-researched project paper. Both 
options provide the opportunity for the students to take optional courses in the third semester in 
order to deepen their interest in a certain region or topic. 
An internship is good a way to test one's interest in a variety of career fields and to gain 
practical experience. Not surprisingly, a majority of IS students choose this option. The intern-
ship takes place in an organization with an international focus, ranging from NGOs to embas-
sies to businesses or international think tanks. 
10. International agreements 
Aarhus University has a bilateral agreement with the University of Greifswald, Germany. 
11. Contacts (university, faculty, chairs) 
Department of Political Science and Government 
Aarhus University, BartholinsAllé 7, Dk-8000 Aarhus C 
Phone: +45-871-50000, E-mail: statskundskab@au.dk, Homepage: http://ps.au.dk/en/ 
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Australian National University, ANU, Australia 
 
1. Name of university    Australian National University, ANU 
2. Year of foundation   1946 
3. Name of faculty where Globalistics is studied School of Politics and International  
Relations 
4. Name of program and year of beginning International Relations, Globalization 
5. Number of students   No information 
6. Levels of study (undergraduate, postgraduate, PhD) Undergraduate (BA),  
Postgraduate (MA) 
7. Languages of study   English 
8. Short description of program  
The School of Politics and International Relations has produced path-breaking work on 
political parties, public administration, trade unions, pressure groups, elections and political 
behavior. For many years the School has also focused on Australian and international public 
policy and public sector management and in 2002 was a foundation member of the Australian 
and New Zealand School of Government (ANZSOG). It houses the innovative Australian Na-
tional Internships Program, and also has a successful Washington Internships Program. 
The major areas of research, teaching and postgraduate supervision are: Australian Poli-
tics; Comparative Politics; International Relations; Political Policy; Political Theory. 
9. Full description of program 
Typical courses for the program in International relations are:  
– Aid and Development Policy;  
– Culture and Development;  
– Globalization: Theories, Debates, Issues;  
– History of Globalization;  
– Human Rights and Human Responsibility;  
– International Migration;  
– Migration, Refugees and Development;  
– The Political Economy of Globalization. 
10. International agreements 
Nowadays the school takes part in two internship programs: Australian National Internship 
Program, and Washington Internships Program. 
11. Contacts (university, faculty, chairs) 
School of Politics and International Relations 
Australian National University, Canberra 
Phone: +61-2-612-55-111 Fax: 519-884-8854 
Postal address: 
School of Politics and International Relations 
Australian National University 
Haydon-Allen Building #22, Acton ACT 0200 
Homepage: http://socpol.anu.edu.au/ 
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University of California at Santa Barbara, USA 
 
1. Name of university University of California at Santa Barbara 
2. Year of foundation In 1891 Anna Blake School was established.  
 In the year of 1944 it joined the University  
 of California. 
3. Name of faculty where Globalistics is studied College of Letters & Science 
4. Name of program and year of beginning Global & International Studies  
Program (1999) 
5. Number of students 12–15 graduate students each year 
6. Levels of study (undergraduate, postgraduate, PhD) 
The program has an interdisciplinary major within the Global and International Studies 
Program, a highly successful MA in Global Studies, a PhD emphasis in Global Studies, and 
anticipates implementing a PhD in Global Studies in 2014–2015. 
7. Languages of study English 
8. Short description of program  
The program provides an undergraduate major that is distinctive in its emphasis on trans-
national processes and interactions that bring the world together across traditional national 
boundaries. 
The MA degree is intended to provide an understanding of the economic, political, social, 
and cultural forces that are shaping global organizations. 
Interdisciplinary PhD emphasis in Global Studies allows students to design a course of 
study focused on international and transnational issues, processes and flows. 
9. Full description of program 
The major includes two introductory gateway courses on global history, culture, and ide-
ology on global socioeconomics and politics and is built around three upper-division core 
courses that provide a coherent introduction to global culture and ethnics, global ideologies and 
world order, and global economy and development. It also affords students an opportunity to 
take additional courses offered by other departments and programs in the university: three in 
global issues and three in one particular region of the world (Africa, the Middle East, 
South/Southeast Asia and the Pacific, East Asia, Europe and Eurasia, Latin America, or North 
America). Moreover, it requires 3 years of language study, which can be fulfilled all in one 
language or by taking 2 years of one language and an additional year of a second language. To 
sum up, the Global Studies major provides a well-rounded liberal arts degree that will help 
prepare students for a variety of careers in the international arena. 
The two-year M.A. program combines courses from the social sciences and humanities 
with practical training and real-world experience. Students typically spend the summer of their 
first year and fall quarter of their second year abroad, taking courses and doing internships with 
non-governmental organizations, governmental bodies, or businesses. The program is develop-
ing partnerships with other globally-oriented educational institutions abroad, and a range of 
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international NGOs, for study and intern placements. Students will also take two policy-
oriented workshops designed to simulate real-life decision-making situations. Non-credit work-
shops will also be available for interested students, providing opportunities to learn about such 
practical matters as grant writing and foundation funding, tracking organizational finances, 
information management, and computer-based technologies. 
The curriculum consists of three courses per quarter. The first year includes required 
courses on Organizational Policy and Management, Micro/Macro Economics, International 
Economics, Global Trade and Finance, Transnational Forces and Political Systems, Global 
Governance and World Order, Theories of Intercultural Understanding, and Global Organiza-
tions and Civil Society. Students are also required to take a course on Research Methods in 
Global & International Affairs, participate in a policy analysis and exercise seminar, and attend 
a one-unit seminar that focuses on contemporary issues and internship preparation. 
The second year allows students to choose courses that provide background in particular 
cultural/geographic regions, and focus on a career emphasis in either Global Social and Eco-
nomic Development or Global Culture and Human Rights. Students are also required to take 
courses in an area specialization of their choice: East Asia, South and Southeast Asia, the 
Americas, the Middle East, Africa, or Europe. A course on Managing Development Organiza-
tions, Non-Profits and Other NGOs: Theory and Practice is also offered as an elective.  
The second year culminates with a required policy workshop. 
PhD emphasis students must be enrolled in good standing in one of the following depart-
ments: Anthropology, Communications, Comparative Literature, Education, English, Feminist 
Studies, Film and Media, Geography, History, Political Science, Religion, Sociology. Each 
student receives guidance and mentoring from the faculty as they prepare their dissertations. 
10. International agreements   No information 
11. Contacts (university, faculty, chairs) 
Global & International Studies Program 
University of California 
Social Sciences & Media Sciences Building, 2nd floor 
Mail Code 7065 
Santa Barbara, CA 93106-7065 
Phone: 805-893-46-68 
Fax: 805-893-80-03 
E-mail: webmaster@global.ucsb.edu 
Homepage: http://www.global.ucsb.edu/ 
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The New School, USA 
 
1. Name of university   The New School  
2. Year of foundation   1919  
3. Name of faculty where Globalistics is studied Eugene Lang College  
The New School for Public Engagement 
4. Name of program and year of beginning Global Studies (BA), Global Political 
Economy and Finance (MA) 
5. Number of students   No information 
6. Levels of study (undergraduate, postgraduate, PhD) Undergraduate (BA),  
postgraduate (MA) 
7. Languages of study   English 
8. Short description of program 
Global Studies is offered as a major to undergraduate students at Eugene Lang College and 
the New School for Public Engagement. 
The Global studies major offers unique opportunities for sharing experiences and coursework 
with programs in urban studies, media studies, and environmental studies. Global studies majors can 
combine their degree with one of a number of planned and existing minors (such as Middle East 
studies, religious studies, and gender studies) or, with their advisor's permission, pursue a double 
major. The curriculum is designed to allow undergraduates to study and work at the intersections of 
social sciences (political science, anthropology, sociology, and economics), human rights, and me-
dia. The major can also make up part of a five-year combined bachelor's and master's program lead-
ing to a graduate degree in international affairs, media studies, economics, and other disciplines. 
Experience on the ground is an important aspect of global studies, and the major gives students the 
chance to apply their knowledge in internships and fieldwork in New York and abroad. 
The MA in Global Political Economy and Finance provides students with a sophisticated 
understanding of the world economy in historical context, the political economic analysis of 
the dynamics of contemporary world capitalist society, and state-of-the art tools of political 
economic and financial analysis. 
9. Full description 
The courses capitalize on the expertise of the university's faculties of social science, lan-
guages, media studies, design, management, and urban policy. 
Global Studies subjects offered by Eugene Lang College are: 
– Arabic;  
– Architecture;  
– Anthropology;  
– Anthropology & Archaeology;  
– Art/Design;  
– History;  
– Art/Design History & Theory;  
– Art, Media & Technology;  
– Chinese Mandarin;  
– Communication;  
– Comp, Scoring;  
– Criticism and Writing;  
– Cultural Studies;  
– Dance;  
– Design Strategies;  
– Design Studies;  
– Economics;  
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– Education Studies;  
– Environmental Studies;  
– Fashion Studies;  
– Food Studies;  
– Film;  
– First Year Writing Program;  
– French;  
– German;  
– Global Studies;  
– History;  
– Interdisciplinary Science;  
– Integrated Arts;  
– International Affairs;  
– Italian;  
– Japanese;  
– Jazz;  
– Jazz Music History;  
– Latin;  
– Literary Studies;  
– Literature;  
– Lit Studies: Literature;  
– Lit Studies: Writing;  
– Media Studies;  
– Music;  
– Music History;  
– Philosophy;  
– Photography;  
– Politics;  
– Portuguese;  
– Psychology;  
– Religion;  
– Russian;  
– Sign Language;  
– Sociology;  
– Social Science;  
– Spanish;  
– Special Design Studies;  
– The Arts;  
– Theater;  
– Urban Studies;  
– Visual Studies;  
– Voice and Opera;  
– Wellness;  
– Workshops;  
– Writing;  
– Yiddish. 
Global Studies Courses offered by the New School for Public Engagement are:  
– Africa, Development & Diaspora;  
– Arab Awakening;  
– Collaborative Research Seminar: International Human Rights;  
– Comparative Constitutional Law;  
– CRS: Genocide & Action;  
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– CRS: Refugee Experience;  
– CRS: Skills for Global Change – Environmental Justice and Resource;  
– Conflicts; CRS: the Politics of Immigration in Action;  
– Death and Rebirth: Genocide and Reconstruction in Rwanda;  
– Directed Research;  
– Displacement, Asylum, Migration;  
– Dwelling in Dilemma – Chinese Middle Class and Cities;  
– Economic Crisis and its Global Consequences;  
– Europe Crisis & World Economy;  
– Food, Global Trade & Development;  
– Foundations of Gender Studies;  
– Gender & the Middle East;  
– Global Gender and Sexuality;  
– Global Justice;  
– Global Outlaws – Law and International;  
– Governing the Global;  
– Human Rights and Transitional Justice;  
– Hungering for Opportunities: Food and Migrations;  
– India and China Interactions;  
– International Environmental Governance;  
– Migrant City;  
– Non-Western Approaches;  
– Representing the Global;  
– Social Movements;  
– The Science and Politics of the Atom Bomb;  
– The US and Latin America;  
– Understanding Global Capitalism;  
– War & Conflict in the 21st Century;  
– Whose Heritage: Contested Cultural Sites. 
To sum up, graduates are prepared to pursue international careers in government and international 
organizations, nonprofit management and development, communication media, and education. 
The MA program in Global Political Economy and Finance consists of seven required 
courses and three electives. There is no written or comprehensive examination. The MA degree 
is awarded for successful completion of the required 30 credits.  
The courses offered are:  
– Financial Economics;  
– Financial Markets and Valuation;  
– Graduate Microeconomics;  
– Historical Foundations of Political Economy, Internship;  
– Introduction to Econometrics;  
– Mathematics for Economics;  
– Mentored Research;  
– Principles of Financial Engineering;  
– World Political Economy. 
10. International agreements 
The New School is currently a member of Global Studies Consortium. 
11. Contacts (university, faculty, chairs) 
The New School 
66 West 12th Street, New York, NY 10011 
E-mail: globalstudies@newschool.edu 
Homepage: http://www.newschool.edu/interdisciplinary-ugrad/global-studies.aspx 
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University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, USA 
 
1. Name of university University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill 
2. Year of foundation 1789 
3. Name of faculty where Globalistics is studied FedEx Global Education Center 
4. Name of program and year of beginning International Studies (BA), 
 Global Studies (MA) 
5. Number of students 500 
6. Levels of study (undergraduate, postgraduate, PhD) Undergraduate (BA),  
          postgraduate (MA) 
7. Languages of study English 
8. Short description of program 
Global Studies program offers students the opportunity to develop an appreciation for and 
fuller understanding of the global issues within the context of a diverse, flexible, interdiscipli-
nary curriculum in the tradition of the University's liberal arts focus. In order to do this each 
student is supposed to take a total of 10 courses and must choose a theme and area studies re-
gion in which to concentrate. 
9. Full description 
Courses deal with topics as diverse as the global impact of nineteenth century European 
colonialism; globalization and economic change; migration and diasporas; environment and 
human rights; global health and human reproduction; global and local social movements; and 
technology and patterns of cultural transmission. Such an integrated learning environment in-
cludes courses in modern foreign languages, enabling the student to develop the ability to in-
teract and learn in a foreign environment; courses in a thematic concentration allowing the stu-
dent a framework for developing critical questioning and reasoning skills; and courses with a 
regional focus, encouraging students to develop a fuller awareness of the ways in which global 
forces shape and transform regional political, economic and cultural change. 
There are core courses which are offered by the university's staff: 
– Agriculture, Food and Supply;  
– Anthropological Perspectives on Cultural Diversity;  
– Cultural Geography;  
– Environmental Conservation;  
– Environment and Labor in the Global Economy;  
– Environment and Society;  
– Ethics of Peace, War, and Defense;  
– Gender and Global Change;  
– Geography of the Developing World;  
– Globalizing Organizations;  
– Human Societies;  
– International Communication and Comparative Journalism;  
– International Relations and World Politics;  
– Introduction to Comparative Politics;  
– Introduction to World Music;  
– Language and Nationalism;  
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– Later Islamic Civilization & Modern Muslim Cultures;  
– Literature and Race, Literature and Ethnicity;  
– Local Cultures, Global Forces;  
– Local Places in a Globalizing World;  
– People and Places;  
– Population Problems;  
– Sociology of Politics;  
– Survey of International Development of the Economy;  
– World Art;  
– World Drama;  
– World Literatures in English;  
– World Regional Geography;  
– The World since 1945. 
There are also theme courses and area courses. Theme courses include courses in different 
areas: International Politics, Global Economy, Global Health & Environment, and Transna-
tional Cultures. The block of area courses approved by individual area studies curricula. All 
they have geographical content: Africa, Asia, Latin America, The Middle East, Eastern Europe, 
and Western Europe. 
To conclude, the curriculum in Global Studies lays the groundwork for successful careers 
with an international dimension in a wide range of fields. 
10. International agreements  
The staff is currently in consultation with two existing academic partners, King's college 
and the National University of Singapore, to establish exchange opportunities for students at 
the graduate level. 
11. Contacts (university, faculty, chairs) 
The FedEx Global Education Center 
The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
301 Pittsboro Street 
Chapel Hill, NC 27599 
Phone: (919) 962-5442 
Fax: (919) 962-8485 
E-mail: laram@email.unc.edu 
Homepage: http://globalstudies.unc.edu/ 
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Gilbert AHAMER is localized in multiple working cultures: Academy of Sciences, Uni-
versities, Environmental Administration and International Consulting. His affiliations have 
pushed him to look through ever new lenses. This experience acts as a motivation to en-
able students to tackle a high diversity of perspectives, disciplines and paradigms. 
David BAKER studied his PhD in Big History at Macquarie University in Sydney under 
David Christian. He now teaches Big History at the universities of Amsterdam, Eindhoven, 
and Rotterdam alongside Fred Spier and Esther Quaedackers. His research interests include 
Universal Darwinism, collective learning, the rise of complexity, and demographic-structural 
theory. He is a co-editor of the 2012 International Big History Association (IBHA) Confer-
ence Proceedings, together with Andrey Korotayev, Leonid Grinin, and Esther Quaedackers. 
He is also engaged with the IBHA Publications Committee in setting up a Big History aca-
demic journal. 
Valentina M. BONDARENKO is a Senior Research Professor at the Russian Academy 
of Sciences Institute of Economics, Director of the N. D. Kondratieff International Foun-
dation, the author of the new methodology for cognition of regularities in the human com-
munity development. Her most widely known publications include: ‘Contours of the New 
Methodology for Cognition of Regularities in the Human Community Development’ 
(2002, in Russian); ‘Warfare and International Security: Future Perspective’ (2006); Fore-
casting the Future: A New Paradigm (2008, in Russian); ‘New Methodological Approach 
to Forming Russia Development Strategy’ (2008, in Russian); ‘Innovations, Information 
Society and Long-Term Development Strategy of Russia’ (2009, in Russian); ‘Contours of 
the Economy of the Future and the Present: Two Paradigms of Development’ (2011, in 
Russian); ‘Outlines of the Future or, Are There Any Chances for A Transition to Sustain-
able and Crisis-Free Development?’ (2011, in Russian).  
Alexander N. CHUMAKOV, PhD, Professor, Head of Philosophy Department at Finan-
cial Academy under the Government of Russia, First Vice-President of the Russian Phi-
losophical Society. His professional interests lie in Global Studies, social philosophy, 
global problems and ecology. Among his numerous scholarly publications are the follow-
ing monographs: The Philosophy of Global Problems (1994, in Russian; 1996, in Chi-
nese); Globalization. The Outlines of Integral World (2005, 2nd edition – in 2009, in Rus-
sian); The Essence of Contemporary Globalization (2007, in Russian); Philosophy of 
Globalization. Selected articles (2010).  
Olukayode A. FALEYE is a Lecturer in the Department of History and International Studies, 
College of Humanities, Joseph Ayo Babalola University, Ikeji Arakeji, Osun State, Nigeria. 
Leonid E. GRININ is Research Professor and the Director of the Volgograd Center for 
Social Research, as well as the Deputy Director of the Eurasian Center for Big History & 
System Forecasting and Senior Research Professor at the Institute for Oriental Studies of 
the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow. He is the Editor-in-Chief of the journal Age 
of Globalization (in Russian), as well as a co-editor of the international journals Social 
Evolution & History and the Journal of Globalization Studies. Dr. Grinin is the author of 
more than 360 scholarly publications in Russian and English, including six monographs. 
These monographs include Philosophy, Sociology, and the Theory of History (2007, in 
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Russian); Productive Forces and Historical Process (2006, in Russian); State and Histori-
cal Process (3 vols, 2009–2010, in Russian); Social Macroevolution: World System Trans-
formations (2009, in Russian; with A. Korotayev); Macroevolution in Biological and So-
cial Systems (2008, in Russian; with A. Markov and A. Korotayev); Global Crisis in Ret-
rospective: A Brief History of Upswings and Crises (2010, in Russian; with A. Koro-
tayev); The Evolution of Statehood: From Early State to Global Society (2011); The Cy-
cles of Development of Modern World System (2011, in Russian; with A. Korotayev and S. 
Tsirel); From Confucius to Comte: The Formation of the Theory, Methodology and Phi-
losophy of History (2012, in Russian); Macrohistory and Globalization (2012); Cycles, 
Crises, and Traps of the Modern World-System (2012, in Russian; with A. Korotayev).  
Anthony HOWELL is currently a doctoral candidate at the Geography Department at 
UCLA and holds advanced degrees in both Statistics (UCLA – 2012) and Geography 
(Michigan State University – 2009). Trained as a statistician, urban-economic geographer 
and China specialist, Anthony's research combines applied statistical approaches with the aid 
of GIS techniques and mapping of spatial relationships to develop new empirically-driven 
theoretical frameworks that are capable of informing social and economic policy. His disser-
tation research, supported by a 2012–2013 Fulbright scholarship, is a microeconomic analy-
sis that presents new, critical information highlighting the short- and long-run impacts of 
Chinese industrial policy on innovation, knowledge spillovers and firm performance. Prior to 
enrolling at UCLA, Anthony attended Michigan State University for both undergraduate and 
graduate studies. At MSU, Anthony participated in nine study/research abroad programs that 
provided diverse opportunities to study Spanish and Chinese languages, volunteer with or-
phans and the disabled, intern, and carry out research projects in countries ranging from 
Mexico to Ireland, Czech Republic, United Arab Emirates and China. In summer 2006, An-
thony participated in an undergraduate research opportunity that took him for the first time to 
China, where he examined rural-urban migration patterns at the Chinese Academy of Sci-
ences in Beijing. The culmination of Anthony's experiences in China were life-changing, 
both personally and professionally. Since 2006, Anthony has accumulated two years of ex-
perience living in China, dedicating much of his time to language acquisition, and research-
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Today globalization can be treated as the most important 
global process. It is a multi-faceted phenomenon and in every 
country it has its own image. One can get a truly objective pic-
ture of the rapidly changing and integrating world only through 
a synthesis of all those particular visions. In the present antholo-
gy one can find perceptions of globalization by a number of fa-
mous scholars from different countries of the world (Ervin Laszlo, Roland Robertson, 
Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, Randall Collins, Christopher Chase-Dunn, William Thompson and 
others), but one can also get to know rather peculiar visions of globalization by the Rus-
sian scientists. 
The volume is entitled Globalistics and Globalization Studies. Globalistics may be re-
garded as a sort of systemic and more or less integrated ‘core’ within Global Studies. The 
anthology consists of four parts presenting a wide range of views on the meaning of the 
contemporary epoch, the past and the future of some important global processes. Part 1. 
Historical Dimension. Part 2. Globalistics, Global Studies and Models. Part 3. Trends, 
Risks, and Problems. Part 4. Perspectives and the New World Order. 
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This is the second issue of the new series titled Globalistics 
and Globalization Studies. Globalistics may be regarded as a sort 
of systemic and more or less integrated ‘core’ within Global 
Studies. At present Global Studies function in two main dimen-
sions – in the research of global political, economic, cultural and 
social processes, on the one hand, and in the realm of teaching – 
manifesting themselves in the creation of various Global Studies programs and courses for 
university students who learn to see the world in its entirety and variety. The second di-
mension is immensely important as the contents of such programs and courses may deter-
mine how the world will be comprehended by those people who may decide its fate in a 
decade or two. This dualistic nature of Global Studies has determined the general direction 
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of our anthology that comprises both the theoretical dimension of Global Studies and their 
application to the teaching process. 
The anthology consists of three parts presenting a wide range of views on the meaning 
of the contemporary epoch, the past and the future of some important global processes as 
well as problems and successes in the teaching process of Global Studies. Part 1. Global-
ization in Historical Retrospective. Part 2. Globalistics, Global Studies, and Global Proc-
esses. Part 3. Teaching Global Studies.  
In the present anthology one can find perceptions of globalization by a number of fa-
mous scholars from different countries of the world (Ervin Laszlo, Christopher Chase-
Dunn, and others), but one can also get to know rather peculiar visions of globalization by 
Russian scientists and educators. 
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According to the working definition of the International Big 
History Association, ‘Big History seeks to understand the inte-
grated history of the Cosmos, Earth, Life and Humanity, using 
the best available empirical evidence and scholarly methods.’ In 
recent years Big History has been developing very fast indeed. 
Big History courses are taught in the schools and universities of 
several dozen countries. Hundreds of researchers are involved in studying and teaching 
Big History. The unique approach of Big History, the interdisciplinary genre of history 
that deals with the grand narrative of 13.8 billion years, has opened up a vast amount of 
research agendas. Big History brings together constantly updated information from the 
scientific disciplines and merges it with the contemplative realms of philosophy and the 
humanities. It also provides a connection between the past, present, and future. Big His-
tory is a colossal and extremely heterogeneous field of research encompassing all the 
forms of existence and all timescales. Unsurprisingly, Big History may be presented in 
very different aspects and facets. In this volume the Big History is presented and discussed 
in three different ways. In its first part, Big History is explored in terms of methodology, 
theories of knowledge, as well as showcasing the personal approach of scholars to Big 
History. The second section comprises such articles that could clarify Big History's main 
trends and laws. The third part of this book explores the nature of teaching Big History as 
well as profiling a number of educational methods. 
This volume will be useful both for those who study interdisciplinary macroproblems 
and for specialists working in focused directions, as well as for those who are interested in 
evolutionary issues of Astrophysics, Geology, Biology, History, Anthropology, Linguis-
tics and other areas of study. More than that, this edition will challenge and excite your 
vision of your own life and the exciting new discoveries going on around us! 
